

KEEPING THE PEACE

**ACPO
Manual of Guidance**

Public Order

Standards, Tactics and Training



CENTREX
DEVELOPING POLICING EXCELLENCE

March 2004

RESTRICTED

KEEPING THE PEACE

**ACPO
Manual of Guidance**

Public Order Standards, Tactics, and Training Manual

March 2004

ACPO Public Order Working Group

RESTRICTED

Copyright

© Centrex (Central Police Training and Development Authority) 2004

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, modified, amended, stored in any retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior written permission of Centrex (Central Police Training and Development Authority) or its representative.

Enquiries Telephone 01256 602640

Contents

PUBLIC ORDER STANDARDS, TACTICS, AND TRAINING MANUAL	3
INTRODUCTION	9
PART ONE: NATIONAL STANDARDS AND DEFINITIONS	13
1. NATIONAL PUBLIC ORDER DOCTRINE	15
2. NATIONAL PUBLIC ORDER POLICY GUIDANCE.....	16
3. PUBLIC ORDER POLICY.....	18
4. RESOURCES AND EQUIPMENT	19
PART TWO: LEVEL 3 & 2 TACTICS AND TACTICAL APPLICATION	49
5. TACTICS DESCRIPTION (LEVEL 3).....	51
6. TACTICS DESCRIPTION (LEVEL 2).....	74
7. TACTICAL APPLICATION AND OPTIONS.....	115
PART THREE: FURTHER OPERATIONAL TACTICS AND POLICY	129
8. ACPO GUIDANCE AND POLICY.....	132
9. ADDITIONAL OPERATIONAL TACTICS	163
10. EXTERNAL AGENCY GUIDANCE	224
PART FOUR: PUBLIC ORDER TRAINING ISSUES	227
11. PUBLIC ORDER TRAINING POLICY GUIDANCE.....	229
12. TRAINING, HEALTH, AND SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS	233
13. PSU BRIEFING - PRINCIPLES	239
14. CROWD BRIEFING	240
15. PUBLIC ORDER TRAINING SAFETY INSTRUCTIONS	241
16. PUBLIC ORDER TRAINING PREPARATION SAFE WARM UP AND STRETCH.....	242
PUBLIC ORDER TACTICS TRAINING RISK ASSESSMENT - AIDE MEMOIRE	245
PUBLIC ORDER TACTICS TRAINING - PROCEDURES & SAFE SYSTEM OF WORK	255
PROCEDURES & SAFE SYSTEM OF WORK	257
UPDATE/NEW TOPICS.....	281
INDEX	283

FOREWORD

The purpose of this Manual is to provide guidance on the tactics and standards approved by the Association of Chief Police Officers in relation to the discipline referred to ordinarily as 'Public Order'. It is essentially the tactical complement to ACPO's strategic document 'Keeping the Peace'.

As with so much in policing 'Public Order' defies a simplistic definition covering as it does a range of policing activities including the most solemn, the most joyous and the most dangerous events that our communities may be involved with. Without doubt the proper maintenance of order in those communities and the preservation of the peace are core activities for the police service.

This Manual is not intended to be the final word in public order tactics - which would be both presumptuous and impossible. It is meant to identify the best of our current knowledge, set standards and give advice - it will therefore need to be changed as the challenges facing the police service and its response develop. To fail to do so would be a corporate dereliction of duty.

As such it seeks to provide authoritative standards and guidance for Forces and officers involved in training, planning for, commanding and reviewing events that are covered by its scope. It does not represent a straightjacket for Commanders; equally it may not always be the only answer - Commanders should be informed by it in making their judgements - it must be a support, not a hindrance.

As must be everything the police service does, it has been tested for legal, diversity and human rights compliance. It is owned - on behalf of ACPO - by the Public Order Working Group, who are responsible for maintaining its currency. It is complemented by a number of detailed guidance documents that are specific to particular issues and a training programme. This Manual has been produced as an ACPO (Public Order Working Group) project with enormous assistance from the Uniform Operations Support Team (Public Order) within the National Centre for Policing Excellence (NCPE) of Centrex. The individuals there have worked extremely hard to pull together and consolidate the many examples of thoroughly excellent work being done across the whole of the service. It has been a vast task - the service is grateful to them and the various people, who have supported, guided and audited the work.

It is not the last word on the subject and the ACPO (Public Order Working Group) is tasked to maintain its currency, the whole service has a part to play in helping with that.

Nigel Yeo
Assistant Chief Constable
Lead - ACPO Public Order Working Group

HUMAN RIGHTS STATEMENT

Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) provides that the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms expressed in it extends to the prohibition of discrimination. In the application of any policies, strategies, tactics or operations contained in this guide, the police service will comply with the principles of ECHR .

Strategies and policies contained within this guide which could interfere with an individual's rights, have been identified as necessary for the following reasons:- preventing crime and disorder, public safety; and protecting the rights and freedoms of others.

It is inherent within this guide that there is a potential to engage Articles 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10 & 11 of the Human Rights Act 1998, thus interference with an individual's rights.

In each and every case where a recommendation has been made or good practice given, it is made with the strongest legal basis, with actions being proportionate, with the least intrusive and the least damaging option chosen.

LEGAL STATUS

As the title of this Manual suggests it is for the guidance of Chief Officers, Operational Commanders, Tactical Advisors and Tactical Trainers in carrying out their duty to provide appropriate policies, training, planning and advice. Such guidance is required by the Police Service to ensure appropriate and proportionate responses to Public Order Incidents as part of their operational duties.

The variable nature of public order policing, along with the maintenance of normality is so diverse that it will never be possible to document guidance to cover every circumstance or eventuality. For this reason, there will always be occasions when individual officers resort to tactics or techniques not described in the Manual.

In such circumstances, the actions of the officer will not necessarily be wrong or unlawful, provided that they acted reasonably and within the law. The organisation and individual(s) concerned must be prepared to account for their decisions and to show that they were justified in doing what they did. In particular, Chief Officers may be required to justify any decision(s) or action(s) taken, when facing legal and/or civil proceedings.

INTRODUCTION

This Manual complements ACPO's Manual of Guidance on Keeping the Peace, in that it additionally signposts considerations for Forces in developing the tactical delivery of public order policing operations and tactical training programmes.

This Manual has been developed as a 'living document', therefore any good practice, areas for development and new innovation identified by Forces through operational and training experience may be considered for subsequent inclusion in future updates of this publication.

What is its status?

The Public Order Tactics, Training and Standards Manual is an ACPO sponsored document, which will supersede the current Public Order Tactical Trainers Manual, as well as incorporating identified good practice, use of equipment and new tactics developed nationwide. The new guide will complement the ACPO Manual of Guidance on Keeping the Peace.

It should be read in conjunction with:

- HMIC Thematic inspections and guidance on good practice
- Home Office Circulars in relation to crime and disorder, public safety and public order management
- ACPO and Force policy documents.

It is a central reference providing a framework of standards and advice relating to tactical awareness and tactical deployment. It is aimed at those involved in the management and training of officers involved in public safety and public order policing.

Who is it for?

Persons who require an understanding of the framework for the management and training in public order policing particularly:

- Gold, Silver and Bronze Commanders
- Tactical Advisors
- Planners
- Training Managers and Tactical Trainers and designers.

What does it do?

It will provide a link between the strategic principles of the Manual of Guidance on Keeping the Peace, operational application of tactics and the training required by police staff for such events.

The principles of this Manual will be underpinned by legislation and conventions, for example, the European Convention on Human Rights and the law relating to the use of force.

This will be supported by the provision of national standards associated with the structure and identification of Police Support Units, associated roles and training related to public order policing therefore enhancing commonality and understanding across the country.

The Manual will include a cross section of further tactics to be considered for use within an operational environment, where appropriate.

It is intended to encapsulate the development of good practice, further tactics and issues related to Operational Policing.

What does it not do?

This document is not an exhaustive solution to tactical application and training. It is not intended to restrict individual innovation within the general principles of this document.

It does not replace the need for the correct selection and provision of specialist training as identified by individual services.

Glossary

BTP	British Transport Police	OSM	Operational Support Medic
CMS	Common Minimum Standards	PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
EGT	Evidence Gathering Team	PSDB	Police Science Development Branch
GRA	Generic Risk Assessment	PUWER	Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998
FIT	Forward Intelligence Team	POLO	Public Order Liaison Officer (Force link to uniformed operational support within NCPE)
HCEO	High Court Enforcement Officer	POPS	Public Order Policing Section
IEDs	Improvised Explosive Devices	PNICC	Police National Information and Co-ordination Centre
KTP	Keeping the Peace	PSP	Personal Safety Programme
MDP	Ministry of Defence Police	PSSO	Police Skills and Standards Organisation
MOE	Method of Entry	PSUs	Police Support Units
		PTC	Police Training Centres
NCPE	National Centre for Policing Excellence	RIO	Rail Incident Officer
NPOIU	National Public Order Intelligence Unit	RIPA	Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000
NSLEC	National Specialist Law Enforcement Centre	TTEWG	Tactics, Training and Equipment Working Group (Sub-group of ACPO Public Order Working Group)
		UKAEAC	United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority Constabulary

:

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

**PART ONE:
NATIONAL STANDARDS
AND DEFINITIONS**

Contents Part One - National Standards and Definitions

1. NATIONAL PUBLIC ORDER DOCTRINE	15
2. NATIONAL PUBLIC ORDER POLICY GUIDANCE.....	16
NATIONAL PUBLIC ORDER STRUCTURE MODEL	17
3. PUBLIC ORDER POLICY	18
4. RESOURCES AND EQUIPMENT	19
DEFINITIONS OF PSU LEVELS	19
DEFINITION OF A PSU	20
NATIONAL PUBLIC ORDER DRESS CODES	22
PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (PPE)	23
WORK EQUIPMENT.....	25
BATONS / SHIELDS.....	25
CHOICE OF SHIELDS	28
BATONS	29
WATER BOTTLES	29
FIRE EXTINGUISHERS.....	29
OPERATIONAL SUPPORT MEDIC (OSM)	30
EVIDENCE GATHERING TEAMS (EGTS)	32
FORWARD INTELLIGENCE TEAMS (FITS)	34
LOGISTICS OFFICER	37
WELFARE ISSUES	38
IDENTIFICATION MARKING OF PUBLIC ORDER HELMETS	40
IDENTIFICATION OF OFFICERS (ROLE AND RANK).....	43
COLOUR CODES FOR ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN PUBLIC ORDER	43
COMMUNICATIONS.....	44
NATIONAL MUTUAL AID CALL-SIGNS	44
PSUS.....	45
CONTINGENT COMMANDER	45
SPECIALIST AID	46
AIRWAVE.....	47

1. NATIONAL PUBLIC ORDER DOCTRINE


The National Public Order Doctrine Model illustrates how the definitive ACPO Manuals of Guidance 'Keeping the Peace' and 'Public Order Standards, Tactics and Training', as well as national public order training programmes underpin Public Order Policing in the UK.

The principle of this model, (based on the experiential learning cycle) is that the development of a policing strategy is supported by the delivery of a suitable tactical plan. Both these processes are further supported by the implementation of appropriate training programmes for public order Commanders, advisors and practitioners.

The three parts to this doctrinal approach should complement each of the others fully. This principle should be considered when Forces are developing new approaches or initiatives, based upon an identified operational or training need, e.g. the development of a new public order tactic should endorse those principles outlined in authoritative guides, as well as being supported by a suitable training programme.

The ACPO Manuals, authoritative national publications and guidelines, and good practice guides should be used in developing local policy, police operational plans and training practice. This will further encourage the development of national standards in public order, the sharing of good practice, and operational expertise between Forces.

NATIONAL PUBLIC ORDER DOCTRINE MODEL



2. NATIONAL PUBLIC ORDER POLICY GUIDANCE

It is important for the Association of Chief Police Officers Public Order business area to have a clear overview of current and emerging issues impacting upon this area, to enable clear policy guidance to be developed.

The Uniform Operations Support Team (Public Order) within the National Centre for Policing Excellence (NCPE) of Centrex has an important role in supporting ACPO and the Home Office in formulating policy and practice in this area.

Reproduced below is an organisational chart, illustrating the national public order structure, including links and relationships, and how Forces and other stakeholders should interact in sharing knowledge and developing new policy/practice.


This principle is reinforced by Sections 6 and 7 of the Police Reform Act 2002 (regulation of equipment and regulation of procedures and practices). These sections provide clear directions to organisations such as ACPO and the Central Police Training and Development Authority (Centrex) in consulting with the service and making recommendations to the Secretary of State, for Forces to adopt certain equipment or operational practices.

The principles this document describes have been developed so as to ensure that, where issues are brought to the attention of NCPE and ACPO for consideration, they will be subject to review and inclusion in this publication. It may be deemed unnecessary for some issues to be included in the Manual, in which case any guidance or good practice recommendations may be circulated separately.

It should be noted that access to good practice guidance and information can be obtained through NCPE. This includes access to the Genesis Database (available on the Police National Network/Criminal Justice Xtranet system), and operational support, including a good practice information guide, operational support and consultancy services.

National Public Order Structure Model

National Public Order Structure



3. PUBLIC ORDER POLICY

Operational Requirements

It is incumbent upon Forces to ensure that their policies cover the requirement to provide competent officers trained to deal with Operational Incidents within each Force and region, which includes the need for Bronze, Silver and Gold Commanders, planners, tactical advisors, Police Support Unit officers and associated specialist support roles.

After the completion of Foundation Training all probationers are trained to Level 3, as defined within this Manual, as a basic pre-requisite to being deployed on operational duties. It is recommended that Forces complete a training needs analysis in order to fulfil the need to train Operational Officers to this level, thereby ensuring a basic level of competence.

As directed within the ACPO Guide on 'Keeping the Peace', all Forces are required to train officers to meet mutual aid commitments to a Common Minimum Standard Level 2 trained officers. In order to meet both inter-Force collaboration or any requests for support from the Police National Information and Co-ordination Centre (PNICC). Level 2 officers must be able to complete all tactics in line with the national standards to further support inter-Force collaboration when dealing with public disorder.

Forces should clearly identify how they will meet the CMS requirements, at the same time meeting local operational needs. It is the responsibility of Chief Officers to ensure that the threats faced by their Force, (within operational policing and the level of risk) is evaluated. This should show that a clear audit trail is available, showing the number of Operational Officers to be trained at Levels 1, 2, and 3, thereby assisting in effective risk management, whilst showing the justification behind the decisions made.

Part Four (4) of this Manual contains details of the training, officers should have attended and maintained their competence in, in meeting the requirements of that role. Additional training requirements for additional specialist roles included on this Manual are highlighted within the relevant sections, as well as a summary in Part 4 *page 228*.

Mutual Aid Commitments

The new approach to the provision of mutual aid was formulated by the ACPO Public Order Working Group, in order to identify a method by which the service would determine its mutual aid requirements, at both national and Force level. The banding mechanism allows for a practical and flexible approach ensuring appropriate and proportionate assistance, whilst providing an indication of call out time for the first PSU. NCPE Uniform Operations Support can provide full details on current national Mutual Aid requirements.

4. RESOURCES AND EQUIPMENT

Officers must not be considered as **Level 3** trained unless they have completed the components detailed in this publication relating to Level 3. Chief Officers must ensure that officers are competent to carry out their duties in accordance with appropriate Health and Safety legislation, so far as is reasonably practicable, prior to deployment.

Officers must not be considered as **Level 2** trained unless they have completed the components detailed in this publication relating to Level 2. If an officer fails to complete the minimum level of refresher training, as prescribed in Part Four of this Manual, then that officer is not qualified. However, it is generally accepted that individuals do not lose psychomotor skills overnight, although they are likely to diminish over time. Chief Officers must ensure that there are appropriate measures in place to maintain officers' continued competence for the roles they are required to perform. Where an officer has fallen outside the re-qualification period, they should not normally be used in a Level 2 capacity until suitable training has been provided.

Definitions of PSU Levels

Level 3

Operational officer(s) who are non-PSU officer(s) with an awareness of public order issues, and trained in foot cordons tactics for dealing with non-violent protest in traditional uniform, see 'Public Order Training Issues' *Part Four* page 228.

Level 2

Officers who are trained to Level 3 and additionally in Public Order Tactics to Level 2 Tactics, equipped and issued with full Personal Protective Equipment, in order that Forces are able to fulfil their Mutual Aid Commitments, see 'Public Order Training Issues' *Part Four* page 228.


Level 1

Officers who are trained and equipped to Level 2, receive regular refresher training, and who may be trained in additional specialist tactics, relevant to any perceived threat within their own Force area or under any regional agreement. They may be member of a full or part time team, e.g. Tactical Support Groups, Operational Support Unit, or currently competent Nationally Approved Tactical Trainers.

Definition of a PSU

A Police Support Unit (PSU) is a numerically fixed body of officers equipped and trained to Level 2. Where trained in specialist tactics there will need to be a clear audit trail for co-operation and co-ordination between Forces should those tactics be deployed.

The basic formation of the unit is shown below:



*** The provision of Operational Support Medics within the above structure is included to ensure that there is effective emergency advanced first aid support, in order to meet any duty of care requirements for both the public and police officers, in support of any policing operations.**

The provision of appropriate emergency first aid during the 'Platinum Ten Minutes' of medical treatment will assist in reducing the impact of any serious injuries sustained during policing operations.

Should an **operations specific risk assessment and local protocols** indicate that the provision of this level of medical support may be provided by the ambulance service, then the need to provide operational support medics may be reduced.

It is imperative that the Commanders risk assessment includes the provision of first aid support and that any decision not to include this aspect is documented.

Forces should be aware that in the event of any Mutual Aid, Operational Support Medics may be required to support PSUs. Therefore the definition of OSMs within this Manual will be

RESTRICTED

used to ensure common understanding, standards, and meaning when requesting such resources.

Drivers will need to be qualified to drive the appropriate vehicle in line with ACPO Guidelines. They should be qualified to Level 2 of Public Order Tactics. However, Forces must ensure that their drivers have received the relevant training, information and instruction in order to carry out this role when deployed in disorder situations.

National Public Order Dress Codes

This section details dress codes to be adopted by Public Order Levels 1, 2 and 3 trained officers deployed within the public order operation.

The decision on the appropriate dress codes as a control measure to reduce the risks to officers, will need to be recorded in relevant Risk Assessments and/or decision logs.

The wearing of Force issue 'body armour' that is 'mandatory' or 'discretionary' (or as a result of an individual's assessment of the risks involved) should be in line with Force policies and Procedures.

Forces will ensure that clothing worn under fire retardant overalls provides an effective thermal barrier against heat transfer, whilst ensuring that it minimises the effect of heat exhaustion and dehydration in officers.

Levels of Dress Codes

Code 1

A Police Support Unit being deployed wearing full personal protective equipment. (Should a Force provide additional fire retardant clothing and the appropriate risk assessment shows the need, then these items **MUST** be worn).

Code 2

A Police Support Unit being deployed wearing Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), (with immediate access to NATO Helmets, but with police issue helmet/hat being worn). Fluorescent jacket/tabard worn over the equipment if required.

Code 3

Police Support Unit being deployed in normal operational uniform wearing Force issue protective boots, with immediate access to Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). (The wearing of additional items of personal protective equipment may be appropriate).

The decision on wearing high visibility clothing is at the discretion of Operational Commander(s) in line with the appropriate specific risk assessment.

However, high visibility clothing must NOT be worn when officers are deployed in Code 1, unless it has flame retardant properties.

Dependent on the results of the relevant Risk Assessments Commanders/Supervisors may deploy officers wearing any item(s) of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) that is operationally necessary or appropriate to reduce risk.

Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

The Personal Protective Equipment at Work Regulations (PPE) gives employers an absolute duty to provide PPE to employees where risks cannot be controlled by other means. The Police (Health and Safety) Regulations require this provision to be complied with so far *as reasonably practicable* where the characteristics of the policing activity are such that compliance would conflict with the exercise of police powers or performance of police duties. Although this does not remove the need for adequate Risk Assessment and planning for Police operations it does allow Forces a degree of flexibility in providing contingency plans directed at meeting any potential escalation in tension.

PPE is defined as all equipment designed to be worn or held by a person at work to protect against one or more risks and any addition or accessory designed to meet this objective.

It is seen as the least favourable option in the hierarchy of control measures; it should only be used as a means of control as a last resort where other methods have not already adequately controlled the particular hazard.

Employers must provide suitable PPE to his/her employees where this is necessary and appropriate.

In deciding as to whether PPE is suitable Forces should consider if it is:

- Appropriate for the risk(s) involved and the conditions where exposure may occur.
- Takes account of the ergonomic requirements and state of health of the person who may wear it.
- Able to fit all wearers correctly.
- Effective to prevent or adequately control the risk(s) involved without increasing overall risk, so far as is reasonably practicable.

Any assessment will need to examine, where more than one item of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) is required, that the items are compatible and continue to be effective against the risk(s).

If Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) is found to be necessary an assessment must be made to determine whether the equipment intended is suitable.

This assessment must include:

- Assessment of any risks(s) which have not been avoided by other means.
- Definition of the characteristics required of the personal protective equipment in order to be effective against the risk(s) identified, taking into account any risks which the equipment itself may create.
- Comparison of the characteristics of the personal protective equipment available with the characteristics identified above.
- Any such assessment must be reviewed, and changed if necessary, if there is reason to suspect it is no longer valid or there have been any significant changes in matters to which it relates.

RESTRICTED

All Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) provided must be maintained, replaced or cleaned as required and kept in an efficient working order and in good repair. Forces must take reasonable steps to ensure that Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) provided is used for the purpose it was designed for. To support this, officers should be provided with appropriate training, information and instruction in the use and maintenance of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). This should include information on Force fault and replacement reporting procedures to ensure that where required, the availability of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) is maintained. Forces should also ensure that training includes the risk(s) the equipment will assist to avoid and guidance on the purpose and manner in which the equipment is to be used and stored.

Officers provided with Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) must also be provided with adequate storage facilities for it when it is not in use. It is incumbent on officers and support staff to take reasonable steps in ensuring that such equipment is returned to the storage facility provided. This will assist in maintaining Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) in a satisfactory and operational condition.

Work Equipment

The Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998 (PUWER) applies to the provision and use of all work equipment, including machinery and other equipment.

The Police (Health and Safety) Regulations 1999 extended the provisions of PUWER to include equipment used by the police for arrest, restraint, self defence or as deterrent equipment, including:

- Batons
- Handcuffs
- Firearms

Forces should ensure that the main provisions of the regulations appropriate to equipment in use in the Police Service are covered within Force Policy and Procedures.

With the key points for consideration being as follows:

- Employers must ensure that work equipment, related to tactical policing, is suitable for the purpose for which it is used or provided, having regard to working conditions in which the equipment is being used.

Batons / Shields

Maintenance and Inspection

All equipment must be maintained in good working order and in an efficient state of repair. Where there is a maintenance log for any equipment, the log must be kept up to date, which would need to be supported by appropriate inspection, record keeping and competence of the persons completing any inspection of equipment.

Where the work equipment is likely to involve a specific risk to health or safety, the following should be noted:

- Use of that work equipment must be restricted to those given the task of using it.
- Only persons specifically designated who have received adequate training to carry out this work must perform repairs, modification or maintenance - ***example - persons trained by the manufacturer and deemed competent must carry out maintenance of Batons and Handcuffs.***

Information, Instructions and Training

Forces must make available adequate Health and Safety information and, where appropriate, written instructions regarding use and storage of the equipment. This information must also be made available to supervisors and managers. Forces should ensure that storage facilities meet with manufacturer guidelines.

Forces must also ensure that supervisors, managers and users of work equipment have received adequate training for the purposes of Health and Safety to include use of the equipment, any

risks associated with its use, together with any relevant precautionary measures, such as emergency procedures and specific risks.

Guidelines for the Storage and Inspection of Polycarbonate Shields at Police Training Centres

Polycarbonate is an extremely tough, transparent thermoplastic material. It is sensitive to damage in the form of nicks, scratches, notches and other indentations. It is also sensitive to a phenomenon known as 'Environmental Stress Cracking', whereby the protective qualities of the material will fail if it is placed under great stress, especially if the stress is concentrated in a small area and/or combined with the action of solvents/petrol.

Other factors, which affect the material, include contact with metal edges because the metal acts as a stress concentrator, and the drilling of holes into the material especially if they are too closely spaced. The number of holes must be kept to a minimum and must be machined according to the manufacturer's specifications. Where metal bolts have been used to attach anything to the polycarbonate material, the metal threads are not to be in contact with the side of the hole and bolt is not to be over-tightened. Both of these circumstances encourage stress concentrations in the material. Some grades of polycarbonate are susceptible to ageing/ultra violet degradation which causes yellowing of the surface, but does not significantly affect the level of protection offered by the material.

These notes lay down a few simple guidelines for the storage of polycarbonate shields in order to ensure that they maintain their protective characteristics as long as possible. The points to look for during inspections reflect the types of damage to or condition of a shield, which indicate the presence of a weakness in the polycarbonate material. Such a weakness may endanger the shield carrier. The maximum shelf life of a shield will vary according to the amount of usage it has had. A shield, which has not been used, can be stored indefinitely if the storage guidelines are adhered to.

Storage Guidelines

When storing polycarbonate shields the following guidelines are to be followed:

- Follow the appropriate manufacturer's instructions where they are available.
- Store shields away from petrol or other solvent vapours.
- Store shields used for petrol bombing training in a separate place to others. (Once shields have been used in petrol bombing training they should not be used for any other type of Public Order Training within their lifetime).
- Store shields in racks to reduce unnecessary stress due to the weight of other shields.
- Store shields in a cool dry environment.
- Store shields away from exposure to direct sunlight.

Inspection Guidelines

In order to ensure maximum safety in the use of polycarbonate shields at Police Training Centres (PTC), the shields should be individually inspected before or after use on a regular basis.

The following points are to be noted:

- Where the polycarbonate shields surface has been marked with paint or any other solvent based material it will be weakened.
- Holes in the shields must be inspected for rough edges and poor machining (especially new shields).
- Metal bolts passing through the polycarbonate material are to be inspected to ensure that the metal is not touching the shield.
- Metal bolts passing through the polycarbonate material are to be checked to see if they have been over tightened.
- The surface and outer edges of the shields should be checked for nicks, deep scratches, notches, indentations and any cracks that might be starting to form.
- The curves and folds in the polycarbonate material should be inspected for small bubbles inside the material (these are indicative of problems in the manufacturing process).
- Shields used for petrol bombing training have to be examined very carefully. Their life is severely limited by contact with petrol and heat.

Action To Be Taken When Shields Are Damaged

Any damage to or potential weakening of a shield found during inspection indicates a greater than normal risk of potential failure in the protective properties of the article. The shield should be withdrawn from service completely.

The following information should be recorded by the nominated officer for all shields:

- Shield manufacture's name.
- Date of supply to PTC.
- Brief details of type of usage.
- Details of damage.
- Shield disposal details.

The information should be maintained centrally within Forces in order to assist Forces in completing Risk Assessments and subsequent equipment selection. This information should also be available for Public Order Liaison Officers within Forces to further develop the identification of hazards and good practice.

Remember if there is any doubt about the condition of the shield - **DO NOT USE IT, REMOVE IT!**

Choice of Shields

As most serious disorders will encompass a range of situations where containment, dispersal and arrest are all considered necessary, then consideration must be given to the proportion of shield units, shields and non-shield officers, which will permit all those options.

The characteristics of individual shields for each of the roles are detailed as follows:

Long Shields

Range in height from 167 - 183cm tall; 33cm wide, weighing approximately 7.65kg.

Advantages	Disadvantages
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provides a sturdy and effective protective screen of protection from hand thrown missiles and petrol bomb attack • Best suited to the role of containment of crowds • May be used to slowly gain and/or hold ground • May be used to provide cover for short / intermediate shield units pending their deployment • May be used to secure doors and stairways within buildings • Flexibility of the shield allows missiles (dependent on the structure and size) to bounce off • Transparency allows for some visibility 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The weight and size of the shield increases the Manual Handling hazards to officers • Encourages a defensive, predictable and static response by police • Tends to increase the level of risk due to increased bombardment from the crowd • Inherent lack of speed inhibits early resolution

Intermediate Shields

A number of shapes and designs are available including those, which are rectangular and ovoid. The shield is seen as a compromise between the long shields increased Manual Handling hazards and the reduced protection given by the short shield.

Advantages	Disadvantages
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provides effective protection to most of the body area against missile attack and petrol bomb attack • Enables the initiative to be taken away from the crowd • Allows a fast fluid response by the police, even against missile attack and petrol bomb attack • Transparency allows for some visibility 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exposes the legs in particular to missile attack • Its usefulness for containment is limited, which may increase dependent upon its shape • Increased Manual Handling issues where its use is protracted • Where normally in protected position there is limited opportunity for the use of other personal issue equipment, such as Batons. This may result in the use of shields offensively

Short Shields

Are generally either circular (varying in diameter) or rectangular in shape.

Advantages	Disadvantages
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Allows a fast fluid response by officers even against missile attack and petrol bomb attack • Enables the initiative to be taken away from a crowd when required • Leaves a hand free to make arrests or use work equipment, e.g. baton, 'Dragon Lamp' etc • Its light weight reduces the potential for fatigue • More convenient to store and transport 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provides only limited protection to the body • It is not appropriate for containment

Batons

Forces have the responsibility to issue batons appropriate to their operational requirement. However, when used in conjunction with public order tactics, straight rigid batons are recommended due to their robustness. In particular, collapsible batons that maintain their integrity through friction alone should not be used in situations where an operational risk assessment has identified there is a likelihood of serious disorder (due to the increased risk to officer safety should a baton collapse during use).

Water Bottles

Dehydration of officers during public order incidents may limit their effectiveness and decision-making capabilities, therefore increasing the risk of injury to officers and those affected by the policing of any public order incident. Forces must provide adequate provision of water for officers deployed on public order duties.

Fire Extinguishers

Forces must seek guidance from their respective Health and Safety Departments with regards to the types of fire extinguishers currently deemed suitable for Public Order Policing.

Further support and guidance may also be obtained from PSDB.

Operational Support Medic (OSM)

Objective

The OSM will provide support to Operational Commanders, officers and PSUs throughout the variety of operational circumstances where risk assessments have shown a need for the provision of 'First Aid' support. Including those incidents pre-planned or otherwise, where paramedic assistance from the ambulance services will not be readily on standby for that operation. Or in those circumstances where protocols between individual Forces and the ambulance services do not permit the deployment of paramedics in an area of potentially high risk, such as public disorder deployments.

The role of the OSM is to 'protect life' in difficult circumstances where there is a reasonable expectation that the provision of first aid is commensurate with the training and experience of the first aider. Such an expectation should be limited, by the requirement that the individual must first ensure adequate safety precautions for his or her own life and the lives of others; and in doing so, the risk to the individual does not exceed that to the person being protected.

The medic is responsible for ensuring suitable 'Advanced First Aid' provision during the **Platinum Ten Minutes** (it is generally accepted that for a non-trapped patient one should aim to be away from the scene of injury within ten minutes; the pre-hospital worker's 'Platinum Ten Minutes'). This in turn will assist in improved medical care during the **Golden Hour** (time from injury to the time of definitive treatment (emergency operation)).

Methodology

- The OSM will be under the direct control of the PSU or Operational Commander.
- Consideration must be given to the type and locality of appropriate professional medical support, such as any triage system.
- Forces will need to ensure that they identify the means of transport required by OSM, dependent upon the type of incident to be attended.
- The medics must be deployed as a pair.
- OSM's may be deployed as a separate resource in support of policing operations.

Considerations

- The OSM is not a paramedic.
- Risk assessments in relation to the deployment of the OSM must look at the history of injuries, the foreseeable injuries that may occur in respect of officers and those affected by the operation. Such risks can be evaluated and provide part of the operational risk assessment. This information will then assist the medic in anticipating the injuries from their experience, training and knowledge. The control measures will be an appropriate medical response to the need of the operation and/or PSU officer(s), innocent bystander(s) or offender(s).
- Forces will need to decide, as a response to their operational risk assessment, the various arenas within which the OSM will be deployed and exactly what equipment the OSM will require.

RESTRICTED

- Inter agency collaboration may be required in order to provide specialist equipment (for example, oxygen) from within ambulance service vehicle(s).
- Chief Officer(s) will need to ensure that their officer(s) are able to meet the potential physical demands of this role, to ensure a consistent ability to apply practical skills with an appropriate medical knowledge, in potentially volatile situations. This will also include being able to remove a casualty to an area where appropriate medical aid can be provided or to a safe area prior to the removal to such an area.
- In the event of medical aid being required the Commanders should ensure that the medic(s) and injured person(s) are provided with appropriate protection and a sterile area, where practicable. Where not practicable the Commanders should, so far as is reasonably practicable in the circumstances ensure that injured officer(s) are removed to an area where support may be obtained.

Evidence Gathering Teams (EGTs)

Objective

Photographic and video evidence gathering has proved to be an extremely effective means of securing the conviction of offenders during incidents involving public disorder.

Optical evidence gathering can visually record:

- a) The scene before disorder occurs.
- b) The nature of events unfolding to prove the level of disorder.
- c) Persons in the area before disorder unfolds enabling a comparison with visual records obtained during and after disorder to be made.
- d) Offenders and witnesses, allowing them to be identified in the midst of events.
- e) Damage done to property and vehicles.
- f) Injuries to police officers and witnesses.
- g) Physical evidence recovered.
- h) The conduct of prisoners when they have been arrested, and a record of the prisoner with the arresting officer.

Level of Training

Officer(s) operating with an evidence gathering team must possess the following skills irrespective of the function they are undertaking:

- Must be Level 2 and PSP trained officers.
- Must be trained and competent in the use of appropriate equipment provided for their role.
- Must have awareness of the impact of all relevant legislation, such as the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and the Criminal Procedures and Investigation Act 1996.

Methodology

Evidence gathering teams are deployed in units of two or three officers based upon the assessment of risk at that deployment, specially trained and equipped to gather photographic and video evidence, supplemented by a verbally recorded commentary.

The evidence gatherers record incident(s) using various media. They have overall responsibility for the team equipment and management of evidence.

The minder or protection officer(s) will manage communication with the designated Commander and will facilitate the safe and effective working of the evidence gatherer(s).

There are three essential ingredients to effective deployment:

- 1) Bronze and Silver Commanders must recognise their potential and ensure they are deployed to best advantage. Whilst this may sound obvious, there is a tendency for them to be kept out of the way or seen as impeding front line operations. If the **Bronze** Commander or EGT Manager does not give them primacy and keep them in mind the best results will not follow.

- 2) The team, comprising of two evidence gatherers (with the additional support of a MINDER where appropriate) needs to be well rehearsed and properly equipped.
- 3) There needs to be an effective follow up procedure to speedily process results, to feed into the investigative and debriefing processes. Liaison and in some cases direction from the Senior Investigating Officer(s) at a pre-event stage may assist with the quality and efficacy of the evidence gathered.

Considerations

Both participants and members of the public are photographed to assist enquiry teams to trace probable offenders and possible witnesses. Even when masked or obscured, they may well be identifiable by clothing or other evidence. The evidence gathered not only provides evidence of actual criminal activity at the time it occurs, but also assists in identifying those present who have been witnessed committing offences at other times.

During disorder the teams operate at a high risk of injury, not only through being on the front line but by virtue of the fact that the crowd often focuses on them because of their perceived threat in terms of individual anonymity.

They should not be deployed beyond the immediate protection of other police units.

Whilst the teams will always rely on their own initiative to obtain the best results, it is important both for their safety and to ensure their efficacy, that their deployment is planned. Silver and Bronze Commanders should know exactly where they are and individual PSU's should be aware of their location and purpose.

Photographers can help to confirm the team's location by prefacing a sequence of frames with a shot of a landmark, street sign etc.

Every care must be taken to employ standard procedures to prove continuity of films during the course of their use, processing and printing. Similar provisions should apply to tape recordings and their transcription.

The selection of the right personnel for these roles is of considerable importance. Team members need to be highly motivated in addition to possessing the appropriate skills. It is essential that they have the opportunity to regularly train together, using their equipment and alongside PSU's. The optical evidence gatherer in particular must be totally familiar with the equipment provided for their role.

It is imperative that evidence is compiled using Evidence Gathering Teams at all stages of the operation:

- Pre the event.
- During the event.
- Post event.

Forward Intelligence Teams (FITs)

Objectives

The identification of those involved in creating or taking part in disorder to remove their anonymity and so reduce the potential for disorder taking place in the first place. The early mutual recognition between FITs and prospective problematic demonstrators has been proven to disrupt unlawful activity and minimise the risk of disorder.

- Identification of individuals and groups linked to public disorder.
- Establishing a rapport/relationship with the above.
- Advise Gold and Silver Commanders on the current situation so that resources can be deployed efficiently and effectively.
- Gathering intelligence by observation, conversation and the effective use of video and other technical equipment.
- Evaluate all information and intelligence gathered from whatever source before dissemination.
- Cultivation and handling of informants, in accordance with RIPA.
- Attend pre-event briefings and contribute as appropriate.
- Be aware of the most likely travel routes and modes of travel of demonstrators.
- Maintain contact with other officers policing the event to assist in the identification of suspects.
- By high profile deployment, search for and identify potential suspects in public houses, railway stations, bus and car parks, shopping centres, etc.
- Monitor marshalling, assembly and dispersal areas to identify prominent participants.
- Identify breakaway groups and, where appropriate, accompany them.
- Identify the demonstrators by using intelligence gathering and photographic teams.
- Obtain information about participants and future events.
- Seek out possible missile caches, skips, building rubble, scaffolding, etc.
- Prevent infiltration by opposing groups.
- Where appropriate visit charge centres and assist in identification.
- Attend post-event debriefings.
- Complete intelligence report.

This is not an exhaustive list and should be considered as a guide.

Level of Training (Prior to deployment)

- Trained and competent in PSP & Level 3.
- Need to attend a FIT course, which includes enhanced officer safety skills.
- An awareness of intelligence procedures.

- Full awareness of human rights issues and RIPA.
- Awareness of public order tactics deployed by Forces.

Methodology

Forward intelligence teams are deployed in basic units of two or three officers, who are in uniform, based upon the assessment of risk at that deployment. They are specially trained to gather intelligence and information, which is then passed back to the control room/intelligence cell to assist in the appropriate deployment of resources.

They are expected to withdraw during outbreaks of disorder to be replaced with officers specifically trained and equipped to deal with those situations, but they need to be familiar with public order tactics. During disorder they will undertake a withdrawn role identifying groups or person(s) away from the seat of the trouble.

They will keep a record of incidents, people seen or identified or any other information and intelligence in a notebook and will later transcribe this into an intelligence report.

Having identified prominent individuals or groups, they will monitor these until directed otherwise by the Intelligence Cell or Silver Commander.

The following are essential ingredients to effective deployment:

- Gold and Silver Commanders should recognise their potential and appoint an Intelligence Co-ordinator at the earliest possible opportunity.
- The teams need to be properly tasked and managed, but given flexibility to react to situations as they develop.
- Systems must be put in place within the command structure to allow rapid deployment of resources to fast-time information and intelligence obtained by the teams.
- There needs to be an effective debrief and intelligence system which can capture and disseminate all the intelligence and information obtained.
- There needs to be effective close working between FIT's and Evidence Gathering Teams (preferably under the intelligence co-ordinator).

Considerations

- The safe deployments of FITs need to be carefully managed and it is desirable to control this deployment on a separate intelligence channel.
- It is also desirable to set up an intelligence cell to manage the information and intelligence.
- During non-disorder situations, FITs may well be deployed beyond police lines and so need to be clearly identified in a crowd situation.
- FIT's rely on **not** wearing protective clothing as it makes them seem 'friendlier' to the participants and less likely to become the target of missile throwing. Their safety must be borne in mind, however, and they should not be left in this situation during disorder.
- Due to their mobile nature and fluidity of situations, FIT's should be encouraged to regularly update the control room with their deployments.

RESTRICTED

- Mobility/transportation of FITs, particularly if incident is transient in nature. Where FIT's will be used, the operational risk assessment should identify any transport need (as well as the most appropriate transport) having regard for operational parameters, such as safe entry and exit routes.
- Education of PSU's is required so that they are aware of what the FIT's role is.
- The FIT's must be reminded that they are the 'eyes and ears' of Silver Commanders, and as such should avoid getting involved in incidents or making arrests.
- Due to their deployments, it is likely that they will be first on scene at any incident. They should collect evidence as well as intelligence and intervene where necessary, but should leave arrests, etc. to other officers.
- Due to the nature of the transmissions made by and to FIT's, it is advisable that communications are done via a secure radio network. Part of this should include ear pieces for those who are using this channel (so their transmissions cannot be overheard).

