The initiative evolved through multiple iterations, and was close to being scrapped several times as CIA officials struggled to find solutions to daunting logistical challenges. But even as the Predator drone emerged as a potent new weapon against Al Qaeda, CIA officials continued to pursue the secret program as an additional lethal option.
"You always want to have capacity because you cannot predict opportunities," said a former senior U.S. intelligence official with extensive knowledge of the program.
With the emergence of the Predator, the official said, "we still wanted to explore having that capacity, but there wasn't the same sense of urgency that may have existed before."
That official and others spoke on condition of anonymity given the acute sensitivity of the issue.
CIA spokesman Paul Gimigliano declined to comment on the nature of the program.
The existence of the program, and the fact that it was kept secret from lawmakers for nearly eight years at the direction of former Vice President Dick Cheney, has fanned an already heated atmosphere in Washington over the Bush administration's intelligence programs.
Current and former U.S. intelligence officials have said that in terminating the program, Panetta may have been more concerned about the fact that the initiative had been kept secret from Congress than he was about the merits of the program.
A U.S. intelligence official said Panetta has not ruled out reviving an effort to develop a similar close-range capability in closer collaboration with lawmakers.
"If the United States ever needs something like this in the future, we'll find better ways to build it," the U.S. intelligence official said. "That includes briefing Congress earlier on. Panetta understands all that. He's an aggressive proponent of counter-terrorism, pushing tools and tactics that work and have the support to be sustainable. This one didn't." ..... More:  http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-cia-cheney14-2009jul14,0,4043827.story ......
CIA officials quickly endorsed the idea of developing small paramilitary teams that could carry out "surgical" strikes on high-value targets. But the program repeatedly bogged down on basic operational and logistical questions.
"Do you put them in Waziristan and sit there and wait?" said a second former U.S. intelligence official with knowledge of the program. "It's one of these things that makes a lot of sense until you start trying to make it work."
The official described internal debates over whether the teams should come out of the CIA's Special Activities Division -- its longtime paramilitary wing -- or whether they should be developed in partnership with U.S. military special operations forces.
The military was faulted after Sept. 11 for its tendency to require elaborate plans and large backup forces even for small-scale operations, a factor that had played into failures to capitalize on opportunities to catch or kill Bin Laden before 2001.
The former U.S. intelligence official said the program was designed to provide an option beyond guided bombs or Hellfire strikes from Predator aircraft.
The initiative was also focused exclusively on the top figures in the Al Qaeda chain of command, the former official said, dismissing suggestions that the effort was aimed at assembling teams of assassins that would roam the world looking for lesser terrorist targets.
By Greg Miller, July 14, 2009  greg.miller@latimes.com -  http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-cia-cheney14-2009jul14,0,4043827.story