Logistics Officer

Objective

To provide appropriate logistical support, as defined by the operational risk assessment and operational order, for those PSU's and support roles identified within their area of responsibility.

Level of Training

Officer(s) operating in this role should be experienced individuals who are aware of the need to provide logistical support and implement the requirements of the Logistics Co-ordinator. They should be provided with training opportunities commensurate with the risk perceived by the Force in question.

Methodology

Within Force areas the requirement for Logistic Officer(s) in support of a policing operation will depend upon the following factors:

- | | |
|------------------------------|---|
| Operational Risk Assessment: | Potential impact of working environment to welfare of officers. |
| Geographical Area: | Availability of welfare facilities etc. |
| Operational Orders: | Operational Parameters, Working Time, Police Regulations, etc. |

Therefore the final decision on the number of Logistics Officer(s) and the type of support provided to an officer(s) during an incident will be the responsibility of Gold Commander when preparing and co-ordinating the operational plan.

Where a Force requires Mutual Aid support the Gold Commander should ensure that there is adequate co-operation and co-ordination with the supplying Force, so that they are able to identify, for example, the following:

- The type of work equipment used by Forces (shields etc).
- The level of training and support required to provide suitable support in relation to PSU and its work equipment, so far as is reasonably practicable.

Along with the numbers of officers required as defined by those aspects identified above during the planning process.

Considerations

- The type of vehicle and support required should be clearly defined, for example spare work equipment, PPE, refreshments etc.
- Briefing logistical support officers as to RV points, deployments, refuelling provision, vehicle repair and recovery arrangements, replacement radio batteries along with other logistical support provided by the tasking Force.

Welfare Issues

General Welfare Issues

The policing of public order events frequently requires protracted deployment of officers often in unsheltered locations and in inclement weather conditions. Failing to consider the welfare issues of an officer(s) can often result in a reduction in the performance of individuals and thereby effectiveness of the overall operation.

Officers deployed in such environments are often required to cater for themselves, which inevitably results in those personnel utilising public catering outlets. In view of these facts it is recommended that provision be made for the refreshment of officers, prior to, and during, an event, with consideration and contingency for such provision when events are unexpectedly prolonged.

Responsibility for welfare in the first instance rests with Line Managers. Nevertheless, involvement of a Federation representative at all stages of an operation may prove beneficial. Federation advice pre-event, during and after the event can support Commanders in all matters relating to the welfare and efficiency of the staff under their command.

Post Disorder Welfare Issues

Public order events policing can vary, to a large extent in terms of the level of disorder that officers are required to deal with. Coupled with the issue of disorder, incidents such as the Hillsborough Stadium disaster and the Bradford City fire further illustrate the stressful circumstances that can be experienced when policing football events.

Where staff may be involved in events/incidents that are outside the range of normal human experience or are particularly distressing, guidance on how such staff can be supported is available to Police Commanders. National guidelines recommend the use of critical incident debriefing following such incidents.

Critical incident debriefing must be carried out by trained individuals and should be conducted approximately two days after the incident; not immediately or on the same day. Trained welfare professionals are best placed to offer commanders advice.

Critical incident defusing, which may best be described as initial help and support, is intended to lessen the impact of the incident and restore an individual's equilibrium. Critical incident defusing may be considered immediately after an incident.

The media are extremely efficient in bringing events of disorder before the public within a short space of time. This fact (particularly if the news involves injuries to an officer) can cause concern to officers' relatives, provision of a contact point for enquiries must be considered.

Conclusion

At events which are considered and categorised as being of 'high risk' the Police Commander should consider the inclusion of Force Welfare Officers at the planning stage of the event to allow for the placement of these mechanisms in advance of their requirement.

RESTRICTED

Where Forces who are required to police events with a significant potential for public disorder the support of a representative of the Police Federation at the planning stages may assist throughout the policing and review of the operation. Their presence on the day of the event may also contribute to the welfare and provision for officers and assist Commanders with related issues.

Forces should also consider the availability of a suitably qualified senior officer to travel with Mutual Aid units when deployed in support of another Force, to co-ordinate any logistical and welfare support required.

Identification Marking of Public Order Helmets

The Tactics, Training and Equipment Working Group of the ACPO Public Order Working Group has tasked PSDB with a review of the rank and Force identification markings displayed by officers during public order duties. Identification is usually provided by the helmet badge and shoulder markings when uniforms and headgear are worn for normal duty. However, the Public Order Working Group has recognised that there is a requirement for additional identification marks when public order helmets and flame retardant overalls are worn.

Police Requirement

The police requirement is for a system of identification that is compatible with the equipment deployed by every Force in the UK. This presents some difficulties where riot helmets are considered because they may be manufactured from different materials, including various laminates, ABS or polycarbonate. The type of shell material is of vital importance when considering any type of marking. The method of marking must in no way degrade the fabric of the helmet. For this reason painted/stencilled numbers are not acceptable (because of the detrimental effect of solvents). Labels that require a solvent to remove them are also unacceptable.

There is a need for all Forces to adopt a common policy. It has previously been agreed that the Mutual Aid call-sign should be used in identifying personnel from different Forces employed on Mutual Aid, and that Sergeants and above should display their appropriate rank insignia.

Forces may choose whether or not to display a divisional letter. However it is important how and where such identifying marks should be positioned on the helmet. This requirement is best accommodated by two badge sizes. The Mutual Aid call-sign and division letters should be produced in the larger size (50mm or equivalent to 200 point Helvetica/Arial Bold), Sergeants chevrons and badges of higher rank in the smaller size (35mm).

Reflectivity

To enhance visibility in poor lighting conditions, only retro-reflective badges should be considered. All samples should display good retro-reflective properties and markings should be easily distinguished under different light sources.

Durability

Labels should be able to withstand abrasion and exposure to solvent vapours (e.g. petrol) without becoming detached from the helmet. The print and/or retro-reflectivity must not be degraded to such an extent that the marking cannot be clearly distinguished.

Adhesion

Some Forces adopt a policy of issuing helmets on a personal basis, while others issue from a central pool whenever the need arises. This imposes a requirement that labels must be removed whenever an officer is promoted or changes division, therefore markings should be easily removable as required. Primary consideration must be given to choosing a fixative that does not attack the helmet fabric.

Adhesion is important in two aspects, first in the initial fixing of the badge to the helmet and second in removing a badge from a helmet after use. They should be removable without excessive effort, and preferably in one piece. Removal of the label must not cause damage to the helmet. The adhesive must not cause degradation of the helmet or remain on the surface after the label is removed. It is therefore recommended that labels should have a clear general-purpose removable adhesive (such as a solvent acrylic) with moderate tack which is cleanly removable.

Other Observations

All labels are likely to crease when applied to the curved surface of a helmet. However, this effect should not unduly distort the image. Labels that have been exposed to water should not become detached from the surface of the helmet, and the print should remain fast.

Helmet Identification of Police Personnel Employed on Mutual Aid

Officers wearing protective clothing will display their Mutual Aid call sign on the rear of the protective helmet. In addition, Forces may choose to display the officer's divisional letter and any rank markings. These should be placed below the Mutual Aid call sign. This will enable officers to be identified when employed on Mutual Aid and will assist in distinguishing between various ranks.

Conclusion

A standardised layout for helmet markings is necessary for the ease of identification of officers engaged on Mutual Aid. It is apparent that many Forces have deviated from this practice. Although the key elements of call-sign, divisional marking and badges of rank are usually present, their positioning is often haphazard and the size and colour varies between Forces.

(It is recognised that many will have existing stocks of labels that may not conform to the colour or dimensions given).

Forces must adopt the following recommendations as soon as practicable:

- Badges should have yellow retro-reflective symbols on a dark blue (or transparent) background. This may be achieved by overprinting blue onto a yellow retro-reflective material.
- The Mutual Aid call-sign and Division letters, to the rear of the helmet shall be 50mm high (or lettering equivalent to 200 point Helvetica/Arial Bold).
- The Mutual Aid call-sign and Collar Number, to the front of the helmet shall be 35mm high (or lettering equivalent to 200 point Helvetica/Arial Bold) and should be placed as low as possible and visible when the visor is in the lowered position.
- Sergeant's chevrons and badges of higher rank should be 35mm high.
- Badges should only be backed with a contact adhesive.
- Badges should be easily removable without the use of solvents.

RESTRICTED

Rear markings should comprise the following:

For Constables: the divisional/district letter is located centrally at the lowest point of the rear of the helmet.

The Mutual Aid call-sign is positioned centrally, immediately above the divisional/district letter.

For Supervisory Officers: the divisional/district letter and badge of rank is located centrally at the lowest point of the helmet, with the letter to the immediate left and rank insignia to the immediate right of the centre line of the helmet.

The Mutual Aid call-sign is positioned centrally, immediately above the divisional/district letter and rank insignia.

Front markings should comprise the following:

For all officers: the Mutual Aid call-sign followed by the Collar Number, placed as low as possible, and visible when the visor is down in the lowered position.

It is recommended that Forces should consult the helmet supplier before any labels are affixed to the helmet to confirm that they are suitable for that purpose, and also to ensure that they do not invalidate any warranty.

All operational Commanders and Supervisors will ensure that officers are correctly displaying relevant identification markings. Tactical trainers will ensure that these standards are complied with when receiving training. The individual concerned should correct deviations from these standards as soon as reasonably practicable.

Identification of Officers (Role and Rank)

It is the responsibility of all officers and supervisors to ensure that they clearly display their rank and identification number (Constables & Sergeants) irrespective of the dress code in which they are deployed.

Colour Codes for Roles and Responsibilities within Public Order

Coloured Markings

Commanders	Bronze	–	Yellow
	Silver	–	Grey
Police Support Unit	Inspectors	–	Red
	Sergeants	–	White
	Medics	–	Green
Specialist Roles	Tactical Advisors	–	Royal Blue
	Evidence Gathering Teams	–	Orange / clearly marked EGT
	Baton Gunners	–	Light Blue

Communications

National Mutual Aid Call-Signs

The call-signs of PSU's and other units sent out of their Mutual Aid are based on the following Force VHF radio identifiers:

Avon & Somerset	QP	Leicestershire	NL
Bedfordshire	VA	Lincolnshire	NC
Cambridgeshire	VB	Merseyside	CH
Cheshire	BA	Metropolitan	MP
City of London	OJ	Norfolk	VK
Cleveland	LZ	Northamptonshire	NG
Cumbria	BB	North Yorkshire	XN
Derbyshire	NA	Northumbria	LB
Devon & Cornwall	QB	Nottinghamshire	NH
Dorset	QC	North Wales	WA
Durham	LA	Staffordshire	YF
Dyfed Powys	WH	South Wales	WL
Essex	VG	South Yorkshire	XS
Gloucestershire	QL	Suffolk	VL
Greater Manchester	CK	Surrey	HJ
Gwent	WO	Sussex	KB
Hampshire	HC	Thames Valley	HB
Hertfordshire	VH	Warwickshire	YJ
Humberside	XH	West Mercia	YK
Kent	KA	West Midlands	YM
Lancashire	BD	West Yorkshire	XW
		Wiltshire	QJ
British Transport Police	BTP		
Ministry of Defence Police	MD		

PSUs

The Force identifier followed by a consecutive number identifies each PSU, commencing from one, up to the total number of PSUs the Force has deployed.

e.g. PSU's from Essex - Victor Golf One ,Victor Golf Two.

PSU Serials

The serials of a PSU are identified by the addition of a suffix 'A', 'B' or 'C'.

e.g. a PSU in Essex uses the identifiers - Victor Golf One Alpha, Victor Golf One Bravo, and Victor Golf One Charlie.

Operational Support Medics

Within a PSU – Oscar Mike plus team number e.g. Oscar Mike One.

Individually deployed as a OSM Team in support of a policing operation - Force Call sign 01.

Contingent Commander

The senior officer in a Force's Mutual Aid contingent uses the Force identifier with the suffix 'S'.

e.g. Essex senior officer -Victor Golf Sierra.

Other senior officers are allocated an additional consecutive number, commencing with two, in descending order.

e.g. Deputy to Essex senior officer-Victor Golf Sierra Two.

Specialist Aid

Specialist Aid call-signs are formed similarly, using the Force identifier and suffix:

C.I.D.	CHARLIE
DOGS	DELTA
EGT	ECHO GOLF
FIREARMS TEAMS	FOXTROT INDIA
FIT/Sporting Event Spotter	ECHO FOXTROT
INTELLIGENCE	INDIA
LOGISTICS	LIMA
MOUNTED	HOTEL
TACTICAL ADVISOR	ALPHA
TRAFFIC	TANGO

e.g. Supervisor, Essex dog handlers - Victor Golf Delta Sierra.

Individual units are numbered consecutively, commencing from two.

e.g. Essex dog handlers - Victor Golf Delta Two.
 - Victor Golf Delta Three etc.

Airwave

Airwave offers opportunities for communications that have not generally previously been enjoyed by the police service.

The Airwave Service is provided by O2, initially for the police service, but hopefully in due course for a wide range of public safety organisations. This will also allow secure inter-agency communication.

Each organisation (e.g. each Force) prepares its own format, in the form of a 'fleet map'. This creates all of the 'talk groups' (a replacement for old radio channels), as well as enabling 'point to point' (a private *radio* communication between two terminals), 'telephone' (making the terminal a 'mobile 'phone'), 'status messages' (e.g. automated updates to a command and control system), and other functions and access rights.

The network enables various talk groups to be in use at the same time, allowing designation of talk groups for different functions such as operational command, escorts, administration etc. Whilst changing from one talk group to another is relatively simple, if officers are wearing PSU kit, helmets etc, then this, and the use of other airwave functions, becomes harder and so should be avoided.

Initially the network for each Force is being built independently, with full integration anticipated in 2004/5, as all Forces use Airwave. This creates short-term obstacles for operations involving some staff with, and some without, airwave.

In general terms, the host Force needs to ensure that appropriate communications are available.

If the Force has no Airwave Structure, then Airwave cannot be used, and existing analogue or other methods must be used.

If airwave is available, then it should be considered, although it may or may not be the optimum solution.

The following issues might need to be considered:

- The availability of Airwave terminals for non-Airwave officers.
- The (limited) level of training for non-Airwave officers to use unfamiliar terminals safely and effectively.
- Supply of a local officer (with an airwave terminal) as a 'pilot' for a Mutual Aid PSU.
- Reverting local officers back to analogue radios for the event.
- If reverting - an analogue network still in place?
- Are sufficient analogue radios (and conditioned batteries) available?
- Any training requirements?

With a virtually unlimited number of talk groups available to the fleet mapper, Forces should have ample talk groups set aside for most types of events. A smaller number of talk groups

RESTRICTED

will be available to staff from nearby Forces as well. Some talk groups will be available nationally on demand from O2, and should be available in virtually all officers' terminals.

If Airwave is to be utilised, then it should be ensured that all users have access to the required talk groups. Each Airwave terminal is individually configured to include selected talk groups. If a talk group is not configured to a terminal as required, then an appropriately authorised dispatcher can add it 'over the air'. Whilst this forms a useful safety net, to add talk groups to a large number of staff is not recommended.

Whilst in general terms point-to-point and telephony are not recommended communication methods in a public order situation, if they are required these also need to have been previously configured.

In general Airwave offers a very flexible communication tool, but to gain maximum benefit, a Commander needs a reasonable understanding of the service and local network to know what options they have available locally. Alternatively a Commander may make use of a communications advisor with specific expertise in this area.

Due to the way in which talk groups are configured there is a need to monitor them during policing operations so that Command Protocols and audit trails are maintained.

PART TWO:

LEVEL 3 & 2 TACTICS AND

TACTICAL APPLICATION

Contents Part Two - Level 3 & 2 Tactics and Tactical Application

5. TACTICS DESCRIPTION (LEVEL 3)	51
STATIC CORDONS	51
LOOSE CORDON (OPEN CORDON)	52
FILTER CORDON	54
TIGHT CORDON (CLOSED CORDON)	55
REFORMING FROM CORDON	56
LINKED CORDON(S)	57
SINGLE BELT CORDON	57
DOUBLE BELT CORDON	59
REINFORCING THE SINGLE / DOUBLE BELT CORDON	60
THE WEDGE	61
MOVING THE WEDGE	62
HALTING THE WEDGE	62
MANOEUVRING THE WEDGE	63
MOVING A WEDGE THROUGH A CORDON	63
DOUBLE WEDGE	65
ADVANCING THE DOUBLE WEDGE	68
MARCHING CORDONS	70
HAND SIGNALS	72
6. TACTICS DESCRIPTION (LEVEL 2)	74
HOLDING AND CARRYING SHIELDS	74
FREE RUNNING SHIELD LINE	76
RUNNING LINE - TACTICAL WITHDRAWAL	79
RUNNING LINE - ATTACK FROM THE REAR	80
JUNCTIONS - WHEELING	81
JUNCTIONS - THREE-SIDED BOX (CROSS ROADS)	82
JUNCTIONS - 'T' JUNCTION	85
JUNCTIONS - LEFT AND RIGHT JUNCTION	88
MIXED SHIELD DISPERSAL	91
DEPLOYMENT FROM/TO VEHICLES	93
DEALING WITH INJURED OFFICER(S)	95
ENCLOSED SPACE TACTICS	97
ENCLOSED SPACE TACTICS - BUILDING ENTRY	97
ENCLOSED SPACE TACTICS - CORRIDOR/ROOM SEARCH	102
CLIMBING STAIRWAYS	105
VIOLENT PERSON - ROOM ENTRY	107
FIRE RISKS / PETROL RECEPTION	109
7. TACTICAL APPLICATION AND OPTIONS	115
HIERARCHY OF CONTROL	115
SHIELD TACTICS	117
INTEGRATED SHIELD TACTICS	118
FRONTAL ASSAULT	119
FLANKING MOVEMENT	120
PINCER MOVEMENT	121
ATTACK AGAINST THEIR REAR	122
TACTICAL WITHDRAWAL	123
DIVERSION	123
FEINT	124
CONSIDERATIONS	124
POLICE BATONS	127

5. TACTICS DESCRIPTION (LEVEL 3)

Static Cordons

Objective

Static cordons are used to create a human barrier, which gives the Operational Commander the ability to maintain a sterile area or to control the passage of persons and vehicles. Dependent upon the level of risk, this may range from presence, to selectively allowing passage through to prohibiting passage.

Level of Training Level 3

Fully qualified in the Personal Safety Programme.

Methodology

All officers must have a basic understanding of drill, as highlighted below, in accordance with the following objectives from the Probationer Training Programme:

- Distinguish basic drill manoeuvres and recognise the reasons for their inclusion in public order incidents.
- Identify the types of situation where drill may be used in public order situations.
- Describe the basic foot manoeuvres and recognise the links with the Level 2 Tactics, i.e. reinforced cordons.
- State the basic formation of a Police Support Unit (PSU).
- State the main purpose of the police role when implementing foot manoeuvres, incorporating use of force and Human Rights.

The purpose of giving input on drill, i.e. before the foot manoeuvres, is to enable a large body of officers to move as one single entity. Whilst assisting in the professional deployment of officers and increasing the visual presence of that unit.


Dependent upon the appropriate risk assessment, officers would be deployed in either standard uniform or in the personal protective equipment required to minimise injury to officers e.g. standard operational uniform, protective boots, shin guards and body armour.

Loose Cordon (Open Cordon)

Officers are marched in double file along the centre, left or right hand side of the road, therefore providing cover from the building line, to an appropriate location identified by the PSU Commander. There is no requirement to halt the officers prior to deployment unless circumstances dictate otherwise.

Implementing Loose Cords

There are two methods of implementing a Loose Cordon. They are defined by either approaching location using the centre of the road thereby displaying a 'show of strength' / 'registering a presence', *OR* by utilising a building line for protection of officers.




On the operative words of command **“Loose Cordon Form”**, when deploying from the centre of a roadway the files wheel left and right respectively and simultaneously step short.



RESTRICTED

When deploying from the left/right hand side of the road the cordon is formed as per 'Running Line' formation, page 76.



The officers halt and turn to face the front in their own time, each officer should stand with their legs shoulder width apart with their hands placed to the front, hands protecting their groin.


The interval between the officers in line is determined by the objective of that cordon. However, where required the second and third serials in a PSU may be moved forward by their respective serial supervisors up to a gap no less than one person's width.

A 'Loose Cordon' may also be used by Commanders to cover a large area by deploying one or more PSUs in a single line. Supervisors will ensure that the integrity of their serials is maintained.

Filter Cordon

When a loose cordon has been formed by a PSU utilising three serials the Commander may form a Filter Cordon by moving the 2nd serial either left or right.

Words of command “2nd Serial - one step to the left/right Form”



Considerations - Loose/Filter Cordon

- The deployment of officers will depend upon the results of any relevant intelligence, threat and risk assessments; this will then indicate the level of Dress Code.
- Suitable consideration should be given to individuals' Human Rights (in particular Articles 8 and 11).
- To allow for the relief or replacement of cordons (to move to a higher Dress Code).
- The volume, speed and consequences in slowing of that crowd.
- Where individuals are identified for arrest consideration needs to be given to the availability of resources to carry out this task.
- Officers should be dressed in suitable uniform and PPE as indicated by the operational risk assessment, whilst carrying out foot tactics.
- Consideration should be given to the provision and use of reflective jackets.
- Consideration must be given to the welfare and resilience of officers on the cordon.

Tactical plans shall include the provision of reserves for the transition to:


- Higher levels of response, for example from Loose Cordon to Tight Cordon.
- Allow for the relief and/or replacement of cordons.

Tight Cordon (Closed Cordon)

Where there is a requirement to prevent the movements of a crowd in a certain direction or to maintain a sterile area, the tight cordon may be appropriate.

When deployed from a 'Loose Cordon', on the operative words of command **"Tight Cordon Form"** the front serial dress left/right as indicated by the PSU Commander. The 2nd and 3rd serials will then move forward to join the front rank as directed by serial supervisors.

Any officers not required to fill the road should position themselves at the centre of the cordon ready for deployment as required by the PSU Commander.



This cordon may also be completed from a marching double file, the PSU march along the centre of the road to an appropriate location identified by the PSU Commander.

On the words of command **"Tight Cordon Form"** the files wheel left and right respectively, and simultaneously step short, turning to face so that they are shoulder to shoulder across the road.

Any officers not required to fill the road should position themselves at the centre of the cordon ready for deployment as required by the PSU Commander.

Considerations - Tight Cordon

In addition to the considerations highlighted for the loose cordon the following may also apply:

- Any increase in potential disorder may impact on the physical demands faced by officers in the cordon.
- The number of resources required to cover a roadway will increase.
- This cordon may be used on the move and control the speed, movement and direction of a crowd.
- Suitable consideration should be given to individuals' Human Rights (in particular Articles 8 and 11).
- The vulnerability of officers' work equipment when in close proximity with the crowd should be considered.

Reforming from Cordon

A nominated Sergeant identifies the two centre officers, who when selected raise their right arm.

On the appropriate word of command “**Unit inwards turn**” the officers turn inwards, on the words of command “**Unit will retire/advance - Quick March**”.

The PSU march off, at this point serials may be mixed due to operational circumstances. Therefore, as the units move off each supervisor should identify six officers each, remaining with these officers until the PSU have moved to a sterile area, where they will reform into their original units. Once the two files are reformed the officers may be deployed elsewhere.

Considerations - Reforming from Cordon

- It may be that due to the demeanour of the crowd it will be difficult to reform in this way and that consideration should be given to tactically withdrawing before reforming.
- Serials within the unit will become mixed when reforming; supervisors should not reform into original serials until it is safe to do so.



Linked Cordon(s)


It may be necessary to strengthen a Loose or Tight cordon, if a crowd increases in size or persists in attempts to breach the cordon. The following methods of linking may be used; each is in turn stronger than the last.

Single Belt Cordon

On the operative word of command **“Single Belt Cordon Form”**.

Officers standing in a tight cordon, place the RIGHT leg forward. Simultaneously, with the left hand, grasp the utility belt of the officer to the immediate left. The belt grip employed is referred to as the **‘Underhand Grip’**. The fingers are pushed up behind the belt to grip. Officers should continue to face forward, the left shoulder should be just behind the right shoulder of the officer to the immediate left. The right hand remains free to assist with personal defence and resist attempts to penetrate the cordon, in line with Personal Safety Programme Guidance.





Considerations - Single Belt Cordon




In addition to the considerations highlighted for the Loose and Tight cordons the following may also apply:

- The degradation of standards of behaviour and increased density of a crowd will be an influencing factor in the deployment of this tactic.
- Suitable consideration should be given to individuals' Human Rights (in particular Articles 8 and 11).
- There may be a risk of officers acting independently to defend themselves thereby weakening the cordon.
- The use of the Single Belt grip may be considered when moving a group of officers through a crowded area.

Double Belt Cordon

The method is similar to the Single Belt Cordon. However on the words of command **“Double Belt Cordon Form”** officer(s) grasp the belt of the person standing next but one to the left. This has the effect of really tightening the cordon.

Officer(s) will need to stand side on to the crowd to ensure that this cordon is effective. The left foot is positioned midway between those of the officer to the immediate left.



Considerations - Double Belt Cordon

In addition to the considerations highlighted in the previous cordons the following may also apply:

- Officer(s) should not take hold of the appropriate belt until they are positioned correctly, side on to the crowd.

Reinforcing the Single / Double Belt Cordon

Deploying further line(s) of officers shoulder to shoulder in either Single or Double Belt formation may reinforce these cordons. The words of command for the support PSU being “**Reinforced Cordon Form**”.

Considerations - Reinforcing the Single / Double Belt Cordon

In addition to the considerations highlighted in the previous cordons the following may also apply:

- A further increased presence from a large crowd will increase the physical demands upon officers in the reinforced cordon.
- The number of resources required to cover an area will vastly increase.


Reforming

To reform from a Linked Cordon into the two original files, it will first be necessary for the officers to ‘unlink’ from whichever link has been deployed. The Commander should use the following word of command “**Disengage**”, at which point the officers return to the Tight Cordon formation, with any extra resources positioned to the centre of the cordon.

The Commander should now use the appropriate drill manoeuvres as for reforming from Tight Cordon.

The Wedge

The Wedge is a formation of officers, which is shaped as the name implies, and reflects its potential use, i.e. to force a formation of officers into a crowd. Therefore the circumstances of its use also dictate that the construction must be strong. It is accomplished by utilising single/double belt cordons to form the Wedge.




The Commander should form their officers in two files, with the tallest at the front, then in descending height order. This should be completed prior to deploying in public view.

On the words of command **“Single/Double belt ... Wedge, Form”** the front officer of the right hand file becomes the lead officer in the Wedge. The two next officers grip the rear of the lead officer’s belt, the officer in the right file using the left hand, the officer in the left file using the right hand.

The rest of the officers then link using the appropriate, single or double, belt grip.

The officers should stand in wide stance with the front foot midway between the legs of the officer in front.

To assist the passage of the Wedge through the crowd, all officers have an arm free and the lead officer has both arms free.



The positioning of Supervision within the wedge should be done so as to enhance communication and the structure of the wedge. The flank Sergeants control the width and the lead pace and direction.

Moving the Wedge

The effective method of moving the 'Wedge' forward is to have the feet moving in unison. On the operative word of command "**Prepare to Advance, ... Advance**", the PSU steps off with the inside foot, i.e. the LEFT foot in the right hand file and the RIGHT foot in the left-hand file.

The rear foot is then brought forward to the front, but not beyond it. The step is then continuous in rhythm. This method is commonly known as the '**Trudge**', it must be carried out in step to avoid tripping.

To assist in this, on the 1st step officers call out "**ONE**", the 2nd pace is "**TWO**". The call out is then repeated whilst advancing, for as long as is required.

Halting the Wedge

On the operative word of command "**Halt**" is given as the front foot makes contact with the ground. There is then a "**Check**" pace with the rear foot. The PSU then actually halts as the next forward step, with the front foot, contacts the ground.

Manoeuvring the Wedge

The decision as to which of the following manoeuvres to use depends upon the purpose behind its use.


Manoeuvre	Purpose
Moving the Wedge through a Cordon	<i>To divide a crowd</i>
Double Wedge	<i>To strengthen another Wedge</i>
Advancing Wedge	<i>To gain ground</i>

Moving a Wedge Through a Cordon


Initially, form the Wedge behind the cordon. The Commander in charge of the cordon causes the cordon to divide in the appropriate place when required. This is completed by instructing a Sergeant initially to nominate two officers.

On hearing the words of command “**Front Officer ... Cordon Divide**” these officers then step back and to the right and left respectively to allow the Wedge to pass through. The Wedge immediately advances into the gap to negate attempts by the crowd to breach the cordon.

All other officers move as required to allow for the Wedge to pass through the cordon.




RESTRICTED



The wedge advances and is halted by the PSU Commander when the two flank Sergeants are level with the original Cordon.

On hearing the words of command **“Front Officer ... Disengage”** the front officer of the left hand file releases the grip on the lead officer and the two files open out creating a corridor. The files remain linked in the grip used to create the Wedge.



RESTRICTED

Considerations - Moving a Wedge through a Cordon


In addition to the considerations highlighted in the previous cordons the following may also apply:

- The speed of the Wedges' movement.
- The potential for individuals to pass through the cordon whilst moving.

Double Wedge



The crowd may be too dense for a Single Wedge to be effective.

The second Wedge is formed within the fold of the first.



The two Wedges advance as one unit, through the gap in the Cordon.


RESTRICTED




The Double Wedge advances until the two flank Sergeants of the outside wedge are level with the cordon.

Either, the inside Wedge can continue on through the apex of the outside Wedge to extend into a large crowd.

RESTRICTED



Or, the inside Wedge can remain contained within the outer Wedge, both Wedges open out, turning outwards to face the crowd in a Linked Cordon.



Considerations - Double Wedge

In addition to the considerations highlighted in the previous cordons the following may also apply:



- The degradation of standards of behaviour and increased density of a crowd may impact upon the stability of the cordons and their integrity.

RESTRICTED


Advancing the Double Wedge

This manoeuvre may be used to push a crowd further back rather than trying to split it.

The Wedge is formed behind the main cordon and then advanced through the appropriate opening, as before.



This advance continues until the rear officers of the Wedge are just clear of the Cordon.



The Wedge is halted and with the operative words of command e.g. **“Loose Cordon Form”** the Wedge fans outwards and forwards to move the crowd back, with the centre officers remaining static and the rear officers pushing out to the edge of the area. The PSU Commander should then give the appropriate word(s) of command to modify the Cordon formation if appropriate.

The Cordon at the rear, then forming a Wedge may be utilised to repeat this manoeuvre.

Considerations - Advancing the Double Wedge to gain ground

In addition to the considerations highlighted in the previous cordons the following may also apply:

- Use of this tactic within a dense crowd will have an impact on crowd dynamics and therefore the potential for injury to officers and the public.

Marching Cordons

Objective

Marching cordons are used to escort large groups of people from place to place, e.g. escorting football supporters.


Level of Training

Fully qualified in the Personal Safety Programme.

Methodology

Single Marching Cordon


A single cordon should be used to flank a procession where there is only a slight risk of disorder.



Such a cordon will enable the 'Bronze' Commander to control the procession by confining the participants inside the cordon. It may also prevent outside interference throughout the route of the procession.

Double Marching Cordon

This is designed for a procession where there is a higher risk of disorder. The two cordons are formed along the line of the procession with sufficient space separating the cordons to enable the supervisors to be deployed in between.




The inner cordon is responsible for controlling the procession, whilst the outer cordon is responsible for protection of the procession from outside interference.

'V' Formation

The 'V' Formation is designed to be placed at the head of a procession where there is a high risk of disorder.

This formation can create a clear passage for the procession and at the same time prevent breakaway groups within the procession running ahead. It can further be used to create a static cordon across the road to prevent the procession from continuing.



The 'V' Formation can naturally be used to form the 'Wedge' if strengthened by using the Single/Double Belt Grips.

Considerations

In addition to the considerations highlighted for the loose cordon the following may also apply:

- Any increased threat of violence from the crowd may increase the physical demands upon officers in the cordon.
- The number of resources required to cover a roadway whilst moving a crowd from 'A' to 'B' may increase.
- This cordon may be used to control the speed, movement and direction of a crowd.
- The vulnerability of officers' work equipment when in close proximity with the crowd should be considered.

Hand Signals


There are occasions when hand signals may be used as a preferred method of communication between officers. The use of such signals should be included in Level 3 training and tactic specific training at Levels 3, and 2. The key to effective communication within a noisy environment must be awareness of all officers within a PSU, effective training, knowledge of tactics and operational objectives and simplicity.

The use of hand signals within Level 2 Tactics supports the verbal commands of the PSU Commander. As they give their commands for each movement of the serial within their PSU they should point to the serial and indicate the direction to which they will move. The serial Sergeants must be fully conversant with the tactics to be deployed and therefore ensure that their officers move as required.


The following pictures show basic hand signals to be taught to officers.

RESTRICTED


HAND SIGNALS



Situation bad



Situation good




Slow



Halt




Come to me



Come quickly




Single file




Move up




Embus



Cordon right



Cordon



Cordon left

6. TACTICS DESCRIPTION (LEVEL 2)

The following Level 2 Tactics detail public order tactics to be used by correctly trained officers wearing suitable protective equipment, as dictated by risk assessments.

Prior to training, all officers will need to meet the following criteria:

- Will be Level 3 and PSP trained.
- Role related Manual/Kinetic Handling Techniques.

Holding and Carrying Shields

Each of the following methods should be explained and demonstrated to officers during training courses appropriate to the shields provided by the Force.

Two Handed Grip (Protected Position)

- The left hand grips the 'hook' and the right hand grips the bottom right handle.
- The stance adopted will vary according to which manoeuvre is being employed, e.g. running line or mounting stairs.
- This grip is used especially when speed is required as part of the manoeuvre.

The Forearm Grip (Protected Position)

- The left forearm is placed under the hook with the left hand gripping the top right-hand handle.
- The right hand grips the bottom handle to enable the officers to push the bottom of the shield away from them.
- When static the carrier bends at the knees, with the left foot forward to maintain the balance.
- The carrier's eyes should be level with the horizontal bend in the shield in order that the head remains below the top of the shield.
- The head must be a sufficient distance from the shield to allow the shield to flex without hitting the officer in the face.

Carrying the Shield (The Carry)

- Place the left forearm under the hook at the top handle with the left hand.
- Allow the left arm to hang down the side of the body.

Short Shield

There are various designs of short shields, which generally employ a securing strap on the left forearm and a grip handle for the left hand.

- The round shield can be carried on either arm.
- The arm passes through the loop (metal, plastic or strap) the respective hand gripping the handle.

- In the '*carry position*' the shield is held down at the officer's side.
- In the '*protected position*' the forearm is held down horizontally across the officer's body, thereby offering frontal protection.

Free Running Shield Line

Objective

- To protect persons, property or a strategic location.
- To move or disperse a crowd.
- To gain the operational initiative.
- To remove persons from the scene and/or effect arrests.
- To protect innocent persons caught behind a disorderly crowd
- To assist in quelling serious disorder.
- To obtain evidence.
- To remove 'ringleaders'.
- To increase crowd insecurity by eroding their morale.
- To reduce crowd-generated excitement and momentum.
- To arrest offenders.

Methodology

This tactic may be deployed from either double file or single file formations, dependent upon the given set of circumstances or Commanders' preferred deployment method, having regard for the tactical considerations and level of hostility displayed.

From double file with shields in the carry position, held down to the side affording no protection to the front, the Commander would give the words of command "**Quick March**".

The PSU will then march off using the building line as protection, along the left or right hand side of the area in which they are deployed. In ideal circumstances there would be a gap of at least 5 meters between each serial, within which the OSM would deploy at the direction of the PSU Commanders.


Supervisors should march the PSU, with the respective serial supervisors nearest to their front officer(s). Where an EGT is deployed with a PSU the Commander will deploy the team as appropriate.

Should the PSU then come under attack from missiles, officers should automatically shout "**MISSILES**" and raise their shields to the 'protected' position, whilst continuing to march on until otherwise directed by the PSU Commander. Officers and Supervisors should also ensure that their NATO helmet visors are in the down position.

Supervisors should then step into the PSU, behind their respective serials, with the Commander positioned between both serials 1 & 2 or serials 2 & 3. Any other resources should take cover either behind the serial or in an appropriate manner.

On the word of command "**Running Line Form**" the front two officers of each serial halt in the protected position. The remainder of the serial then fan out across the road so that there is a sufficient space for other resources to pass through the lines should they be required to do so.

RESTRICTED



The PSU are then given a fixed, identifiable objective, e.g. a road junction, a street sign, by the PSU Commander with the words of command **“The objective is Do you understand?”** The PSU if understood should reply **“Yes”** whereupon the Commander would then give the instruction **“Shields - Advance”**. Any objective set by the Commander should be no more than 40 metres away, unless appropriate in the circumstances.

The shields will then advance along that road at a jog ‘double time’, taking its dressing from the centre officer. The speed of this advance should be controlled by the supervising officers, but would need to be within the capability of all officers forming the line.

On reaching the objective, the front serial will call **“Hold the Line”** the whole unit will halt, the next objective is then identified by the PSU Commander and the sequence would then be repeated as necessary.

PSU Commanders should be aware of the level of fatigue and physical condition of the officers within the PSU. Should environmental and operational circumstances allow then the PSU Commander might consider a rest period.

If a firearm is produced or fired, or a similar threat is faced, then the PSU Commander will give the order to find hard cover **“PSU Hard Cover”** (e.g. wall, doorways). The PSU Commander should inform Silver Commander of the current situation and instruct the PSU to withdraw, if necessary, to an appropriate RV point and wait further instructions and support.

Where a PSU no longer face the threat of ‘Missiles’ the Commander may reform the PSU in either single or double file with the command **“Single/Double File to the Left/Right Reform”**. The PSU then reforms into the appropriate formation by officers in each serial stepping behind their front officers. Supervisors stand to the side of their serials as stated above, all officers hold their shields in the *Carry Position*, with their visors down; unless otherwise directed by the PSU Commander.

RESTRICTED

Considerations

- Approximately 5 meters between each serial.
- Unit discipline must be maintained at all times.
- The type of shield used with the application of the Running Line will impact on the level of protection afforded and the impact of this tactic. Therefore, the threat assessment and operational risk assessment should be considered alongside all others.
- All officers should be aware of the strategy and tactical aims of the operation.
- Communication systems within the operational field must be effective, supported by verbal commands and hand signals from the PSU Commander and Supervisors.
- Physical fitness levels and welfare of officers should be considered at all times by Commanders and Supervisors.
- Considerations as to the compatibility use and type of shields used within a Mutual Aid operation.
- Relevant training, information and instruction must be given in respect of the operational deployment of the OSM, EGT and Baton Gunner.
- Suitable consideration should be given to individuals' Human Rights (in particular Articles 8 and 11).

Training in this tactic should include its use linked with the following:

- a) The taking and maintaining of ground by the PSU.
- b) The replacement of a PSU.
- c) The use of mounted officers in support of a PSU and vice versa.
- d) PSU vehicles maintaining close support of their PSU officers so far, as is reasonably practicable.

Running Line - Tactical Withdrawal

Objective

- In support of appropriate objectives within operational parameters.
- To assess the level of threat and allow for appropriate action to be taken.
- The Commander could withdraw the PSU until they require them to **“Hold the Line”** (or alternatively they may advance the shields to create a tactical advantage).
- To give the police the initiative.
- To reduce the potential risks associated with the use of missiles.
- To withdraw to vehicles where circumstances and/or Commanders decisions dictate.
- Where the threat to officers is so great, there is no other realistic option.
- In conjunction with other resources or tactical movement.

Methodology

From a static position the Commander would give the command **“Withdraw”** the PSU then withdraw utilising the ‘shuffle step’ from the PSP system.

The Commander could withdraw the PSU until they require them to **“Hold the Line”** or alternatively they may advance the shields using the command **“Shields - Advance”**. Where the latter is utilised, the PSU would only advance to the original objective, unless the PSU Commander sets a new objective.

Considerations

- As per Running Line considerations.
- Level of threat will dictate the need for continued withdrawal.
- The need for a unit to withdraw may impact on the positioning of other resources.

Running Line - Attack From the Rear

Objective

- To assess the level of threat and allow for appropriate action to be taken.
- To disperse crowd and to minimise the potential of injury to officers.
- To give the police the initiative, and
- Request further support where required.


Methodology

The tactic may initially be deployed as a serial or as an entire PSU dependent upon resources and circumstances, if attacked from the rear by hostile persons.

Where such an attack comes from the rear whilst the PSU is static awaiting deployment by the respective PSU Commander, the first officer, realising that such an attack is imminent, should call out “**Attack From the Rear**”. All officers on hearing this call shall then repeat that call.

The PSU Commander should then assess the threat, and if necessary instruct the rear serial to about turn and face the threat. The serial Sergeant will then take responsibility for that serial and use the appropriate words of command to advance and/or withdraw that serial. This objective should be up to approximately 20 metres away from the remainder of the PSU. Environmental and operational circumstances may impact on the distance to be covered.

On reaching the objective the supervisor should immediately withdraw the serial and may advance the serial back to that objective. This will allow the PSU Commander to make a decision on the appropriate deployment of the PSU.



Where an attack occurs and the PSU have already started an advance to an objective, the PSU should continue their advance to that objective, with the same procedure being utilised.

Considerations

- As per ‘Running Line’ and ‘Tactical Withdrawal’ considerations.

Junctions - Wheeling

Objective

- To move a PSU around a junction or area, whilst maintaining the current formation, with very little or no threat.


Methodology

Where a PSU is in single or double file or 'Running Line' formation, advancing to a location before negotiating any junction or obstructions the PSU Commander should consider the use of officers or other resources in 'spotting' and reporting back any information that may influence subsequent tactical decisions.

On reaching the junction the officers on the right would report on what they can see to their left and then left hand officer would report on what they can see on the right to the PSU Commander.

The Commander will give the words of command "**Left / Right Wheel**".

In the double file and 'Running Line' formation the outside officer should extend their stride, whilst the inside officers should step short. This then gives the effect of the unit wheeling around a centre point.



Whilst in the 'Running Line' formation officers should angle their shields as they enter a roadway so as to provide protection from a potential attack from the front/side.

The front serial should move far enough into the junction to allow the full PSU to follow.

Considerations

- As per 'Running Line' considerations.
- The level of potential threat, the environment into which the unit is advancing and type of missiles being utilised must be considered.
- This tactic would normally be carried out with an entire PSU moving into a junction. However, dependent upon the appropriate threat and risk assessment, a junction may be taken by one PSU wheeling in single serial formation.

Junctions - Three-Sided Box (Cross Roads)

Objective

- To move a PSU around a junction or area whilst under fire from missiles.
- To disperse a crowd.
- To give the police the initiative.
- To remove persons from the scene and/or effect arrests.
- To assist in quelling serious disorder.
- To obtain evidence.
- To control a junction.

Methodology

Before negotiating any junction or obstructions the PSU Commander should consider the use of officers or other resources in 'spotting' and reporting back any information that may influence subsequent tactical decisions.

On reaching the junction the officers on the right would report on what they can see to their left and then left hand officer would report on what they can see on the right, back to the PSU Commander. Officers should report details such as numbers, threats, obstacles etc.

The Three-Sided Box is then used where there is a need to advance in the 'Running Line' formation. This is achieved by using three lines of shield officers.


The front deploys as a cordon across the road prior to the junction. The remaining lines are directed to 'Stack' left and right respectively, thus forming the other two sides.

The Commander should use the following words of command **"The objective is to take the Junction"**.

The Commander would then call **"Rear Rank Stack Right. Centre Rank Stack Left ... Three-Sided Box Form"**.

On the key word **"FORM"** each of these serials must move into place. The two officers either side of the front serial would step in to allow the front officer of the relevant serials to stand side by side.

RESTRICTED




The next command is then given **“The objective is to take the Junction. Do you understand?”**

Officers should then reply **“YES”**. Serial supervisors should ensure that their officers are aware of the objective. This is then followed by the command **“Shields - Advance”**.

The whole configuration then moves into the junction to cover all three roads simultaneously. The two front officers, of serial two and three, advance in line with the front serial, affording some protection by angling their shields towards any threat, into the junction into which they are advancing.

Once the units have entered the junction they should advance far enough into the junction to avoid crossfire and to take advantage of the protection of the building line.




RESTRICTED

The Commander should then assess the threat and, where appropriate to the tactical plan, advance.

At this point the Commander should signal as to which direction the PSU will advance and inform/signal to the serial Sergeants of that decision. The two remaining serials, under the direction of their respective supervisor would, dependent upon the threat, either tactically withdraw or about turn and join the lead serial.

This tactic may be utilised with three PSU's, with each PSU taking control of each respective road or, with one PSU taking the junction, the serials subsequently being replaced by the PSU's.



Considerations

- As per Running Line considerations.
- The level of potential threat, the environment into which the unit is advancing and type of missiles being utilised must be considered.
- The Commander should ensure that the PSU is not split to such an extent that a serial cannot be seen or becomes isolated.
- Potential feint by the crowd should be given consideration, followed by an attack.

Junctions - 'T' Junction

Objective

- To move a PSU around a junction or area whilst under fire from missiles.
- To disperse a crowd.
- To give the police the initiative.
- To remove persons from the scene and/or effect arrests.
- To assist in quelling serious disorder.
- To obtain evidence.
- To control a junction.

Methodology

'T' Junctions should be dealt with in a similar manner, with the Commander paying credence to the environmental conditions at that junction, including 'spotting' of the junction.

Where there is a wall directly in front of the front serial the Commander may feel that the front serial should stand fast until the right and left junctions have advanced into the junction.

On reaching the junction the officers on the right would report on what they can see to their left and the left hand officer would report on what they can see on the right to the PSU Commander.

Followed by **"The objective is to take the Junction"**

The Commander would then call **"Rear Rank Stack Right. Centre Rank Stack Left" ... "Three-Sided Box Form"**


On the key word **"FORM"** each of these serials must move into place. The two officers either side of the front serial would step in to allow the front officer of the relevant serials to stand side by side.

The next command is then given **"The objective is to take the Junction. Do you understand?"**

Officers should then reply **"YES"**. Serial supervisors should ensure that their officers are aware of the objective.

Followed by command **"Front Rank Stand Fast ... Shields - Advance"**. On which the stacked serials would then advance into the junction.

RESTRICTED



Once the units have entered the junction they should advance far enough into the junction in order to afford a sterile area between the serials. The Commander should then assess the threat and take action appropriate to the tactical plan.

At this point the Commander should signal as to which direction the PSU will advance and inform/signal to the serial Sergeants of that decision.

However, when the PSU is faced with an area from where there is a potential for an attack, for example open ground or gardens, the Commander may wish to advance the PSU as per the basic Three-Sided Box formation.

Junctions can also be taken using a combination of resources wheeling and staking before entering the junction. The choice of specific tactics will be dependent upon the levels of threat faced from different directions.

This tactic may be utilised with three PSU's, with each PSU taking control of each respective road or, with one PSU taking the junction, the serials subsequently being replaced by the PSU's.

Considerations

- As per 'Running Line' considerations.
- The level of potential threat, the environment into which the unit is advancing and type of missiles being utilised must be considered.
- The Commander should ensure that the PSU is not split to such an extent that a serial cannot be seen or becomes isolated.
- Potential feint by the crowd, should be given consideration, followed by an attack.

Junctions - Left and Right Junction

Objective

- To move a PSU around a junction or area whilst under fire from missiles.
- To disperse a crowd.
- To give the police the initiative.
- To remove persons from the scene and/or effect arrests.
- To assist in quelling serious disorder.
- To obtain evidence.
- To control a junction.

Methodology


These may be dealt with in a similar manner to that of the 'Three-Sided Box' as above, by simply dispensing with the left or right flank as appropriate.

That is for a right hand junction the rear serial stacks right, with the centre serial stacking for a left-hand junction.

On reaching the junction the appropriate officer would report back to the PSU Commander what they can see in the junction.

Followed by **"The objective is to take the Junction"**.


The Commander would then call **"Rear Rank Stack Right / Centre Rank Stack Left Three-Sided Box Form"**.



RESTRICTED

On the key word **“FORM”** the respective serial must move into place. The two respective officers on the lead serial would step in to allow the front officer of the stacking serial to stand side by side.

The next command is then given **“The objective is to take the Junction. Do you understand?”** Officers should then reply **“YES”**. Serial supervisors should ensure that their officers are aware of the objective.



Followed by command, where necessary (**“Rear/Centre Rank Stand Fast)... Shields - Advance”**); the front and relevant serial would then advance into the junction.

The serial left to the rear may then advance closer to the junction, dependent upon the environmental conditions at that junction, under the direction of that serial Supervisor.

Once the units have entered the junction they should advance far enough into the junction in order to afford a sterile area between the serials. The Commander should then assess the threat and take action appropriate to the tactical plan.

At this point the Commander should signal as to which direction the PSU will advance and inform/signal to the serial Sergeants of that decision.

It may not be necessary to leave a serial from the point at which the junction was first entered, e.g. other resources following the lead PSU. If this is the case the PSU Commander may deploy their serials within the junction to face the main threat.

This tactic may be utilised with three PSU's, with each PSU taking control of each respective road or, with one PSU taking the junction, the serials subsequently being replaced by the PSU's.

Considerations

- As per 'Running Line' considerations.
- The level of potential threat, the environment into which the unit is advancing and type of missiles being utilised must be considered.
- The Commander should ensure that the PSU is not split to such an extent that a serial cannot be seen or becomes isolated.
- Potential feint by the crowd should be given consideration, followed by an attack.

Mixed Shield Dispersal

Objective

- To disperse a crowd from an area.
- To give the police the initiative.
- To remove persons from the scene and/or effect arrests.
- To assist in break the resolve of crowd and quell serious disorder.
- To obtain evidence.


Methodology

To give a PSU the capability to contain, disperse and arrest consideration may be given to equipping officers with a combination of shields.

The ratio of shield types would depend on the situation at that time or the perceived priorities.

For example, it would be possible using an intermediate/long shield Cordon with a short shield running line to ‘leapfrog’ the line and cordon towards an objective. The running line gains ground, the cordon holds it.

The tactical plan, threat assessment and preferred objective(s) would dictate the combination.



In preparing for a ‘Mixed Shield Dispersal’ from a ‘Running Line’ formation, the centre (short shield) serial would move up, where indicated by the PSU Commander, so that they were approximately 2 meters from the front serial.

The front serial supervision would deploy directly behind one of their officers.

The Commander gives the objective as per ‘Running Line’, should the crowd be within approximately 20 meters of the front line the short shield serial supervisor would give the words of command “**Short Shields - Advance**”.

RESTRICTED

The short shields step out to the right of the shield in front and advance at an increased pace, through the gap to the front and towards the crowd. Holding the line approximately 2 meters prior to the original objective set by the PSU Commander.

The long/intermediate shield officers continue to the original objective, running to the left of the short shield officer.

As the intermediate shield passes the short shield officer, these officers step back behind the cover of the intermediate/long shield, and take up the original position.

The PSU may take a junction, where the threat of attack and/or relevant support is available.

Considerations

- As per 'Running Line' considerations.
- The level of potential threat, the environment into which the unit is advancing and type of missiles being utilised must be considered.
- The Commander should ensure that the PSU is not split to such an extent that a serial cannot be seen or becomes isolated.
- Potential feint by the crowd should be given consideration, followed by an attack.
- Physical fitness levels, the length of deployment and subsequent efficiency of this tactic must be considered by Commanders prior to and during its deployment.

Deployment from/to Vehicles

Objective

- To deploy officers from/into vehicles.
- To increase the flexibility in the deployment of resources.
- Assist in reducing the amount of direct exposure, to serious disorder, faced by officers.
- To give the police the initiative.
- Vehicles may provide support to the running line as they progress through an area allowing for a fast effective withdrawal or re-deployment.
- This deployment supports the strategic principles of initial response, effective resourcing and tactical deployment.

Level of Training (Minimum standard prior to this training)

This involves the Commander deploying officers from a vehicle so that they are immediately able to perform the required tactics.


The method of deployment is dependent upon the type of vehicle used, as well as the situation and environmental conditions to be dealt with.

See Part 3 for further guidance on the use of vehicles in policing public order incidents.

It is difficult to identify definitive manoeuvres in this section due to the diversity of vehicles throughout the Police Service. However, the following is a basic framework.

The three vehicles of an individual PSU would travel along the road in normal convoy manner (as described in Part 3 of this Manual), with the PSU Commander in the front of the lead vehicle. All warning instruments will be illuminated and activated where appropriate.

As the vehicles approach the area to be deployed, the front vehicle moves to the near side of the road. The 2nd vehicle would then be positioned to the offside of the lead vehicle. The 3rd takes up a similar position behind the second. (Where other resources are deployed they would take up a position between 2nd and 3rd vehicles, thereby providing some cover when deployed).



So as far as is reasonably practicable, there would be no less than 5 meters between each vehicle.

RESTRICTED

On the word of command the front vehicle stops, followed by the remaining vehicles. After an initial threat assessment the PSU Commander may give the command to the officers in their vehicle(s) **'De-bus'** via vehicle radios. If this is not practical, the driver of the front vehicle switches off their warning instruments, or executes a pre arranged signal indicating this word of command has been given. The subsequent vehicles then repeat this to warn the vehicle behind.

Once the word of command **'De-bus'** has been given all officers then deploy from the vehicle; the Sergeants open their doors and place their shields in the gap between the open door and pillar, therefore reducing the potential for missiles passing through into the vehicle.

Officers then de-bus and backfill along the side/rear of the vehicle for cover. Once all officers are out of the vehicle, the doors are shut and secured where necessary. The last officer out calls **"Last Officer"**. At this point the serial supervisor should secure their own door and take control of their serial.

As soon as the Supervisor in the rear vehicle is aware of this they indicate by either radio or hand signals that all officers are ready for deployment. This is then passed forward to the lead vehicle once ready, the Supervisor gives the command **"Running Line Form"**.

Officers from the front serial deploy by running along the building line and fanning out from left to right across the road approximately 20 meters from the front vehicle. The 2nd and 3rd serials then deploy by running either between their vehicle and the front vehicle or by following the first serial's route, forming a 'Running Line' with approximately 5 meters between each serial.

The Supervisor deploys as the second serial passes their vehicle, ensuring that the door of the lead vehicle is closed. Deployment is then as per the 'Running Line' tactic, where practicable, followed by the PSU vehicles.

Withdrawal to the vehicles is a mirror image of the deployment. Once all officers are in their vehicles they would then deploy as required by the appropriate Commander.

Considerations

- As per 'Running Line' considerations.
- The tactic is purely to facilitate entry and exit from the vehicle(s). This should be done at a pre-selected site away from confrontation and not by use of the vehicle itself.
- Vehicles, so far as is reasonably practicable, should be able to withdraw from any area into which they are deployed.
- Officers must be aware of the configuration of vehicles prior to deployment so as to minimise the potential for injury when in full protective equipment.
- All officers deploying from a vehicle must have their visors down prior to deployment.
- Prior to training, it is important that a risk assessment in relation to the vehicles being used has been conducted.
- Forces must ensure that the vehicles utilised for deployment in serious disorder are suitable for the task for which they are to be used.

Dealing with Injured Officer(s)

Refer to 'Operational Support Medics' in Part 1 of this Manual (page 30)

Objective

- To ensure that an appropriate emergency response is received by injured person(s) within the 'Platinum Ten Minutes'.
- To maintain a sterile area whilst an injured officer is assessed, treated, and where required / practicable, removed from an area in which paramedics are able to provide treatment.
- To increase the potential for a full recovery, so far as is reasonably practicable.
- To provide Emergency First Aid in line with the ACPO First Aid report and Centrex training package.
- To deliver an injured officer with appropriate information to the Health Service Paramedics.
- To remove an injured person whilst reducing the potential for further injury.


Level of Training (Minimum standard prior to this training)

- OSM will be trained to Level 4 and 5 of the Police First Aid System, in accordance with the ACPO Guidelines and Centrex First Aid Training Programmes.
- All officers within a PSU will be trained to Level 2 of the ACPO Police First Aid System.
- Role related Manual/Kinetic Handling Techniques.

Methodology

As a PSU advances towards an objective, in 'Running Line' formation where any officer receives an injury causing them to stop or fall and require medical attention, then the officer or any other(s) that become aware of this will call out "**Officer Down**".

Two officers from a serial behind (where appropriate) stand with their shields together to protect the injured officer.



It should be for the OSM or a paramedic to stop and assess the injuries, whilst the remainder of the PSU carry on to the original objective. In circumstances where the aforementioned medical support is not available then an officer from the PSU should carry out that assessment.

RESTRICTED

If their colleague has merely tripped, or sustained only a minor injury not requiring on-the-spot medical treatment, they should protect and assist the officer to rejoin the unit. The supervisor must be told that **ALL** officers have returned to the unit.

To ensure a full compliment of front serials, any injured/recovered officers must be replaced from the following serials as indicated by supervision.

The third serial Sergeant may remain with the injured officer so as to report back to the PSU Commander as to the current assessment of that injured person. Once aware that an injured officer is down and the objective has been reached the PSU Commander may advance and withdraw the PSU while treatment/support is requested. This may assist in creating a sterile area and keep the crowd moving, whilst minimising the potential from further injuries from missiles.

Should an officer require removal to Paramedic Support or to cover, due to the level of injury and level of resistance faced by a PSU, the unit should continue to push the crowd back and create a 'sterile area'. Where available, the ideal method of removal is stretcher or drag sheet, dependent upon the type of injury and the first aid aim of promoting recovery. In extreme emergencies where immediate evacuation is necessary, the injured officer will be moved in the most appropriate manner.

First aid and manual handling requirements will dictate this method. For example officers will kneel either side of the injured officer's torso, facing the head, keeping their back in the neutral position so far as is practicable, take hold of the officer's body armour/uniform and pull to the seated position. They draw the officer's arms across the front of their own bodies around their waists and lock their innermost arms under the officer's armpits. Rising to their feet, they drag the officer to cover.

The PSU Commander should request further support from other resources. However, if this is not available the OSM and/or PSU may be required to evacuate that officer.

Considerations

- As per 'Running Line' considerations.
- When pre-planning an event where disorder and subsequent injuries may be expected, planners must ensure that the 'Specific Risk Assessment' includes the emergency first aid needs of officers and those affected by the policing operation. The *Platinum 10 Minutes* and *Golden Hour* should be catered for within this assessment.
- Any decisions not to include an OSM within the PSU deployment must be documented with the appropriate level of Emergency First Aid provided.
- The way in which OSMs are to be transported in support of a PSU.
- The availability of appropriate resources to provide support.
- Multi-agency approach to contingency planning and operational deployment of appropriate resources directed at suitable removal and recovery of injured officers.
- Possibility of further injury by moving injured officers. Face up recovery is necessary for speedy removal from a danger zone however, once out of danger the casualty must be placed face down in the recovery position and ideally tended to by trained medical staff.

Enclosed Space Tactics

The enclosed space tactics set out in this *Manual* comprise a range of options necessary to carry out Public Order operations within buildings and other enclosed spaces. The 'Building Entry', 'Building/Corridor Searching' and 'Climbing Stairs' tactics offer a range of options for use by officers whether on patrol/small scale situations or on large scale/Mutual Aid scenarios.

The precise method employed to enter, search, and secure enclosed spaces must take account of the risk assessment for the planned activity. The tactics outlined below offer methods available to supervisors and may require adaptation and improvisation within safe guidelines to meet every operational situation.

Forces should also consider these tactics in conjunction with their own Method of Entry Policies and Practices.

Enclosed Space Tactics - Building Entry

Objective

- To enter buildings in a protected formation.
- To secure a building ready for search during an operation.

Methodology

Entry may be effected by erecting a 'Roof' of linked shields combined with a protective 'Front Wall' of linked shields.

Various formations are possible dependent upon the level of threat and the number of officers required to deal with a situation. These methods include 3, 6 and 8 officer entry teams.

Six Officer Overhead (Long or Intermediate Locking Shields)

Six officers, all of whom are equipped with shields, carry out this manoeuvre.


The Commander instructs the serial Sergeant to select six officers, taking into consideration the manual handling implications, as follows:

- Three taller officers for the 'Roof Team'.
- Three shorter officers for the 'Front Wall'.

Once selected the Commander gives the words of command "**Shields (3, 6 etc) Officer Overhead - Form**".

Each team, of three officers, interlocks their shields utilising the two-handed grip. The front centre officer takes up the role of team leader, and instructs the team to number off.

RESTRICTED



The next command from the team leader will be “**Roof On**”, at which point they lift their shields above their heads, placing the bottom edge of the shields on to the top of the ‘**Front Wall**’, thus creating the ‘**Roof**’. The roof should be angled down from rear of the formation towards the front, ensuring that the construction is solid. Once established the team should call “**Roof On**”. The supervisor calls “**Lift**” and then “**Shields - Advance**”. Should the shields split on the approach to the doorway the team is to halt, then reform or withdraw dependent upon the threat.

The formation advances to the doorway where, just prior to reaching the entrance, the team leader instructs the team to lift the front shields assisting the roof officers in placing their shields against the building, angling the shields downward towards the ground, front to back.

The front centre officer checks that it is safe to advance into the building. The left and right hand officers in the front wall may either keep their shields linked with the centre officer or turn outward to afford some protection to the side dependent upon the environment.

Once entry can be gained, officers should ideally enter in numbered order. It is suggested that the order of entry should be:

1. Front Centre Officer
2. Front Left Officer
3. Front Right Officer
4. Left Roof Officer
5. Right Roof Officer
6. Centre Roof Officer

It may assist officers to count themselves into the building.

In order to assist in breaking the roof shield seal the officers at point 4 and 5 would need to step in front of the centre roof officer pulling the outer hand down until the seal has split. They then move the shield to afford protection to the front and enter. The last officer bends their knees slightly and enters the building with the shield above their head, all other officers in the building should position themselves away from the entrance so far as reasonably practicable.

As officers enter the building they must ensure that there is sufficient space for officers to enter behind them whilst ensuring that they cover any areas of threat, such as doorways and hall.

RESTRICTED

In order to ensure that supervision is available within the building the PSU Commander may include a Sergeant at any position other than 1 and 6. Therefore enabling increased:

- Control.
- Consideration of other tactics once inside.
- Radio communication.

Considerations

- The use of vehicles to transport units to building entry points.
- The level and type of threat from above/side of entry points.
- The need to enter the building/area at this time.
- Set the teams up under cover or out of range of missiles from the building.
- So far as is reasonably practicable, take into consideration manual handling factors.
- Any alternative entry points.
- The potential of traps and other dangers within that building.
- The need to utilise specialist MOE teams and equipment.
- Once entry is gained, the use of smaller officer entry teams may be quicker and safer.
- Officers must be aware of the potential for trip hazards.
- Suitable consideration should be given to individuals' Human Rights (in particular Articles 8 and 11).

Eight Officer Overhead (Long or Intermediate Locking Shields)

Eight officers, six of which are equipped with shields, suitable to carry out this manoeuvre.

The PSU Commander instructs the serial Sergeant to select eight officers, taking into consideration the manual handling implications, as follows:

- Three taller officers for the '**Roof Team**', and
- Three shorter officers for the '**Front Wall**'.
- The two centre places taken by the appropriate person (may be with or without short shields) in order to provide either:
 - i) Lighting equipment
 - ii) Door opening equipment
 - iii) Barricade removal
 - iv) OSMs
 - v) Negotiator etc.

The amount of room in this formation is restricted; therefore supervisors will need to select officers for individual roles, whilst minimising the risk so far as is reasonably practicable.

RESTRICTED

Once selected the PSU Commander gives the words of command “**Shields 8 Officer Overhead - Form**”.

The methodology highlighted within the ‘6 Officer’ team applies.

The officers at points 2 & 3 may angle their shields to allow barricade removal/method of entry officers to remove the obstruction/utilise door opening teams to effect entry.

Considerations

- As per ‘6 Officer’ overhead.
- The use of an ‘8 Officer Overhead’ allows greater flexibility in the carriage and deployment of personnel and equipment when attempting building entry, where a high degree of protection is required.

Three Officer Overhead (Long or Intermediate Locking Shields)


Three officers, all of whom are equipped with appropriate shields, carry out this manoeuvre.

The PSU Commander instructs the serial Sergeant to select three officers, taking into consideration the manual handling implications, as follows:

- One taller officer for the ‘**Roof Team**’.
- Two shorter officers for the ‘**Front Wall**’.

Once selected the PSU Commander gives the words of command “**Shields 3 Officer Overhead - Form**”.

The front centre officer takes up the role of team leader, and instructs the team to number off. Officers at points 1 & 2 interlock their shields utilising the two-handed grip.



The next command from the team leader will be “**Roof On**”, at which point the ‘Roof Officer(s)’ lift the shields above their heads, placing the side edge of the shield on to the top of the front.

The formation advances to the doorway where the Roof Section drives their shields against the building, angling the shields downward from front to back.

RESTRICTED

The front officers (in number order) enter the building, whilst the roof officer changes grip in preparation to enter the room/building. The Roof Officer should then turn the shield from its current position keeping it above the head until they are in the room, to its normal protected position, once in the building.

As officers enter the building they must ensure that there is sufficient space for officers to enter behind them whilst ensuring that they cover any areas of threat, such as doorways and hall. Or where members of the PSU already occupy the building, these officers need to be ready for deployment.

Where this is the sole method of entry due to the level of threat, in order to ensure that supervision is available within the building the PSU Commander may include a Sergeant in the second team to enter, therefore enabling increased:

- Control
- Consideration of other tactics once inside
- Radio communication.

Considerations

- As per '6 Officer Overhead'.
- When forming building entry teams, when supervisors are equipped with short shields, the PSU Commander should give some thought as to how and when they are to enter. This may necessitate supervisors exchanging shields with officers within their unit, in order that the tactic minimises the risk of injury to officers.

Enclosed Space Tactics - Corridor/Room Search

Objective

- To search enclosed spaces where force has been used or there is a threat of force against officers requiring a systematic approach.

The overall aim of building/corridor searching is to secure premises by conducting a thorough search, as far as reasonably practicable, with minimum risk to officers.


Methodology

This tactic should be employed when searching enclosed spaces when there is force or threat of force used against officers.

The layout of the enclosed space should be assessed and officers with either long or intermediate locking shields should take up position across the enclosed space.

It should be noted that whilst interlocking shields might provide a more effective barrier against force they can prevent officers retaining flexibility, particularly when the size of the enclosed space varies and speed and manoeuvrability are desirable.

The principles when engaged on searches where width of space varies greatly, is that the front line of shields should form a consistent and even barrier, should extend from building line to building line and should progress at a safe speed.



The officers in the front line take position from wall to wall and, at the extremes of that line, against the wall or building line, officers should be positioned at right angles to the line with their shields butted against the front shield to offer maximum protection.

RESTRICTED


The size of the doorway or space to be encountered should be assessed and a suitable number of officers should form themselves with interlocked shields, as per the violent person tactic, at the sides.

These officers will form a seal over the door/space so that other units as appropriate can search the room or space. This creates protection to the front, officers advance past the doorway/spaces to a safe distance, so as to allow support officers to carry out their roles. Simultaneously, the 'sealing' officers advance and contain the doorway/space and remain there, unless instructed otherwise by the Commander. The room space is then searched or replacement officers are brought up to form the next door/space 'sealing' units.

Where doors are directly opposite each other the Commander would need to ensure that both doors are sealed and decide which room to enter first.

Where doors are staggered or where the environment does not allow for one door to be taken at a time, both doors would need to be secured at the same time. The Commander must ensure that the doors are secured as soon as possible so as to minimise the potential of attack to the side of the front officer team.

At a given signal from the PSU Commander, the front line advances past the doorway/spaces and the sealing officers move to form a containment of the doorway/space. The front line progresses to a safe distance and remains there whilst either the room/space is searched or replacement officers are brought up to form the next door/space sealing units.



This technique is repeated until all the rooms in a building/enclosed space have been searched and situations dealt with, by way of other tactics including climbing stairs and room entry/violent person tactics if necessary and appropriate.

Considerations

- The application of this tactic will require strict control by the PSU Commander and Supervisors so that the available resources are able to complete a thorough search of the building.
- Consideration as to the amount of resources and the type required, i.e. EGT teams, MOE teams etc.
- The use of long shields may afford increased protection in this slow moving tactic.
- It may be necessary to consider putting shields above the front line to offer overhead protection if the corridor or space is high, and there is force or threat of force being used against an officer.
- A consideration for Supervisors should be the movement of resources from outside the building into a room/space that has been searched and secured, to replace and rest officers on the front line, or to give flexibility for other situations that may arise while conducting building/corridor searches.
- Emergency procedures in the case of a firearm or other weapons that increases the threat to the remainder of the PSU unit.
- The potential of traps and other dangers within that building.
- Where a door is outward opening and is visibly locked from the outside (e.g. padlocked), the Commander may wish to log its location and proceed without checking that room, dependent upon all the circumstances.
- Suitable consideration should be given to individuals' Human Rights (in particular Articles 8 and 11).

Climbing Stairways

Objective

- To gain access to the next level, where there is a threat of missiles or other resistance.

Methodology

Having entered the building, it may be necessary to climb the stairs in the face of missiles. One effective method of ascending the stairs is described below.

Climbing Staircases Using a Team of Three Officers (Long or Intermediate Linking Shields)

This manoeuvre is utilised where persons on upper floors are throwing missiles down the stairs.

The PSU unit set up in an area away from the stairway, or secures an area in order to allow the stairs team to set up.

The PSU Commander then gives the words of command **“Take the Stairs”** ... **“Shields - Advance”**.

Number 1 Shield shouts **“1 Moving”** and moves to the base of the first flight of stairs, where he/she reports back a brief description of the threat and geography of the stairway. Circumstances allowing, this officer then shouts **“1 Moving”** and advances to the next level.

Simultaneously **No 2 Shield** moves shouting **“2 Moving”** replacing **No 1** at the base of the stairs. This format continues until **No 1** has reached the first level, **No 2 & 3** then move up in support.

On reaching the second landing, **No 3** may discard his/her shield, ensuring it will not impede those following. This officer then becomes back-up officer, providing a driving force to maintain balance and momentum should opposition be encountered.


The team advances to establish itself on the next floor. As soon as the first team has secured the first landing the next team will follow. Subsequent teams will follow under the direction of the PSU Commander until sufficient officers are in the building to secure it in this way floor by floor.

This is a relatively safe method of ascending stairs whilst missiles are being thrown and is flexible enough to adapt for a variety of stair plans. A degree of reliance is placed on the structural condition of the building and the size of the stairway may hamper the manoeuvre.

If the stairway is narrow, a single officer will ascend the stairs with a second shield officer behind. The second officer may form a roof with a shield on the top of the front shield.

There is a danger of an individual officer becoming isolated. If officers are injured, it could be difficult to recover them without further injury.

It is emphasised that the above method may not suit every circumstance and improvisation may be required.



Considerations

- The level of resistance faced and the necessity to climb the stairway.
- The urgency in climbing the stairway.
- Appropriate resources for support.
- Availability of OSM to assist with injured officers or persons.
- An alternative route
- The potential of traps and other dangers on stairways.
- Suitable consideration should be given to individuals' Human Rights (in particular Articles 8 and 11).

Violent Person - Room Entry

Objective

- To gain entry, detain and remove a violent person from the room.

Methodology

This is one technique, which may be used as a last resort to overpower a person who has become extremely violent and is likely to cause harm. Only necessary, proportionate and justifiable force should be used.

The following description is the basic tactic. The way it is utilised and the number of officers required will depend upon the circumstances and associated impact factors of any incident.

Overcoming a Violent Person (Long or Intermediate Shields)

Where a violent person is secured in a room, arrest can be effected by the use of a minimum of 3 x three-officer teams (2 shields and a link officer). **Negotiation with the person must be maintained by the lead officer at all times in an effort to resolve the situation using the minimum amount of force.**

The first team secures the doorway whilst additional shield teams form up outside the room. As soon as all teams are ready, the PSU Commander hands over to the first team.



The first team enters through the doorway with shields linked, at an appropriate time; simultaneously the second team seals the door.

Once inside, the shield carriers raise their interlocked shields to an angle of approximately 30° (to maximise the distance between the violent person and themselves). The back-up officer will power the unit and pivot them left or right, dependent on the tactics the violent person adopts, ideally pressing the person back ideally into a corner.

Once the violent person is secured, the shield officers keep pressure applied; the lead officer then calls for support where required. It is the responsibility of the lead officer to maintain communications with the violent person whilst maintaining control of the team.

The support team enters putting down their shields, so as not to become a trip hazard. These officers should then assist in the lawful arrest/detention, search and removal from that location.

If officers become tired, shields are damaged or the shields split, the team should back up into an area that affords cover, ready to leave the room, whilst the door team enter and take control of the incident. The third team should simultaneously secure the door.



Considerations

- The availability and use of a trained police negotiator.
- There may be occasions due to a room's configuration that more than one team can operate within the room.
- The larger the shield, potentially the greater the protection; however reduced flexibility and increased fatigue of officers can occur.
- Intermediate shields may increase the flexibility of the team; however reduced protection may impact on officer safety. Potential fatigue of officers will still need to be considered.
- Throughout, the officers dealing with the violent person, the force used by officers must be necessary, justifiable and proportionate to the threat posed by the violent person.
- Appropriate resources for support.
- Availability of OSM to assist with injured officer(s) and/or violent person(s).
- An emergency escape route.
- The impact of weapons.
- Appropriate selection, maintenance and storage of shields.
- Suitable consideration should be given to individuals' Human Rights (in particular Articles 8 and 11).

Fire Risks / Petrol Reception

This section should be read in conjunction with the training issues in Part 4 of this Manual.

Objective

- The object is to acquaint officers with the procedures to be adopted in the event of them or others being fire risks.

Methodology/Training

Safety Instructions

During training involving petrol bombs, the following instructions should be strictly adhered to, with caution being exercised at all times, in order to eliminate any element of danger.

Training Area

A specially selected area should be designated for the training, which meets all current appropriate legal requirements and specifications.

A smooth concrete surface is ideal since it will not burn and there is less chance of officers tripping over obstructions.

Consideration should be given to the location of surrounding walls and the behaviour of wind within this area. Only persons immediately involved in the training should be allowed in this area with observers (remaining behind barriers) located in a safe area and supervised by a member of the training staff.

If the training takes place inside a building, it should be done towards the end of the session, as the fumes remain for some time and may affect the officers.

Important: A suitable number of fire extinguishers must be on site, (this will be prescribed within the relevant training/site Risk Assessment) ready to hand and in sufficient quantity.

Clothing

Any officers taking part in the training as students or trainers on duty in the training area must wear the appropriate Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and visors must be down at all times.

Supervision

One trainer will be designated as being in overall charge of a training session, whose responsibilities will include:

- Supervision of staff.
- Manufacture of petrol bombs.
- Condition of the training area.
- The general conduct of the session.
- Ensuring that all safety aspects are adhered to.

Trainers and Equipment

The following staff are necessary to ensure that the training is conducted in a safe and controlled manner:

- One trainer who will act as the 'thrower'.
- One trainer who will act as Safety Officer/First Aid officer.
- One trainer, who stands adjacent to the thrower, equipped with 2 fire extinguishers.
- One trainer, who stands at the side of the shield unit, equipped with 2 fire extinguishers.

In addition to the fire extinguishers already mentioned, the following equipment must be available in the training area, ready for immediate use if necessary:

- Two fire blankets.
- One clean receptacle, of an appropriate size, full of clean cold water to immerse burns or equivalent first aid provision.
- Two first aid kits.
- Two burns kits.
- A brush and shovel to regularly clean the training area of broken glass.

The fire extinguishers must be checked prior to the commencement of each training session and be replaced after discharge, regardless of the extent of the use.

The Petrol Bombs

Prior to the training session a qualified Tactical Trainer must make the petrol bombs, with no more than half a pint of petrol being used in each. Fuel must not be mixed and no additives used to cause the petrol to stick. They should then be sealed with the wick and placed in a crate to avoid accidental breakage. In the throwing area they should be kept at sufficient distance from the flame-pot to avoid accidental ignition.

Igniting Petrol Bombs

The throwing of a lit petrol bomb, may be construed as hazardous. Forces are advised to ensure that their risk assessments and subsequent control measures are appropriate to the risk.

Where a flame-pot is used for lighting the bombs, it should be placed next to the thrower's position whilst being a good distance from the stored petrol bombs.

Alternatively, petrol may be ignited on the floor and petrol bombs thrown at this ignition source. The amount placed on the floor should only be sufficient to ignite the bombs as they strike the floor; all steps should be taken to control the risks involved.

In any case where petrol is to be used within the training environment, a comprehensive risk assessment MUST have been completed.

The Thrower

The petrol bombs are thrown at the ground aiming to land immediately in front of the shields. If one fails to break, it should be extinguished and placed in a safe area/returned to the thrower before any further bombs are thrown.

Injuries

The procedure for dealing with an officer who is set on fire is detailed in the following section.

Whenever petrol bomb training is being conducted, procedures for the emergency provision of either a police vehicle or ambulance should be readily available to transport any injured officers to hospital. Medical attention should be sought in all cases of burning, however slight, owing to the possibility of infection occurring.

Method of Training

The following points should be explained to all officers when they initially undergo petrol bomb training. Consideration should be given to repeating the procedure at refresher training:

- Petrol bombs do not explode as such. A glass container smashes on impact, showering petrol around, which is instantly ignited by the wick.
- The shield is the first line of defence. It should not burn; however, additives in the petrol (e.g. washing up liquid, grease, etc) may cause burning material to adhere to the shield.
- Should there be a direct hit on the shield, in the majority of cases the shield will flex with the impact and the petrol bomb will glance off without breaking. Similarly, if the petrol bomb hits the body, then again it will probably glance off without breaking.
- Should the flame-retardant overalls become contaminated with burning petrol, the material should provide protection (providing it has been cleaned and proofed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions) sufficient for a colleague to extinguish the flames.
- Boots are the most likely item to be contaminated with burning petrol; however, if officers stamp their feet, this will dislodge the petrol and extinguish the flames.
- The contents of the fire extinguisher should be sufficient to last for about 10/15 seconds. The size determines the rate of emission, not the duration, therefore a 2.5 kg appliance will extinguish a fire quicker than a 1.5 kg extinguisher, but will not last longer. If used, it should be handed in at the end of the tour of duty for recharging.
- Providing the subject lies still and there is no draught or wind, one 1.5 kg extinguisher should extinguish a total body fire within seconds, if correctly used.
- Personal fire extinguishers are for use on burning colleagues and must not be wasted on extinguishing burning barricades, etc.
- One of the most frequent injuries to occur during petrol bomb training is burning to the wrist, owing to skin in this area being exposed. Officers should therefore be made aware of this and told to ensure that the glove and/or the sleeve of the overall cover the wrist.

As the manoeuvre, when dealing with petrol bombs, is now to go quickly over the burning petrol, **headovers are now an essential part of the personal equipment** for PSU trained officers.

Explain to the group the procedure to follow should their clothing become contaminated with burning petrol:

- **Do not panic.**
- Tuck the head to the chest to make a seal between the visor and the chest. This will prevent flames reaching the face.
- Try not to breathe in the hot fumes, as they can cause permanent damage to the respiratory tract if inhaled.
- Move clear of petrol on the ground and lay down flat, so that officers carrying fire extinguishers can get to them to extinguish the flames.

Similarly, if a colleague is contaminated with burning petrol the procedure is as follows:

- Put them to the ground clear of any other petrol as quickly as possible.
- Extinguish the flames with fire extinguishers beginning at the head.
- If at all possible it should not be aimed directly at the face since injury may be caused.

These 3 actions should be done simultaneously if possible and would be best achieved by more than one person.

Remember SPEED is crucial.

If possible, a dummy should be used to demonstrate the procedure as for extinguishing as described above. The group should then be formed into units to practice using the extinguishers.

To avoid suffocation from smoke, petrol fumes and chemical vapours, officers using the fire extinguishers should raise their visors to prevent toxic fumes accumulating inside their helmets.

Officers should be trained in the method of dealing with fire with and without the appropriate shield, as follows:


- Chin onto chest to create a seal with the visor.
- Left or right arm is placed across the bottom of the visor creating additional seal with the chest.
- The other arm is placed around the waist so not to dangle free.
- The safety officer or appointed trainer gives the following words of command “**Unit Advance**”.
- Officers then advance at a running line pace, on seeing the petrol bomber the officer shouts “**PETROL BOMBER**”.
- Officers should run through the flames at a steady pace, in a straight line and keeping their dressing.

The inclusion of petrol within scenarios may further assist the development of an officer's confidence in their equipment. However, there must be a balance between training for reality, and the objective of this tactic.

Considerations

- Officers must be suitably equipped, provided with information and trained to deal with the petrol/fire.
- All personnel involved in the training of this aspect must be tactical trainers.
- Forces must ensure that appropriate systems, for the selection and provision of suitable work equipment and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), are in place and monitored.
- The use, storage and disposal of shields must take into consideration the effects of fire on the material from which they are made.
- Forces should ensure that the selection and use of fire retardant overalls are suitable and sufficient for both training and operational use.
- Forces should also ensure that officers wear appropriate underclothing as a thermal barrier. Good practice indicates that natural fibres are preferable. However, further advice should be sought from PSDB.
- Forces should consider any additional control measures appropriate for officers wearing spectacles, and contact lenses etc.

RESTRICTED



RESTRICTED

7. TACTICAL APPLICATION AND OPTIONS

The tactical options and their application considered and used throughout a policing operation must be proportionate and necessary in the circumstances. Decisions made should also reflect the strategy of a given operation and be supported by the Conflict Management Model, as shown in KTP, along with the hierarchy of control (found in the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999) from Health and Safety management systems.

Hierarchy of Control

Some control measures are more effective than others. The following safety precedence sequence shows the order of effectiveness of measures. This aide memoire provides a framework for consideration in dealing with risk control:

- 1) **Hazard Elimination**, e.g. can the hazard be avoided?
- 2) **Substitution**, e.g. can alternative tactical options be considered?
- 3) **Use of Barriers**, by *isolation* or by *segregation* e.g. use of equipment and resources to create a barrier.
- 4) **Use of Procedures**, e.g. safe systems of work (such as Command Structures, Personal Safety Training, Public Order Training, Operational Plans and Orders).
- 5) **Use of Warning Systems**, e.g. signs, instructions, warning messages, etc and **Discipline** - self discipline through compliance and appropriate supervision.
- 6) **Use of Personal Protective Equipment**, e.g. helmets, goggles, gloves, body armour, leg protection etc, *PPE is the last level of risk reduction for an individual.*

There is a strong duty to highlight foreseeable risks, so far as is reasonably practicable. A thorough determination of all of the above options with a view to minimising the risks supports that duty, as does the provision of the appropriate training information and instruction to officers. In addition all of the above must be considered having regard for the policing objectives, Human Rights, and legal issues.

The assessment of policing operations and tactics in pre-planned and spontaneous events will normally have a clear audit trail up to the operation, whether that is in the form of planning meetings and associated material or contingency plans for the foreseeable eventualities. It is recognised that the fluidity of operations means that the decision making process and assessment process is extremely dynamic, with the resultant audit trail being in documents from Pocket Notebook entries to Policy Logs.

Officers, within all roles of a policing operation where there is a potential for public disorder, must fully understand the assessment process in line with the 'Conflict Management Model'. An understanding of the impact of selection and application of tactical options should support this and should therefore be reflected in the training provision to meet the operational needs of individual Forces.

RESTRICTED

Once officers are competent in the basic application of the various tactics, their training should be linked together and practised before attempting to test in full during exercise training, thereby improving the safety of the public and officers by following a sound structure, as shown below:

- 1) Teaching of basic formations, i.e. 'Running Line', cordons, overhead entry, etc, and how they are used.
- 2) Teaching of tactics, i.e. frontal assault, flanking movements, diversions, etc.
- 3) Experience of this teaching in a random environment, e.g. regional exercise training where the Bronze/Silver PSU Commanders have to decide which of these tactics to employ.

The following contents within this section are directed at providing a basic framework, from which tactical application and awareness may develop further, for all involved in the management, training and application of 'Public Order Tactics'.

Shield Tactics

Objectives

To provide protection from attack by missiles thereby enabling police officers to effectively contain, disperse or arrest members of a riotous crowd. Additionally for effecting entry into buildings or mounting staircases under hostile attack, overcoming violence or people suffering from Acute Behavioural Disturbance¹ or recovering injured persons.

Methodology

The deployment of protective shields is now generally acknowledged by the public as being the normal response when disorder has reached unacceptable levels and police officers come under attack or are likely to come under attack from missiles. The shields currently in use fall into three categories - long, intermediate, and short.

Where persuasive attempts at peaceful resolution have failed then the command strategy should be directed towards making the crowd feel so insecure that they disperse. That is the object of all shield manoeuvres whether they are attempts to outflank or direct frontal offensives. When a feeling of insecurity erodes the will of the crowd the situation improves dramatically. (A good Commander is one who is sold neither on the slow defensive tactics of the long shield nor on the fast moving and constantly advancing shield line. They are Commanders who shrewdly combine the two.)

The effective development of shield formations depends on an understanding of three basic areas of activity.

Containment	Dispersal	Arrest
Containment is necessary: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To prevent disorder in one area spreading to a number of other areas. • To gain time and enable reserves to be mustered. • To protect a vulnerable area. • As a prelude to dispersal. 	Dispersal is necessary: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To break the resistance of the crowd and to ensure that they leave the area. • To give the police the initiative. • To remove persons from the scene and/or effect arrests. • To protect innocent persons caught behind the crowd lines. • As the only real way to quell serious disorder. 	Arrests are necessary: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To obtain evidence. • To remove 'ringleaders'. • To increase crowd insecurity by eroding their morale. • To reduce crowd-generated excitement and momentum.

¹ Further information about 'Acute Behavioural Disturbance' and references to 'Excited Delirium' and 'Positional Asphyxia' can be found in the Police Complaints Authority (PCA) Publication 'Policing Acute Behavioural Disturbance' (ISBN 0-9533157-7-0)

Long Shields

Long Shields tend to attract missiles and are generally deployed when missiles have already been thrown. They can be used for containment of riotous crowds and may allow police to slowly gain and hold ground. They may also be used for effecting entry into buildings or mounting staircases under hostile attack, overcoming violence or people suffering from Acute Behavioural Disturbance, and recovering injured persons.

Short Shields

Short Shields afford less protection but allow a fast fluid response by police, which enables the initiative to be taken away from the crowd. The shield is carried in one hand leaving a hand free to make an arrest or use a baton and its lightness does not quickly induce fatigue.

The Intermediate Shield

The Intermediate Shield is essentially a compromise between the more cumbersome long shield and the lighter short shield, which combines some of the attributes of both.


Integrated Shield Tactics

This enables the understanding of formations to be linked together to achieve an objective. These should also be practised until proficiency is achieved before moving to exercise training where additional pressures are added. The inclusion of Officers involved in Bronze/Silver and Gold Commander training would benefit from participating at this stage of the training.

A number of tactics are listed below although it is not a definitive list. The decisions as to which tactic to employ are made by the Silver/Bronze Commander based on the level of threat and topography of the area.


Frontal Assault

The threat is directly challenged by the most appropriate means, for example, barricade removal and running line(s) to disperse the crowd, thus achieving the tactical objectives.




Flanking Movement

As an alternative to a direct frontal assault on the barricade, police converge on one or both sides of the crowd as a softer target, again dispersing the crowd and establishing a safe route.




Pincer Movement

Police advance simultaneously against the two flanks and the front of the hostile crowd in this co-ordinated tactic, in order to drive the crowd back in one direction and thereby achieving their objective.




Attack Against Their Rear

Police advance against the rear of the crowd, to achieve dispersal and a clear route to the objective.



Tactical Withdrawal

Police withdraw seemingly as a sign of weakness to entice a hostile crowd to follow, thereby leading them away from their established position or drawing them into a position, which is advantageous to police. e.g. where they could be dispersed or arrested. This tactic may also be deployed due to officer safety requirements, to minimise the risks faced by officers.



Diversion

Something done to distract the attention of the crowd from the main police tactic (e.g. noisy display of police vehicles with lights and horns sounding behind police lines) whilst units advance to perform a pincer movement.

Feint

A mock assault, again to distract attention from the main police tactic.

Officers carrying short shields in a running line formation can effect arrests if required.

There are many methods of employing this tactic, one example is shown below where two officers responsible for making an arrest are protected by officers carrying shields.

Considerations

The characteristics of individual shields for each of the roles are detailed as follows:

	Containment	Dispersal	Arrest
Long Shields	Best suited to this role, provides a sturdy and effective protective screen.	Dependent on the type of formation in which deployed, has a limited dispersal role.	Most unlikely, unless the crowd are trapped by the tactical manoeuvres of a number of units.
Intermediate Shields	Depending on the shape of the shield there is a limited containment role. However, it is unlikely that it is supportable for any length of time.	Permits relatively good freedom of movement and provides good flexibility, although the weight of the shield is an important consideration when trying to achieve speed.	Possible with this shield, but the weight and size will limit this option.
Short Shields	Has no tactical use for containment.	Provides excellent fluidity and speed of movement.	Allows arrests to be made.

During the initial stages of disorder police behaviour may have a critical effect upon the crowd. A decision to use a particular tactic to promote a desired effect may produce an opposite result.

For instance if a long shield cordon was erected as a show of strength with the intention that it should dissuade the crowd from disorder it may draw a missile bombardment. This might galvanise the crowd into action and produce further disorder. The signals sent towards a crowd must therefore be clear.

A long shield cordon, for instance, must not be erected as a show of strength as it indicates weakness because:

- Long shields are a defensive wall.
- Officers crouch behind them in a submissive posture.
- Missiles can be thrown at the shields without fear of injuring people. This may encourage the throwing of missiles as the social constraints of not causing injury have been removed.
- Crowds soon learn that long shields are slow and offer little threat.

RESTRICTED

- A proactive response may be used to keep the initiative in public order situations and shield tactics should be selected with this objective in mind. Further consideration should be given to the resources available to Commanders for selected tactical options.
- In conjunction with the appropriate risk assessment during the early stages of a disorder, the use of fast moving officers and positive action may prevent the situation escalating. It may be that the deployment of officers equipped with short or intermediate shields who can move quickly to gain ground and make arrests will achieve an early resolution to the threat of disorder making the deployment of long shields unnecessary.
- Dependent upon strategic intentions the objective may be to advance to gain ground and restore order to an area. Retaining police in static lines under attack is to be avoided. The use of positive tactics can therefore allow police to gain and maintain the initiative.
- Once the appropriate PSU Commander has regrouped and consolidated resources he/she may consider that it is necessary to re-deploy in order to maintain tactical advantage or achieve other tactical objectives.
- The securing of key strategic locations such as buildings and high ground may be necessary to maintain or regain the initiative.
- There are two principal aspects to police activity once disorder has begun - containment and dispersal:

<p>Containment: is necessary to prevent disorder in one area spreading, to enable reserves to be mustered, to protect vulnerable areas and as a prelude to dispersal.</p>	<p>Dispersal: is necessary to break the resistance of the crowd and to ensure they leave the area, thereby giving the initiative to the police, to remove persons from the scene and/or effect arrests and to protect innocent persons caught behind the crowd lines.</p>
--	--

- The characteristics of individual shields in adapting to the roles are that:

Long Shields	Are best suited to the containment role providing a sturdy and effective screen. They have a very limited dispersal role and are unlikely to facilitate arrests unless the victims are trapped by the tactical manoeuvre of a number of units.
Intermediate Shield	Has a limited containment role but it is unlikely that this is supportable for any length of time. It permits relatively good freedom of movement for dispersal, good flexibility although the weight of the shield is an important consideration when trying to achieve speed. Arrests are possible with this shield but the weight and size of the shield limit this option.
Short Shield	Has no tactical use of containment but provides excellent fluidity and speed of movement and facilitates arrests being made.

- This decision is not possible without first determining the strategic role of the police in a particular geographical area. For instance, in an effort to limit danger to life and damage to property it may be decided to contain disorder within a limited area and protect a shopping

RESTRICTED

centre from being the focus of widespread looting and damage. In these circumstances a strong element of defensive containment tactics will be required necessitating the use of long shields to apply the containment. The tactical plan henceforth might then be to disperse the crowd and make arrests, e.g. of petrol bombers or identified ringleaders. This will necessitate the use of swift moving short shield units. However, not all situations will contain these elements.

- Early resolution may be obtained by rapid decisive action. Containment by long shields would not therefore be required and the limited numbers of police employed may mitigate, against making arrests.
- It can be seen, therefore, that there are no definitive guidelines as to the type and quantity of shield units that should be deployed. There are, however, a range of options, some of which are effectively specialised units, e.g. a PSU comprised entirely of short, intermediate or long shields and others which seek to achieve a compromise of flexibility by combination.
- It should be noted that strong discipline is especially important. Clear, precise commands need to be given and an objective stated. The units must not advance further until directed by the PSU Commander, or officers may become detached from their units and be at risk of injury.
- As most disorders will encompass a range of situations where containment, dispersal and arrests are all considered necessary then consideration must be given to the proportion of shields or shield units which will permit all those options.

Police Batons

Objectives

Officers equipped with appropriate batons and short shields may be deployed as a deterrent, into a violent crowd to effect the arrest of offenders or to prevent a continuance of the offences by dispersal.

Level of Training (Minimum requirement before deployment)

- Level 2 and/or 3 trained officers minimum, with additional training where identified in specific threat and risk assessments for area and regional requirements.
- Trained and competent in PSP, refreshed in accordance with Centrex guidelines.
- Trained in the use, maintenance, replacement procedures and storage of such equipment.

Methodology

The police baton is a traditional means of defence for a police officer. It may be used to prevent injury to the officer or another person, protect property or to prevent crime provided its use does not extend beyond proportionate, necessary and reasonable force. Officers must follow ACPO and Centrex PSP instructions and guidelines.

Officers may be lawfully ordered to draw their batons; however the actual decision to use the baton can only be made by the individual who must account for his/her actions.

Considerations

- An individual's decision to use a baton may be supported by his/her perceptions, justification and preclusion of other responses in a potentially hostile environment. However, the drawing of batons may induce less aggressive members of the crowd to disperse. This may reduce the task for police and minimise the risk of bystanders becoming involved in violent confrontation.
- Once the decision has been made that batons will be drawn, three stages may follow:
 - 1) The drawing and presenting of batons
 - 2) Advancing on the crowd
 - 3) Use of batons

The escalation of use must be purposeful to make arrests or prevent crime. This will not be achieved easily against a violent crowd and batons may also be necessary for officers to defend themselves in the execution of their duty.

- The baton can be effectively used as a weapon of defence and as an aid for the system of lock and restraint holds. Its use must be capable of being justified in each individual case.
- A baton charge may be a viable tactical option. A baton charge is intended primarily to prevent the continuance of criminal activity. Crowd escape routes must be considered. Warning messages must be considered in line with guidance given in KTP.
- The baton charge must be a controlled and disciplined manoeuvre. The principles governing the use of force are:

RESTRICTED

- a) No more force should be used than is necessary.
 - b) Force must not be used as a punitive measure.
 - c) Force must cease immediately the objective has been achieved.
- Nothing in these guidelines will affect the principles contained within the Human Rights Act 1998 and Section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967; that only the minimum force necessary and proportionate in the circumstances must be used.

Authority Level

- As a tactical communication tool directed at a hostile crowd, the appropriate Commander should give the authority, in line with guidance given in KTP.
- During disorder, drawing and use of the police baton is at the discretion of individual officers in line with the principles set out within their PSP training. Individual officers can be held accountable for their actions.

PART THREE:
FURTHER OPERATIONAL
TACTICS AND POLICY

Contents Part Three - Further Operational Tactics and Policy

INTRODUCTION	131
8. ACPO GUIDANCE AND POLICY	132
WATER CANNON.....	132
SCREENING SMOKE.....	144
CS SMOKE	146
BATON ROUNDS IN PUBLIC ORDER.....	151
ANNEX 'A'	158
FIREWORKS, ADAPTED FIREWORKS, BLAST BOMBS AND ACID BOMBS	159
9. ADDITIONAL OPERATIONAL TACTICS.....	163
PROTESTOR REMOVAL - LOCKED-ON (PASSIVE).....	163
ARREST TEAMS	166
ADDITIONAL - CORRIDOR / ROOM SEARCH.....	168
BRITISH TRANSPORT POLICE: RAILWAY STATIONS / TRAINS	175
PUBLIC ORDER VEHICLE TACTICS AND CONVOY DRIVING	182
OPERATIONAL USE OF POLICE VEHICLES	182
CONVOY DRIVING.....	184
VANS WITH SIDE SHIELDS	190
SAFE TOWING OF VEHICLES.....	191
PROTECTION OF DISABLED VEHICLE.....	193
ARMOURED LANDROVER	193
REMOVAL OF DISABLED VEHICLE	195
PASSIVE CROWD CONTROL - FUNNELLING	196
PASSIVE CROWD CONTROL - SMALL CROWD	197
ROAD BLOCK	198
CROWD DISPERSAL - VEHICLE LINE.....	199
CROWD DISPERSAL - MIXED VEHICLE AND FOOT TACTICS.....	200
CROWD DISPERSAL - VEHICLES THREE-SIDED BOX	202
CROWD DISPERSAL - HERRINGBONE	204
PETROL BOMB	206
MOUNTED TACTICS (SEPARATE FILE ON CD).....	207
DOG SECTION TACTICS (SEPARATE FILE ON CD).....	207
BARRICADE REMOVAL (VEHICLES)	208
BARRICADE REMOVAL (PSU OFFICERS).....	209
ORGANISED EVENTS: SPORTING AND NON-SPORTING	211
SPORTING EVENTS - FOOTBALL	211
FOOTBALL STADIUM SEATING TACTIC	213
OPEN GROUND TACTICS.....	215
DOUBLE-SPACING.....	215
SINGLE PINCER AND DOUBLE PINCER (OPEN GROUND TACTICS)	216
FOUR-SIDED BOX (OPEN GROUND TACTICS).....	219
ARREST TEAM (OPEN GROUND TACTICS)	220
LICENSED PREMISES.....	221
POLICE PRISON TACTICS.....	223
10. EXTERNAL AGENCY GUIDANCE.....	224
SHERIFFS.....	224
HIGH COURT ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS	225
DEALING WITH THE LARGE SCALE WRIT OF POSSESSION	225
CHANGES IN THE NEAR FUTURE.....	226

Introduction

The following section will include identified policy, guidance, national and international good practice after being approved for inclusion through ACPO, NCPE and associated channels.

This will assist Forces in ensuring appropriate quality approval of the tactical options designed to meet operational need, whilst ensuring an appropriate audit trail in relation to operational effectiveness.

For inclusion in the Manual a tactic/guidance will need to be approved via the following process:

- 1) Formatted in line with the Manual's contents (i.e. 'Objective', 'Training requirements - prior to/in order to apply the tactic', 'Methodology' and 'Considerations'). Along with an appropriate risk assessment and forward explaining the reasoning behind its development, effectiveness and inclusion in the Manual.
- 2) An appropriate risk assessment.
- 3) Rationale behind its development and effectiveness within the Manual.
- 4) Assessed in line with NCPE quality assurance systems.
- 5) Forwarded to TTEWG for review and acceptance for inclusion.
- 6) Forwarded for ACPO approval where appropriate.

The new section will then be inserted into the Manual at the next review.

Inclusion of other Tactical Manuals

Those tactics utilised by the Mounted Sections, Dog Sections and other agencies will fall within this section, and will be available as a separate electronic file for printing and inclusion as a hard copy. This will ensure that any changes included in these Manuals that do not affect the contents of this document are easily updated when required.

ACPO Policy

Those areas that require further guidance and/or policy from ACPO will also fall within this section, e.g. Guidance on the use of CS smoke and baton rounds during disorder.

Reference should also be made to the ACPO Code of Practice on the Police Use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons, where appropriate.

8. ACPO GUIDANCE AND POLICY

Water Cannon

ACPO Guidance on the Deployment and Use of Water Cannon

Introduction

The purpose of these guidelines is to facilitate an understanding, and to provide practical guidance concerning the deployment and use of vehicle mounted water cannon.

The guidelines have been audited to ensure the content is in compliance with the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the provisions of the United Nations Basic Principles on Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials and the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials. Account has also been taken of the Police Service of Northern Ireland Code of Ethics.

Managing conflict and responding to violence are core police functions. Police response is underpinned by Human Rights and in particular the obligation under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, to uphold the right to life.

Article 2 of the UN Basic Principles on the use of Force and Firearms states that:

'Governments and law enforcement agencies should develop a range of means as broad as possible and equip law enforcement officials with various types of weapons and ammunition that would allow for a differentiated use of force and firearms.'

Vehicle mounted Water Cannons can be used in a variety of modes and therefore provide the police service with an additional, flexible and graduated means of responding to situations where use of force is considered necessary to disperse individuals or persons causing violence. As well as the physical presence of the water cannon providing a deterrent, the modes of operation are:

- a) Spray or Diffused Mode
- b) Short bursts of water jets
- c) Continuous water jets.

The design and use of the vehicle mounted water cannon system are subject to strict criteria. Only water cannon that have undergone a full technical evaluation and consideration of the medical implications of its operation may be used within in the United Kingdom. The 'RCV9000 Vehicle Mounted Water Cannon' is currently approved for use within the UK.

The deployment and use of water cannon will be informed by reference to the ACPO Conflict Management Model. The availability or deployment of the Water Cannon should not however be considered as a replacement for other less lethal weapons but rather as a further tactical option. Whilst primarily designed as an option for dealing with unlawful protest and disorder water cannon may provide a tactical and less lethal response in other situations where a use of force is required.

The deployment and use of water cannon is required to be documented as soon as practicable, thus providing an audit trail of decision making in respect of command and operational decisions.

Water cannon are one tactical option within a range of tactics and equipment that are available to the police service when responding to unlawful protest, disorder and threats of violence. They provide a graduated, flexible and proportionate police response and may reduce the need to resort to other less lethal weapons or other uses of force. Police, in carrying out their duty, shall as far as possible, apply non-violent means before resorting to the use of force. Force may be used only if other means remain ineffective or without any promise of achieving the intended result. In dealing with assemblies that are unlawful but non-violent the use of force should be avoided, or where that it is not practicable, such force shall be restricted to the minimum extent necessary.

(Sourced from United Nations' Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials - Principle 4)

A unique characteristic of water cannon is the ability to graduate the delivery of water from a diffused spray to a directed jet and at varying pressures. Thus water cannon provide a graduated and flexible application of force ranging from use of the water cannon in spray or diffused mode to deter or discourage unlawful protestors from remaining in an area, to forceful water jets that can physically push people to disperse them. This represents a use of force option that may be considered appropriate in a variety of situations falling short of serious disorder and riots where its use may prevent the escalation of violence.

Water cannon are intended to complement the existing range of tactical options and equipment. Size, weight and manoeuvrability may place constraints on their use. Therefore, whilst water cannon may be an appropriate option in many circumstances, the topography of the area and ground conditions may negate their use and other appropriate tactical options should be considered.

Nothing in these guidelines should be construed so as to constrain the police service in its fundamental responsibility to save life, protect property and maintain the peace. Police officers shall at all times fulfil the duty imposed upon them by law, by serving the community and by protecting all persons against illegal acts, consistent with the high degree of responsibility required by their profession.

Outline Description of the RCV9000 Vehicle Mounted Water Cannon

The RCV9000 water cannon vehicle consists of a six wheel drive chassis on which is mounted a superstructure consisting of a crew cabin, a pump compartment and a water tank. Water Cannon may only be operated by officers who are currently trained in their use.

Within the cab there is a comprehensive set of controls and recording equipment to capture data from sensors monitoring water pressure, date and time of use. Each vehicle has two water cannons mounted on the roof of the cab.

The vehicles are each equipped with a public address system, distinctive audible sirens and blue flashing lights. A high intensity light bar is fitted to the front of the cab above the windscreen.

Due to their size and weight water cannon should normally be deployed at least in pairs to provide mutual support and immediate recovery capability in the event of a mechanical failure.

Considerations for Deployment and Use of Water Cannon

As with the use of any vehicle in areas where there are large crowds of people there is a risk that the moving vehicle could result in a collision and injure individuals. The provision and use of the public address system, distinctive audible sirens and blue flashing lights system will provide a means to warn persons present of impending use.

The ability to discharge jets of water in differing modes and at varying pressures is a unique characteristic of water cannon representing a use of force option that may be considered appropriate in a wide range of situations.

Water cannon can provide an effective means by which persons using violence towards the police or others involved in the destruction of property, or who are engaged in unlawful assemblies, protests or demonstrations, can be kept at a distance, contained or dispersed. In dealing with assemblies that are unlawful but non-violent the use of force should be avoided, or where that it is not practicable, such force shall be restricted to the minimum extent necessary.

(Sourced from the UN Basic principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials - Principle 13)

Water cannon are intended to be a less lethal use of force option. The method of delivery and use is intended to avoid causing serious or permanent injury. However as with any use of force there is the potential for unintended or unforeseen injuries being caused. In respect of water cannon the following potentials for injury have been identified:

- a) Direct injury from water jet. In particular the application of two jets on individuals (e.g. both jets from one vehicle or one jet from two vehicles) will increase the risk to subjects.
- b) Running, tripping or falling when trying to evade water cannon.
- c) Being pushed onto hard or sharp objects and windows by the force of the jets (Tertiary Impact).
- d) Being knocked off walls or other high positions.
- e) Secondary missiles being propelled from the ground or dislodged from buildings or other structures.

Training will address these considerations and other potential risks from:

- Jets directed at the ground in front of crouching/sitting persons where there may be debris on the ground;
- Jets striking the head, even peripherally;
- Jets striking, even peripherally, persons using optical equipment or with the equipment (cameras etc) directly;
- Persons adjacent to obstacles such as walls, barricades and vehicles, or lying on the ground where the pressure of water may cause them to fall against such objects;

RESTRICTED

- Persons on top of structures who may be toppled by the jet;
- Persons who may be thrown into the path of moving vehicles by the jet;
- Children, the elderly or small adults being struck by the jet.

Water cannon should be supported by other public order tactical options and equipment and should not ordinarily be deployed as a stand-alone option.

Water Cannon will only be deployed following appropriate threat and risk assessments. However in certain situations where there is limited time for detailed planning, commanders may have to undertake real time dynamic threat and risk assessments. Specific tactical objectives will be drawn up by the Silver Commander and agreed with the Gold Commander to be implemented by the relevant Bronze Commander(s).

Given the flexibility in use of the water cannon it is impossible to provide a definitive list of situations or precise criteria for their deployment and use but the following principles should be taken into consideration:

- a) The physical presence of water cannon can act as a deterrent to those intent on disobeying lawful and reasonable police directions or using violence; however their presence may also inflame a situation and the decision to move water cannon forward and into view must rest with Bronze and Silver Commanders at the time.
- b) The public address system, high intensity lights, flashing blue lights and distinctive sirens can all be used to provide warnings and alert a crowd of the presence of water cannon and police intentions.
- c) Water cannon may be considered as an alternative tactical option to police officers physically engaging with unlawful protests and violent persons in situations that would otherwise require the intervention of officers at close quarters, thus placing police and others at potentially greater risk.
- d) The modes of use (diffused or directed jets of varying duration) and level of water pressure used on any given occasions must be necessary and proportionate to the situation being encountered.
- e) Use of the water cannon is likely to result in more than one person being affected and the use of the water cannon may have a direct or indirect effect on the whole crowd hence the importance of providing warnings. See 'Warnings' below.

Useful Definitions

In the course of reading these guidelines the following definitions will be of assistance.

Deployment

Water cannon is deployed when it has been made available for operational purposes.

Authority to Deploy

The authorisation by an officer of Assistant Chief Constable/Commander rank to make water cannon and trained personnel available for operational purposes.

Use

Water cannon is deemed to have been used when it has been discharged at any person in pursuit of police operations.

Authority to Use

The authorisation given by the Silver Commander (Inspecting and Superintending ranks) to discharge water cannon, in accordance with the principles set out in these instructions. The authority to use water cannon is not an order to discharge it. It is a decision that is made, based upon all of the information available, that water cannon may be a necessary and proportionate response to public protest or disorder.

Assistant Chief Constable/Commander

An officer of substantive ACC or Commander rank or an officer of Superintending rank who is specifically designated to perform the role of ACC/Commander in the absence of the relevant ACC/Commander.

The Law Relating to the Use of Force

The law relating to the use of force is set out in this section and must be complied with.

The deployment of water cannon does not, of itself, constitute a use of force. It is only when water cannon are used to discharge water against persons that the considerations contained in this section become relevant.

The law is contained within ...

Section 3 Criminal Law Act 1967 and Section 3 Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1967

'A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in the effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large'

Section 117 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and Article 88 Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989

'Where any provision of this Act or Order

a) confers any power on a constable; and

b) does not provide that the power may only be exercised with the consent of some other person other than a police officer, the officer may use reasonable force, if necessary, in the exercise of the power.'

Common Law

The Common Law has always recognised the right of self-defence.

European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)

When making a determination as to whether the level of force used was lawful in any particular instance the courts will take cognisance of the Articles under the ECHR.

Whilst water cannon are intended to be a less lethal use of force option it is recognised that the use of any force may have unintentional lethal consequences and, as such, Article 2 of the ECHR is of particular relevance.

Article 2 - Right to Life

- a) Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.
- b) Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of the Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:
 - i) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
 - ii) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;
 - iii) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.

The European Court has held that *'in keeping with the importance of this provision [the right to life] in a democratic society the court must, in making its assessment, subject deprivation of life to the most careful scrutiny ... taking into consideration not only the actions of the agents of the State who actually administer the force but also all the surrounding circumstances including such matters as the planning and control of the actions under examination'* (McCann v United Kingdom (1995) 21 EHRR 97 at paragraph 150).

The test of absolute necessity found in Article 2 of the ECHR relating to the obligation to protect life provides a stricter test of proportionality than is required in other areas of the Convention. It is also a stricter test than is provided by the concept of reasonable force within s.3 Criminal Law Act 1967, s.117 of Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, the equivalent Northern Ireland legislation and the Common Law. Even where the use of force may be seen as being reasonable it may not be absolutely necessary.

Water cannon can be used in a variety of modes and its use in any given circumstances must be based on the principals of proportionality.

The justification for the mode (spray or jet), the pressure and duration of use will always be dependent on each situation and based on the principles of legality, necessity and proportionality. For example directed jets may be a necessary and proportionate level of force against a violent and riotous crowd who have refused to disperse and their dispersal is necessary for the maintenance of the peace and the prevention of disorder. However if dispersing an unlawful but non-violent assembly, in the first instance a diffused spray may be appropriate followed by lower pressure jets proportionate to the amount of resistance offered by the crowd. A record is maintained on the pressure of the jets on each occasion they are used.

When that force is used it should be reported at the time, or as soon as practicable thereafter, by the Crew Commander to the Water Cannon Commander and to the Silver Commander. It is not intended that each short burst of water need to be reported, however a report(s) should be made when a particular phase of use has ended. It is impossible to set strict guidance in this respect and must be left with the discretion of the Crew Commander who has a duty to report the use of force.

Authorisation for the Deployment and Use of Water Cannon

Deployment of Water Cannon

Chief Constables/Commissioners may delegate the authority for the deployment of water cannon to an officer of Assistant Chief Constable/Commander rank. The authority to deploy water cannon should be limited by time and geographical boundaries. These may be for as long and cover as wide an area as necessary for the purpose of the operation(s) for which they are being deployed.

The deployment and use of water cannon in situations of unlawful public protest and disorder should only be considered where it is believed that their use (in conjunction with other methods of policing disorder) is appropriate in order to achieve lawful objectives.

A Tactical Adviser, who is specifically trained in the characteristics and use of water cannon, will be consulted prior to any deployment. The Tactical Adviser must be consulted on the deployment and use of water cannon in the planning phase and during the operation.

Pre-Planned Deployments

For pre-planned operations, the Gold Commander in consultation with the Silver Commander must make an assessment of the threat to public order and the need to deploy water cannon. Where the Gold Commander is not an Assistant Chief Constable/Commander, a written request for the deployment of water cannon, based upon this assessment, will be made to the relevant Assistant Chief Constable/Commander by the Gold Commander.

Water cannon vehicles will be deployed under the overall command of the Water Cannon Commander. The Water Cannon Commander will liaise with the appropriate Bronze Commander to ensure co-ordination in achieving tactical objectives.

The relevant Gold and Silver Commanders will keep authority to deploy water cannon under constant review.

Use of Water Cannon

Once authority to deploy water cannon has been granted the authority to use water cannon is vested in the Silver Commander (Inspecting and Superintending ranks).

The Silver Commander will keep authority to use water cannon under constant review through liaison with the relevant Bronze Commander(s) and Water Cannon Commander.

Water Cannon can be used in the following ways:

- a) Stationary
- b) As part of a forward moving police line.

When being used as part of a moving formation care must be taken to avoid striking any person with the vehicle.

Warnings

The use of the public address system, high intensity lights, flashing blue lights and distinctive sirens can all be used to provide warnings and alert a crowd of the presence of water cannon and police intentions. RCV9000 water cannon vehicles are equipped with a powerful public address system and distinctive audible sirens that can be used to give audible warnings. Blue flashing lights mounted on the front and on the roof will provide a visual warning of their presence.

Water Cannon Crew Commanders should ensure that sufficient warning is issued to the crowd before water cannon and/or any other use of force option is deployed. The warning(s) should make it clear to the crowd that unless they disperse, a specified use of force tactical option will be used. The officer delivering the warning will keep a record of the time of the warning(s) and the words used. The following words should be used:

“Attention, attention, this is a police warning.

Disperse immediately or *

*(Baton Rounds) (Water Cannon) (other named tactical option)

will be **”

**(deployed) (used) (used again)

The above warning(s) should be given on as many times as is reasonably practicable in the circumstances, ensuring that police intentions to deploy tactical options and/or use force are clearly communicated, prior to use.

When the use of specific tactical options/force is imminent, a final warning message should be given, ending with the words:

“No further warning will be given.”

Warnings should be repeated, as frequently and as often as is necessary to ensure that all of those engaged in the unlawful activity and bystanders have heard the warning(s) and have had an opportunity to disperse. The police objective should be to ensure those who choose to remain are left in no doubt of the police intentions.

Command

In order to ensure appropriate operational command over the use of water cannon, the following procedures are to be implemented. These procedures are intended to enhance command and increase accountability whilst maintaining the ability to evidence the need to use water cannon.

Policy and command decisions in respect of the deployment and use of water cannon should be subject to continuous critical review during the lifetime of any incident or operation. The officer in overall command of the incident (Gold Commander) should ensure formal review and documentation of the requirement for water cannon as the disorder enters each new phase.

All command decisions in respect of the authority to deploy and use water cannon (or not, as the case may be) should be fully documented. The relevant Bronze Commander will be responsible for documenting the assessment of the situation and rationale pertaining to the decision to request the authorisation to use water cannon. In addition the Crew Commander will, in respect of the vehicle under their command, ensure that a record is maintained of the use of water cannon and that reports are completed as soon as practicable after each use.

In the event of spontaneous outbreaks of public disorder water cannon may, or may not be readily available. In any event the officer in charge of the scene of disorder should ensure the introduction of formalised command and control structures (Gold-Silver-Bronze) with the minimum delay and if water cannon are available they must be duly authorised for deployment and use. However, nothing in these instructions should be so construed so as to prevent an immediate and effective police response or the use of water cannon where their use is justified on the grounds of necessity and proportionality where decisive intervention is likely to bring about an early resolution of a potentially violent situation.

Role of Crew Commanders

Crew Commanders are responsible for the safety of the entire crew and that of the vehicle. A Crew Commander has overall command of their respective vehicle.

Crew Commanders will set a water pressure for any period of use that is a proportionate response to the unlawful protest or disorder being encountered. They will also determine the appropriate mode of use (diffused or directed jets). Whilst this will be the overall water pressure individual water cannon operators have the ability to reduce the pressure in their respective cannons by 5 or 10 bar or can close their cannon if appropriate.

Once a decision has been made to use water cannon the Crew Commanders will be responsible for directing and commanding their respective water cannon vehicle whenever their use has been authorised. The Crew Commander must also issue orders to cease the use of water cannon when the tactical objective has been achieved or when ordered to do so by the Water Cannon Commander.

A Crew Commander (nominated by the Water Cannon Commander) will cause a warning(s) to be given to the crowd using the on-board public address system when available. Details of date, time, method and wording of the warning(s) should be recorded by the person issuing the warning.

Crew Commanders will ensure records are kept in respect of the use of water cannon, including records of date, time, place of authorisation and use.

Crew Commanders will be responsible for ensuring that water cannon crews wear protective clothing and equipment appropriate to the level of threat pertaining to the circumstances.

The Crew Commander is responsible for the filling of the water cannon with water. To this end he will ensure correct procedures are followed at all times.

Role of Water Cannon Commanders

When two or more water cannon vehicles are deployed the senior Crew Commander will act as the overall Water Cannon Commander unless an additional officer has been specifically appointed. When authority for the use of water cannon has been given, the Water Cannon Commander will brief and instruct the Crew Commanders and crews as to the tactical objective(s). A record of authorisations, times etc. must be made at the time or as soon as possible thereafter (by the Water Cannon Commander, Crew Commanders and the relevant Bronze Commander) for evidential purposes.

The Water Cannon Commander is responsible for the overall safety of the water cannons, any escort and support vehicles and their crews.

Water Cannon Commanders/Crew Commanders are trained to provide Tactical Advice to Gold, Silver and Bronze Commanders. If an additional Water Cannon Commander has been appointed he or she can operate from within the vehicle or in close proximity outside the vehicle, providing communications can be maintained by the use of radio/intercom.

Water Cannon Operators

Water Cannon Operators control the use of the jets and must be appropriately trained and qualified.

In undertaking this role the operators must take account of the considerations set out in 'Considerations for Deployment and Use of Water Cannon' of this guidance.

Water Cannon Drivers

Drivers must be trained in driving water cannon and hold appropriate driving licences and internal police service qualifications for this category of vehicle.

Drivers have a great responsibility for the safety of the crew and the public when moving to and from deployments and during operational use and must therefore drive in a safe, responsible manner appropriate to road conditions, crowd conditions and general traffic legislation.

Selection of Personnel

Water Cannon Commanders and crews are selected on the basis of the following criteria:

- a) Length of service and relevant experience
- b) Attitudes and approach to work
- c) Motivation and interests
- d) Temperament, maturity and personality
- e) Relationships with colleagues and supervisors (teamwork)
- f) Personal Skills and competencies
- g) They are Public Order trained
- h) Only those officers who are capable of displaying a mature and professional approach to public order policing should be selected.

Medical Considerations

Police officers will ensure that assistance and medical aid, where possible, are secured for any injured or affected person(s) that they are aware of at the earliest possible opportunity.

The relatives and close friends of the injured or affected person should be notified at the earliest possible opportunity

Where it is known that death or injury has been caused by the use of water canon, the police officer becoming aware will report the matter promptly to his or her supervisor.

(Sourced from United Nations' Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, Article 5 and Article 6.)

Records

Water cannon vehicles are equipped with electronic means of recoding data including date and time of use, the pressure set at any specific time by the Crew Commander, the pressure and flow rates used by the individual cannon operators and the duration of each use and the temperature of water in the water tank. The Crew Commander, who is in charge of a specific vehicle and is responsible for all technical aspects, will ensure the recording equipment is tested prior to deployment. If it is not working and cannot be repaired in time before necessary deployment the Crew Commander will ensure these records are recorded manually. The water Cannon Commander will ensure that records are maintained for all vehicles under his or her command.

Water cannon vehicles are equipped with video cameras mounted beside each cannon, behind the front windscreen and on a telescopic mast mounted to the rear of the cab. An additional two cameras are mounted at the rear of the body as a safety aid for the driver before reversing.

Whilst the images from cameras will be recorded during operational deployment water cannon are not intended for primary use as an evidence-gathering platform. The cannon mounted cameras are primarily intended to be an aiming aid for the cannon operators before the cannons are used. When in use the spray from the water jets generally obscures the image that these cameras can capture.

The combination of the various cameras means the crew has 360⁰ vision around the vehicle, primarily for road safety purposes and the safety of the crew and others deployed in the vicinity. Images from this camera will also be recorded and when water cannons are in use the mast mounted camera should be forward facing to capture images from above the water jets, although these images may also be obscured by spray depending on prevailing conditions.

During the deployment the Crew Commander should at the time, or as soon as possible thereafter, make contemporaneous notes concerning deployment and use of water cannon. At the end of the deployment the overall Water Cannon Commander will submit a report to the officer in charge of the operation through normal channels which may be used as necessary for local debriefing purposes or to assist in any form of investigation.

The Crew Commander will ensure data and images recorded during operational deployment are downloaded from the data recorder, logged and stored in accordance with existing Force instructions and practice in respect of the storage of electronic data for evidential purposes.

RESTRICTED

All equipment required for the recording of data and images must be tested frequently and any faults reported for prompt attention and repair. If during operational use the Crew Commander becomes aware of any defects in this equipment they must make a contemporaneous note of this and take all reasonable steps to record events by other means including contemporaneous notes.

RESTRICTED

Screening Smoke

Screening smoke may only be used in accordance with the following guidance, supported by the following requirements:

- Risk and Threat Assessment.
- Human Rights Compliance.

Objectives

Screening smoke must only be used in situations of extreme public disorder where:

- Conventional methods of policing have been tried and failed or are unlikely to succeed if tried.
- Where such action is necessary because of the risk of:
 - Loss of life or serious injury or,
 - Widespread destruction of property and,
- Where such action is judged likely to reduce that risk.

Levels of Training

- Trained and competent at Level 2.
- Trained, competent and refreshed in PSP as shown in Centrex guidance.
- Trained and competent in the use, storage and maintenance of Screening Smoke.

Methodology

- Screening smoke may be used to assist the police to achieve crowd dispersal and arrests.
- It may be used as a barrier or diversionary tactic to conceal movements or deployment of police and may be particularly useful where strategic withdrawal is a necessity.
- In all cases when smoke is used the crowd must have suitable avenues of escape.

Considerations

- This option may only be sanctioned by the direct personal authorisation of or above the rank of Assistant Chief Constable or Commander.
- It may only be used by officers trained in its use and under the supervision of a designated officer of at least the rank of Inspector who must satisfy himself that the situation still justifies the use of screening smoke and that the criteria for use is met before directing that screening smoke can be used.
- There is a risk in using screening smoke in that:
 - i) The crowd may suspect that fire has started or that the smoke is CS Agent or contains other harmful chemicals.
 - ii) Its use may lead to allegations that it was used to cover unlawful or questionable police activity; or
 - iii) The crowd may use the cover to loot or commit damage outside the view of the police.

RESTRICTED

- Where practicable warning messages in the prescribed form should precede the use of smoke. These warnings should emphasise that it is smoke and not CS Agent, which is being used.
- Screening smoke is not incapacitating through inhalation therefore respirators or masks are of no benefit.
- Records must be maintained and Chief Officers should supply a written report on the circumstances of each tactical use.
- All officers should receive information, instruction and training in the reason for use and the potential affects on both the crowd and themselves.

CS Smoke

ACPO GUIDELINES (as approved by the Home Secretary)

Circulated by ACPO Public Order Sub-committee (June 2001)

Use of CS Smoke in Situations of Serious Public Disorder

Introduction

Separate guidelines have been issued on the use of hand-held CS aerosol incapacitates for personal protection.

CS is not a gas; it is a crystalline particulate. The carrier for the CS particulate may be liquid, micronised powder or smoke. CS used in public order situations is normally carried in smoke.

When someone is exposed to CS the effects are: pain and discomfort in the eyes which causes excessive watering, involuntary spasm of the eyelids, leading to blinking or closure of the eyes, burning sensation in the nose and throat, excessive nasal secretion, excessive salivation, burning and constriction of the chest, sneezing, coughing, retching and a stinging or burning sensation on the exposed skin. The effect may be virtually instantaneous, delayed by up to 20 seconds, or there may be no effect at all. For this reason, officers must not rely on CS as their only tactical option but must be prepared to draw on other appropriate response options. CS will affect those who wear glasses or contact lenses.

The use of CS against persons who have previously suffered from bronchitis or asthma may precipitate an attack, but this will be similar in every way to a natural attack. Persons suffering from heart conditions and from epilepsy are not likely to be directly affected by CS, but the excitement of the situation in which CS is used may precipitate an attack.

Although police dogs are conscious of the presence of CS, they are not affected in the same way as human beings. They are able to work quite happily and produce similar results as when working in non-contaminated areas. Tests conducted in areas concentrated with CS have proved the dog to be capable of tracking, finding articles, barking at disorderly crowds and attacking. Where the level of CS is far beyond that which a human being can endure, dogs and horses show no signs of anxiety.

Public disorder includes a wide spectrum of unlawful activity, which, at the upper level may include serious rioting. In these situations conventional public order policing responses may have been tried and failed; and taking account of the level of violence and the risk to officers, be considered no longer appropriate. Where on the basis of a risk assessment of existing intelligence, it is believed that serious disorder would involve a risk of loss of life, serious injury or significant damage to property, an officer of Assistant Chief Constable/Commander rank may, with the prior agreement of the Chief Constable of Police, deploy officers who are trained in the use of suitable CS munitions as a less than lethal contingency in dealing with serious disorder. In addition, where there is reason to believe that lethal weapons may be used, it will be appropriate to consider the deployment of specially trained officers armed with conventional firearms.

These instructions should read in conjunction with the Police Health and Safety Manual, Volume Three, Appendix 'A'.

As with all applications of force, there remains a potential for unintended serious injury. Whilst exposure to CS is not life threatening, there is potential for injury from the discharge of canisters or projectiles used to disperse CS particulate. The design and use of CS munitions are, therefore, subject to strict criteria. These guidelines take account of the continuing developments in the design criteria, command, control and training, all of which are designed to reduce the potential for serious and life threatening injuries. Nothing in these guidelines should be construed so as to constrain the police service in its fundamental responsibility to save life, protect property and maintain the peace. Police officers shall at all times fulfil the duty imposed on them by law, by serving the community and by protecting all persons against illegal acts, consistent with the high degree of responsibility required by their profession. In discharging their duties police officers will be cognisant of the provisions of the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and of their obligations to uphold Human Rights.

This document provides guidelines in responding to these levels of threat and on the use of CS munitions.

CS munitions are designed to provide a less than lethal option when dealing with threats of serious violence and provide an effective means by which persons involved in disorder can be dispersed.

In public order situations, CS should only be used:

- Where conventional methods of policing have been tried and failed, or must from the nature of the circumstances, be unlikely to succeed if tried; and
- Where their use is judged to be necessary to reduce a serious risk of:
 - ◊ Loss of life or serious injury; or
 - ◊ Substantial and serious damage to property where there is or is judged to be a sufficiently serious risk of loss of life or serious injury to justify their use; and
- In assessing the risk of loss of life or serious injury occurring, account should be taken of the risks to police officers and members of the emergency services, as well as to members of the public or others.

Individual Force Policies on Weaponry and Equipment

Responsibility for setting the policy as to weapons and equipment, which may be used, in any Force area rests with the Chief Officer of Police. Where this equipment includes CS munitions for use in public order situations, the Chief Officer may delegate authority of the deployment of this equipment to an officer of Assistant Chief Constable/Commander rank. Such delegated authority may be for a specified time period or within a specific geographical location or for a particular operation.

Use of Force - Legal Provisions

Nothing in these guidelines affects the legal principles pertaining to the use of reasonable force as provided for under:

- The common-law duty to preserve the peace.
- The common-law rules of self-defence.

RESTRICTED

- The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Section 117.
- The Criminal Law Act 1967, Section 3 which states:

“A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large”.

The appropriateness of using CS will be subject to the combined tests of necessity and proportionality: in that, the objective cannot be achieved by a lesser degree of force and that the anticipated injury or harm to be prevented is greater than the harm which is likely to be caused by the use of CS munitions.

Conditions of Use

Only CS munitions of a type authorised by the Home Office for dealing with serious disorder in the open air may be used. Details of the approved equipment are included in the ACPO police user manual.

Wherever CS is to be used, attention should be paid to the direction in which the wind is likely to carry the smoke containing CS particulate. Police officers downwind and without protection are likely to experience severe discomfort. Police should therefore wear respirators or protective facelets wherever possible. The use of CS in public order situations should be subject to comprehensive risk assessment. Health and Safety legislation should be fully complied with.

Warnings

Unless circumstances do not permit, CS munitions are to be used only after an oral warning, for example by means of a loudhailer or PA system, has been given to the crowd to disperse. The warning should make clear that, unless the rioting stops or the crowd disperses CS will be used without further warning. A record is to be kept of the words used in giving the warning. The following words should be used whenever possible:

<p>“Attention, attention, this is a police warning.</p> <p>Disperse immediately or *</p> <p>*(Baton Rounds) (Water Cannon) (other named tactical option)</p> <p>will be **”</p> <p>** (deployed) (used) (used again)</p> <p>The above warning(s) should be given on as many times as is reasonably practicable in the circumstances, ensuring that police intentions to deploy tactical options and/or use force are clearly communicated, prior to use.</p> <p>When the use of specific tactical options/force is imminent, a final warning message should be given, ending with the words:</p> <p>“No further warning will be given.”</p>

NOTE: This updated warning is based on the current Water Cannon, and Baton Round approved guidance dated March 2004.

Medical Assistance

Steps are to be taken to ensure that medical attention is provided at the earliest opportunity for anyone who has been exposed to CS. First Aid to suspects must be delayed until they have been secured and any threat neutralised.

Decontamination - The first principle is to allow the small particles of CS to blow off the skin and clothing. This is best achieved by removing the subject from the area where the CS has been deployed into fresh air and allowing them to face into the wind. The significant effects of CS will normally subside within 15 minutes, provided the person has moved to a non-contaminated area.

If there is no improvement within this time, it may be necessary to irrigate with copious amount of clean cold water or saline solution.

CS is broken down in water. It is important to use copious amounts of water; otherwise there is the possibility of a weak solution of CS being spread over a wider area, increasing the initial discomfort.

Pre-planned Operations

In situations where serious public disorder is anticipated an officer of Assistant Chief Constable/Commander rank may, with the prior agreement of the Chief Officer of Police, give the authority for the deployment of officers trained and equipped with CS.

Command and Control

Policy and Command decisions in respect of the issue, deployment and use of CS should be subject to continuous critical review during the lifetime of any incident. The officer in overall command of the incident (the Gold Commander) should ensure formal review and documentation of the requirement for CS as the disorder enters each new phase.

Authority for Use

Before a decision to use CS in public disorder is put into effect, a designated senior officer will, by virtue of an on the ground assessment, confirm that the situation is sufficiently serious to justify the use of CS, and that the criteria for use will continue to be met. The Silver Commander will only use CS following authorisation.

Designated senior officers (DSOs) will be drawn from the Superintending and Inspecting ranks and will be fully trained for the role by virtue of a course approved nationally by the Association of Chief Police Officers.

DSOs will have a detailed understanding of public order tactics and the guidelines governing the use of CS. The DSO will ensure that effective processes are in place for the direction and control of officers equipped with CS who have been specifically trained in the use of the equipment and know its characteristics.

Strict criteria applicable to the selection and training of officers equipped to discharge CS will ensure proficiency with the equipment through thorough understanding of the conditions relating to its use, the injury potential and characteristics of CS.

Reports

Officers who discharge CS during public disorder must complete reports pertaining to the reason for discharging CS and information about the outcome and number of CS projectiles discharged. The record should also list any known injuries that may have occurred as a result of using CS.

The Chief Officer should provide the respective Secretary of State for the Home Department with a written report on the circumstances surrounding the use of CS in public order situations as soon after the event as possible.

Records

All command decisions in respect of the issue, deployment and authority to use CS should be fully recorded and documented. The DSO will be responsible for documenting the assessment of the situation and rationale pertaining to the decision to recommend the use of CS. In addition, commanders will ensure that a record is maintained of the discharge of CS and those officers who discharge CS complete reports pertaining to the discharge.

Spontaneous Disorder

Chief Constables must have contingency plans for the availability and deployment of CS in emergency situations. These should provide for the availability and deployment of CS resource and establishment of appropriate command structures to enable an effective response to serious spontaneous disorder. As in pre-planned operations an officer of Assistant Chief Constable/Commander rank may, with the prior agreement of the Chief Officer of Police, give authority for the deployment of officers trained and equipped with baton guns. The officer authorising deployment will ensure formal review and documentation of the requirement for CS as the disorder enters each new phase.

The contingency plans should provide for the introduction of formalised command and control structures with the minimum of delay, however nothing in these guidelines should be construed so as to prevent an immediate and effective police response or the discharge of CS where its use is necessary. CS may only be used if the strict criteria set out above, are met.

The requirement to deploy officers equipped with CS should be formally reviewed by an officer of at least Assistant Chief Constable rank on a regular basis.

Baton Rounds in Public Order

Policy and Guidelines on the Use of Baton Rounds in Situations of Serious Public Disorder

Introduction

The Heckler and Koch baton gun designated the L104Aa1 was introduced into service in 1994, as part of a common weapon system, to be used during serious public disorder, by police forces and the armed services within the United Kingdom.

A new baton round designated the L21A1, designed to be fired from the L104Aa1, entered operational service in June 2001. The new round, when used with the new optical sight designated the L18A1 (as it always should be) is consistently more accurate than the older design of baton rounds and the probability of it causing serious or life threatening injuries has been reduced.

A collimator has also been provided to assist in checking the zero of the weapon, instructions on its use are contained at Annex 'A' to this Guidance *page 158*.

As with all applications of force, there is a potential for unintended serious and even fatal injury. The design and use of the baton round system is therefore subject to strict criteria. Baton rounds of the approved design may only be used as part of the common weapon system approved for use by members of the police service or HM Forces in the United Kingdom.

The system has also been approved for use as a less lethal weapon augmenting the range of options available to police officers when responding to non-public order situations requiring the deployment of conventional firearms.

This document provides guidance on the deployment and use of baton rounds in situations of serious public disorder.

These revised guidelines take account of the most recent developments in the weapon system, baton round design, command protocols and training, all of which are designed to reduce the potential for serious and life threatening injuries. Nothing in these guidelines should be construed so as to constrain the police service in its fundamental responsibility to save life, protect property and maintain the peace. Police officers shall at all times fulfil the duty imposed on them by law, by serving the community - and by protecting all persons against illegal acts, consistent with the high degree of responsibility required by their profession. In discharging their duties police officers will be cognisant of the provisions of the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officers and of their obligations to uphold human rights. Article 3 C of the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officers is specific in stating that:

'The use of firearms is considered an extreme measure. Every effort should be made to exclude the use of firearms, especially against children. In general, firearms should not be used except when a suspected offender offers armed resistance or otherwise jeopardizes the lives of others and less extreme measures are not sufficient to restrain or apprehend the suspected offender.'

RESTRICTED

In particular every effort should be made to ensure that children are not placed at risk by the firing of baton rounds in public order situations and children should not be directly targeted unless their actions are presenting an immediate threat to life or serious injury, which cannot otherwise be countered. For the purpose of these instructions this provision, in relation to children, will apply to the use of baton rounds in public order situations.

These revised guidelines take account of the most recent developments in the weapon system, baton round design, command protocols and training, all of which are designed to reduce the potential for serious and life threatening injuries. Nothing in these guidelines should be construed so as to constrain the police service in its fundamental responsibility to save life, protect property and maintain the peace. Police officers shall at all times fulfil the duty imposed on them by law, by serving the community - and by protecting all persons against illegal acts, consistent with the high degree of responsibility required by their profession. In discharging their duties police officers will be cognisant of the provisions of the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officers and of their obligations to uphold human rights. Article 3C of the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officers is specific in stating that:

'The use of firearms is considered an extreme measure. Every effort should be made to exclude the use of firearms, especially against children. In general, firearms should not be used except when a suspected offender offers armed resistance or otherwise jeopardises the lives of others and less extreme measures are not sufficient to restrain or apprehend the suspected offender'.

In particular every effort should be made to ensure that children are not placed at risk by the firing of baton rounds in public order situations and children should not be directly targeted unless their actions are presenting an immediate threat to life or serious injury, which cannot otherwise be countered. For the purpose of these instructions this provision, in relation to children, will apply to the use of baton rounds in public order situations.

Baton rounds represent a less lethal alternative to conventional firearms. Every effort should be made to ensure that children are not placed at risk by the firing of baton rounds in public order situations and children should not be directly targeted unless their actions are presenting an immediate threat to life or serious injury, which cannot otherwise be countered.

Public disorder includes a wide spectrum of unlawful activity, which at the upper level may include serious rioting. In these situations conventional public order policing responses may have been tried and failed; and taking account of the level of violence and the risk to officers be considered no longer appropriate.

Where on the basis of a risk assessment of existing intelligence it is believed that serious rioting would involve a risk of loss of life, serious injury or significant damage to property, an officer of Assistant Chief Constable/Commander rank may, with the prior agreement of the Chief Officer, deploy officers who are trained in the use of baton rounds and/or suitable CS munitions as a contingency in dealing with serious disorder. Such delegated authority may be for a specified time period, or within a specific geographical location or for a particular operation.

In addition where there is reason to believe that lethal weapons may be used it will be appropriate to consider the deployment of specially trained officers armed with conventional firearms. (These instructions should be read in conjunction with the Police Health and Safety Manual, Volume 3, Three Appendixes A).

In certain circumstances it may be appropriate to deploy specialist firearms officers in public order situations. The deployment of specialist firearm teams in situations of public disorder must be closely co-ordinated and gives rise to specific command issues. For this reason specialist firearms resources should not, in these circumstances, be deployed without the express authority of an officer of at least Assistant Chief Constable/Commander rank.

Baton rounds are designed to provide a less lethal option in dealing with threats of serious violence and provide an effective means by which individuals armed with petrol bombs or other weapons can be kept at a distance, contained or dispersed. Experience has shown that rioters can throw such missiles, with force, for a considerable distance ranging out to approximately 60 metres, depending on the type of object being thrown or fired. In certain circumstances it will therefore be appropriate to maintain a tactical stand-off distance, where circumstances permit, this should in public order situations be in excess of 20 metres. However baton rounds may be used at closer ranges when absolutely necessary to reduce a serious risk of loss of life or serious injury in accordance with paragraph set out in s.12 of the ACPO Manual of Guidance on the Police Use of Firearms and within 'Conditions of Use' below. Baton rounds also provide a means of keeping at a safe distance those posing a serious threat to life, which would otherwise require the interventions of officers at close quarters potentially placing them at greater risk.

Baton rounds should only be used in a public order situation:

- a) Where other methods of policing to restore or sustain public order have been tried and failed, or must from the nature of the circumstances be unlikely to succeed if tried, and
- b) Where their use is judged to be necessary to reduce a serious risk of:
 - i) Loss of life or serious injury or;
 - ii) Substantial and serious damage to property where there is, or is judged to be, a sufficiently serious risk of loss of life or serious injury to justify their use.

In assessing the risk of loss of life or serious injury occurring, account should be taken of the risks to police officers and members of the emergency services as well as to members of the public and others.

Use of Force; Legal Provisions

Every effort should be made to ensure that children are not placed at risk by the firing of baton rounds in public order situations and children should not be directly targeted unless their actions are presenting an immediate threat to life or serious injury, which cannot otherwise be countered. Nothing in these guidelines affects the legal principles pertaining to the use of reasonable force as provided for under:

RESTRICTED

'The common law duty to preserve the peace, the common law rules of self-defence, The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 sec 117, Article 88 Police and Criminal Evidence Order (Northern Ireland) 1989 and Section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967, Section 3 Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1967 which states'

'A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large.'

The reasonableness of individual action will be subject to the combined tests of necessity and proportionality; in that, the objective cannot be achieved by a lesser degree of force, and that the anticipated injury or harm to be prevented is greater than the harm which is likely to be caused by the firing of a baton round.

European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)

When making a determination as to whether the level of force used was lawful in any particular instance the courts will take cognisance of the Articles under the ECHR.

It is recognised that the use of a baton round has in certain circumstances the potential for lethal consequences and, as such, Article 2 of the ECHR is of particular relevance when the Police Service uses them.

The test of absolute necessity found in Article 2 provides a stricter test of proportionality than is required in other areas of the Convention. It is also a stricter test than is provided by the concept of reasonable force within s.3 Criminal Law Act 1967, s.117 of Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, the equivalent Northern Ireland legislation and the Common Law. Even where the use of force may be seen as being reasonable it may not be absolutely necessary. In addition the use of force must be based on an honestly held belief that it is necessary, which is perceived for good reasons to be valid at the time.

Conditions of Use

Only baton rounds and baton guns of a type authorised by the Home Office may be used. Details of the approved equipment are included in the ACPO police user manual.

Baton guns are not to be loaded unless their use is imminent.

Baton Gun Commanders, in charge of tactical formations which contain Baton Gunners, will be responsible for giving directions to Baton Gunners including instructions to load and unload, authority to fire and directions to cease firing.

Warnings

Unless circumstances do not permit, baton rounds are to be fired only after an oral warning, for example by means of a loud hailer or PA system has been given to the crowd to disperse. The warning should make clear that, unless the rioting stops or the crowd disperses, baton rounds would be used without further warning. A record is to be kept of the words used in giving the warning.

RESTRICTED

The following words should be used whenever possible:

**“Attention, attention, this is a police warning.
Disperse immediately or *.....
*(Baton Rounds) (Water Cannon) (other named tactical option)
will be **”**

**(deployed) (used) (used again)

The above warning(s) should be given on as many times as is reasonably practicable in the circumstances, ensuring that police intentions to deploy tactical options and/or use force are clearly communicated, prior to use.

When the use of specific tactical options/force is imminent, a final warning message should be given, ending with the words:

“No further warning will be given.”

If a tactic is to be used over a period of time, or a large area, it may be desirable to repeat the warning message(s).

Baton rounds should be fired at selected individuals and not indiscriminately at the crowd. Baton rounds should be aimed to strike directly (without bouncing) the lower parts of the subject’s body i.e. below the rib cage. Baton Gunners are trained to use the belt-buckle area as the point of aim, at all ranges thus militating against upper body hits.

Unless there is a serious and immediate risk to life, which cannot otherwise be countered, use at less than one metre or aiming the weapon to strike a higher part of the body is prohibited. In these circumstances the risk of serious and even fatal injuries is increased and the firer must be able to justify the increased use of force.

Steps are to be taken to ensure that medical attention is provided at the earliest opportunity for any casualties.

When possible, baton rounds should be recovered.

Baton Gunners may be deployed on foot or in specially adapted protected vehicles from which baton rounds may be fired. Baton rounds should not be fired from moving vehicles. Tactical formations will differ dependent on the local circumstances and resources of a particular force.

Reports

Baton Gunners must complete reports pertaining to the reason for firing baton rounds and information about the outcome and number of rounds fired. The record should also list any known injuries that may have occurred as a result of using baton rounds.

In England and Wales the Chief Officer should supply to the Home Secretary a written report on the circumstances surrounding the firing of baton rounds as soon as possible after the incident. In Northern Ireland there is a requirement to inform the Northern Ireland Policing

Board of any operational discharge of a baton round. The Police Ombudsman is also informed.

Pre-Planned Operations

In situations where serious public disorder is anticipated an officer of Assistant Chief Constable/Commander rank may, with the prior agreement of the Chief Officer of Police, give authority for the deployment of officers trained and equipped with baton guns.

Command

Policy and command decisions in respect of the issue, deployment and use of baton rounds should be subject to continuous critical review during the lifetime of any incident. The officer in overall command of the incident (the Gold Commander) should ensure formal review and documentation of the requirement for baton guns as the disorder enters each new phase.

Authority for Use

Before a decision to use baton rounds is put into effect, a designated senior officer, will by virtue of an on the ground assessment, confirm that the situation is sufficiently serious to justify the use of baton rounds, and that the criteria for use continues to be met. Except where urgent action is necessary, in circumstances where there is an immediate risk to life, baton rounds will only be used following authorisation by the Silver Commander.

Designated Senior Officers (DSOs) should be accredited public order commanders drawn from the Superintending and Inspecting ranks and will be fully trained for the role by virtue of a course approved nationally by the Association of Chief Police Officers. DSOs will have a detailed understanding of public order tactics, the characteristic of the baton round system and guidelines governing their use. They will also be aware and familiar with the principles and tactics associated with command of a situation where officers armed with conventional firearms require to be deployed. The designated senior officer will ensure that effective processes are in place for direction and control of Baton Gun Commanders and Baton Gunners who have been specifically trained in the use of the equipment and know its characteristics.

Strict criteria applicable to the selection and training of Baton Gun Commanders and Baton Gunners will ensure proficiency with the weaponry, thorough understanding of the conditions relating to its use, the injury potential and characteristics of baton rounds. Baton Gunners deployed within a public order situation should be fully trained in public order policing and regularly complete baton gun training within that context.

Records

All command decisions in respect of the issue, deployment and authority to use baton rounds should be fully recorded and documented. The DSO will be responsible for documenting the assessment of the situation and rationale pertaining to the decision to recommend the use of baton rounds. In addition Baton Gun Commanders will ensure that a record is maintained of the firing of baton guns and that Baton Gunners complete reports pertaining to the firing of baton rounds.

Spontaneous Disorder

Chief Constables must have contingency plans for the availability and deployment of baton rounds in emergency situations. These should provide for the availability and deployment of baton gun resources and establishment of appropriate command structures to enable an effective response to serious spontaneous disorder. As in pre-planned operations an officer of Assistant Chief Constable/Commander rank may, with the prior agreement of the Chief Officer of Police, give authority for the deployment of officers trained and equipped with baton guns. The officers authorising deployment will ensure formal review and documentation of the requirement for baton guns, as the disorder enters each new phase.

The contingency plans should provide for the introduction of formalised command structures with the minimum of delay. However; nothing in these guidelines should be construed so as to prevent an immediate and effective police response or the firing of baton rounds where their use is necessary. Baton rounds may only be used if the strict criteria set out above are met.

The requirement to deploy officers with baton rounds should be formally reviewed by an officer of at least Assistant Chief Constable rank on a regular basis.

ANNEX 'A'

Zeroing of the L104A1 Baton Gun and use of the Collimator

The following points should be noted with reference to the Army Infantry Training Pamphlet no. 13, Chapter 2, which contains detailed instructions.

- Zero the weapon using live fire and then establish a personal setting on a collimator for that particular weapon and collimator.
- This setting can only be used with the same combination of weapon and collimator as used in the live firing.
- This setting can be used to confirm that the weapon is still zeroed for the original firer at any subsequent time.
- Should the collimator reading be different to that obtained in the live firing, the sight will need to be adjusted to the original collimator setting. Should the user have any doubts as to the integrity of the weapon system since the last time it was used, it is recommended that the zero be checked by live firing.
- A competent person who has been trained in the adjustment of that sight must carry out adjustment of the L18A1 sight.

Fireworks, Adapted Fireworks, Blast Bombs and Acid Bombs

Guidelines for Forces

Background

The issue of Forces being able to deal effectively with the threat posed by the use of acid bombs, fireworks and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) during incidents of public disorder has been identified as a concern. This is based on the experience within Northern Ireland by the Police Service of Northern Ireland, as well as the increased threat to officers in mainland Forces by the use of fireworks in disorder.

The inclusion of this topic is directed at looking at the foreseeable risks faced by officers in disorder situations. The availability of information through the Internet, publications, news networks, the reporting of serious disorder in Northern Ireland and the general threat posed by extremist individuals, groups and organisations, should be a prompt for Forces to consider the use of appropriate tactics if faced with these devices.

The Use of Fireworks and Adapted Fireworks

Many fireworks are manufactured and sold legitimately within strict safety guidelines, however there are many types of fireworks, sold all year round from commercial outlets throughout the country, that do not conform to these specifications and are readily available from unofficial sources. It is this type of firework that poses the biggest risk in terms of their composition and safety standards.

Certain types of fireworks including 'Rockets' and 'Mortars' have been used against police lines during disorder in Northern Ireland. 'Mortar' fireworks fire one or a number of individual firework 'balls' in the air which then explode. Generally, within disorder, fireworks are launched horizontally or in a low trajectory at police lines.

The use of fireworks against police officers, in itself, presents a risk of injury. However, of even greater concern is the ease in which these fireworks can be adapted in order to potentially cause serious injury.

An adapted firework may consist of a rocket with nails, shards or scraps of metal taped to the outside. Similarly, the mortar firework may be disassembled, nails taped or hammered through the 'balls' inside, then re-assembled ready for use. The adapted firework is then fired, causing the metal fragments to act in a 'shrapnel' effect when the device explodes.

Experience in Northern Ireland indicates that, in the absence of other available information or intelligence it is difficult to differentiate between the use of fireworks, adapted fireworks or blast bombs against officers until they actually explode. It would appear 'normal' fireworks are used, occasionally supplemented by 'adapted' fireworks and/or blast bombs, to cause greater confusion and risk of injury amongst officers.

Use of 'Blast Bombs'

The term 'Blast Bomb' or 'Pipe Bomb' refers to an IED, which can be described as a crude home-made 'hand grenade'. The use of such devices during disorder in Northern Ireland is widespread. This is largely due to the ease and availability of components required in the making of such a device. This type of IED tends to be used by more extreme individuals or groups within a crowd.

Construction of Blast Bombs

Blast bombs typically consist of an outer case, for example a length of copper tubing, plumbing pipes or accessories. One end is sealed using screw caps or crimping and the device is filled with black powder from fireworks or shotgun cartridges. Additional shrapnel may also be attached, such as nails or metal shards. A firework fuse or 'banger' type firework may be used as a fuse or detonator for the device, sealed at the other end. Other initiation devices such as percussion caps and timers have also been used. The device is usually initiated and thrown; on detonation the fragments of metal are capable of causing fatal/serious and multiple injuries and can penetrate standard public order shields and PPE.

These devices can also be made using mild steel tubing or cast iron pipes and fittings and filled wholly or partly with black powder/home-made/other explosive substances. This sort of IED, when exploded, sends larger fragments of metal out in a shrapnel effect and is potentially lethal. The outer and inner casing can also be 'scored' in an attempt to encourage fragmentation on exploding. This sort of device is usually thrown at or in police lines during disorder, but has also been used in 'booby trap' incidents.

Other Considerations

Before considering tactics in dealing with the threat posed by the use of fireworks and IEDs, Forces should also give consideration to their ability to deal with injuries caused to officers and members of the public injured by such devices. This not only includes dealing with blast/trauma injury, but also firework burns, shrapnel injuries and chemical contamination from firework burns.

Awareness of Threat

Identification of the threat of use of these sorts of devices is a major difficulty during incidents of disorder. Apart from information or intelligence that may indicate the intended use of such devices, another way in which officers may anticipate the presence/imminent use of a blast bomb is through crowd behaviour.

Experience indicates that, on occasions, a crowd may suddenly part, allowing a person carrying the device to move into a position to throw it towards officers. The crowd may quickly 'take cover' and return after the device has exploded. These devices are unstable and carry a high risk of injury to the thrower and/or bystanders once lit.

Awareness of fragments/shrapnel accompanying fireworks/explosions may also indicate the use of adapted fireworks or IEDs.

Police Tactics

Current tactics and PPE should provide adequate protection against the use of standard fireworks on police lines.

It is essential that, once the threat from improvised devices has been established, there is an appropriate reaction to minimise the potential for injury. Immediate action is required if the device explodes.

When dealing with adapted fireworks and blast bombs, the preferable option is for officers to distance themselves and/or seek, hard cover as quickly as possible. Where available, officers may return to either their armoured Land Rover or other protective vehicles.

Hard cover, such as walls, buildings, etc will provide initial protection against most devices, but officers should not remain within the immediate area and should move to a safe distance at the earliest opportunity.

Once the presence of an unexploded device, having been thrown, is confirmed, officers should use their shields to face the direction of the device, whilst distancing themselves and/or seeking hard cover as quickly as possible. A public order shield will not normally provide ballistic protection; however, this action may minimise the risk of injury as far as is reasonably practicable, should the device explode prior to finding hard cover or reaching a suitable safe distance. The nature of the device makes it impossible to predict how the IED will fragment upon detonation. In the absence of available hard cover, officers should distance themselves from the IED as far as practicable, lying flat and using the shield to maximise protection. Current guidelines and experience indicates that 100 metres is the minimum recommended safe distance from this sort of IED.

The key points in reacting to **a device that is thrown, but does not explode** is as follows:

- Establish safe distance of 100 metres minimum if possible.
- Use shield to face threat when reacting, if possible.
- When distance is limited, hard cover may afford additional protection.
- Officers adopting a prone position together with the use of a shield to deflect shrapnel can also achieve risk reduction, at distance from the device.
- The location of the unexploded device should be noted for follow up action.

Should the IED fail to explode, it should be dealt with in accordance with established EOD (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) procedures.

Follow up action which can be further considered to minimise any continued threat from such devices, could include the following:

- The withdrawal of unprotected resources.
- The creation of a sterile area between the crowd and police officers (using available tactical options) to a distance large enough to prevent further devices being thrown at police lines.
- Tactics to immediately advance upon, disrupt and disperse the crowd.

The use of fireworks, adapted fireworks and IEDs against officers may also prompt consideration for the use of other tactical options, which require additional authorisation / warnings before use.

Acid Bombs

Forces should also consider how officers should react when faced with the use of acid/corrosive substances during disorder.

In addition to thrown acid bombs, PSNI officers have faced an additional threat where offenders have discharged syringes of liquid at officers, normally by striking the syringes against hard objects or parts of their own bodies to 'fire' the liquid at close range. Any officer affected in such a way should be immediately withdrawn, and the affected area immediately irrigated with water. The effects of inhalation of the fumes/vapour should also be considered and immediate medical attention should be sought. Every effort should be made to identify the solution used, its method of application and affects. This will enhance the future assessments of risk, the identification of subsequent control strategies and therefore the awareness of tactical considerations.

Conclusion

The above information deals purely with the tactical considerations and actions in dealing with the threat posed by the use of fireworks, IEDs and acid bombs. It takes no account of the need to secure and preserve evidence in relation to prosecuting relevant offences, which will require additional considerations.

It should be emphasised that standard PSU protected vehicles should not normally be relied upon to provide adequate protection against IEDs.

Forces should consider providing PSU officers with an awareness and training in tactics to be used if faced by such a threat, based upon their own Force risk/threat assessments, and consider their ability to provide first aid to officers and members of the public injured by such devices accordingly. This should include an ability to deal with burns and phosphorus injuries.

Phosphorus can be found in some types of imported fireworks; burns from this chemical should not be treated with water, as this will cause a further chemical reaction. The availability of water gel blankets or similar products in initially treating burns should be considered, prior to seeking further medical attention.

This is a general summary of the description and threat posed by acid bombs, fireworks and IEDs during disorder. Further information and technical details on type and specification of blast bombs in particular is available through PSNI and other agencies. It is stressed that the type and appearance of IEDs within Northern Ireland are continually changing, as do the tactics used by the Security Forces in meeting these challenges.

9. ADDITIONAL OPERATIONAL TACTICS

Protestor Removal - Locked-On (passive)

Objective

- To remove participants in protests where Lock-Ons are not utilised.
- To remove participants in protests where additional direct action tactics are used by participants, e.g. Lock-Ons.

Level of Training (Prior to deployment)

- Trained and competent in PSP.
- Dependent upon the associated assessment, officers may be trained to either Level 3 or Level 2 Public Order Tactics.
- Receive information and instruction in relation to their role.
- Role related Manual/Kinetic Handling.

Methodology

Prior to deploying this tactic the PSU Commander will need to ensure that the individuals are available for the following roles:

- Person Removal Teams
- Arrest teams
- EGT
- Prisoner Processing Teams.

The PSU Commander should ensure that individuals involved in this type of protest are provided with an opportunity to leave without police intervention. All police actions should be recorded by an EGT.

Where individuals decide to maintain their protest, the commander should ensure that suitable warning(s) is issued, for example:

“You are by your actions committing the offence of ”

“I would now ask that you remove this obstruction”

An appropriate delay and a further repeat warning should be given:

“Is there anything I can reasonably say or do that will get you to remove this obstruction?”

“I must warn you that we will now take steps to remove this obstruction and we will use reasonable force. Will you now remove this obstruction?”

RESTRICTED

If this request is ignored then when directed to do so by the Commander, designated removal officers should approach the line and identify the best location from which to apply any primary control techniques. They will need to identify themselves as police officers as follows:

“I am, will you please move?”

“Is there anything I can reasonably say or do that will make you comply with our request?”

“If you do not move reasonable force will be used.”

The ‘Lock-On’ team (if appropriate) should be deployed to carry out their task(s) as required.

If the individual fails to move and all efforts to ensure their removal have failed then the officer should prepare to use an appropriate primary control skill where necessary. As this is being done the second officer will need to ensure that the person to whom they are linked does not prevent the first person from being removed. If they do then the second officer may need to use the following or a similar phrase to assist in the first persons removal.

“I am, I require you to release grip.”

Is there anything I can reasonably say or do that will make you comply with our request?”

“If you do not comply reasonable force will be used.”

In conjunction with the above an appointed Supervisor should ensure that there are two officers available to assist in lifting, removing and arresting the first person. As part of this process these two officers should be either recorded on video or photographed with this person in accordance with any prearranged processing systems being invoked.

This tactic will need to be controlled by Commanders and Supervisors so as to ensure that resources are not depleted to an extent where the situation becomes unmanageable and therefore increases the risk to safety, of litigation and to any subsequent prosecutions.

Considerations

- Further advice and guidance may be sought through NCPE, Uniformed Operations Support.
- Whether police are primarily responsible for the removal of persons from the location.
- Ensure that officers are appropriately equipped, have received relevant information and trained in the use of any equipment used to remove any ‘Lock-On’.
- Any ‘Lock-On’ should be removed, prior to deploying officers to use any force or further force to remove individual.
- Commanders will need to ensure the availability of appropriately trained officers and resources for the application of this tactic.

RESTRICTED

- All officers involved should receive appropriate information instruction and training in relation to relevant legal issues and powers and their role in the application of this tactic.
- Rotation of individuals and teams of individuals involved in applying this tactic where appropriate.
- Continuity of application and process for the accurate recording of evidence for subsequent prosecutions.
- That only proportionate force is used in order to move individuals.
- In applying primary control techniques that the individual involved is not required to attempt to move in a manner that is impossible in the circumstances.
- Appropriate provision of facilities for the detention and disposal of arrested persons.
- All statements and evidence is completed and secured prior to completion of that duty period.

Arrest Teams

Objectives

During situations involving disorder, arrest teams may be used to identify ringleaders or agitators and can prevent or reduce disorder by their prompt arrest for offences committed prior to, during, or after serious disorder.

Their use may support the collation of evidence to support their prosecution and identify property stolen by or recovered from them.

They may be utilised to identify and interview witnesses and execute search and arrest warrants.

Level of Training (Minimum requirement before deployment)

- Level 2 trained officers, with additional training where identified in specific threat and risk assessments for area and regional requirements.
- Trained and competent in PSP refreshed in accordance with Centrex Guidelines.
- Trained in the use, maintenance, replacement procedures and storage of their work and personal protective equipment.

Methodology

Arrest teams can be split into 4 main categories:

- 1) Pre-emptive arrests based on intelligence and evidence collated can be instrumental in defusing a volatile situation. This will provide Commanders with the opportunity to corroborate or dismiss general intelligence and specific items of information.
- 2) Arrest teams deployed during disorder by Silver and Bronze Commanders.
- 3) Arrest teams to arrest offenders from information provided by FIT/EGTs throughout and ongoing public order event.
- 4) Retrospective arrests and raids to secure and preserve evidence of offences.

Dedicated arrest teams should be identified to meet operational requirements; they would be deployed and managed in accordance with existing command structures and tactical plans.

The team, during a disorder event would consist of an Inspector, four Sergeants and sixteen Constables, sub-divided into four units. Supervisory ranks would be a number of such teams deployed; they would be co-ordinated by the SIO in consultation with Silver Commanders and supporting Gold Commander's strategy.

CID officers should be issued with suitable equipment in accordance with that issued to PSU officers, i.e. flame-retardant overalls and marked riot helmets. Teams should have access to surveillance suitable vehicles, either unmarked and/or protected vehicles, fitted with suitable radios. In addition to standard personal radio, the provision of a unit-to-unit secure radio system is also desirable, as is direct communication between the co-ordinator of the teams and any observation posts, which may have been set up.

Arrest Teams should be deployed and abide by systems and procedures structured to support the continuity of arrest evidence. This should be linked to effective liaison with local C.P.S office, so as to support a comprehensive custody and interviewing procedure, directed at providing appropriate corroboration during arrest, detention and disposal of detainees. This will reduce the likelihood of conflicting evidence, whilst increasing the potential for accurate and successful prosecution(s).

Considerations

- The use of arrest teams at an early stage may increase the availability of intelligence and the preservation and securing of evidence.
- Considerable discretion must be exercised in the deployment of Arrest Teams, as such action may become a precipitating factor for disorder.
- It may enhance, corroborate or dismiss general intelligence or specific information and to monitor the activities of known agitators and may also identify hitherto unknown activists.
- The premature formation of such teams may be wasteful in terms of resources. It may also affect the relationships with the community and attract adverse publicity.
- Arrest teams may be deployed covertly or overtly depending upon operational requirements and appropriate risk assessments.

Additional - Corridor / Room Search

Objective

- To search enclosed spaces where force has been used or there is a threat of force against officers requiring a systematic approach.
- The overall aim of building/corridor searching is to secure premises by conducting a thorough search as far as reasonably practicable with minimum risk to officers.

Level of Training (Minimum standard prior to this training)


- Officers within the respective serials will be a Level 3 and PSP trained officers.
- Role related Manual/Kinetic Handling Techniques.

Methodology

The layout of the enclosed space should be assessed and officers with either long or intermediate locking shields should take up position across the enclosed space. It should be noted that whilst interlocking shields might provide a more effective barrier against force they can prevent officers retaining flexibility, particularly when the size of the enclosed space varies and speed and manoeuvrability are desirable.

The principles when engaged on searches where width of space varies greatly, is that the front line of shields should form a consistent and even barrier, should extend from building line to building line and should progress at a safe speed, under strict control of the unit's supervision. The following methods assist in promoting such flexibility.

Formation of the Team




- 1) Two officers cover the corridor to the front.
- 2) Two officers cover the sides ready to secure any doorways the teams come across.
- 3) A Supervisor stands in the middle ready to direct any room searches and to control the team's movement.
- 4) The remainder of the PSU stand in pairs ready for deployment.

- 5) The Supervisor stands behind the first pair of standby officers, to control overall movement of the PSU.

The commands used, by the appointed Supervisor, to move the PSU to the first doorway are:

“The objective is to stop prior to the next door on the left/right. Do you understand?”

PSU reply **“Yes”**. Followed by **“Shields - Advance”**



On reaching the first objective the Supervisor assesses doors ahead for configuration (inward or outward opening), and then reports the situation back to the PSU Commander.

Inward Opening Doors


In the event of the door being an inward-opening door, the next step is to secure the door or doors with the side facing shields. The Supervisor instructs each officer as to their role, that is to cover the corridor just past the door to cover any door way with a shield.

The Supervisor then sets the objective as follows:

“The objective is one metre past the door on the left/right. Do you understand?”

PSU reply **“Yes”**. Followed by **“Shields - Advance”**.

RESTRICTED



On reaching the objective, if the door is closed then the covering shield moves slightly to allow the Supervisor to open the door slowly. Without stepping into the room the shield officers scans the room for people and reports back.

Should no person be immediately visible, the next step is to send in a search team to carry out a thorough search of that room.


Search Team

At this point the Supervisor nominates a two-officer search team:

- The team place their shields in a safe location and form up outside the room, in single file.
- Team enters room in a defensive stance.
- Officer One - enters room and checks behind the door, before taking up a position one metre in.
- Officer Two - follows behind officer one and positions his/herself one metre in on the opposite side of the room.
- Both officers now scan the room.
- Officer One acts as Search Team Leader for that room **“SEARCH THE ROOM”**.
- Both officers search the room for people.
- On completion of the search Officer Two indicates that their half of the room is clear by putting their thumb up.
- Officer One shouts **“ROOM CLEAR”**, to the Supervisor.
- Search Team then rejoins the PSU once able to do so.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED



Ideally the door of the cleared room will be left open and may be utilised by any support officers should space be restricted.

Outward Opening Doors


The team advances just prior to the door. Once identified as an outward door the Supervisor will attempt to open the door where the door opens. The outside officer with best view scans as much of the room as he/she can observe and reports back to supervision.

The Supervisor(s) then plan activity of the team based on corridor layout and instructs each individual as to their role. Once ready the team are given the appropriate words of command and the team advance procedure as previously rehearsed, followed by the appropriate search of the room.

The Supervisor would need to set up the appropriate Violent Person teams, with the door cover officer protecting those officers in the corridor, whilst initiating dialogue.


RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED



Passive Subject Discovered Prior to Entering Room


- 1) Shield officer to challenge subject.
- 2) Subject is instructed to show open palms of hands.
- 3) Subject instructed to put hands on head, walk close to shield then turn around and back up to shield.
- 4) Shield officer will then command subject to back out of the room.
- 5) The two officers next in line will now place their shields against the wall and detain and search subject (handcuff if necessary).
- 6) Subject removed to place of safety.



RESTRICTED

Room Entry - Hidden Person Located on Entering

- 1) An officer, on seeing a subject shouts “**SUPPORT**”.
- 2) Shield officer to enter room and provide cover, supervisor to ensure the doorway remains sealed.
- 3) Searching officers take cover behind shield.
- 4) Subject is then directed by the shield officer to show palms and put hands on head.
- 5) Subject then commanded to turn around and face wall.
- 6) Shield officer to gently place shield against subject’s back.
- 7) An officer searches the subject (handcuffed if necessary) whilst the other provides support as necessary.
- 8) The subject is removed and the search continues as required.



This technique is repeated until all the rooms in a building/enclosed space have been searched and situations dealt with, by way of other tactics, including climbing stairs and room entry/violent person tactics, if necessary and appropriate.

Should the team come across a room within a room, the shield officer should cover that door whilst the room is searched.

The PSU Commander should ensure that the search is carried out methodically; time is not a factor that should be considered when conducting a search with a potentially high level of threat.

Considerations

- Emergency procedures in the case of a firearm or other weapon that increases the threat to the remainder of the PSU.
- It may be necessary to consider putting shields above the front line to offer overhead protection if the corridor or space is high and there is force or threat of force being used against an officer.
- A consideration for Supervisors should be the movement of resources from outside the building into a room/space that has been searched and secured, to replace and rest officers on the front line, if necessary, or to give flexibility for other situations that may arise while conducting building/corridor searches.
- To the potential of traps and other dangers within that building.
- MOE officers may be required to open doors by force.
- Where a door is outward opening and locked from the outside the PSU Commander may wish to log its location and proceed without checking that room, dependent upon the circumstances.

British Transport Police: Railway Stations / Trains

The contents of this section should be considered alongside individual Force 'Rail Safety Agreements' and 'ACPO Guidelines'. Suitable consideration should be given to individuals' Human Rights (in particular Articles 8 and 11).

Authorised Person (PNLD Reference Number D3291)

This is defined as:

'A person acting in the course of his duties, who is an employee or agent of or any other person authorised by the Operator or authorised by a person operating any railway assets'

and

'ANY CONSTABLE, acting in the execution of his duties upon or in connection with the railway'.

Removal of Demonstrators: On Trains

Objective

- The safe removal of persons from trains, stations and track-side with the minimum of disruption to the TOC (Train Operating Company) and travelling public.

Level of Training

Guidance required from BTP.

(Officers must be trained and competent within their roles, which should include aspects such as PSP and Manual/Kinetic Handling).

Methodology

This falls into two categories **internally** and **externally**.

Internally

All passengers able to do so, disembark from the train and the platform is then cleared. A nominated officer should then start basic negotiations with the subjects, individually where possible. This would be done with the support of an (E.G.T) Evidence Gathering Teams where it is reasonably practicable to do so.

During this process liaison with the Train Operating Company to ascertain whether the train may be placed within a bay road (similar to a siding). This will allow minimum disruption to the service, whilst maintaining safety for all involved.

Once it is decided that all such efforts have failed then relevant legislation should be considered and if available the subjects should then be arrested and then cut free in line with the relevant specific risk assessment by competent persons.

Considerations

May be resource intensive, dependent upon numbers involved, time and day of protest.

To ensure a continuous circulation of air, Underground trains and Sprinter trains need to be moving; a long delay with the doors shut may impact on the associated risk assessment and subsequent control measures required to reduce the potential of a major incident.

Officers should consider the use of Railway Bylaws as well as standard legislative powers.

Externally (to Train/Rails)

Methodology

Liaison with relevant local emergency services may be required at an early stage along with other relevant Police Forces e.g. UKAEAC, and/or BTP.

For persons attached to the outside of trains such as handles etc, the basic principles as above will apply.

There will be crossover with other tactics within this Manual.

Considerations

- The close proximity to high voltage electricity (overheads/third rails/pick up shoes etc).
- The time it takes to inform Line Controllers/power supply/signals to protect the scene.
- Pressure from Train Operating Companies.
- The type and role of the relevant rolling stock will impact upon the manner in which an operation is managed.

Persons Attached to Rails

Objective

- To remove persons from track or rolling stock in a manner that reduces the potential for injury to persons, damage to property and disruption to the rail network.

Level of Training

Guidance required from BTP.

(Officers must be trained and competent within their roles, which should include aspects such as PSP and Manual/Kinetic Handling).

Methodology

Officers detain and form either a single file in an area safe to do so, and approach subjects and fan out in an appropriate cordon to the circumstances, behind protestors, thus making a sterile area.

There may be a requirement to place other resources such as a serial or PSU at the rear of a train to ensure this is also sterile.

The protestors would then be required to leave or removed dependent upon the response and type of 'Lock-On'.

Considerations

- The close proximity to high voltage electricity (overheads/third rails/pick up shoes etc).
- The time it takes to inform Line Controllers/power supply/signals to protect the scene.
- Pressure from Train Operating Companies.
- The type and role of the relevant rolling stock will impact upon the manner in which an operation is managed.
- Liaison with rail representatives in relation to cessation of train services.
- Appropriate specialist removers should be considered in slow time for Lock-On.
- There is a need for track safety qualified staff to be involved; specialist BTP officers only.
- Risk assessments should include the remoteness of site and potential access points.
- Economic issues/passengers trapped on affected trains should always be considered with the railway representative (RIO) - Rail Incident Officer.

Railway Station Clearance

Objective

- The safe movement and/or removal of persons from station platforms and/or stations.

Level of Training

Guidance required from BTP.

(Officers must be trained and competent within their roles, which should include aspects such as PSP and Manual/Kinetic Handling).

Methodology

Liase with BTP so far as is reasonably practicable and in turn the Station Manager. They will have intimate knowledge of the environment and passenger flows.

The utilisation of tactics shown within this Manual, for example those shown in Level 3 and Level 2, in order to facilitate a proportionate and necessary response to the threat and risks faced by officers and the public.

Considerations

Stations are private property and under the control of organisations such as Network Rail or London Underground. Station operators will often act upon police advice but officers should be aware of the economic pressures that they operate under so compliance with police instructions should not be taken for granted. They have operational constraints that have no relevance to the policing operation and conversely police action could severely disrupt train services and trap thousands of passengers on trains. Negotiation with relevant stakeholders is therefore crucial.

Cessation of trains should be considered as a last resort. Diverting trains to alternative platforms is an option.

Needs to be planned and resourced effectively in consultation with BTP. Alternative access / exit points should be considered to minimise risk (e.g. taxi ranks, roadways delivery access).

Station staff and tannoy announcements should be considered to assist if appropriate.

Public communication by officers/rail staff is key.

Consider and plan routes for persons i.e. football supporters, to leave the area. Be aware of other arriving supporters by foot/train, along with the remoteness of stations where supporters may meet and clash.

Minimise risk of injury to participants, the public and staff so far as is reasonably practicable by creating a sterile area. However additional hazards, such as high speed trains, and those present being pushed on to tracks, will impact upon associated assessments.

Carriage Containment

Objective

- The containment of persons on carriages (passive and violent) whilst minimising risks to all involved.

Level of Training

Guidance required from BTP.

(Officers must be trained and competent within their roles, which should include aspects such as PSP and Manual/Kinetic Handling).

Passive - Methodology

To facilitate the movement of passive groups such as football fans. To hold fans outside the station in a bubble formation.

A proportionate amount of resources enter the station to facilitate the following:

RESTRICTED

- Liaise with rail operating services to clear carriage or train at previous station.
- Remove members of public from route to platform.
- Put resources in crossover passageways.
- Place a foot cordon across platform.

On arrival of the train, so far as is reasonably practicable, officers should contain group down onto platform.

Officers board the train, deployed so as to prevent persons passing through the inter-connecting doors and the doors on the opposite side of the train.

The train set number (found on the front) needs to be passed via control room to ensure movement is monitored.

Upon arrival at the destination a foot cordon is placed across the platform to allow the formation of a foot cordon around fans.

A route plan may be required for officers going in advance of the train to clear platforms and prevent subjects using crossover passages.

Considerations

- Due to the environment communications need to be assessed and appropriate support systems put in place to assist the effective deployment of staff.
- The ideal of having a train held in the platform whilst moving groups onto and off the platforms.
- Placing a team member with the driver to facilitate the above. Also to notify escort if the emergency handle is activated in a carriage.
- The use of Bylaws and other legislation to prevent disruptive elements using the underground system.
- The hostile working environment, e.g. solid objects barriers/fixtures, heights (platforms), escalators, stairs, subways and tunnels.

Violent Person(s) Methodology

On most railway journeys automatic train doors usually open on arrival at the station. This may be prevented in some situations with a request via the control room to the railway operating companies. This will assist in a person being contained, if appropriate.

Persons on the platform and station should be evacuated with the assistance of the rail staff. Entry into the train can be made using either:

Butterfly cock Situated on the side of the carriage and activates one set of doors on that carriage. This will facilitate the safe evacuation and entry onto the carriage.

Porters button Situated at the end of the carriage and opens all the doors on one carriage.

Once entry is made onto adjacent cars access should be made simultaneously through inter-connecting doors and violent person tactics should be employed.

If you are able to distract the subject three teams may be able to enter the car, two via connecting doors and one team through butterfly cock operated doors.

Considerations

- The delay on following services.
- The narrow layout of carriages on the lull and the different layout that each TOC use.
- The latent heat on deep underground stations.
- The subject will have a height advantage using seats and straphangers.

Use of CS Incapacitant Spray Within the Railway Environment

Any reference to CS incapacitant spray in this section includes all other police issue incapacitant sprays such as 'Captor' and 'PAVA'.

Objective

Officers who are engaged on operational duties carrying live CS spray must always consider the environment in which they work.

Confined space issues are paramount within the railway and therefore the use and overall likely effects arising will be covered in more detail during CS training.

Level of Training

Officers must be trained and competent within their roles, which should include aspects such as PSP and Manual/Kinetic Handling.

Methodology

In accordance with PSP Guidance and manufacturers' guidelines.

Considerations

Main areas of high risk are:

- Crowds on platforms and stations.
- Contamination to train carriages and passengers.
- Contamination to shops and offices.
- Proximity to overhead lines and live rails.

RESTRICTED

During peak hours the platforms are likely to have significant numbers of people in close proximity to the track area. If CS is used on a busy/crowded platform there is a possibility that affected members of the public could suffer disorientation and be placed in a position of danger.

The consequences of the use of CS spray on trains could be that passengers become disoriented and self evacuate onto the track. There is a significant risk with train doors that are not centrally locked, especially on 3rd rail systems. There will definitely be contamination that may result in the train being removed from service for de-contamination.

CS incapacitant spray will act in a similar fashion to any liquid-based sprays when in contact with electricity in that it is an ideal conductor.

This means that careless use of the spray in the vicinity of any live electrical items may expose the user, together with anyone in very close proximity, to the risk of electrocution.

It must not be sprayed within 3 metres of overhead or third rail power lines.

and

So far as is reasonably practicable it should not be sprayed directly towards any other sources of live electricity for example, live rails.

Public Order Vehicle Tactics and Convoy Driving

This section is aimed at authorised PSU carrier drivers and supervisors, in order to raise awareness in common practice in the use of vehicles in public order incidents.

It is intended to supplement but not replace current ACPO Police Driving Guidelines. Further advice or current driver training methodologies, should in the first instance, be referred to the relevant Force police driver training department.

Operational Use of Police Vehicles

Forces are responsible for the efficient selection and use of appropriately protected vehicles in line with relevant legislation, such as the Health and Safety at Work Equipment Regulations. This responsibility includes the manner in which they are serviced and maintained, records are kept and the provision of appropriate training.

Use of Police Vehicles

The appearance of a police vehicle, the driver and the quality of the driving reflect the image of the service as a whole. Poor posture and dress, supported by sub-standard driving gives an impression of inefficiency in the mind of the public.

The public are quick to criticise discourteous, selfish or aggressive driving and all police drivers should remember that highly conspicuous police vehicles do not create licence to ignore speed or other traffic regulations. Police drivers are 'in the eye' of the motoring and general public and complaints can be expected if driving falls below standards.

Emergency calls can seldom justify excessive speed and because of the short distances involved only minor savings in time can be made and this at the risk of collision or not arriving at all.

Police drivers will scrupulously observe traffic laws and regulations, except where to do so would hinder them in the execution of their duty. When utilising the warning instruments fitted to a vehicle, they will do so with the minimum of inconvenience to others.

The practice of accelerating away from a standstill and late or fierce braking, which is often unnecessary, gives a false impression of speed and should be avoided.

Although there is no hard and fast rule, police drivers should generally stop other motorists from the rear. This reduces the likelihood of a collision occurring between the two vehicles and has the added advantage of keeping the driver of the other vehicle in sight at all times.

The Law and Police Drivers

Successful completion of a police driving course will allow the police driver to drive vehicles appropriately in response to emergency situations. While undertaking such a role, or while engaged in a course for the purpose of training officers for such a role, the law will exempt them from various aspects of road traffic legislation, **BUT** with certain specified conditions attached.

Police drivers must familiarise themselves with the exemptions and conditions listed within relevant Road Traffic Regulations.

Personnel Carrier Specifications

The purpose of a Personnel Carrier is to provide safe transport of personnel to, into, through and away from an area of disorder. They protect passengers/drivers from physical attack when patrolling an area of disorder. They can protect foot personnel from physical attack or be used in support of them. They also provide for the safe transport of essential equipment and stores, the removal of injured personnel to safety and the conveyance of prisoners.

The desirable Personnel Carrier would be one that could meet the following criteria:

- Capable of carrying out a dual-purpose role, so that it can be used for normal patrol duties and in areas of serious disorder and is a financially realistic proposition.
- Ability to transport a section together with a full range of equipment.
- Comfortable seating to accommodate both long journeys or prolonged times spent in the vehicle.

Levels of Protection

Partial Protection

Toughened windscreen, grilles or polycarbonate window replacement.

Full Protection

Ideally will include the above and additional features including:

- Polycarbonate body lining and reinforced roof.
- Protective grilles to vehicle front and radiator.
- Run flat and reinforced tyres.
- Explososafe and all steel fuel lines.
- Engine and vehicle extinguisher system.
- Shield and equipment racking.
- Auxiliary ventilation system.
- Auxiliary windscreen wash.
- Auxiliary vehicle heating.
- Emergency lighting/horns.

Convoy Driving

Some of the following sections have been extracted from a 'RESTRICTED' military document and are therefore 'RESTRICTED'.

Experiences have shown that the movement of large numbers of officers, vehicles and equipment by road requires careful and accurate planning, strict supervision and skilled drivers if it is to be carried out efficiently, therefore initiative and common-sense are called for on the part of all concerned. It is the duty of every officer and driver to do all they can to make movement on the road simple and smooth flowing.

It is not sufficient merely to assemble a quantity of officers and vehicles at a starting point, state the destination and expect a smooth conclusion to the operation. Each step must be carefully planned, supervisors must be fully aware of their responsibilities and each driver must put their training into practice.

All drivers should be experienced and fully qualified to drive the types of vehicles used in convoys. This document outlines recommended instructions for personnel connected with the movement of a convoy.

A need for a re-appraisal of the situation has been highlighted by the problems, which have arisen in the past. These problems can be attributed to deficiencies in planning, supervision and driving. Some unacceptable and avoidable examples were:

Lack of Planning

- Only the lead vehicles knew the route and destination.
- Speed of lead vehicle set too high causing rear vehicles to travel at dangerous speeds.
- Drivers fatigued through long hours.
- Lead vehicles deployed at incident before rest of convoy arrived.
- Rear vehicles deployed without equipment.
- Convoys too large causing traffic disruption.
- Escort vehicles taking undue risks because of high speed of convoy.

Supervision

- Lack of proper attention at assembly areas regarding vehicle security and safety checks.
- Vehicles dispersing without any supervision or flexibility, particularly when returning home.
- Racing between convoys or individual vehicles, particularly at meal times.
- Allowing lead vehicle to travel too fast.

Driving

- Some drivers were inexperienced with the vehicles and conditions.
- Travelling too closely to the vehicle in front.
- Blocking lanes on motorways.
- Failing to use mirrors and giving late or misleading signals.

- Following a vehicle into a closing gap.
- Lack of sympathy for the vehicle and passengers especially on rough roads.

Mistakes, which have been made in all aspects of the passage of a convoy, can be eliminated by the disciplined application of standardised instructions. It is not sufficient merely to assemble a quantity of officers and vehicles at a starting point, state the destination and expect a smooth conclusion to the operation. Each step must be carefully planned, supervisors must be fully aware of their responsibilities and each driver must put their training into practice.

Planning

Any person likely to be involved in the organisation of a convoy or the implementation of orders within a convoy should be fully conversant with:

- Factors Which Affect the Movement
- Control of a Convoy
- Composition and Order of a Convoy
- Convoy Discipline

Factors Which Affect Movement

Types of Roads Available

Routes must be carefully scrutinised to avoid unsuitable roads or areas, bearing in mind the capabilities of the vehicles in the convoy and the needs of normal traffic flow.

Weather Conditions

Dramatic changes in weather conditions could seriously affect the passage of a convoy. Advanced information should be obtained where possible in order to counteract any problems.

Rest Areas

Sufficient thought must be given to suitable resting points capable of accommodating the number of vehicles in the convoy.

Convoy Escorts - Methods of Movement

Low density: As much as 800 metres between vehicles. Vehicles can move faster and attract less attention but control is more difficult.

High density: Many vehicles moving at a set speed in close order. This results in a long stream of vehicles at a slower speed but control is easier.

Packets: A method of moving at low density. Groups of four to six vehicles in tactical units with up to one mile between vehicles and vehicles within packets separated, for safety, by not less than 70 metres. Small groups can usually maintain a faster average speed and may, through local towns and busy roads, prove easier to control than a long convoy.

Free running: Independent travel by single or groups of vehicles at the best speeds for the vehicles concerned. Overtaking of other units is permitted. Could be useful in emergencies over short distances but lack of control could make it totally ineffective.

Advantages of Packets	Disadvantages of Packets
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Small groups can usually maintain a faster average speed. • Local control (through towns and busy roads etc.) is better than a long convoy. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Roads not used to capacity - especially motorways. • Overall control is not as easy as a long convoy. • There is a greater reliance on more people for route finding and pace setting.

Types of Vehicles

The maximum speed of a convoy will be that of its *slowest* vehicle.

Other Traffic

Serious disruption of movement can be avoided if accurate forecasts of other traffic problems are made.

Security of Operational Intentions

Large-scale movement may disclose operational intentions. Radio silence may be necessary which will impede control of the movement.

Control of a Convoy

If two or more units are using the same road it will be necessary for a supervisory officer to exercise a degree of control. The amount of control needed depends on the factors affecting movement and the number of vehicles. A large number of vehicles being moved make control more difficult, therefore necessitating the need for careful and accurate planning and communication.

Composition and Order of a Convoy

A convoy is a group of at least three vehicles moving under a single PSU Commander over the same route and in the same direction.

A large convoy may be broken down into a number of organised units consisting of packets of three vehicles or more. The convoy PSU Commander will decide the order of move. A convoy should be so constituted that it can be deployed readily.

Each convoy and organised unit of a convoy must include:

- a) A Commander, whose position in the convoy is variable
- b) An officer in the lead vehicle to be pace setter
- c) An officer in the last vehicle as 'trail officer'
- d) A person delegated as Commander in each vehicle.

Units within a convoy should always be aware of the identity of other units, both in front and to the rear, especially when travelling in packets. They must have details of any route, markings, signposts etc.

Critical Points of the Route

Any points on the route likely to need extra care such as difficult junctions, bends or steep gradients, or any sections where the convoy is liable to external interference should be detailed.

Density and Method of Movement

All officers in charge of units and all drivers should be aware of the methods of movement and the spacing between vehicles.

Traffic Control and Escorts

Any area where there is local traffic control or escorts to assist the passage of the convoy should be passed to the convoy Commander.

Lights

All units must be fully aware of any decision made regarding use of lights and emergency equipment. Daytime use of headlights is useful for drivers to keep following drivers identified and in view.

Recovery

In the event of breakdown or accident there should be clear instructions as to the action to be taken for vehicle recovery.

Convoy Discipline

When plans are made for the movement of a convoy, due allowance should be made to permit drivers and supervisors to comply with convoy discipline.

Planning must therefore be sympathetic towards the following difficulties:

Maintaining correct distances and speeds	If too high a speed is set or distances between vehicles are unreasonable the passage of the convoy becomes very erratic especially at the rear.
Traffic regulations	Convoys are subject to speed limits both for the roads and types of vehicles being used. Planners must be aware of this and any other traffic regulations en route.
Dispersion techniques	Dispersion of a convoy must be carried out in a disciplined manner. Planning must take into account the problems of supervisors at dispersion and cater for any flexibility in the route, which may improve efficiency.

Responsibilities

All officers engaged in the actual movement of a convoy must be fully aware of their individual responsibilities to ensure the efficient execution of plans.

Drivers Responsibilities

- S** - Speed of lead vehicle to be maintained as set down by convoy Commander.
- A** - Accelerating too quickly from stationary will cause rear vehicles to travel at excessive speeds.
- F** - Following vehicles in convoy must always be kept in view.
- E** - External mirrors to be used frequently and early signals given to following vehicles.
- C** - Comfort and safety of passengers will ensure that they are better able to deal with an incident on reaching their destination.
- O** - Overtaking should be strictly forbidden unless by prior agreement between convoy Commanders.
- N** - Narrow twisting roads and uneven surfaces call for careful and smooth handling of a vehicle.
- V** - Vehicles should always be kept at a safe distance from the preceding vehicle.
- O** - Observe the position and movement of all traffic and not just those forming the convoy.
- Y** - You are responsible for ensuring that the convoy completes its journey safely.

Convoy Commander

- Ensure that the correct route is followed.
- Ensure that correct speeds and distances are maintained.
- Deployment/diversion whilst en route.
- Dispersal and supervision at rest areas and destination.

These are onerous duties at all times, but particularly when moving at low density. They call for a complete awareness of all that is going on. Although some of the duties will usually be delegated, e.g. to the pacesetter and vehicle Commanders, the ultimate responsibility remains with the Commander of the convoy.

Pace Setter

To maintain speed and density, to meet requirements, so that the journey may be completed in a safe and orderly manner.

Trail Officer

To maintain observations on the convoy, deal with any problems which may occur and communicate with the convoy Commander on the progress of the convoy.

Vehicle Commanders

The vehicle Commander, who may also be the driver, must ensure that instructions regarding speed and distance are complied with. The officer is also responsible for dispersal of personnel and re-assembly at rest areas, and for vehicle security.

Summary

Drivers

All drivers should be experienced and fully qualified to drive the types of vehicles used in convoys.

Additional training should be given to accustom drivers to working in a team and to acquaint them with the extra demands associated with driving in a convoy.

The following training points should be emphasised:

- Driving for long periods in a fully laden passenger vehicle.
- Driving fully laden passenger vehicles along roads which require careful and smooth handling of the vehicle and controls, i.e. narrow twisting roads, uneven road surfaces etc.
- Maintaining a predetermined following distance.
- More use of external mirrors and early signals to following drivers.
- Driving in a convoy of vehicles as part of a team, with special appreciation of the problems of other members.
- Correct acceleration from stationary to allow following vehicles to keep up.
- Correct braking, including avoidance of unnecessary braking, to prevent telescoping of convoy.
- Overtaking.
- Driving in different positions in the convoy.
- Maintaining a predetermined set speed.
- Correct use of motorways.
- Keeping the following driver in view.

Escort Vehicles

Escort vehicles, particularly motorcyclists, are very useful for shepherding a convoy through a busy or complicated route. However, convoy Commanders and pace setters should not be induced into increasing the speed of a convoy simply because passage has been facilitated through junctions. This makes the job of the escort more difficult when he/she has to re-overtake the convoy to lead through the next junction and, in the past, escort vehicles have taken unnecessary risks in order to get ahead of the convoy.

Overtaking

The overtaking of one convoy by another should be strictly forbidden unless by prior agreement between the convoy Commanders.

Vans with Side Shields

Objective

Primarily the vehicle would be used for the protection of officers.

Level of Training

- Drivers must hold the relevant ACPO approved driving authority for the use of this vehicle.
- Trained to Level 2 and fully competent in the PSP programme.

Methodology

The vehicles could advance through shields cordons, which are under attack, halt and give a visible representation or show of strength. This should be supported by warnings.

The vehicles can present a physical barrier to restrict offender movements and as such give some relief to the police lines.

If the vehicles were to advance as a cordon they would afford protection for officers who can also advance on foot.

They would support both Evidence Gathering Teams and arrest teams in targeting individuals and these could advance at a quicker pace than the cordon tactic.

It would allow personnel who were under heavy attack to withdraw, disengage from the conflict and regroup prior to re-engaging or escalation in the use of lawful force, without the loss or perceived loss of too much ground.

It may allow EGTs to move towards disorder under protection and continue their role whilst other tactics are deployed e.g. Armoured Landrovers.

Considerations

- Public perception during the use of this equipment may impact as either a trigger to further directed disorder or in reducing the numbers involved.
- Communication to the drivers and the maintenance of control.
- Officers must be trained and competent in the driving, use and integration of this option.
- All means, so far as is reasonably practicable, should be considered in providing warning messages in respect of the use of this tactic.
- Silver Commander(s) will need to be consulted prior to deployment of this option in order to ensure that its use is both proportionate and necessary.
- All officers driving and using these vehicles should be trained and competent in accordance with manufacturer's guidelines.

Safe Towing of Vehicles

Only in the most serious circumstances would you consider towing a disabled Personnel Carrier with its full complement of crew and equipment. However, circumstances may arise where it may be necessary to remove a stricken vehicle from imminent danger.

There are no hard and fast rules when attempting the removal of a stricken vehicle in such circumstances.

By observing the following guidelines, the time taken to successfully accomplish the safe removal of the stricken vehicle will be reduced to a minimum, thus diminishing the chances of possible serious injury to all involved. (*A safe successful removal of the vehicle and crew is the challenge, not the speed at which it is carried out.*)

- The ignition key must be switched to the position 1 (steering lock off) in order to have full steering control.
- The gear lever should be placed into neutral.
- The handbrake must be released.
- If the engine is not running it must be remembered that there will be no **servo** assistance for the service brake or power steering.
- In this situation, much greater effort will be needed to operate the brake pedal and in turn the steering wheel.
- The vehicle must not be towed with the front axle raised and the ignition key in the position 2 (ignition on) as the rear wheels could then lock due to the acceleration skid controls being actuated.
- The towing medium must be suitable to bear the load of the disabled vehicle, and in some circumstances, its personnel and contents.
- Efforts should be made to ensure that the towline is kept taught at all times to reduce the possibility of 'whipping' or failure.
- It should be remembered that a vehicle's brakes are designed to work more effectively when travelling forward, therefore their efficiency will be reduced when being towed backwards.

In an ideal world the towing vehicle should always lead the disabled vehicle out of the area, the tow rope being attached to the rear of the towing vehicle and to the front of the stricken vehicle. However there will be many occasions when this will not be possible because, to do so, would result in the towing vehicle being forced to drive towards the danger.

In such circumstances the towing vehicle should be reversed up to the rear of the disabled vehicle, where the two can then be linked together and safely towed away. It must be remembered that the driver of the stricken vehicle now not only has the above problems to deal with (no servo etc.) but also has the added challenge of having to steer the vehicle backwards.

There may also be circumstances where the towing vehicle is unable to turn around at the venue. In such cases, this vehicle will have to be driven forward towards the rear of the stricken vehicle and linked together then requiring both drivers to reverse from that location.

RESTRICTED

Consideration should be given to fitting the front and rear of each personnel carrier with 'D' or 'Bow' shackles before entering an area of risk, in order to expedite any coupling as a result of vehicle failure.

Regular practice of such exercises by trained team members will improve the efficiency of such operations.

Protection of Disabled Vehicle

Where a disabled vehicle is coming under attack, other vehicles may be used as a physical barrier to protect it. This may also be of use when considering de-bussing and bussing crew members to remove them from imminent danger.

All of the information above may, on the surface, appear to be common sense, but in the face of great danger, the simplest of functions may be overlooked with very serious consequences!

Armoured Landrover

Objective

- Facilitates the movement of personnel into hostile areas.
- May be utilised as a 'show of strength'.
- Used as a vehicle Cordon/Block.
- Allows the carriage of arrest teams who can remain in safety and deploy with an element of surprise.
- Allows the rescue of injured or trapped officers.
- Provides lighting for identification and sound for the disorientation/disruption of offenders.

Level of Training

- Drivers must hold the relevant ACPO approved driving authority for the use of this vehicle.
- Trained to Level 2 and fully competent in the PSP programme.

Methodology

The vehicles could advance through shields cordons, which are under attack, halt and give a visible representation or show of strength. This should be supported by warnings.

The vehicles can present a physical barrier to restrict offender movements and as such give some relief to the police lines.

They would support both Evidence Gathering Teams and arrest teams in targeting individuals and these could advance at a quicker pace than the cordon tactic.

Considerations

- The vehicles are new and may impact upon public perception during the use of this as either a trigger to further directed disorder or in reducing the numbers involved, whilst providing a positive perception in relation to positive police action.
- Communication to the drivers and the maintenance of control.
- Officers must be trained and competent in the driving, use and integration of this option.
- Relevant authority from the Gold Commander via Silver Commander will be needed during deployment of this option, to consider and ensure that its use is both proportionate and

RESTRICTED

necessary. This will depend on how these vehicles are being utilised, for example, a firearms deployment within a public order incident. *Refer to ACPO Manual of Guidance on the Police Use of Firearms.*

- All means, (so far as is reasonably practicable), should be considered in providing warning messages in respect of the use of this tactic.
- All officers driving and using these vehicles should be trained and competent in accordance with manufacturer's guidelines.
- These vehicles provide an improved level of protection and flexibility due to their size and configuration.
- The restricted number of officers able to be carried, (with round shield) may restrict tactical options.
- The flexibility in deployment and movement may improve the ability to enter areas of disorder, arrest offenders, deploy EGTs or remove injured officers to paramedic support.
- Suitable consideration should be given to individuals' Human Rights (in particular Articles 8 and 11).

Removal of Disabled Vehicle

Objective

- To assist in the protection and removal of disabled vehicles.
- Minimise the risk to injury to officers.

Training Level

- Drivers must hold the relevant ACPO approved driving authority for the use of this vehicle.
- Trained to Level 2 and fully competent in the PSP programme.


Methodology

If a vehicle breaks down in a vulnerable location, other vehicles drive around it in a circling movement to protect it, as directed by the appropriate PSU Commander.

One van is nominated as a recovery vehicle, and hitches up a tow rope from inside the protected area. When the disabled vehicle is attached, the circling vehicles break and allow the towing vehicle to move off.

Considerations

- Towing broken down automatic vehicles can damage the gearboxes, but the risk is worth it to protect the vehicle and its occupants.
- All officers and drivers must be trained and competent in the deployment of this tactic prior to use.



Passive Crowd Control - Funnelling

Objective

- To reduce the speed/flow of a moving passive crowd, by positioning vehicles in an area and using them as a barrier.

Training Level

- Drivers must hold the relevant ACPO approved driving authority for the use of this vehicle.
- Trained to Level 2 and fully competent in the PSP programme.

Methodology

The decision on the positioning of vehicles is that of the PSU Commander in consultation with the appropriate staff within the management structure.


Cognisance should be given to the ability to tactically withdraw vehicles should the risks to officers increase or the need for the filter decreases.

If a tactical withdrawal is required, the left-hand two vehicles will drive forwards, and the right hand vehicle will follow them by performing a 'U' turn in the area.

Alternatively, were the right hand vehicle positioned the other way round (*as shown below*), all three vehicles could drive off in the same direction without the requirement for manoeuvring first.

Considerations

- The effect on crowd dynamics should vehicles create a 'pinch point' due to the decreases in flow of that crowd.
- Environmental constraints in respect of withdrawing vehicles to a safe location should the need arise, without, so far as is reasonably practicable, creating risks to the public.



Passive Crowd Control - Small Crowd

Objective

- To reduce the speed of a moving passive crowd by positioning vehicles in an area and using them as a barrier to assist in identification and filming of participants present.

Training Level


- Drivers must hold the relevant ACPO approved driving authority for the use of this vehicle.
- Trained to Level 2 and fully competent in the PSP programme.

Methodology

This tactic may be used to assist Evidence Gathering Teams in filming individual members of a small crowd as they emerge through the gap in the vehicles, or so that a witness can view its members for identification purposes. Vehicles are positioned across the road as shown below:

Considerations

- This tactic is best used for a passive crowd because the vehicles are sideways on to the crowd and would be at risk of being turned over in the event of serious disorder.
- The effect on crowd dynamics should vehicles create a 'pinch point' due to the decreases in flow of that crowd.
- Environmental constraints in respect of withdrawing vehicles to a safe location should the need arise without, so far as is reasonably practicable, creating risks to the public.



Road Block

Objective

- To prevent a crowd passing beyond a particular point.
- As a show of strength to a crowd.

Training Level

- Drivers must hold the relevant ACPO approved driving authority for the use of this vehicle.
- Trained to Level 2 and fully competent in the PSP programme.


Methodology

To prevent a crowd passing beyond a particular point, officers will stand in front of their vehicles as illustrated. The vehicles are parked behind them as a show of strength and as a physical barrier.

PSU Commanders would not however, allow the crowd to reach their vehicles due to the risk of damage to them, along with the resultant impact on the overall operational effectiveness. Vehicles are positioned across the road as shown below.

Considerations

- Environmental constraints in respect of withdrawing vehicles to a safe location should the need arise without, so far as is reasonably practicable, creating risks to the public.
- PSU Commanders must assess the implications of ECHR, and use of force legislation in support of dynamic risk assessments, prior to deploying this tactic.
- All officers and drivers must be trained and competent in the deployment of this tactic prior to use.



Crowd Dispersal - Vehicle Line

Objective

- To assist in the dispersal of person(s) involved in major disorder.
- To provide a show of strength.
- Minimise the risk to injury to officers.

Training Level

- Drivers must hold the relevant ACPO approved driving authority for the use of this vehicle.
- Trained to Level 2 and fully competent in the PSP programme.

Methodology

All commands are as per Level 2 Running Line tactics. Co-ordination by an appointed PSU Commander, from within the vehicles, will be required where the environment dictates that more than 1 PSU will be deployed.

Vehicles are driven towards a crowd at a slow walking speed with headlamps flashing, blue lights on and audible warning devices.

They stop approximately 25 metres short of the crowd to allow for deployment of the PSU in the required formation. This also assists in reducing the risk of collision with individuals at the scene.

On stopping, vehicles turn off lights, and audible warning devices. Use of the P.A. system to give additional warning messages to the crowd, giving them time to disperse, should be considered.

Officers may then de-bus and disperse the crowd on foot.

If the roadway is too wide to span with vehicles, officers on foot will fill in the gaps between them.

Considerations

- Commanders must assess the implications of ECHR, and use of force legislation in support of dynamic risk assessments, prior to deploying this tactic.
- All drivers must be trained and competent in the deployment of this tactic prior to use.
- Delivery of warning messages prior to use of this tactic.
- Allowance for an escape route for the crowd/participants of disorder.
- The tactic may increase participant's perceptions in respect of the numbers of police resources responding to the incident.

Crowd Dispersal - Mixed Vehicle and Foot Tactics

Objective

- To assist in the dispersal of person(s) involved in disorder.
- To provide a show of strength.
- To minimise the risk of injury to officers.

Training Level

- Drivers must hold the relevant ACPO approved driving authority for the use of this vehicle.
- Trained to Level 2 and fully competent in the PSP programme.

Methodology

All commands are as per Level 2 'Running Line' tactics.

Vehicles are then driven towards a crowd at a slow walking speed with headlamps flashing, two tones and blue lights on. They stop approximately 25 metres short of the crowd to reduce potential allegations due to physical contact with participants.

On stopping, vehicles turn off lights and two tones then use the P.A. system to pass a warning message to the crowd, giving them time to disperse.


Co-ordination by an appointed PSU Commander, from within the vehicles, will be required where the environment dictates that more than one PSU will be deployed.

Officers will then de-bus and disperse the crowd on foot as directed by their respective Commanders.

Considerations

- PSU Commanders must assess the implications of ECHR, and use of force legislation in support of dynamic risk assessments, prior to deploying this tactic.
- All drivers must be trained and competent in the deployment of this tactic prior to use.
- Each PSU Commander and PSU officer should be clear on their roles and responsibilities.
- The environment must allow for participants in disorder a route of escape.
- The tactic may increase participant's perceptions in respect of the numbers of police resources responding to the incident.
- It is particularly effective in poor lighting or at night.

RESTRICTED



Crowd Dispersal - Vehicles Three-Sided Box

Objective

- To assist in the dispersal of person(s) involved in disorder.
- To take junctions ready for assessment and decision on tactical response.
- To provide a sterile area at the junction.
- To minimise the risk to injury and fatigue to officers.

Training Level

- Drivers must hold the relevant ACPO approved driving authority for the use of this vehicle.
- Trained to Level 2 and fully competent in the PSP programme.

Methodology

This tactic requires the deployment of two PSUs vehicles; the commands given are as per 'Running Line' foot tactics. The vehicles move towards the junction in formation, environmental impact factors allowing, four abreast with vehicles stacked left and right. Prior to deployment in this formation one of the PSU Commanders must identify to all vehicles that they have control for this tactic.

When instructed by the appropriate PSU Commander the vehicles split as shown in the diagram above, and continue into the road ensuring that they still maintain contact with the PSU. If the crowd do not disperse, units will de-bus and disperse them using foot tactics.

However, it should be noted that in this formation there will only be two serials per a roadway and that support will be required to continue this tactic in support of any subsequent strategy of dispersal.


Where practical this tactic may be better utilised with nine vehicles so that each PSU has an appropriate level of command and direction dependent upon the risks faced on entering the roadway. However, the Lead Commander should initiate the time at which autonomy is given to PSU Commanders on entering the junction, where possible.

Considerations

- This tactic may assist in reducing potential fatigue in officers involved in foot tactics and provide additional protection.
- The level of control by PSU Commanders is made more difficult.
- Where practical this tactic may be better utilised with nine vehicles so that each PSU unit has an appropriate level of command and direction dependent upon the risks faced on entering the roadway. However, the lead PSU Commanders should initiate, where practicable, the time at which autonomy is given to Commanders on entering the junction, where possible.
- Commanders must assess the implications of ECHR, and use of force legislation in support of dynamic risk assessments, prior to deploying this tactic.
- All drivers must be trained and competent in the deployment of this tactic prior to use.

RESTRICTED

- The environment must allow for participants in disorder a route of escape.
- The tactic may increase participant's perceptions in respect of the numbers of police resources responding to the incident.



Crowd Dispersal - Herringbone

Objective

- To assist in the dispersal of person(s) involved in major disorder.
- To provide a show of strength.
- To minimise the risk to injury to officers.

Training Level

- Drivers must hold the relevant ACPO approved driving authority for the use of this vehicle.
- Trained to Level 2 and fully competent in the PSP programme.

Methodology

Vehicles are driven towards the threat taking turns to leap frog each other through the middle of the vans in front.

Vehicles to initially form up three in line at a location adjacent to the line up point.

On the instruction of the PSU Commander, the vehicles are driven to a pre-determined point and lined up three abreast within the view of the threat.

The following pre-determined warning is to be given using a public address system prior to deployment:

“ATTENTION, ATTENTION, THIS IS A POLICE WARNING.

DISPERSE IMMEDIATELY OR VEHICLE TACTICS WILL BE USED.

NO FURTHER WARNING WILL BE GIVEN”

An objective will be determined and set by the PSU Commander positioned between the police vehicles and the hostile crowd.

Prior to movement the command will be **“The Objective is third lamp post on the left”**

Followed by **“VEHICLES ROLL FORWARD”**


All vehicles will operate in low gear and high revs, with blue lights and headlight main beam on before moving **slowly** forward, three vehicles abreast.

Where the crowd is failing to respond as required the command **“VEHICLES ADVANCE”** will signify the need to implement the ‘Herringbone’ tactic.

Upon this command the vehicles (from the left) will operate emergency audible warning instruments and commence ‘snaking’ manoeuvres crossing each other’s tracks at a controlled pace. They drive in low gear and high revs, with flashing blue lights, headlamps, and sirens on. Each van is driven quickly as it comes through the gap, then stops to wait for the others to overtake until its next turn.

RESTRICTED

The linear speed along the road appears to the crowd to be high, but is in fact only about 15 miles per hour.



All vehicles will extinguish emergency audible warning instruments and reform abreast at the 'objective'. The PSU Commander may give a further 'objective' at any time.

Where the crowd disperse, the PSU Commander may decide to continue with this tactic, or adopt an alternative e.g. Mixed vehicle and foot tactics. If the crowd hold their ground, the vans will stop short of them and debus. Foot dispersal tactics will then be used.

Considerations

- PSU Commanders must assess the implications of ECHR, and use of force legislation in support of dynamic risk assessments, prior to deploying this tactic.
- All drivers must be trained and competent in the deployment of this tactic prior to use.
- The environment must allow for participants in disorder a route of escape.
- The tactic may increase participant's perceptions in respect of the numbers of police resources responding to the incident. They also may believe that vehicles are being driven at them at speed, and that they were in danger of being run over and therefore get out of the way.
- It is particularly effective in poor lighting or at night.
- In order to maintain appropriate control and increase the tactical options available to PSU Commanders this tactic is to be conducted by three or six vans.

Petrol Bomb

Objective

Increase the awareness of PSU officers and drivers.

Training Level

- Drivers must hold the relevant ACPO approved driving authority for the use of this vehicle.
- Trained to Level 2 and fully competent in the PSP programme.

Methodology

During PSU training, officers receive advice on how to deal with a direct hit on the front of the vehicle with a petrol bomb.

They are to be instructed to use the water power washers fitted to the vehicle, and to either:

- Continue driving where possible in an effort to blow the ignited petrol away and restore vision.
- Stop and operate the external vehicle fire extinguisher system where fitted.

Officers must resist the natural instinct to switch the windscreen wipers on, as the melting rubber will smear across the windscreen, reducing visibility.

Considerations

- Dependent upon the type of equipment fitted and circumstances either of the aforementioned options may be relevant.
- PSU Commanders must assess the implications of ECHR, and use of force legislation in support of dynamic risk assessments, prior to deploying this tactic.
- All officers and drivers must be trained and competent in the deployment of this tactic prior to use.

Mounted Tactics (Separate File on CD)

Dog Section Tactics (Separate File on CD)

Barricade Removal (Vehicles)

Objective

- To assist in the removal of barricades.
- To minimise the risk to injury and fatigue to officers.

Training Level

- Drivers must hold the relevant ACPO approved driving authority for the use of this vehicle.
- Trained to Level 2 and fully competent in the PSP programme.

Methodology

In order to reduce the threat to officers in the handling of materials used to erect barricades and prevent exposure to potential traps within a barricade, the most appropriate method would be to find an alternative route, followed by the deployment of vehicles.

Where officers are able to reach a barricade during its construction, PSU Commanders may wish to drive PSU vehicles or armoured vehicles straight through it.

Where the risks faced are thought by the PSU Commander to be too great, the use of appropriate light or heavy plant vehicles may be the most effective method.

Where vehicles cannot reach a barricade the final method would be to revert to dismantling it manually using protected officers on foot as 'moles'.

Considerations

- There is a greater risk of injury and damage to vehicles, which is likely to reduce the effectiveness of the police response.
- Consideration must be given to the use of traps within a barricade, such as barricades wired up to main electricity via felled lampposts.
- PSU Commanders must assess the implications of ECHR, and use of force legislation in support of dynamic risk assessments, prior to deploying this tactic.
- All officers and drivers must be trained and competent in the deployment of this tactic prior to use.

Barricade Removal (PSU Officers)

Objective


- To remove a barricade where all other methods or options, such as mechanical means or an alternative route are, so far as is reasonably practicable inappropriate.

Methodology

This tactic has been included to allow resources to negotiate obstacles and barricades, which as a last resort must be breached.

Barricade removal teams are formed with up to four long shields for increased protection and two non-shield officers for barricade removal.

It may be necessary to use officers from a number of PSUs in order to have sufficient shields.



Supervisors select their teams, and the PSU Commander gives the instruction “**Barricade Teams Form**”. These teams then form linking their shields in the appropriate manner.

RESTRICTED

Once ready the responsibility of control is handed over to the individual team leader(s), this may be a Supervisor or other officer carrying out the role of 'mole'.

On the word of command "**Shields - Advance**", the barricade removal teams approach the barricade in rotation, where environmental impact factors allow.

They must only stay there for a short period and should try to remove only one item from the barricade.

They then withdraw, place the debris in a predetermined location and join on to the back of the other teams to rest prior to approaching the barricade again.

As soon as the breach is made, this is then reported back by calling "**Breach**". The PSU Commander gives the command for their own PSU to advance, forming a 'Running Line' formation on the other side, whilst other resources are used to remove the barricade.

Alternatively the PSU Commander may link in with the relevant command so that other resources may utilise the breach, such as a short shield teams.

Negotiating the Breach

The PSU is advanced to the barricade, the officers nearest the breach advance through it, and maintain the advance to the objective, protecting the breach. Subsequent officers reform alongside the covering officer in 'Running Line' formation.

Any tactical withdrawal through a breach is done in reverse, ensuring that the gap remains protected at all times.

Considerations

- As per 'Running Line' considerations.
- The use of grappling hooks or other machinery should be considered.
- The urgency in removing this barricade.
- The potential for an attack from the rear of the PSU.
- Utilise other resources such as helicopter CCTV for an overall view.
- To an alternative route.
- To the potential of traps and other dangers within that barricade.
- To where each team is to place debris from the barricade.
- Ensure that the teams do not cause an alternative barricade increasing the risk of injury to themselves or other resources.
- The availability of appropriate resources to provide support.

Organised Events: Sporting and Non-Sporting

Sporting Events - Football

This section deals with the management of crowds attending sporting events and in particular football matches.

It should be understood that the points raised and the possible options tendered do not in any way replace the general tactics illustrated within this Manual but address some of the unique situations typical to football events policing.

Three principal areas have been identified as being particularly associated with the management of football crowds, those being:

- 1) Escorting groups of supporters
- 2) Clearing the playing surface
- 3) Extracting supporters from viewing/seated areas

Escorting Groups of Supporters

The escorting of supporters from one location to another is often seen as problematic in terms of the distance to be covered, the numbers involved and the resources available to the Police Commanders. Because of these variable factors the recommendation of specific measures, tactics or methods is almost impossible.

It is, however, suggested that the recommendations set out within this Manual address a vast majority of scenarios utilising mounted officers, vehicle tactics, the use of police dogs and foot tactics with marching columns.

More details can be obtained from the ACPO Manual of Guidance on the Policing of Football Events.

Clearing the Playing Surface

The issue of clearing the playing field following an invasion on a large scale is one that is often faced by Police Commanders and stewarding supervisors. The resources available to manage this type of occurrence are varied as are dispersal opportunities, those being either into the stands or out of the stadium via a voluminous exit (a large door of a building by which crowds are let out).

It is suggested that the general principals of containment, dispersal and arrest illustrated in this Manual, utilising cordons of police officers, police dogs and mounted tactics, are sufficiently specific to address the containment of supporters in seated or standing areas as well as clearance of the playing surface.

More details can be obtained from the ACPO Manual of Guidance on the Policing of Football Events.

Extracting Supporters from Viewing/Seated Areas

It should be considered by Police Commanders that the removal of spectators from seated areas is the general responsibility of the club safety stewards, however, in certain circumstances it may be necessary for police officers to enter and effect an arrest whilst the suspect is enclosed within a viewing area.

Prior to any police action in this respect the authority of the Police Commander in consultation with the club safety officer should be sought and the implications both strategic and tactical considered. An assessment of the group within the viewing area is essential and depending upon the objective of the manoeuvre and the circumstances rendering the arrest necessary a decision to intervene or not is made.

The implications of such intervention even in a relatively co-operative crowd are great and should only really be considered if the vast majority of the surrounding group are considered as non-confrontational and passive.

Principally the Commander should firstly consider other options such as retrospective arrest, or arrest upon relocation of the offender, before committing officers to this inherently risky course of action, for example when the subject leaves their seat at half time or the end of the game.

The tactic should be fully risk assessed and a list of control measures recorded and considered, for example:

- Viewing areas above the subject where missiles may be thrown down onto officers, the adjoining spectators or subject.
- The position of the subject, such as a balcony, where there is an increased risk of falling onto spectators below.
- The gradient of the viewing area.
- The level of personal protective equipment available to the intervening officer.
- Whether the severity of the offence is sufficient to warrant the risk.
- Egress routes for officer and any panicked supporters.
- The ability to reinforce officers should the situation deteriorate and support is required.

In short the question should be asked:


Is there any other realistic way with which we achieve our objective?

All arrests within stadiums should be conducted in a considered and methodical manner with the Health and Safety of officers, the public and the subject paramount.

Human Rights legislation must be a primary consideration.

Simultaneously:

- 'A' serial move to the 2nd row and clear as much as necessary by asking spectators to move from their seats into a suitable location.
- 'B' serial move along the 3rd row, asking spectators to stand. They position themselves behind 'A' serial ready to offer support as necessary.
- 'C' serial move to the stairs and assist in the displacement of 2nd row spectators.



Once all serials are in position, the officers from 'A' serial detain the target by standing him/her up, directing him/her over the chair and walking him/her along the empty 2nd row and away. 'B' & 'C' serials then withdraw together, allowing displaced spectators to return to their seats.

Middle Row Removal

As 'Front Row' but 'A' serial displace spectators in the same row as the target. 'B' serial move in to the row above the target (spectators are asked to stand but are not displaced.). 'C' serial offer support as necessary from the stair area.

When 'A' reach the target they withdraw, followed by 'B' & 'C' serials.

Top Row Removal

As 'Front Row' but 'A' serial displace spectators in the same row as the target. 'B' serial move in to the row below the target (spectators are asked to stand but are not displaced.) 'C' serial offer support as necessary from the stair area.

When 'A' reach the target they withdraw, followed by 'B' & 'C' serials.

Considerations

- Commander should consider other options (e.g. post match arrest) before committing police officers to this course of action.
- The area and operation must be risk assessed to ensure what control measures are needed e.g.:
 1. If the stadium is severely steep, then potential danger to officers may outweigh the operational need.
 2. If there is a balcony above and a perceived threat from missiles.
 3. Level of personal protective equipment required.

Open Ground Tactics

Double-Spacing

Objective

- To enable columns of officers to move across open and uneven ground safely.

Level of Training (Minimum requirement before deployment)

- Level 2 and/or 3 trained officers minimum, with additional training where identified in specific threat and risk assessments for area and regional requirements.
- Trained and competent in PSP, refreshed in accordance with Centrex guidelines.


Methodology

Officers are formed up, in twos, side by side.

At the command “**In double spacing - Advance**”, the lead two officers step off.

The next two officers allow a count of two paces before stepping off and following, and so on with the next two.

At the command to halt, the leading officers halt. The next two then close the gap before halting and so on.



Considerations

- This tactic allows officers to see the ground in front of them without it being obscured by the officers in front.
- It allows a body of officers to be moved across open ground in an orderly fashion.
- It extends the length of the column, which may cause possible vulnerability and communications difficulties.
- Supervisors to position themselves alongside the column to ensure they remain with their serial and further identify any hazards.

Single Pincer and Double Pincer (Open Ground Tactics)

Objective

- To isolate a particular section of a crowd either to remove that particular section or to remove and relocate the entire crowd, section by section.


Level of Training (Minimum requirement before deployment)



- Level 2 and/or 3 trained officer's minimum, with additional training were identified in specific threat and risk assessments for area and regional requirements.
- Trained and competent in PSP refreshed in accordance with Centrex guidelines.

Methodology

Single Pincer


A column of officers, lead by a supervisor, will advance towards and into a passive crowd. The supervisor will lead the column in single file into the crowd and by forming a horseshoe around a small manageable section they will isolate or 'bite off' this section of the crowd. The officers will then withdraw, moving the isolated crowd with them. This can be repeated until the objective is achieved.





Double Pincer

Two columns of officers, each lead by a supervisor, enter the crowd some distance apart. Having advanced an appropriate distance into the crowd they will head towards each other, cross over and form a double horseshoe. The inner cordon faces the isolated section of the crowd, the outer cordon faces the main body of the crowd. The inner cordon then withdraws, moving the isolated crowd with them. The outer cordon will then withdraw. This can be repeated until the objective is achieved.



Considerations

- Allows part of the crowd to be isolated in order that they may be dealt with.
- The double pincer affords some protection to officers' backs.
- The tactic may not be effective and the risk of injury will increase where the crowd are too violent or too organised.

Four-Sided Box (Open Ground Tactics)

Objective

- To isolate a section of a crowd (e.g. a Lock-On), in order that they can be dealt with, or to isolate a particular area in order that a lawful activity may take place.

Level of Training (Minimum requirement before deployment)

- Level 2 and/or 3 trained officers, with additional training (where necessary) in specific threat and risk assessments for area and regional requirements.
- Trained and competent in PSP refreshed in accordance with Centrex guidelines.


Methodology

The aim of this tactic is to form a 'box' of officers around an area or object to create a sterile area.

Prior to forming up an assessment of the number of officers necessary to achieve the objective is completed.

Officers will be organised into four columns, each lead by a supervisor. Each column will be assigned a side of the box. Having advanced to the assigned side, supervisors will step inside the box and officers will form the appropriate cordon.

To disengage, officers will be formed back into columns, headed by the supervisor and marched to their next objective.



Considerations

- Although this tactic enables an area to be isolated, dependent upon the threat level and the type of cordon employed, this tactic may require a large number of officers.
- Can be adapted to form a protected mobile unit isolating persons within.
- Officers may become isolated where this tactic is not deployed and managed appropriately.
- To have enough officers to create a sterile area in order to achieve the objective.

Arrest Team (Open Ground Tactics)

Objective

- To enter a crowd in order to arrest offenders.

Level of Training (Minimum requirement before deployment)

- Level 2 and/or 3 trained officers minimum, with additional training where identified in specific threat and risk assessments for area and regional requirements.
- Trained and competent in PSP refreshed in accordance with Centrex guidelines.
- Role related Manual Handling.

Methodology

An arrest team consists of six constables and a supervisor.

One officer will be designated as the arresting officer.

Two officers will be designated as escorting officers to restrain and escort the prisoner.

Three officers, referred to as 'minders' will afford protection to the arresting and escorting officers.

The six officers form up either in two columns of three or in a formation with the minders forming an arrowhead.

The supervisor should identify a position where they feel that they can best supervise.

The team advances into the crowd, with the minders moving beyond the target in order to afford protection to the arresting officer.

The team then withdraws together as a unit.

Considerations

- May take the target by surprise, especially where used through a cordon.
- Affords protection to the arresting officer, although risks increase where the team progress to deeply into a crowd.
- Although an effective method to remove ringleaders from a crowd, dependent upon the threat level, this tactic may require a large number of officers.
- Consideration must be given to minimising the risks of injury to officers and offenders upon withdrawing the unit.

Licensed Premises

The layout and design of most licensed premises are so diverse that to provide specific generic tactics to meet operational demand would not be possible. The tactics contained within this Manual, however, will provide a firm base of tactical options which should address most scenarios.

Objective

- To enter, secure and search licensed premises in accordance with operational requirements.

Level of Training (Prior to deployment)

- Trained and competent in PSP.
- Trained and competent in Level 3 Public Order Tactics.
- Received information and instruction in relation to their role for that operation.

Methodology

The following are examples of tactics that may be utilised within licensed premises, dependent upon operational requirement, threat and risk assessments.

Perimeter Cordon

- Teams of officers tasked to enter the premises and make their way to the prominent room.
- Officers disperse around the exterior of the premises in a slow controlled methodical way, evenly spaced, without losing line of sight of the next officer.

The Wedge

- Officers enter through allocated entrances, formed up as per the 'Wedge', and move in line through middle ground of premises in order to split crowd/revellers or gain access to a particular point or specific target (e.g. stage/D.J.).
- Officers to be mindful of barriers and obstructions.
- If the crowd is close together or more obstructive utilise the 'Wedge' formation with largest officer at the point.
- Officers in defensive non-violent postures and shuffle step as necessary.

Tight Cordon

- Officers enter through allocated entrances and form up in loose or tight cordon.
- Officers to move slowly, under the direction of the Commander and progressively moving crowd in direction required.
- Officers in defensive non-violent postures.
- Slow walk or shuffle facing crowd until desired objective is made.
- All tactical options to be addressed in conventional uniform, or the appropriate dress code as indicated in the operational risk assessment, which may include PPE batons and shields.

RESTRICTED

The above tactics may be used independently or in conjunction with each other and other similar tactical options.

The following points are aspects that must be considered in all circumstances:

- Nominated officers to take control of D.J and music equipment (turn music off).
- Nominated officers to take control of the bar area and staff (turn lights on).
- Nominated officers to clear anti-rooms such as toilets.
- No officer to be left alone - support officer present.

Considerations

- Liaison with local licensees in order to formulate protocols directed at reducing risks to officers. For example, where officers are called to the premises to deal with an incident, lights to be turned on, music to be turned off and officers to be met by a responsible member of staff (i.e. the manager or owner).
- Operational plan to include establishment plans, identification of emergency routes and exits, identification of arrest teams where required, appropriate safe systems for searching of premises and persons, policing of any licensed premises attendees and application of relevant legislation.
- Consideration must be given to the management of crowd dynamics within the licensed premises.
- An appropriate number of officers outside the premises in order to assist in external security and if necessary dispersal of the crowd away from the doorway.
- Consideration should be given to the use of Protected Personnel Carriers in order to provide a safe route of egress for both officers and subjects, shielding them from potential attack or traffic problems.
- Officers must be reminded that they are likely to be recorded by visual or audio means, either by Evidence Gatherers, CCTV or interested parties.
- Officers must be reminded that their communication skills (verbal and non-verbal) are of paramount importance in relation to escalating or de-escalating events. It should be highlighted about the use of batons/CS and shields as communication tools not just as weapons of defence.
- Officers should be made aware of the use of other skills during confrontations in the confined spaces, either on an individual basis or as 'contact and cover' or as a group e.g. use of empty hand skills or CS incapacitates.
- Protagonists must be given a chance to de-escalate, surrender or move away from others if circumstances allow.
- Officers must be reminded about the factors surrounding the dispersal of crowds in confined spaces and the fact that escape routes must be utilised.

Police Prison Tactics

HM Prison Service currently trains a number of their officers in advanced control and restraint (C & R) tactics, which are used in order to deal with disorder within prison establishments.

The police role in supporting the prison service during incidents of disorder within prisons, is primarily one of maintaining perimeter security and not ordinarily direct intervention within prisons.

It is for this reason that police prison tactics will no longer be covered.

However, those Forces which have prison establishments within their areas, may wish to familiarise key members of staff in Prison Service intervention tactics. This can be achieved by attendance or observation of Prison Service Training which can be arranged through the appropriate HMP (C & R) centre.

This will assist in awareness of HMP tactics in the event of significant disorder and assist the appropriate policing response.

10. EXTERNAL AGENCY GUIDANCE

Sheriffs

(See High Court Enforcement Officers section below - this comes into force on 1st April 2004)

Objective

The Sheriff is responsible for the Enforcement of High Court Writs in each County under the Sheriffs Act 1887. See the Sheriffs website: www.hceoa.org.uk for details of Sheriff's Offices in England & Wales.

The term 'The Sheriff' encompasses three separate types of individual and it is important to understand the distinction between them:

The High Sheriff: Is responsible to the Crown for the efficient enforcement of writs in her or his County and holds an annual ceremonial appointment.

The Under Sheriff: Is a solicitor responsible to the High Sheriff for the mechanics of carrying out enforcement in his/her County and tends to hold the appointment for many years, but is appointed annually by each High Sheriff.

The Sheriff's Officer: Is the enforcement officer dealing with day to day enforcement, again being appointed annually, but tending to stay in office for many years.

Under Sheriffs and Sheriff's Officers are Officers of the Court for enforcement purposes in common with County Court bailiffs.

There are 50,000 - 60,000 High Court Writs issued each year and the majority are for enforcement of money judgements. A small number are for possession of land and property and an even smaller number involve large scale Writs of Possession, which involve considerable planning.

All Writs are based on a judgement or order issued from either a County Court or a High Court, although in many cases judgement will be obtained by default without a Court hearing.

When will the Police come across a Sheriff?

- 1) During the course of the enforcement of a money judgement or normal possession of land and property &/or when called to assist to prevent a likely breach of the peace.
- 2) As part of planning for a large scale Writ of Possession, when the police are formally requested to assist under Section 8(2) Sheriffs Act 1887.

What powers do the Police have?

In the case of (1) one above the normal breach of the peace considerations apply. Police officers should satisfy themselves of the identity of the Sheriff's Officer and his/her authority to act by asking to see his/her ID and the Warrant under which he/she is acting. The Police officer should not become involved in the merits of the case.

In the case of (2) two above, Section 10 Criminal Law Act 1977 makes it a criminal offence to resist or intentionally obstruct an Officer of the Court in the enforcement of a Writ of Possession. A senior police officer should obtain a copy of the Writ from the Under Sheriff and ensure that he/she has a copy of the formal notice, served on the Chief Constable under Section 8(2), at the appropriate time.

High Court Enforcement Officers

(See Sheriffs section for guidance on High Court Enforcement issues prior to 31st March 2004)

Under Section 99 and Schedule 7, The Courts Act 2003 and The High Court Enforcement Officers Regulations 2004, the responsibility for enforcing High Court Writs passed from Sheriffs of Counties to High Court Enforcement Officers (HCEOs).

The main difference in practical terms is that there will be no geographical restriction by County and any HCEO will be able to enforce any Writ in any part of England and Wales.

A HCEO combines the former roles of Under Sheriff and Sheriff's Officer (see Sheriffs for background information and the role of the Police in High Court Enforcement).

In general terms, the law applying to Sheriffs has simply been re-enacted to apply to HCEOs, pending the implementation of the Enforcement Review White Paper 'Effective Enforcement' (March 2003) sometime after 2005.

The duty of the Police to assist an HCEO in the execution of a Writ is contained in Paragraph 5 of Schedule 7; Section 10 of The Criminal Law Act 1977 has been amended accordingly. This duty now applies to all Writs and not just to Writs of Possession.

Lists of all HCEO's and the areas in which they are based can be found on the following websites: www.hceo.org.uk and www.courtservice.gov.uk

Dealing with the Large Scale Writ of Possession

The key to a successful enforcement is careful planning and co-operation between all those involved: the Police, the Under Sheriff, the Landowner, the Project Co-ordinator, the Sheriff's National Eviction Team, and any specialist contractors involved.

Intelligence on the activity of occupiers is always helpful and a local police officer should make it his/her business to get to know as much as possible about the site and the individuals involved, from the date of occupation up to the date of issue of possession proceedings.

From the date of occupation to the issue of a Writ to the Sheriff, the Landowner remains responsible for the entire site and the activities of the occupiers, who are civil trespassers, and should take appropriate action to minimise any risk on the site, either to the occupiers themselves or to the general public.

The Under Sheriff is responsible for the land and its occupants, and for the conduct of the enforcement, from the date of the issue of the Writ to the date of the signing off of the Writ at the end of the enforcement, when the land is handed back to the Landowner.

Planning normally starts well before the Writ is issued and the initial approach to the police would, in most cases, come from the Under Sheriff.

The police do not normally intervene on the site occupied unless a criminal offence has occurred, although there are matters requiring investigation, such as an unlawful death on the site. Powers under the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 are not generally used as a substitute for civil proceedings for possession, other than in very exceptional circumstances.

Changes in the Near Future

Section 99, The Courts Act 2003 removes the responsibility of the Sheriff in enforcing High Court Writs. This role is to be taken by a High Court Enforcement Officer (HCEO), many of whom will be former Under Sheriffs and Sheriff's Officers, and the functions of an Under Sheriff and a Sheriff's Officer will effectively be merged.

Powers in relation to High Court enforcement, including the power to call for police assistance, are re-enacted in Schedule (5) five.

The main difference in practical terms is that there will be no geographical restriction by County and **any** HCEO will be able to enforce **any** Writ in **any** part of England and Wales.

Implementation date will be 1st April 2004, details of all HCEO's are set out on the website: www.hceo.org.uk .

**PART FOUR:
PUBLIC ORDER TRAINING
ISSUES**

Contents Part Four - Public Order Training Issues

11. PUBLIC ORDER TRAINING POLICY GUIDANCE	229
12. TRAINING, HEALTH, AND SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS	233
GENERAL SAFETY GUIDELINES.....	235
13. PSU BRIEFING - PRINCIPLES	239
14. CROWD BRIEFING.....	240
15. PUBLIC ORDER TRAINING SAFETY INSTRUCTIONS	241
16. PUBLIC ORDER TRAINING PREPARATION SAFE WARM UP AND STRETCH.....	242
RISK ASSESSMENT - AIDE MEMOIRE.....	246
PROFORMA 1 & 2.....	249
PROFORMA 3.....	252

11. PUBLIC ORDER TRAINING POLICY GUIDANCE

Recruitment/Selection of Personnel

In determining the number of officers required for training at either Levels 1, 2 or 3 Chief Officers must take into consideration the following aspects, within the decision making process:

- The provision of Mutual Aid Commitments and the ability to maintain that requirement.
- The threat/strategic risk assessment, identifying operational needs of Forces, along with any regional protocols.
- Compliance with Equal Opportunities and Human Rights Legislation.
- Compliance with Health and Safety legislation, in particular the provision of trained and competent officers.

All operational officers shall be trained to Level 3, Public Order Tactics, supported by the Personal Safety Programme in accordance with the ACPO Guidelines.

Occupational Health Screening and Fitness Standards

The variety of roles carried out within the policing of public order range from normality to serious disorder, thereby increasing the likelihood of injury to officers. In order to reduce this risk and in supporting the identification of potential Occupational Health related injuries, it is recommended that Forces meet the requirements of the following national guidelines:

- National Occupational Health Strategy
- Home Office Guidance on Police Fitness Standards

Training Implementation

All training provision will need to develop so that it equates to those competencies highlighted within the Integrated Competency Framework. This should be achieved by following the Centrex Training Design Model along with evaluation of that training to ensure that it meets operational needs, further information can be found at www.centrex.police.uk/trainingdesign. Forces will be responsible for ensuring that operational officers are trained to the appropriate level.

The requirement and content of training shall ensure that officers are competent in the basic application of the various tactics operationally. The training of tactics will be linked together and practised before being tested during full exercise training.

The following is a summary of that process:

- a) Teaching of basic formations i.e. 'Running Lines', Cordons, Overhead Entry, etc, and how they are used.
- b) Teaching of tactics i.e. frontal assault, flanking movements, diversions, etc.
- c) Experience of this teaching in a random environment, e.g. Forces or regional exercise training where the various levels of command and tactical application are tested and developed.

The depth to which Forces will be able to achieve all three levels of this training delivery and scenario-based training will be dependent upon the level of investment, resources and facilities available to Forces in providing a suitable training environment for trainers and students.

In relation to the provision of Level 1 training Forces will need to conduct Threat and Risk Assessments in line with appropriate needs analysis for training provision. As with Levels 2 & 3, this training must cover any requirement for officers to complete both initial and refresher training.

Initial Training

Level 3

All **uniformed** operational police officers shall be trained **and competent** to Level 3.

Initial training will include all aspects identified within the previously defined standard of training within this Manual.

This will be supported by the syllabus within the current Probationer Training System in relation to this area www.centrex.police.uk/business/foundation

Initial Training must cover all tactics shown below:

- Cordons: Loose, Tight and Filter
- Single and Double Belt Cordons
- Reinforced Cordons
- The Wedge: Single and Double Belt
- Marching Cordons.

Incorporated into Level 3 training should also be an awareness of the following components of drill:

- Forming up in Two Ranks and Two Files
- Standing Easy
- Standing at Ease
- Attention (and back to standing at ease)
- Dismissed and Falling Out
- Turn at the Halt to the Left, Right and About
- Marching, Wheeling and Halting
- Double and Quick Time
- Street Entry Formation Manoeuvre to Left, Centre and Right of Street.

Level 2

These officers will train in all basic Level 2 Tactics, along with tactical application in the training environment, and supported by revision of Level 3 syllabus.

Those officers trained to Level 2 standard will be competent for deployment in a Mutual Aid role.

- Shield Cordon.
- Free Running Lines including:
 - ◊ Attack from the rear
 - ◊ Tactical Withdrawal
 - ◊ Recovery of Injured Officer.
- Mixed Shield Dispersal Units.
- Junctions:
 - ◊ Three Sided Box
 - ◊ Cross Roads
 - ◊ 'T' Junctions
 - ◊ Left & Right Junctions.
- Wheeling Roads:
 - ◊ 'T' Junctions
 - ◊ Left & Right Junctions.
- Deployment from Vehicles.
- Enclosed Space Tactics:
 - ◊ Building Entry
 - ◊ Building/Corridor Searching
 - ◊ Climbing Stairs.
- Room Entry/Violent Person.
- Petrol Reception.

Refresher Training - Guidance

Refresher training will need to cover any new aspects related to the role of officers within the Public Order environment, whilst refining the basic psychomotor skills, knowledge, understanding and application of tactics at a minimum.

Forces will need to complete a Threat/Risk Assessment that considers relevant historical data, in relation to the application of tactics within their operational field. Training content should cover the refreshment of tactics, along with expanding levels (b) and (c) of the aforementioned training structure (see Training Implementation Section, *page229*).

Trainer Standards

In order to ensure that the level of training provided to police officers remains at an appropriate standard, Public Order Tactical Trainers must successfully complete the Centrex approved course or equivalent.

Forces must ensure that Trainers maintain a portfolio of evidence in line with the competencies required by Tactical Trainers. This portfolio must be maintained by the trainer and include periodic assessments by competent assessors. This process will be supported by internal verification of these portfolios in line with Centrex guidelines.

In order to enhance the standard of training delivery, Forces may wish to consider that Tactical Trainers complete the Centrex Training Development Programme, assessor programme and internal verifier awards or equivalent, to further develop their trainer skills.

Training Venues and Delivery

Centrally accredited centres have historically delivered the nationally approved Tactical Trainers Course and Tactical Advisors Courses.

With the introduction of the Integrated Competency Framework and the ongoing review of Training and Development awards, the approval for provision of this training and associated aspects will be reviewed in order to bring it in line with Centrex training guidelines.

In order to standardise the delivery and evaluation of training on a national basis, it is recommended that Force training departments consider utilising the Centrex Quality Approval process. From this they may achieve a quality standard to provide current and future Centrex approved Public Order related training products. In the longer term this will lead to the delivery of Centrex products through a franchise agreement for individual training products.

12. TRAINING, HEALTH, AND SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS

Rationale for Training

During public disorder incidents, physical safeguards will provide a degree of protection, but a significant factor in ensuring Health and Safety of police officers lies in the adoption of safe systems of work by skilled and experienced personnel; who understand the hazards and precautions that need to be taken. This is supported by officers' confidence in their training, work equipment and PPE provided by Forces. If training for operational activities is to be effective it must be relevant and simulate the conditions to be encountered, to the extent that it is necessary to meet training objectives. This may necessarily expose persons to an element of risk, albeit a reduced risk, to that encountered operationally.

Training for many skills can be carried forward effectively in an environment which provides safeguards which are not reasonably practicable in operational situations. However, at an appropriate stage in the progressive development of skills, it is necessary to train in circumstances more similar to those likely to be encountered operationally.

Responsibility for Safety

The Health and Safety of all involved in Public Order Training is the responsibility of the Police Authority via relevant Force management teams. The tasks of conducting risk assessments, review, monitoring and subsequent supervision of safety measures may be delegated to appropriately trained staff; however this does not absolve senior management from its overriding responsibility for safety.

Forces must ensure that Management Systems that are implemented are updated in line with local, national and legislative requirements, so as to minimise the risk of injury to officers and those affected by such training.

Health and Safety in Public Order Training

The aims and objectives of Public Order Training should always be considered in advance and a Risk Assessment carried out. Suitable safeguards should be introduced where the exposure to any particular hazard is necessary for the stated aims and objectives of the training. There may be some circumstances in which the risk a during training is so significant that it outweighs any likely benefits. In such cases, alternative training should be used, in which the objectives may be met in another way, e.g. controlling the nature of the missiles used, avoiding dropping heavy objects from a height, etc.

The purpose of risk assessments is to identify hazards and control measures. These help employers judge what steps they need to take to comply with Health and Safety Legislation and decide priorities for action.

The principles of risk assessment, whether for operational activities or in training, will be the same. However, the preventive and protective measures identified may vary according to such factors as environment, levels of knowledge, experience, supervision and relevance to the aims and objectives of the activity.

RESTRICTED

Forces should consider the content of the Home Office Circulation in respect of both operational and training activities.

Detailed information as to the requirements for Risk Assessments are contained in the Management of Health and Safety Regulations 1999 and its associated Codes of Practice.

A Risk Assessment aide memoire can be found on page 246.

RESTRICTED

General Safety Guidelines

The purpose of these guidelines is to ensure that the training of Public Order duties at accredited Police Training Centres is in accordance with this Manual, in an environment that is safe, so far as is reasonably practicable.

Qualified Member of Staff

Means a suitably qualified Tactical Trainer.

Crowd Leader

Means a qualified member of Tactical Training Staff.

First Aid Equipment

Means that as outlined in the Health and Safety (First-Aid) Regulations 1981, Approved Code of Practice and Guidance L74 HSE Books 1997 ISBN 0 7176 1050 0

Safety Officer

Means an authorised member of staff who has been assessed as such.

Qualified First Aider

Means a person who holds a current Police First Aid at Work Certificate, or equivalent in line with the Centrex First Aid programme Module 4, or issued by an organisation approved by the Health and Safety Executive.

Fluorescent Jacket

Means a police issue jacket or tabard in day glow yellow or orange.

Organisation

The organisation of Public Order Training at Training Centres is ultimately the responsibility of the Police Authority.

Training departments are responsible for ensuring that sufficient qualified trainers are available for the training sessions.

The Public Order Trainer has overall responsibility for public order training equipment and, together with other qualified Public Order Trainers, for the day-to-day implementation of the public order training programme.

A member of staff will be nominated to be the Safety Officer for each training session.

Safety Officer

At each training session a member of staff will act as a dedicated site Safety Officer with specific responsibility for the safety of students and training staff.

The principal responsibilities of the Safety Officer are:

- Checking the training site for safety.
- Ensuring provision of first aid equipment.
- Briefing of other Safety Officers as necessary.
- Briefing trainers and students on safety and site rules.
- Recording of injuries and potentially dangerous incidents.
- Ensuring that the Course Training Log Book is maintained to assist in subsequent incident/accident investigations.

The Safety Officer(s) will be clearly identifiable e.g. wearing a reflective jacket.

Instructions given by Safety Officers will be followed immediately by all staff and students on site.

The role of the Safety Officer is to ensure the safety of all those involved, including the training staff.

Each session will have a Safety Officer. If that session has more than one seat of disorder then the 'Risk Assessment' for each session shall include the desirability of a Safety Officer being present solely for that seat of disorder, e.g. the training of the violent person scenario.

Training Staff

The Head of Centre is responsible for ensuring that each Public Order training session is adequately supervised by qualified training staff. All training staff who take a leading role in Public Order Training must be trained to Level 2.

Level of Training:

- Public Order Level 2 and Personal Safety Programme (PSP) trained officer.
- Trained in Level 4 and Level 5 of the Centrex First Aid Training Course in accordance with the ACPO Report on First Aid Training 2nd Edition or its equivalent.
- Role related Manual/Kinetic Handling Techniques.
- Training should be integrated within Forces where appropriate to ensure that all officers are aware of the medic's role and position.

Safety Rules

Prior to the commencement of each training session, the officer performing the role of Safety Officer will reinforce the safety rules, whilst briefing staff and students (see *page 241*) 'Training Safety Instructions' (*Safety Brief*).

The safety rules will be followed at all times by staff and students whilst engaged in Public Order Training.

Injuries/Near Miss

Any injuries sustained during Public Order Training must be reported immediately to the training staff. Injury forms are to be completed in accordance with Force Policies and Centre instructions.

Students must be encouraged to report incidents that had the potential to cause injury (near misses). A record of these incidents shall be maintained in accordance with Force Policies as this information will assist Forces when reviewing Risk Assessments and accident data, as to whether Risk Management Systems require further development.

The Management Team shall identify an appropriate person to check injury and incidents records in accordance with their Force management systems and make adjustments to the training programme as necessary.

Forces should review and implement appropriate Occupational Health Policies that support and assist officers in being trained to a competent level whilst not exposing them to unnecessary risk. Such policies should examine the implications of an officer not being fit to be trained and therefore potentially not fit for operational duties. No officer will be allowed to participate in training unless fit to do so.

Equipment

The Public Order Trainer is responsible for maintenance of public order training equipment.

Guidelines for the storage and inspection of shields must be adhered to.

Forces will provide officers with suitable and sufficient work equipment and personal protective equipment, e.g. NATO helmet, leg protectors and appropriate overalls. No officer will be allowed to participate in public order training sessions unless properly equipped.

The Public Order Trainer should ensure that all work equipment and personal equipment is examined before use. If it is damaged, defective or in any way unfit for its intended purpose it should be taken out of use immediately and conspicuously marked to prevent accidental use. The item of equipment should be stored separately from other personal protective equipment before disposal. Officers should be provided with replacement equipment as soon as is reasonably practicable, in line with Force and legislative requirements.

First Aid

There must be a qualified First Aider on hand during each training session and a first aid kit must be readily available for immediate use. The contents of the first aid equipment provided should be identified after the completion of a First Aid Risk Assessment that should include the identification of prevalent injuries supported by foreseeable risks of injury. Each Force should ensure that they provide appropriate systems for the checking, replacing and identification of first aid supplies.

Safety Officer - Responsibilities

The Safety Officer must ensure that:

- 1) The control measures contained in the Public Order Training Risk Assessment are complied with.
- 2) All sharp or valuable items of property are removed from the training area or that appropriate control measures are in place to minimise risk of injury, damage or loss.
- 3) Participants are fit to take part in training, in accordance with Force Policy.
- 4) Adequate warm up and warm down sessions are provided.
- 5) First Aid officers are on hand.
- 6) First Aid equipment is readily available for immediate use.
- 7) Training areas are readily identifiable and if necessary suitably marked.
- 8) All trainers are in possession of an audible warning instrument e.g. whistle, klaxon or air horn.
- 9) Safety officers are readily identifiable by wearing fluorescent jackets or other suitable clothing.
- 10) Designated training areas are checked before each training session, giving due consideration to Health and Safety at Work provisions.
- 11) Missiles provided for training are blocks of softwood or rubber.
- 12) Crowd members are readily identifiable as such. (It is recommended that crowd members be provided with a bib that clearly identifies them as such).

13. PSU BRIEFING - PRINCIPLES

Trainers must ensure that all officers within a PSU are aware of the following:

- 1) The aims and objectives for the training session are outlined.
- 2) The intention is to train not maim.
- 3) To follow the directions of Public Order Trainers and Supervisors at all times.
- 4) Upon hearing the audible warning instrument, stop the action and do not restart until told otherwise.
- 5) Upon hearing “**Checkmate**” stop the action and do not restart until told otherwise.
- 6) Keep to the marked training areas only (specify local arrangements).
- 7) ‘**Touch**’ arrests only, except in violent person scenario.
- 8) If vehicles are used do not drive at crowd members.
- 9) All crowd members will be easily identifiable as such.
- 10) Wear protective equipment at all times, i.e. visors down on buckled helmets, overalls buttoned/zipped up.
- 11) Control restraints must not be used, except in violent person scenario.
- 12) Check personal protective equipment to ensure it is not damaged, defective or in any unfit for use. Report any deficiencies to a trainer **before** taking part in training.

14. CROWD BRIEFING

The Safety Officer must ensure that the following principles are followed:

- 1) That the aims and objectives for the training session are outlined.
- 2) That intention is to train not to maim.
- 3) That the directions of the crowd leaders are followed at all times.
- 4) Upon hearing the audible warning instrument stop do not restart until told otherwise.
- 5) Upon hearing “*Checkmate*” you must stop the action and do not restart until told otherwise.
- 6) Throw only the missiles provided.
- 7) Wear protective equipment at all times.
- 8) Keep to marked training area only.
- 9) Report all injuries as soon as possible.
- 10) Do not come into contact with the shields or the shield carriers.
- 11) Do not shout any misleading instructions.
- 12) If arrested do not struggle, except as directed during violent person training in accordance with the Public Order Training Manual.
- 13) Wear an identification bib (if provided).
- 14) Check your personal protective equipment to ensure it is not damaged, defective or in any way unfit for use. Report any deficiencies to a trainer **before** taking part in training.

15. PUBLIC ORDER TRAINING SAFETY INSTRUCTIONS

Safety Brief

These instructions will be used by the officer performing the role of the Site Safety Officer to brief students and staff prior to each Public Order Training session. They must be given to students and staff prior to each Public Order Training session.

- 1) I am the Site Safety Officer. Safety Officers are identifiable by the reflective jackets that they wear. Trainers and students will obey their instructions.
- 2) All staff and students must attend each training session equipped with a NATO helmet, leg protectors, Force-issue protective boots, overalls, police-issue leather and gloves. Batons and handcuffs must not be carried on the training site unless directed otherwise.
- 3) All officers are to remove watches, rings and all other personal valuables before commencing training and ensure they are in a safe place.
- 4) If you are suffering from an illness or injury that affects your fitness you must bring it to the attention of the trainer. You have a duty of care to yourself and the organisation in assessing your own ability to train in accordance with Force Policies.
- 5) The commands of the trainer will be followed at all times by all those taking part in the training, irrespective of rank.
- 6) The sounding of an audible warning instrument means stop and stand still. Similarly, the word "**Checkmate**" means stop and stand still.
- 7) If you feel you or someone else is in danger and feel that the training should stop you must bring this to a trainer's attention immediately by shouting, "**Checkmate**".
- 8) You are responsible as individuals for your actions during training and should not expose any officer unnecessarily to the risk of injury. If you behave in a dangerous manner you will be removed from training and face the possibility of disciplinary action or prosecution.
- 9) All officers are reminded that whilst there is a need to bring realism to the training serious injuries can result if the safety rules are not strictly followed.
- 10) The following instructions must be adhered to when training the violent person scenario:
 - ◇ Only a qualified trainer will play the part of a violent person.
 - ◇ The violent person will not charge at the student.
 - ◇ The violent person will not make contact with the students' shields, except by using the pickaxe handle or baseball bat.
- 11) Any injury sustained at the training venue must be reported before leaving the site. A formal report must be completed in accordance with Force policies to ensure that the Department of Social Security rules and Health and Safety legislation are complied with, and your right to have the injury treated as an industrial injury is preserved.
- 12) If any officer is involved in an incident, which could have resulted in an injury (near miss), the circumstances should be reported in accordance with Force policies at an appropriate stage of the training session.

16. PUBLIC ORDER TRAINING PREPARATION SAFE WARM UP AND STRETCH

The activities undertaken by Police Support Unit (PSU) duties can be very strenuous. To be an operational PSU officer students will require a certain level of fitness. Forces must be aware of the need for health screening and fitness testing their officers against national guidelines.

The training may put officers under stresses both physical and mental. For the body to perform effectively the preparation needs to be in line with the activities that are about to be undertaken. All PSU training and exercises should include a warm up.

When physical activities are undertaken and warm ups are required they should be made up of the following:

1	Initial pulse raiser	Raises the heart rate increasing the supply of blood to the body and major muscles, i.e. walking, jogging.
2	Mobilisation	Increasing the levels of synovial fluid in the joints thus limiting wear to them.
3	Stretching	The preparation of muscles for the activities that are to be undertaken improving flexibility and injury prevention.
4	Secondary pulse raiser	To again raise the officer's heart rate and prepare them for the activities ahead, i.e. increase running speed.
5	Activity	The training to be done.
6	Cool down	Allowing the body's temperature to reduce naturally. This should include developmental stretching to promote flexible, healthy muscles.

For the activity to be safe, good practice dictates that a qualified Physical Training Instructor or equivalent should take all warm ups. This will ensure that all the requirements for the warm up are met.

If this is not possible then a trainer who has had suitable training in the delivery of Health and Fitness training should lead it. Once the warm up is complete, the officers should be given the opportunity to carry out any further stretching that they may require. This may apply to sports players in the group or people who have individual stretches for particular areas of the body.

The responsibility for an officer's health and fitness should be placed with the individual. Before the commencement of any session there should be a health and injury check of all officers.

Any injuries or illness should be noted. If in doubt no officer should be allowed to partake in a session if it believed that they are sick or injured. This should be recorded along with any other health issues that may arise during the training and referred to as necessary.

Injury During Training

If an officer is injured they must stop their training immediately and report the injury.

They should also be instructed to report any injuries that may come to light after the training to the training department.

It should be explained to them that they might feel a degree of muscle soreness as PSU training is tiring depending on levels of fitness. This explanation should be provided in a manner that enables officers to differentiate between an injury and muscle soreness.

PUBLIC ORDER TACTICS TRAINING

RISK ASSESSMENT - AIDE MEMOIRE

Risk Assessment - Aide Memoire

This aide memoire has been included in this Manual to assist tactical trainers in adopting a standardised approach to Risk Assessment within the training environment.

It is important to note that the Risk Assessor's role is to identify hazards, evaluate risks and to identify potential control measures that reduce risk, so far as is reasonably practicable.

In deciding upon which control measures to implement, the Manager's role in this process is to consider the cost benefit analysis, including the implication of legislation.

Forces should always seek guidance from their respective Health & Safety Departments.

Identify Significant Hazards

The assessor should complete a list of significant hazards, which they have identified and list them below. This would be supported by the involvement of a Force Safety Representative or other staff.

Where a Home Office (HO) or Force Generic Risk Assessment (GRA) exists, the following steps would be taken:

- Work through the GRA listing those hazards that are applicable.
- Indicate in the appropriate column whether the GRA applies to the hazard.
- Ensure that all significant hazards not included in the GRA are listed.
- For the hazard where the GRA is not applicable complete a full risk assessment using Proforma 1 & 2 as well as the risk factors considered.
- Having established the separate hazard and risk levels, utilise the risk estimator to establish the final level, which is then recorded on the summary.

Identify Who May be Harmed

Tick against all those who may be affected.

Evaluate the Level of Risk

Is the risk adequately controlled, have precautions already been taken against the risks from hazards listed? For example

Have the following been provided:

- Adequate information instruction and training?
- Adequate systems or procedures?

Do the precautions:

- Meet the standards set by a Legal Requirement/Force Policies?
- Comply with a recognised industry standard?
- Represent good practice?
- Reduce the risk so far as reasonably practicable?

If so, then the risks are adequately controlled; however there will be a need to record the precautions and confirm they are in place by ticking 'In Place' on Proforma 3.

Hazard Levels

- HIGH:** Death, major injury or serious illness is likely to occur.
- MEDIUM:** Serious injuries or ill health are likely to occur, for example people may be off work for more than 3 days as a result (**but not hospitalised**).
- LOW:** Where other less serious injuries could arise, for example, where injuries may not necessitate time off work for up to three days.

Risk Levels

- HIGH:** Where it is more likely or near certain that harm will occur.
- MEDIUM:** Where harm is possible/likely to occur.
- LOW:** Where harm is unlikely/highly unlikely and will seldom occur.

Risk Assessment

Using the risk estimator assess the hazard and the risk. Record the level as low, medium, or high. This is carried forward on to the summary (Proforma 3).

Risk Estimator - assesses the likelihood of the hazard and the risk coming together	LOW HAZARD (slightly harmful)	MEDIUM HAZARD (moderately harmful)	HIGH HAZARD (extremely harmful)
LOW RISK POTENTIAL Highly unlikely/unlikely	LOW RISK (Trivial)	LOW RISK (Acceptable)	MEDIUM RISK (Moderate)
MEDIUM RISK POTENTIAL Likely/possible	LOW RISK (Acceptable)	MEDIUM RISK (Moderate)	HIGH RISK (Substantial)
HIGH RISK POTENTIAL More likely/near certain	MEDIUM RISK (Moderate)	HIGH RISK (Substantial)	HIGH RISK (Intolerable)

Hierarchy of Control

Where further control measures are required the assessor should record those thought relevant, in consultation with personnel who complete the task. Some control measures may be more

effective than others. Forces should follow a **'hierarchy of control'** - the following safety sequence shows the order of effectiveness of measures.

E limination, e.g. by use of alternatives, changing a process, etc.

R educed by Substitution, e.g. substituting one substance or process for another.

I solation - Use of Barriers, (isolating the hazard away from the person affected) or by *segregation* (isolating the person from the hazard).

C ontrol Measures - Use of Procedures, e.g. instruction and training, safe systems of work.

S igns & Discipline - Audible/Visual Warning Systems, e.g. signs, instructions, labels, etc supported by appropriate supervision.

P ersonal Protective Equipment - *PPE should be used as a last resort* e.g. goggles, gloves, body armour etc, should only be used as a sole measure when all other methods have been exhausted.

Monitoring Measures

Detail any measures considered necessary to ensure that the specified control measures are applied.

Review

Detail when a review is required, as a maximum this must be done twelve months after the initial assessment, assuming that the tasks assessed are still conducted by the organisation.

It must be reviewed when there are reasons to believe it is no longer valid, for example:

- After an injury or near miss is reported.
- A significant change in task/location has occurred.
- Introduction of new equipment.
- Introduction of personnel.

The review process should include those affected by the assessment in consultation, where appropriate, with the Force Safety Officer and relevant staff association or union.

RESTRICTED

INVENTORY OF HAZARDS		PROFORMA 1 & 2									
Department/Division:		Location/premises:									
Name of person carrying out risk assessment		Date completed:									
Duties, locations and persons covered by the inventory:											
Ref	Description of activity	Hazards	Type of people affected			GRA Force	GRA H/O	Hazards Criteria L-M-H	Risk Criteria L-M-H	Combined Hazard & Risk Rating	
			S	C	P						
1.											
2.											
3.											
4.											
5.											
6.											
7.											

S = Staff including Special Constables C = Contractors P =Public

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Ref	Description of activity	Hazards	Type of people affected			GRA Force	GRA H/O	Hazards Criteria L-M-H	Risk Criteria L-M-H	Combined Hazard & Risk Rating
			S	C	P					
8.										
9.										
10.										
11.										
12.										
13.										
14.										
15.										
16.										
17.										
18.										
19.										
20.										

S = Staff including Special Constables C = Contractors P =Public

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Risk Factors Considered	
1	11
2	12
3	13
4	14
5	15
6	16
7	17
8	18
9	19
10	20

May include for example:- frequency, duration, time, numbers involved, experience of those involved, previous history etc.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

PROFORMA 3	LOCATION: REFERENCE: OTHER RELEVANT RISK ASSESSMENTS:
RISK ASSESSMENT: COMPLETED BY:	DATE COMPLETED: REVIEW DATE:

ACTIVITY		Overall Haz/risk	HAZARD	CONTROL MEASURES REQUIRED	IN PLACE	FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED	
Ref No	Description					By When	Person Responsible

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

ACTIVITY		HAZARD	RISK	CONTROL MEASURES REQUIRED	IN PLACE	FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED	
						By When	Person Responsible
Ref	Description						
No							

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

ACTIVITY		HAZARD	RISK	CONTROL MEASURES REQUIRED	IN PLACE	FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED	
Ref No	Description					By When	Person Responsible

Signature of assessor	Signature of local Safety Representative
Name and title:	Name:
Date	Date:
Signature of Force Health and Safety Advisor	Signature of Head of Division/Department
Name and title:	Name and title:
Date:	Date:

RESTRICTED

PUBLIC ORDER TACTICS TRAINING - PROCEDURES & SAFE SYSTEM OF WORK

Course No:

Date :

Contents - Procedures & Safe System of Work

PROCEDURES & SAFE SYSTEM OF WORK.....	257
COURSE TRAINERS.....	261
COURSE TRAINERS.....	262
PSU 1 (CALL SIGN) - LIST	263
PSU 2 (CALL SIGN) - LIST	265
COURSE SPECIFIC RISK ASSESSMENT (TO BE COMPLETED WHERE APPROPRIATE) ...	267
PSU 1 TRAINING LOG.....	268
PSU 2 TRAINING LOG.....	269
TACTICAL EXERCISE/SCENARIO LOG	271
TACTICAL EXERCISE/ SCENARIO LOG	273
ACCIDENT / INCIDENT LOG	275
ACCIDENT / INCIDENT LOG	277
EQUIPMENT AND VENUE DAMAGE.....	279
APPENDIX: PROCEDURES & SAFE SYSTEM OF WORK (AUDIT TRAIL)	280

PROCEDURES & SAFE SYSTEM OF WORK

Introduction

This booklet has been developed to provide Forces with an audit document that will assist in the recording and evaluation of training, whilst providing key information that may be required within incident/accident investigations.

In order to ensure that the training required by officers facing public disorder is kept as safe and as close to reality as is practicable, Forces should identify minimum ratios of trainers to students. The following ratios of trainers are provided as an example of good practice.

Number of Students	Trainers	Safety / Asst. Safety Officer	Comments
Minimum - 1 Insp. / 3 Sgt's./ 12 Constables'	-	-	
1 PSU - 1 Insp. / 3 Sgt's./ 18 Constables'*	-	-	
2 PSU'S - 2 Insp. / 6 Sgt's./ 36 Constables'*	-	-	

- Forces will need to decide on the number of trainers to students from the appropriate risk assessments, taking into consideration the dynamic nature of the training to be undertaken and environmental circumstances within the training venue.
- Trainers will need to be assessed by a competent assessor in line with force policies, for example, at least one assessed lesson per year.
- Trainers should ensure that all lessons meet the required training outcomes.
- The provision of additional trainers will be required when additional students are anticipated.
- There must be adequate First Aid at Work trained Training staff at the training venue.

All trainers must ensure that they are fully aware of the contents and procedures to be adhered to within this document. They must also provide suitable and sufficient information and instruction to enable those who attend training to fulfil their own obligations with regards to Health and Safety Legislation.

Where deficiencies in the control of hazards faced by officers within the training arena are highlighted, all trainers must, so far as is reasonably practicable, reduce the potential for injury by applying the following hierarchy of control:

- Take steps to eliminate any hazard.
- Reduce exposure to the hazard by substitution (e.g. substituting one process or substance for another).
- Use of barriers in order to isolate the hazard away from employees or segregation (isolating the worker from the hazard).
- Develop other control measures such as procedures or safe systems of work.
- Use warning signs and discipline.

RESTRICTED

- Finally by utilising appropriate Personal Protective Equipment.

Any such deficiencies in risk control, near miss/incident or accident must be reported in accordance with both departmental and Force Policies **prior** to leaving training venues.

Safety Officer / Assistant Safety Officer Responsibilities (Check List)

The site Safety Officer/Assistant Safety Officer must ensure that the following control measures and procedures have been completed prior to training commencing:

No:	Control Measure / Procedure to be Checked	Yes	No*
1	Check the training arenas for any hazards (e.g. leaking roof, obstructions, missiles used in training) are cleared.		
2	Confirm that all officers have signed in.		
3	Ensure that ALL officers have reported any existing injuries in accordance with Force Policies. <i>(Where an individual reports an injury for which they are receiving treatment the Occupational Health Unit (OHU) Nurse should be contacted prior to the commencement of any practical teaches).</i>		
4	That the site First Aid equipment is available within the training arena.		
5	That ALL officers have received the Safety Briefing.		
6	Ensure that all officers are in possession of Personal Protective Equipment and are wearing approved Force-issue boots.		

* *Where deficiencies are identified appropriate steps must be taken to comply with the control measures and procedures, all of which must be supported by a specific Risk Assessment in order to show that all such actions are taken.*

Late Arrivals

Training Times:hrs -hrs

All officers attending training must be changed, in accordance with course requirements, ready to start training athrs. Where officers are late for training, they must be changed and ready for a safety briefing no later thanhrs.

The officer would be unable to take part in training without either commencing without a safety briefing or delaying training for the rest of the students, both of which are unacceptable. Therefore, should any officer arrive later than the above cut off time they are to be directed by the Safety Officer/Assistant Safety Officer to return to their area/department.

The venue administration will contact the relevant area/departmental Personnel Manager with brief details. This should then be followed up by a report to the officer's Area/Departmental Head confirming the reason for refusing entry to training via training department management team.

Injuries Prior to Training

On attending training each officer is given the opportunity to report any pre-existing injuries in writing. The Safety/Assistant Officers should liaise with the department's reception staff and review the contents of those forms to confirm that no pre-existing injuries are disclosed that may prevent an officer from conducting the training.

Where an officer has reported that they are still receiving treatment the Force Occupational Health Unit (OHU) should be contacted in accordance with relevant Force Policies, for their advice prior to an identified cut-off time (e.g. prior to any dynamic activities that may impact upon that injury). Should the officer be removed from training on the advice of the OHU staff then that officer should be referred to them in accordance with relevant Force Policies.

Where training takes place outside OHU office hours, it is the individual officer's responsibility to obtain this advice prior to attending training. If an individual is unable to satisfy the Safety Officer that advice has been obtained, the officer will not take part in training.

Reported Injuries/Incidents/Ill Health

The Safety Officer will ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that all injuries/ill health reported as being received during training at the identified training venue, are reported in accordance with Force procedures. Brief details should be recorded within this booklet, including location, persons involved, tactic/tactical exercise the person was involved in and witnesses.

Dependent upon the severity of the incident good practice would indicate that all evidence and statements should be recorded at the earliest opportunity, to assist in the resultant accident investigation.

The Safety Officer will subsequently consult with the departments Health and Safety Co-ordinator and/or line management, to decide upon the level of accident/incident investigation and Risk Assessment review, required in accordance with Force Policy and Procedures.

First Aid Provision

Where an officer is injured only trainers(s) who hold a current First Aid at Work (Police First Aid at Work Module 4) certificate are to provide treatment.

When treatment is provided to any officer the type and content of treatment must be recorded in accordance with the department's procedures.

RESTRICTED

Should a First Aid Officer feel that further advice should be sought then the injured officers must be given the following alternatives:

- To be taken to Accident and Emergency by the most appropriate means.
- To be examined by a Force Medical Examiner.
- To see their own GP at a time to be arranged by the individual.

Failure to Complete Training

Trainers have a responsibility to monitor all staff during training. Where an individual officer appears to be experiencing some difficulty in completing training, the officer should be withdrawn and provided with appropriate support. Trainers should be guided by Force Policies with respect to being removed from training and the subsequent referral of the officer (e.g. Force Occupational Health Unit).

Responsibilities During Training

The Safety Assistant(s) and Safety Officer(s) are required to complete the following tasks during training:

- 1) Complete the training log.
- 2) Communicate with and co-ordinate any other people using the training venue while training is in progress.
- 3) Report any incidents/hazards to an appropriate person where external support is required to minimise risk of injury to any person.
- 4) Ensure that any requirement to hand over responsibility as the Safety Officer is recorded with appropriate briefing.

**ALL TRAINERS ARE REQUIRED TO ASSIST THE SAFETY OFFICER IN
COMPLETING THEIR DUTIES DURING TRAINING**

RESTRICTED

PSU 1 (call sign)

TRAINERS:

.....

	RANK	Collar No:	SURNAME	AREA	SERIAL	COMMENTS
1	INSP					
2	SGT				A	
3	CON				A	
4	CON				A	
5	CON				A	
6	CON				A	
7	CON				A	
8	CON				A	
9	CON				A	Driver
10	SGT				B	
11	CON				B	
12	CON				B	
13	CON				B	
14	CON				B	
15	CON				B	
16	CON				B	
17	CON				B	Driver
18	SGT				C	
19	CON				C	
20	CON				C	
21	CON				C	
22	CON				C	
23	CON				C	
24	CON				C	
25	CON				C	Driver

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

PSU 2 (call sign)

TRAINERS:

.....

	RANK	Collar No:	SURNAME	AREA	SERIAL	COMMENTS
1	INSP					
2	SGT				A	
3	CON				A	
4	CON				A	
5	CON				A	
6	CON				A	
7	CON				A	
8	CON				A	
9	CON				A	Driver
10	SGT				B	
11	CON				B	
12	CON				B	
13	CON				B	
14	CON				B	
15	CON				B	
16	CON				B	
17	CON				B	Driver
18	SGT				C	
19	CON				C	
20	CON				C	
21	CON				C	
22	CON				C	
23	CON				C	
24	CON				C	
25	CON				C	Driver

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Course Specific Risk Assessment (to be completed where appropriate)

INVENTORY OF HAZARDS & RISK ASSESSMENT PROFORMA		Signature of assessor:	Signature of Supervisor:	Signature of Federation/ Staff Association Rep:	Signature of the Health & Safety Manager:				
Department:	Location and type of premises:								
Name and signature of person carrying out risk assessment:		Review date		Reference Number:					
Duties, locations and persons covered by the inventory:		Have you checked the department's specific Training risk assessments prior to completing this assessment: YES / NO All parties are given the opportunity to sign this assessment: YES/ NO If no explain why they were unable to sign the assessment:		Monitoring measures required:					
Description of activity	Hazards	Those people affected			Risk Criteria L M H	Overall risk level L M H	Control measures in place or required	In place Y/N	To be put in place By whom & when
		S	C	P					

S = Staff C = Contractors P =Public

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Tactical Exercise/Scenario Log

Venue: _____

Date: _____

Route and Tactics to be completed:

Trainers & their respective roles:

Comments:

Risk Assessment completed where required

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Tactical Exercise/ Scenario Log

** One form to be completed for each tactical exercise for course audit trail.*

Venue: _____ Date: _____

Route and Tactics to be completed:

Trainers & their respective roles:

Comments:

Risk Assessment completed where required

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Accident / Incident Log

** Where appropriate the following should be completed, including actions taken post incident and/or details of witnesses at the scene, first aid provided etc. Alternatively it may be used to record areas of concern that should be reviewed in course evaluation or details of maintenance required on site.*

Venue: _____ Date: _____

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Accident / Incident Log

** Where appropriate the following should be completed, including actions taken post incident and/or details of witnesses at the scene, first aid provided etc. Alternatively it may be used to record areas of concern that should be reviewed in course evaluation or details of maintenance required on site.*

Venue: _____ Date: _____

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Equipment and Venue Damage

What and how damaged?

What action taken?

Who was informed?

What time was this reported?

Appendix: Procedures & Safe System of Work (Audit Trail)

The following documentation must be attached to this pack and filed/stored in accordance with Force Policies and Statutory Requirements.

An example list is shown below:

- 1) *Pre-Injury Report Forms*
- 2) *Copy of Force Accident Report Form*
- 3) *OHU Referral Report*
- 4) *Tactical Exercise/Scenario Plans (where applicable)*
- 5) *Daily De-Brief Forms - a record should be kept as to comments made in relation to course procedure/uniform/equipment and PPE*
- 6) *Copy of Training Evaluation Form*
- 7) *PSU Signing In and Out Sheets*
- 8) *Statements where accidents have been reported from trainers involved and any witnesses (including negative statements)*
- 9) *Any other documentation produced that may be required for civil/criminal litigation purposes*

Update/New Topics

Case Guidance or Good Practice Recommendations

Material listed as requiring to be included in next version and/or circulated/distributed by e-mail/Intranet/CD.

Document/Publication - date issued	Document/Publication title	Notes	Circulated/distributed date

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

INDEX

PUBLIC ORDER STANDARDS, TACTICS, AND TRAINING MANUAL	3
Contents	5
FOREWORD	7
FOREWORD	7
HUMAN RIGHTS STATEMENT	8
LEGAL STATUS	8
INTRODUCTION	9
Glossary	11
PART ONE: NATIONAL STANDARDS AND DEFINITIONS	13
Contents Part One - National Standards and Definitions	14
1. NATIONAL PUBLIC ORDER DOCTRINE	15
2. NATIONAL PUBLIC ORDER POLICY GUIDANCE.....	16
National Public Order Structure Model	17
3. PUBLIC ORDER POLICY.....	18
<i>Operational Requirements.....</i>	<i>18</i>
<i>Mutual Aid Commitments.....</i>	<i>18</i>
4. RESOURCES AND EQUIPMENT	19
Definitions of PSU Levels.....	19
Definition of a PSU	20
National Public Order Dress Codes	22
<i>Levels of Dress Codes</i>	<i>22</i>
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)	23
Work Equipment.....	25
Batons / Shields	25
<i>Maintenance and Inspection.....</i>	<i>25</i>
<i>Information, Instructions and Training.....</i>	<i>25</i>
<i>Guidelines for the Storage and Inspection of Polycarbonate Shields at Police Training Centres.....</i>	<i>26</i>
<i>Action To Be Taken When Shields Are Damaged.....</i>	<i>27</i>
Choice of Shields	28
Batons	29
Water Bottles	29
Fire Extinguishers.....	29
Operational Support Medic (OSM).....	30
Evidence Gathering Teams (EGTs)	32
Forward Intelligence Teams (FITs).....	34
Logistics Officer.....	37
Welfare Issues	38
Identification Marking of Public Order Helmets.....	40
<i>Police Requirement</i>	<i>40</i>
<i>Helmet Identification of Police Personnel Employed on Mutual Aid</i>	<i>41</i>
Identification of Officers (Role and Rank)	43
Colour Codes for Roles and Responsibilities within Public Order.....	43
Communications	44
National Mutual Aid Call-Signs	44
PSUs	45
Contingent Commander	45
Specialist Aid.....	46
Airwave.....	47

PART TWO: LEVEL 3 & 2 TACTICS AND TACTICAL APPLICATION	49
Contents Part Two - Level 3 & 2 Tactics and Tactical Application	50
5. TACTICS DESCRIPTION (LEVEL 3)	51
Static Cordons	51
Loose Cordon (Open Cordon)	52
Filter Cordon	54
Tight Cordon (Closed Cordon)	55
Reforming from Cordon	56
Linked Cordon(s)	57
Single Belt Cordon	57
Double Belt Cordon	59
Reinforcing the Single / Double Belt Cordon	60
<i>Reforming</i>	<i>60</i>
The Wedge	61
Moving the Wedge	62
Halting the Wedge	62
Manoeuvring the Wedge	63
Moving a Wedge Through a Cordon	63
Double Wedge	65
Advancing the Double Wedge	68
Marching Cordons	70
<i>Single Marching Cordon</i>	<i>70</i>
<i>Double Marching Cordon</i>	<i>70</i>
<i>'V' Formation</i>	<i>71</i>
Hand Signals	72
6. TACTICS DESCRIPTION (LEVEL 2)	74
Holding and Carrying Shields	74
Free Running Shield Line	76
Running Line - Tactical Withdrawal	79
Running Line - Attack From the Rear	80
Junctions - Wheeling	81
Junctions - Three-Sided Box (Cross Roads)	82
Junctions - 'T' Junction	85
Junctions - Left and Right Junction	88
Mixed Shield Dispersal	91
Deployment from/to Vehicles	93
Dealing with Injured Officer(s)	95
Enclosed Space Tactics	97
Enclosed Space Tactics - Building Entry	97
Enclosed Space Tactics - Corridor/Room Search	102
Climbing Stairways	105
Violent Person - Room Entry	107
Fire Risks / Petrol Reception	109
7. TACTICAL APPLICATION AND OPTIONS	115
Hierarchy of Control	115
Shield Tactics	117
Integrated Shield Tactics	118
Frontal Assault	119
Flanking Movement	120
Pincer Movement	121
Attack Against Their Rear	122
Tactical Withdrawal	123
Diversion	123
Feint	124
Considerations	124
Police Batons	127

PART THREE: FURTHER OPERATIONAL TACTICS AND POLICY	129
Contents Part Three - Further Operational Tactics and Policy	130
Introduction	131
8. ACPO GUIDANCE AND POLICY.....	132
Water Cannon	132
<i>Considerations for Deployment and Use of Water Cannon.....</i>	<i>134</i>
<i>The Law Relating to the Use of Force.....</i>	<i>136</i>
<i>Authorisation for the Deployment and Use of Water Cannon.....</i>	<i>138</i>
<i>Use of Water Cannon.....</i>	<i>138</i>
<i>Warnings.....</i>	<i>139</i>
<i>Command.....</i>	<i>139</i>
<i>Role of Crew Commanders.....</i>	<i>140</i>
<i>Role of Water Cannon Commanders.....</i>	<i>141</i>
<i>Water Cannon Operators.....</i>	<i>141</i>
<i>Water Cannon Drivers.....</i>	<i>141</i>
<i>Selection of Personnel.....</i>	<i>141</i>
<i>Medical Considerations.....</i>	<i>142</i>
<i>Records.....</i>	<i>142</i>
Screening Smoke	144
CS Smoke.....	146
<i>Use of CS Smoke in Situations of Serious Public Disorder.....</i>	<i>146</i>
<i>Individual Force Policies on Weaponry and Equipment.....</i>	<i>147</i>
<i>Use of Force - Legal Provisions.....</i>	<i>147</i>
<i>Conditions of Use.....</i>	<i>148</i>
<i>Warnings.....</i>	<i>148</i>
<i>Medical Assistance.....</i>	<i>149</i>
<i>Pre-planned Operations.....</i>	<i>149</i>
<i>Command and Control.....</i>	<i>149</i>
<i>Authority for Use.....</i>	<i>149</i>
<i>Reports.....</i>	<i>150</i>
<i>Records.....</i>	<i>150</i>
<i>Spontaneous Disorder.....</i>	<i>150</i>
Baton Rounds in Public Order.....	151
<i>Policy and Guidelines on the Use of Baton Rounds in Situations of Serious Public Disorder.....</i>	<i>151</i>
<i>Use of Force; Legal Provisions.....</i>	<i>153</i>
<i>Conditions of Use.....</i>	<i>154</i>
<i>Warnings.....</i>	<i>154</i>
<i>Reports.....</i>	<i>155</i>
<i>Pre-Planned Operations.....</i>	<i>156</i>
<i>Command.....</i>	<i>156</i>
<i>Authority for Use.....</i>	<i>156</i>
<i>Records.....</i>	<i>156</i>
<i>Spontaneous Disorder.....</i>	<i>157</i>
ANNEX 'A'	158
<i>Zeroing of the L104A1 Baton Gun and use of the Collimator.....</i>	<i>158</i>
Fireworks, Adapted Fireworks, Blast Bombs and Acid Bombs	159
<i>Guidelines for Forces.....</i>	<i>159</i>
<i>The Use of Fireworks and Adapted Fireworks.....</i>	<i>159</i>
<i>Use of 'Blast Bombs'.....</i>	<i>160</i>
<i>Awareness of Threat.....</i>	<i>160</i>
<i>Police Tactics.....</i>	<i>161</i>
<i>Acid Bombs.....</i>	<i>162</i>
9. ADDITIONAL OPERATIONAL TACTICS	163
Protestor Removal - Locked-On (passive)	163
Arrest Teams	166
Additional - Corridor / Room Search.....	168
<i>Formation of the Team.....</i>	<i>168</i>
<i>Inward Opening Doors.....</i>	<i>169</i>
<i>Search Team.....</i>	<i>170</i>
<i>Outward Opening Doors.....</i>	<i>171</i>
<i>Passive Subject Discovered Prior to Entering Room.....</i>	<i>172</i>
<i>Room Entry - Hidden Person Located on Entering.....</i>	<i>173</i>
British Transport Police: Railway Stations / Trains.....	175

RESTRICTED

<i>Removal of Demonstrators: On Trains</i>	175
<i>Persons Attached to Rails</i>	176
<i>Railway Station Clearance</i>	177
<i>Carriage Containment</i>	178
<i>Use of CS Incapacitant Spray Within the Railway Environment</i>	180
Public Order Vehicle Tactics and Convoy Driving	182
Operational Use of Police Vehicles	182
<i>Levels of Protection</i>	183
Convoy Driving	184
<i>Planning</i>	185
<i>Responsibilities</i>	187
Vans with Side Shields	190
Safe Towing of Vehicles	191
Protection of Disabled Vehicle	193
Armoured Landrover	193
Removal of Disabled Vehicle	195
Passive Crowd Control - Funnelling	196
Passive Crowd Control - Small Crowd	197
Road Block	198
Crowd Dispersal - Vehicle Line	199
Crowd Dispersal - Mixed Vehicle and Foot Tactics	200
Crowd Dispersal - Vehicles Three-Sided Box	202
Crowd Dispersal - Herringbone	204
Petrol Bomb	206
Mounted Tactics (Separate File on CD)	207
Dog Section Tactics (Separate File on CD)	207
Barricade Removal (Vehicles)	208
Barricade Removal (PSU Officers)	209
<i>Negotiating the Breach</i>	210
Organised Events: Sporting and Non-Sporting	211
Sporting Events - Football	211
<i>Escorting Groups of Supporters</i>	211
<i>Clearing the Playing Surface</i>	211
<i>Extracting Supporters from Viewing/Seated Areas</i>	211
Football Stadium Seating Tactic	213
Open Ground Tactics	215
Double-Spacing	215
Single Pincer and Double Pincer (Open Ground Tactics)	216
Four-Sided Box (Open Ground Tactics)	219
Arrest Team (Open Ground Tactics)	220
Licensed Premises	221
Police Prison Tactics	223
10. EXTERNAL AGENCY GUIDANCE	224
Sheriffs	224
<i>When will the Police come across a Sheriff?</i>	224
<i>What powers do the Police have?</i>	224
High Court Enforcement Officers	225
Dealing with the Large Scale Writ of Possession	225
Changes in the Near Future	226

PART FOUR: PUBLIC ORDER TRAINING ISSUES	227
Contents Part Four - Public Order Training Issues	228
11. PUBLIC ORDER TRAINING POLICY GUIDANCE	229
<i>Recruitment/Selection of Personnel</i>	<i>229</i>
<i>Occupational Health Screening and Fitness Standards</i>	<i>229</i>
<i>Training Implementation</i>	<i>229</i>
<i>Initial Training</i>	<i>230</i>
<i>Refresher Training - Guidance</i>	<i>231</i>
<i>Trainer Standards</i>	<i>232</i>
<i>Training Venues and Delivery</i>	<i>232</i>
12. TRAINING, HEALTH, AND SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS	233
<i>Health and Safety in Public Order Training</i>	<i>233</i>
General Safety Guidelines	235
<i>Safety Officer</i>	<i>235</i>
<i>Training Staff</i>	<i>236</i>
<i>Safety Rules</i>	<i>236</i>
<i>Injuries/Near Miss</i>	<i>237</i>
<i>Equipment</i>	<i>237</i>
<i>First Aid</i>	<i>237</i>
<i>Safety Officer - Responsibilities</i>	<i>238</i>
13. PSU BRIEFING - PRINCIPLES	239
14. CROWD BRIEFING	240
15. PUBLIC ORDER TRAINING SAFETY INSTRUCTIONS	241
<i>Safety Brief</i>	<i>241</i>
16. PUBLIC ORDER TRAINING PREPARATION SAFE WARM UP AND STRETCH	242
PUBLIC ORDER TACTICS TRAINING RISK ASSESSMENT - AIDE MEMOIRE	245
Risk Assessment - Aide Memoire	246
<i>Identify Significant Hazards</i>	<i>246</i>
<i>Evaluate the Level of Risk</i>	<i>246</i>
<i>Risk Assessment</i>	<i>247</i>
<i>Hierarchy of Control</i>	<i>247</i>
PROFORMA 1 & 2	249
PROFORMA 3	252
PUBLIC ORDER TACTICS TRAINING PROCEDURES & SAFE SYSTEM OF WORK	255
Contents - Training Procedures & Safe System of Work	256
PROCEDURES & SAFE SYSTEM OF WORK	257
<i>Introduction</i>	<i>257</i>
<i>Safety Officer / Assistant Safety Officer Responsibilities (Check List)</i>	<i>258</i>
<i>Injuries Prior to Training</i>	<i>259</i>
<i>Reported Injuries/Incidents/Ill Health</i>	<i>259</i>
<i>First Aid Provision</i>	<i>259</i>
<i>Failure to Complete Training</i>	<i>260</i>
<i>Responsibilities During Training</i>	<i>260</i>
Course Trainers	261
Course Trainers	262
PSU 1	263
PSU 2	265
Course Specific Risk Assessment (to be completed where appropriate)	267
PSU 1 Training Log	268
PSU 2 Training Log	269
Tactical Exercise/Scenario Log	271
Tactical Exercise/ Scenario Log	273
Accident / Incident Log	275
Accident / Incident Log	277
Equipment and Venue Damage	279
Appendix: Procedures & Safe System of Work (Audit Trail)	280
UPDATE/NEW TOPICS	281

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED