Flashback: Key facts to keep in mind while opposing war against Iran

by Phil Wilayto, 29 September 2009


Representatives of Iran and six of the world's most powerful countries are scheduled to meet this week in Geneva, one of a series of events that increasingly looks like a rerun of the build-up to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.

As we prepare for a barrage of anti-Iranian media spin, it would be good for anti-war activists to remember five basic facts:

One: There is absolutely no evidence that Iran is trying to develop a nuclear weapon.

Two: The U.S. has not discovered a “secret nuclear facility” in Iran.

Three: The recent Iranian tests of long-range missiles is a purely defensive exercise.

Four: Despite what we all have repeatedly heard, Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad does not deny the Holocaust. (Please see quotes below.)

Five: Iran has a lot of oil. A whole lot.

On Oct. 1, a senior Iranian diplomat is to meet with representatives of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council: the U.S., U.K, France, Russia and China, plus Germany, a group dubbed the G-5-plus-1. These will be the first international talks to address Iran's nuclear program in more than a year.

During these negotiations, Iran will attempt to discuss a wide range of issues. The six countries – or at least the U.S., U.K., France and Germany – will make demands on Iran's nuclear program that they already know will be rejected. These four most powerful Western nations will then move to impose even harsher sanctions than the three sets they have already rammed through the U.N. Security Council.

There may even be a military attack on Iran by Israel, a move already given the green light by U.S. Vice President Joe Biden.

And this will all be in violation of international law.


Is Iran trying to develop a nuclear weapon?

Iran has a program to develop nuclear power for peaceful energy purposes. Part of that program involves enriching uranium to power nuclear reactors. Enriched uranium is also an essential component in building a nuclear bomb, but the enrichment process is so different that it would be virtually impossible to conceal it, and Iran is the most inspected country in the world.

Further, Iran was one of the first countries to sign the U.N.'s Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), under which it renounced the right to build nuclear weapons in return for not only the right to develop nuclear power, but to receive help in doing so from the world community.

There is absolutely no evidence that Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons. None. Zip. Not from the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, the U.N. body charged with making sure NPT members abide by that treaty. Not from the U.S. and its 16 separate intelligence agencies, nor from Israel and its Mossad intelligence agency nor from counter-revolutionary Iranian organizations such as the Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK), all of which have been working overtime to come up with any fact, report, material or rumor with which to indict Iran.

Meanwhile, of course, none of the G-5, G-5-Plus-1, G-20 or G-We-Rule-the-World countries are saying “boo” about Israel's estimated 200 nuclear weapons, let alone the U.S. with its 10,000.

It's true that Iran has a lot of oil, but oil is a finite resource. Even Iran's vast reserves will someday run out. So it's developing alternative sources of energy, including solar and wind, as well as nuclear.

The U.S and other Western powers are opposed to Iran developing nuclear power because that would ensure Iran can remain independent. And strong. And influential in its own region. And that is unacceptable to the world's former colonizing powers.

Iran, like Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, North Korea, Zimbabwe, the Sudan and many other countries, rejects the status of a “second-tier” country. These countries refuse to accept the authority of the Empire.

They have thrown off the yoke of colonial oppressors and have charted their own independent courses on the world stage. Their peoples are like runaway slaves who have established their own modern maroon colonies and as such are viewed as a threat to the orderly administration of the New World Order.

And they must be brought back under control, lest they serve as dangerous examples for those peoples still enslaved.

That's why keeping those countries from developing technologically is a prime goal of U.S. foreign policy.


Has the U.S. discovered a “secret nuclear facility” in Iran?

On Sept. 21, the Iranian government sent a letter to the IAEA in Vienna describing the construction of a plant designed to enrich uranium, up to 5 percent in purity, sufficient for energy production but well below the 90 percent level required for weapons-grade material. “Further complementary information will be provided in an appropriate and due time,” the letter stated.

According to the provisions of the NPT, Iran and other treaty signatories are required to inform the IAEA six months before a uranium enrichment facility becomes operational. President Ahmadinejad later told a news conference that the new facility won’t be up and running for 18 months.

In other words, Iran was a year early in fulfilling its treaty obligations to provide notice to the IAEA.

But on Sept. 25, U.S. President Barack Obama, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and French President Nicolas Sarkozy interrupted their G-20 meeting in Pittsburgh to hold a press conference at which they charged Iran with constructing a secret nuclear fuel facility.

Sarkozy, whose country depends on nuclear power for 80 percent of its energy needs, detailed intelligence information that Brown said would “shock and anger the whole international community.” Obama charged Iran with “breaking rules that all nations must follow ... and threatening the stability and security of the region and the world.”

The next day, Iran announced it would place the plant under the IAEA's supervision.

So: Iran built a nuclear facility. Then, fully one year before the required deadline mandated by the U.N.'s NPT, it informed the IAEA about the plant's existence. But, just days before the Oct. 1 seven-nation negotiations, the leaders of the U.S., U.K. and France decided to hold a dramatic press conference to denounce Iran for breaking the rules.

A Sept. 26 story in The Washington Post noted that “the rapidly escalating confrontation provided (Obama) with a fresh opportunity to project toughness and success on the world stage. Obama's detractors have long called him naive for his willingness to engage diplomatically the nation's adversaries, including Iran. Republicans say his decision to change the deployment of a missile shield for Eastern Europe demonstrates weakness, and critics have chastised him for taking time to weigh a decision on sending additional troops to Afghanistan.

“The announcement also provided a boost for the CIA at a time when the agency is facing harsh attacks - and possible prosecution - for detainee interrogations.”


Are the recent Iranian missile tests an offensive move?

Starting on Sept. 26, Iran began testing a number of missiles, including its medium-range Shahab-1 and Shahab-2 and, on Sept. 28, its longer-range Shahab-3. The latter missiles are believed to have a range of up to about 1200 miles, far enough to reach Israel, U.S. bases in the Middle East and parts of Europe.

So the question is, are the missiles meant to be defensive or offensive?

Defensive, according to Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari, commander of Iran's Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, as quoted by the semi-official Fars News Agency: “As a result of this capability, those who used to speak of attacking Iran are now declaring that they entertain no such desires or thoughts, for they have realized that attacking Iran is an extremely dangerous act.”

It's a little hard to argue with that logic, since Israeli officials have now toned down their threats to attack Iran, citing an increased international concern after the revelation that Iran had been building a new uranium enrichment facility.

Yes, the missiles could be used to attack as well as defend or retaliate. But Iran hasn't attacked another country for hundreds of years. For it to launch a war now against nuclear-armed opponents would be a complete departure from 30 years of foreign policy into the realm of insanity, something for which there is no recent historical precedent.


Does President Ahmadinejad deny the Holocaust?

Every time I read somewhere that President Ahmadinejad has denied the Holocaust, I try and go back and find his original quote. That's not easy, because most of the time the alleged denial is paraphrased or partially quoted.

This month, I finally got a break.

On Sept. 24, Steve Inskeep, host of National Public Radio's Morning Edition program, interviewed President Ahmadinejad at his hotel in New York. The transcript says Ahmadinejad's remarks were delivered via a translator. (see  http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=113175352&ps=rs)

Here's the relevant section of that interview:

...

INSKEEP: We have, in a previous interview, discussed how you feel (the Holocaust) is being used unjustly to justify Israel, so we need not cover that ground again. But if you would like to describe to me what specifically you believe happened between 1942 and 1945, I would be interested.

AHMADINEJAD: But then 1942 to 1945 is still about the Holocaust, right? I do raise a couple of questions about the Holocaust, and you are a member of the media, and I believe that you should actually tell people what these questions are, and try to receive answers from them as well.

The first question is, is the Holocaust a historical event or not? It is a historical event. And, having said that, there are numerous historical events. So the next question is, why is it that this specific event has become so prominent? Normally, ordinary people and historians pay attention to historical events. Why are politicians giving so much attention to this particular event? Why are they so biased about it? Does this event effect what is happening on the ground this day, now? What we say is that genocide is the result of racial discrimination. Sometimes we look at history to learn the lessons of history.

INSKEEP: Are you acknowledging that millions of people were killed? Millions of Jews, specifically, were killed during World War II?

AHMADINEJAD: If you bear with me so that I can complete my statements, you will receive your answer. I'm asking, and I'm asking a number of serious questions. And I'm not addressing these questions to you, but to a wider audience — everyone — anyone who cares about the fate of humanity; who care about human beings and the rights of people. These are serious questions. If we are looking at history with the aim to learn — derive lessons from it, then what this indicates is that in the future, we should not carry out the same mistakes that were done in the past. While I personally was not alive 60 years ago, I happen to be alive now, and I can see that genocide is happening now under the pretext of an event that happened 60 years ago. So the fundamental question I raise here is that, if this event happened, where did it happen? As a form of an objection question, who was it carried by? Why should the Palestinian people make up for it?

...

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez recently pointed out that, before the European Conquest, the Americas were home to some 90 million indigenous people. A few hundred years later, there were 4 million.

Up to 100 million Africans died as a result of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade.

Surely these also were “holocausts.”

Six million Jews were systematically murdered in what has come to be known as The Holocaust. And, although it is rarely mentioned, that diabolically efficient mass murder also took the lives of up to 5 million political prisoners, trade unionists, communists, gays and Roma people. Truly, this was one of the world's great atrocities – an atrocity committed in Europe, by Europeans, against Europeans.

It had absolutely nothing to do with Palestinians. Or Iran.

So why, after being elevated to a status above all other mass murders in history, is it used to justify the establishment of what basically is a European colony on Arab land?

Ahmadinejad isn't calling the Holocaust a myth – he's asking why the mythology that has been built up around it is used as a weapon against the Palestinian people and those who support their struggle for self-determination.


Iran has oil

Iran has a lot of oil. And that oil has been off-limits to the world's private oil companies since it was nationalized after the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Huge potential profits are at stake. Further, whoever controls the flow of oil – whether or not that involves actual ownership – can control the development of world production, commerce and politics. And the U.S is determined that, rather than allow a multi-polar world to develop, it will be the only country to play that role.


Tasks facing the U.S. anti-war movement

After an unfortunate year-long ebb, the anti-war movement in the U.S. is again beginning to show signs of life. This October there will be many local and regional protests against the U.S-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Most will also address the expanding war in Pakistan and the Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank.

While some of these protests also will demand no war against Iran, there seems to be less enthusiasm for addressing this issue. The barrage of media attacks, charges and misinformation has taken its toll. The controversy around the Iranian presidential elections and their aftermath have also played a role. Taken together, these factors have to a certain extent disarmed the anti-war movement, even as the possibility of a new war grows ever more serious.

Now is the time to reaffirm this one simple principle that ought to be the bedrock of our movement: every country that has been oppressed by U.S imperialism has the right to determine its own destiny. It has the right to determine its own form of government, choose its own leaders, decide on its own relations with the rest of the world. And the U.S., as the world's foremost imperialist power, ought to be the last country on earth to presume to dictate to any other how to conduct itself.

It's not necessary to agree with every pronouncement of the leaders of oppressed countries in order to demand loudly and determinedly “No war, sanctions or internal interference!” If we were anti-slavery activists in the 1800s, would we stand by as Nat Turner or John Brown were about to be hung, arguing about tactics or controversial statements? Or would we defend the oppressed and their defenders?
This is how we need to approach the issue of defending Iran.

This October, as we denounce the wars against Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan and the continuing oppression of the Palestinian people, we must also raise our voices loud and clear to demand “No war, no sanctions, no internal interference in Iran!”



* Phil Wilayto, is a writer and organizer based in Richmond, Virginia, USA. A civilian organizer in the Vietnam-era GI Movement, he is the author of “In Defense of Iran: Notes from a U.S. Peace Delegation's Journey through the Islamic Republic” (December 2008) and “An Open Letter to the Anti-War Movement: How should we respond to the events in Iran?” (June 2009).

(c) 2009 - Permission to reproduce with attribution.

Editorial note: At the 46th Munich Security Conference, both the US National Security Adviser and the NATO Secretary-General advocated against Iran and for the extension of NATO’s field of action. In practical terms, the integration of States members of the Gulf Cooperation Council in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative on the West, plus the Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict on the East, put NATO in a position to encircle Iran. It is too early to tell whether the false accusations levered against Iran are a pretext for NATO’s further deployment or whether its deployment constitutes the premise for a new war.

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NATO’s Role In The Military Encirclement Of Iran

by Rick Rozoff, Voltairenet, 11 February 2010


Following on the heels of identifying himself as the "Commander-in-Chief of a nation in the midst of two wars" and moreover the head of state of no less than "the world’s sole military superpower" [1] while being presented with what is still curiously called the Nobel Peace Prize, U.S. President Barack Obama in his first State of the Union address on January 27 asserted "the international community is more united, and the Islamic Republic of Iran is more isolated" and threatened: "As Iran’s leaders continue to ignore their obligations, there should be no doubt: They...will face growing consequences. That is a promise." [2]

Two days later his secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, delivered an address at a major French military academy, revealingly enough, and while there she coupled excoriation of Iran with an anything but diplomatic dressing down of China, stating "China will be under a lot of pressure to recognize the destabilizing impact that a nuclear-armed Iran would have in the [Persian] Gulf...." [3]

Pressure from Washington, of course. On the very day of Clinton’s speech in Paris the White House confirmed the completion of a $6.4 billion weapons transfer to Taiwan.

On February 9 U.S. Department of Defense spokesman Geoff Morrell told the press that his boss, Pentagon chief Robert Gates, wants the United Nations to impose sanctions on Iran within "weeks, not months" and "clearly thinks time is of the essence." [4]

During the First World War Austrian journalist and dramatist Karl Kraus lamented: "What mythological confusion is this? Since when has Mars been the god of commerce and Mercury the god of war?"

If he were alive today he would be equally bemused by the U.S.’s top diplomat delivering an address at a military academy (and condescendingly admonishing the world’s most populous nation) and its defense chief pressuring the world to impose punitive sanctions against a country that has not attacked any other in centuries.

The secretary general of the U.S.-led "world’s sole global military bloc" - Anders Fogh Rasmussen - spoke at the annual Munich Security Conference on February 7, delivering himself of a ponderous and grandiose screed entitled NATO in the 21st Century: Towards Global Connectivity, during which he touted the role of the military bloc in intruding itself into almost every interstice imaginable: The ever-expanding war in Afghanistan, terrorism, cyber attacks, energy cut-offs - the last two references to Russia if not formally acknowledged as such - nuclear non-proliferation, climate change, piracy, failed states, drugs, "humanitarian disasters, conflicts over arable land, and mounting competition for natural resources," [5] North Korea and Iran.

In repeating Alliance and other Western leaders’ demands that "NATO should become a forum for consultation on worldwide security issues," Rasmussen stated that "to carry out NATO’s job effectively today, the Alliance should become the hub of a network of security partnerships and a centre for consultation on international security issues....And we don’t have to start from scratch. Already today, the Alliance has a vast network of security partnership[s], as far afield as Northern Africa, the Gulf, Central Asia, and the Pacific." [6]

Indeed NATO has a broad and expanding network of members and military partners throughout the world. It has one member, Turkey, the second largest contributor of troops to the bloc, which borders Iran, and a partnership ally, Azerbaijan, which does also.

Rasmussen’s allusion to the Persian Gulf refers to increasing military contacts, visits and joint activities between NATO and the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which parallel the intensification of the U.S. buildup in the region [7] and is conducted within the framework of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) launched in 2004. [8]

The project received the name it did as it was inaugurated at the NATO summit in Istanbul which, after almost completing the absorption of all of Eastern Europe into the bloc, introduced the same graduated partnership process used earlier to incorporate ten new European members for the seven Mediterranean Dialogue nations in the Middle East and Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia) and six states in the Persian Gulf (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates). All thirteen are covered under the ICI, but extending NATO military partnerships to six Persian Gulf nations for the first time was the most ambitious and significant aspect of the program.

It marked the commencement of NATO’s drive into the Gulf to complement the U.S. strategy of containing and eventually confronting Iran.

One of the stated objectives of the ICI was to "invite interested countries...to join Operation Active Endeavour (OAE)," [9] the NATO naval surveillance and interdiction operation (a de facto blockade) throughout the Mediterranean Sea which will be nine years old this October. The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative links control of the Mediterranean with expansion through the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, where the NATO Ocean Shield naval operation is currently being run, and the Arabian Sea into the Persian Gulf.

An earlier article in this series listed the main objectives of the ICI:

- Employing GCC states to base troops, warplanes, cargo and surveillance for operations both in the area and throughout the so-called Broader Middle East.

- [I]ncorporating the Gulf states into a global missile surveillance and missile shield program.

- Bringing the GCC nations not only under the U.S.’s missile and nuclear umbrella, but effectively under NATO’s Article 5 mutual defense provision, the latter entailing the possibility of claiming that one or more GCC members is threatened by a non-member (that is, Iran) and using that as a pretext for “preemptive” attacks.

- Reprising NATO’s Operation Active Endeavor in the Gulf by inaugurating a comprehensive naval interdiction – that is, blockade – in the Strait of Hormuz where an estimated 40-50% of world interstate oil transportation occurs. [10]

In 2006 NATO signed both military intelligence and transit agreements with Kuwait and initiated a new faculty for the Middle East at the NATO Defense College in Rome. NATO held a conference on the ICI in Kuwait in December attended by all six Gulf Cooperation Council states.

The next year four of the six GCC members - Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates - formally joined the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

NATO’s penetration of the Gulf continued steadily and in May of 2009 Admiral Luciano Zappata of the Italian Navy and NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (based in Norfolk, Virginia), while speaking of the new NATO Strategic Concept currently in progress, praised the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative as a "successful example" of the new model of "partnership and cooperation" the Alliance plans for most of the world.

What Zappata had in mind - the Iranian pretext for Western military expansion into the Persian Gulf for once wasn’t evoked to hide NATO’s real interests - was detailed in discussion of what was described as the "maritime dimension of the new strategy."

He said that "the network of ports, infrastructure and pipelines as well as vessels sailing along sea lines of communication supports trade and is vulnerable to disruption.

"With the beginning of the exploitation of the resources at the bottom of oceans, there is a shift in security and strategic focus."

The admiral added that the United Arab Emirates are "a significant trading partner and energy supplier in the global economy. The new French military base opening at Port Zayed will be an important addition to the increasing international efforts in support of maritime security." [11]

On the same day as the above report appeared, May 26, 2009, French President Nicolas Sarkozy was in the United Arab Emirates to open a new military base, his nation’s first in the Persian Gulf and the first major foreign base in the UAE. The French facility in Port Zayed, on the coast of the Strait of Hormuz, "contains a navy and air force base and a training camp." [12]

"The base will host 500 personnel from the French navy, the army, and the air force. It will be able to simultaneously accommodate two frigates of the French fleet operating in the region....[T]he French base is the first of its kind in the Arabian [Persian] Gulf."

A Gulf analyst was quoted on the occasion saying, "The US has a number of military, air and maritime bases in Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain. The Abu Dhabi French Maritime Base is the first foreign military base for a friendly army in the UAE." [13]

"For France, the military base certainly improves its status within NATO as well as with the US as it would become the only NATO member other than the US that is stationed in the Gulf." [14]

The following month Sarkozy pushed a deal with the UAE for the purchase of 60 Rafale fighter jets at a cost of $8-11 million.

The previous year France led war games in the UAE, the 12-day Gulf Shield 01, with military counterparts from the host country and Qatar. 4,000 troops participated in the exercises, which "simulated a war pitting two regional countries and their ally against a neighbouring state which has invaded one of the two countries." [15]

In late October of 2009 a two-day conference called NATO-UAE Relations and the Way Forward in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative was held in Abu Dhabi, the capital of the United Arab Emirates. It gathered "together 300 participants, including the Secretary General of NATO, NATO Permanent Representatives on the North Atlantic Council, the Deputy Secretary General of NATO, the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee and high level NATO officials with government representatives, opinion leaders, academics and senior scholars from countries in the Gulf region invited in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative." [16]

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen told an Al Arabiya correspondent that "NATO considers the Gulf region a continuation of the Euro Atlantic security area," and in reference to Iran - which of course was not invited to the conference - "we all are seriously concerned about nuclear ambitions and about the nuclear domino-effect they could cause in a region that is pivotal for global stability and security." [17]

In recent weeks the United States announced the sale of land-based interceptor missiles to Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. It has supplied both Patriot Advanced Capability-3 and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile systems to GCC states and has deployed sea-based Standard Missile-3 interceptors in the Gulf on Aegis class warships.

In early February the deputy secretary general of NATO, Claudio Bisogniero, was in Qatar and, "Lauding the support extended by Qatar to Nato since the Istanbul Initiative in 2004," said "Qatar has become an active participant in most deliberations held under the aegis of Nato...." [18]

GCC states being integrated into international NATO operations are being recruited for the war in Afghanistan. A U.S. armed forces publication disclosed in late January that 125 security personnel from Bahrain were guarding "the headquarters for U.S. military operations in volatile Helmand province, where more than 10,000 Marines are stationed and more are on the way." [19] The U.S. and NATO are launching the biggest and bloodiest battle of the more than eight-year war in Afghanistan in Helmand.

Troops from the UAE have been serving under NATO command in Afghanistan for years.

The Kuwait News Agency wrote on January 28 that the chairman of NATO’s Military Committee, Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola, said "the Alliance is in discussion with a Gulf state to deploy AWACS planes for reconnaissance mission[s] over Afghanistan in support of its ISAF mission and also for anti-piracy off Somalia."

In addition, Di Paola was quoted saying "The Alliance is close to closing the basic issue with one of the Gulf countries" and "We are looking forward to be in a position to follow on the temporary deployment that we have today in Oman with a more permanent long-term deployment." [20] Oman directly overlooks Iran on the Strait of Hormuz.

The true military powerhouse in the Gulf region, Saudi Arabia - armed to the teeth with advanced U.S. weapons - has been engaged in its first-ever war since last November. Riyadh has launched regular attacks with infantry, armor and warplanes in the north of neighboring Yemen against Houthi rebels. Hundreds of Yemeni civilians have been reported killed in the assaults, which rebel spokesmen claim have been accompanied by U.S. air strikes. [21] 200,000 civilians have been uprooted and displaced by fighting in the north since 2004.

The Saudi government acknowledges over 500 military casualties, both dead and wounded.

The population of northern Yemen is Shia in terms of religious conviction, and the Saudi offensive is not only fraught with the danger of being converted into a war with Iran once removed but in fact can serve as a rehearsal - and training - for the genuine article.

In other countries bordering Iran, last July NATO Deputy Secretary General Claudio Bisogniero signed an agreement with the Iraqi Minister of Defense to train the nation’s security forces. The NATO website reported: "This agreement represents a milestone in the cooperation between the Republic of Iraq and NATO and demonstrates the Alliance’s strong commitment....The agreement will provide the legal basis for NATO to continue with its mission to assist the Government of the Republic of Iraq in developing further the capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces." [22]

Last month NATO started recruiting ethnic Kurds for Iraq’s national security force in the north of the country near the Iranian border.

On Iran’s western border, during meetings of NATO defense ministers in Turkey late last week Pentagon chief Robert Gates met with Chief of Turkish General Staff General Ilker Basbug and Gates said that he had "discussed, with General Basbug, Turkey’s role in the missile defense system and relations between our armies." [23]

Former NATO secretary general George Robertson, arguing that U.S. nuclear warheads should be kept in Germany, recently divulged that there are between 40 and 90 American nuclear weapons stored at Turkey’s Incirlik Air Base under NATO arrangements.

To Iran’s northwest, Azerbaijan is increasingly being developed as a NATO outpost in the South Caucasus and the Caspian Sea Basin. Early this month "A working group of the Azerbaijani Defense Ministry and the United States European Command (USEUCOM) held a meeting in Stuttgart, Germany....The meeting [was] held within the framework of the Azerbaijan-US action plan for military cooperation" and lasted five days. [24]

The country has been granted a NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan as have other former Soviet states like Georgia, Ukraine and lately Moldova. In January Azerbaijan hosted a planning conference for the NATO Regional Response 2010 military exercise. Last year "the Regional Response 2009 military training was held within the NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme in April 2009 in Baku.

"Commander of US Land Forces in Europe Carter Ham participated in the training." [25]

Azerbaijan has doubled its troop strength in Afghanistan and will train Afghan National Army personnel at its military schools. The nation’s Foreign Ministry recently announced that Azerbaijan is interested in joining the NATO Response Force along with Ukraine, regarding which the Alliance provides this description:

"The NATO Response Force (NRF) is a highly ready and technologically advanced force made up of land, air, sea and special forces components that the Alliance can deploy quickly wherever needed.

"It is capable of performing missions worldwide across the whole spectrum of operations...." [26]

In late January a former Azeri presidential adviser, Vafa Guluzade, spoke at a seminar called NATO-Azerbaijan Cooperation: A Civilian View and said, "The territory and people of Azerbaijan are ideal for military cooperation with NATO. The country has a favourable geostrategic location....Azerbaijan has military aerodromes suitable for NATO bases." [27]

To Iran’s east, the U.S. and NATO will soon have over 150,000 troops, and according to a recent study 400 bases, in Afghanistan and both Western belligerents are coordinating military actions with Pakistan, the Alliance through the Trilateral Afghanistan-Pakistan-NATO Military Commission.

The chain is being tightened around Iran from every direction and NATO is supplying several of the key links.

_________________


Notes:

[1] "Obama Doctrine: Eternal War For Imperfect Mankind", by Rick Rozoff, Voltaire Network, December 11, 2009.

[2] "State of the Union Address", by Barack Obama, Voltaire Network, January 27, 2010.

[3] "Speech on Future of European Security", by Hillary Clinton, Voltaire Network, January 29, 2010. "Hillary Clinton’s Prescription: Make The World A NATO Protectorate", by Rick Rozoff, Stop NATO, January 31, 2010

[4] Associated Press, February 9, 2010.

[5] "Speech at the 46th Munich Security Conference", by Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Voltaire Network, February 7, 2010.

[6] Ibid.

[7] "U.S. Extends Missile Buildup From Poland And Taiwan To Persian Gulf", by Rick Rozoff, Stop NATO, February 3, 2010.

[8] "NATO In Persian Gulf: From Third World War To Istanbul", by Rick Rozoff, Stop NATO, February 6, 2009.

[9] "NATO, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative".

[10] "NATO In Persian Gulf: From Third World War To Istanbul", Op, cit.

[11] Khaleej Times, May 26, 2009

[12] Radio Netherlands, May 26, 2009

[13] Gulf News, May 23, 2009

[14] Gulf News, January 27, 2008

[15] Agence France-Presse, March 6, 2008

[16] NATO, October 28, 2009

[17] Al Arabiya, November 1, 2009

[18] Gulf Times, February 8, 2010

[19] Stars and Stripes, January 23, 2010

[20] Kuwait News Agency, January 28, 2010

[21] "Yemen: Pentagon’s War On The Arabian Peninsula", by Rick Rozoff, Stop NATO, December 15, 2009.

[22] NATO, July 26, 2009.

[23] World Bulletin, February 6, 2010.

[24] Azeri Press Agency, February 1, 2010

[25] Azeri Press Agency, January 21, 2010

[26] NATO, The NATO Response Force.

[27] Novosti Azerbaijan, January 22, 2010.

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US army chief: We are obligated to make sure that the Holocaust will never happen again

[propaganda alert]


Editorial note: In the name of preventing another Holocaust, the war-criminal-in-chief threatens war against a country that has never waged any war of aggression.

_______________


“We, all of us, are obligated to make sure that such terrible events [i.e. the Holocaust] will never happen again.”

[US army chief Michael Mullen, speech at the Yad Vashem Holocaust Museum, Jerusalem, 15 February 2010] [1]


“We would operate all our forces for Israel. […] The option to attack Iran is still on the table, but we’re not there yet.”

[US army chief Michael Mullen, joint press conference with the Israeli army chief Gabi Ashkenazi, Tel Aviv, 14 February 2010] [2]

___________________


from the archives:


“Our soul screams out: ‘This [i.e. the Holocaust] can’t be correct, this must not be real.’ But then, defeated, it screams out ‘Never Again.’ ”

[Italy’s Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, comments in the visitors’ book, Yad Vashem Holocaust Museum, Jerusalem, 1 February 2010] [3]


“Never again ignore blood-thirsty dictators, hiding behind demagogical masks, who utter murderous slogans. The threats to annihilate a people and a nation are voiced in the shadow of weapons of mass-destruction [...]”

[Israeli President Shimon Peres, speech on the International Holocaust Remembrance Day, Germany’s Parliament Bundestag, Berlin, 27 January 2010] [4]


“We cannot allow this to be repeated. We, means the whole civilized world. We cannot allow those who wish to perpetrate mass death, those who call for the destruction of the Jewish people or the Jewish state, to go unchallenged. […] [T]he most important thing to do is to nip it at the bud.”

[Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, speech at the Axel Springer publishing house, Berlin, 27 August 2009] [5]


“The Holocaust is […] an eternal responsibility of our country, and part of a basic tenet of our policy […] is to defend Israel always, […] and that is why we feel so responsible now also as regards Iran.”

[Germany’s Prime Minister Angela Merkel, joint press conference with the Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, Berlin, 27 August 2009] [6]


“There are clocks ticking all around. One of those clocks is the uranium enrichment clock, which will show that by a certain date the Iranians will have sufficient, highly enriched uranium materials to create a bomb that could literally wipe Israel off the map in a matter of seconds.”

[Israeli Ambassador to the US Michael Oren, Aspen Ideas Festival, Colorado, 3 July 2009] [7]


“When you see the gas chambers, the concentration camps, […] it makes you absolutely determined that we should not ever allow this to happen again.”

[UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown, interview at the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp, 28 April 2009] [8]


“How do we ensure that ‘never again’ isn’t an empty slogan, or merely an aspiration, but also a call to action?”

[US President Barack Obama, Holocaust Remembrance Day ceremony, United States Capitol, Washington D.C., 23 April 2009] [9]


“France will always stand shoulder to shoulder with Israel when her security and existence are threatened. […] And those who call scandalously for Israel’s destruction will always find France in their way, blocking the path.”

[France’s President Nicholas Sarkozy, speech at the Israeli Parliament Knesset, Jerusalem, 23 June 2008] [10]

________________


notes:


[1] Admiral Mullen Visits Yad Vashem Holocaust Museum

Israel Defense Forces website, 15 February 2010

 http://dover.idf.il/IDF/English/News/today/10/02/1503.htm


[2] U.S Army Chief: “Iran attack option on the table”

Israel Defense Forces website, 14 February 2010

 http://dover.idf.il/IDF/English/News/today/10/02/1403.htm


[3] Visit of Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi at Yad Vashem

Yad Vashem (Holocaust Museum) website, 1 February 2010

 http://www1.yadvashem.org/yv/en/about/events/2010/berlusconi.asp


[4] Address by President Peres at the German Bundestag

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, 27 January 2010

 http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2010/Address_President_Peres_German_Bundestag_27-Jan-2010.htm


[5] PM Benjamin Netanyahu’s Speech at Axel Springer, Berlin, Germany

(Israeli) Prime Minister’s Office website, 27 August 2009

 http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Communication/PMSpeaks/speechspringer270809.htm


[6] Joint Press Conference of PM Netanyahu and Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel in Berlin

(Israeli) Prime Minister’s Office website, 27 August 2009

 http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Communication/PMSpeaks/speechangela270809.htm


[7] Israel US ambassador warns of Iranian bomb

by Yitzak Benhorin, Ynetnews, 3 July 2009

 http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3740959,00.html


[8] PM’s words at the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp
Number 10 (UK Prime Minister’s Office) website, 29 April 2009

 http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page19172


[9] Remarks by the President at the Holocaust Days of Remembrance Ceremony

The White House website, 23 April 2009

 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-at-the-Holocaust-Days-of-Remembrance-Ceremony/


[10] Speech by M. Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the Republic, to the Knesset

Embassy of France in Washington website, 23 June 2008

 http://fr.ambafrance-us.org/spip.php?article1027

_______________________

We should be organising a protest against Iran for developing these Nuclear reactors.

Nuclear power is dangerous for the environment and also causes a lot of greenhouse gases. I don't agree with invading Iran, but i will support their nuclear program either for ethical reasons even if it is peaceful, afterall who wants to live in a nuclear contaminated world when one of these reactors melt down?

If you want to campaign against nuclear power then do so, but what has this got to do with the US and NATO invading Iran?

How about going along to this instead of getting involved in discussions about Iran:  http://www.earthfirst.org.uk/actionreports/node/22483

CASMII is a paid for propaganda front, run by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Crap!

We all know you wont be happy until they exhume the Shahs dead body, tie a few puppet strings to it and crown him king again. It'll never happed - get over it.

Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Reply to the IAEA on the "Implementation of Safeguards in Iran"


IAEA Information Circular
INFCIRC/786
Date: 2 March 2010


ORIGINAL DOCUMENT (PDF)
 http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2010/infcirc786.pdf

in response to

Report of the Director General on implementation of Safeguards in Iran (GOV/2010/10)
 http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2010/gov2010-10.pdf


Communication dated 1 March 2010 received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency regarding the implementation of safeguards in Iran



Explanatory note
by the
Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the IAEA
on the
Report of the Director General on implementation of Safeguards in Iran
 http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=17975

(GOV/2010/10)


1- GENERAL COMMENTS

1- The report (GOV/2010/10) is not balanced and factual since it has not duly reflected the cooperation, letters and explanations of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the questions of or communication made with the Agency.

2- The report, in contradiction to the Agency's statutory mandate, contained tremendous confidential technical details which create a lot of confusions for various groups of readers, diplomats, experts and the public at large.

3- The only new development since the last report by the former Director General is the successful enrichment activity up to 20% in order to produce the required fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor after Iran was disappointed due to lack of a responsible response to its legitimate request. But the lengthy text of the historical background and repeating obsolete issues such as alleged studies, so called American laptop, with details has created confusion for the public. The alleged studies, including baseless allegation on Green Salt Project, high explosive testing and missile re-entry vehicle, had been raised over 4 years ago, thus is not a new issue. The Safeguards Department has claimed that the intention of this report is to refresh the memories of the members of the Board of Governors at the cost of public confusion and damaging the Agency's credibility. Despite there has been no any other new development, this DG report (GOV/2010/10) complies with parts of the past DG's reports
which have been chosen selectively and incompletely, specifically focused on unproved and baseless allegations, so called alleged studies, and possible military dimension.

4- Pursuant to the official communication by Iran dated 7th February 2010 in which it officially notified the Agency about its decision to start enrichment activities up to 20%, Iran did not start the activity until the Agency officially had acknowledged the receipt of its notification and informed Iran on the same day that the inspectors have already been instructed to be present at FEP in Natanz on 9th February 2010. [Quote from the letter of the Agency by the Director of the Division of Operations B, Department of Safeguards, dated 8 February 2010: “I refer to your letter dated 8 February 2010 (Ref.M/137/315/5009) and I would like to inform you that our inspectors have been instructed to be at FEP on the 9th February 2010 to detach seal at the 30B cylinder containing LEU, maintain continuity of knowledge during re-batching to a 5B cylinder and seal both the 30B and 5B cylinder after the verification”]

The centrifuges used for this purpose were already under full scope safeguards including 24 hours surveillance of the Agency's camera and the routine inspections. Iran however decided to inform the Agency before taking any action and also to invite the inspectors to be present at the time of commencement of the 20% activity. Therefore, the text of paragraph 11 of the report is in contrary to the factual arrangement and is misleading.

5- The fact that all declared nuclear materials is accounted for and is remained peaceful and under the Agency full scope surveillance is not reflected and is a missed essential element of this report.

6- Mixing the notions of “all nuclear material”, “declared nuclear material” and the issue of “assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material” in the context of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and Additional Protocol, respectively, in a non-professional manner, has undermined the full cooperation of Iran in accordance with its CSA obligation and has misled the public.

7- The facts that the material of the alleged studies has lack of authenticity, that no nuclear material was used and no components were made as declared by the former Director General in respect of baseless alleged studies, are missing parts in this report.

8- The report lacks any reference to the fact that the United States did not permit the Agency to deliver to Iran the material related to the alleged studies, associated to the so called American laptop, thus the Agency's verification activities were jeopardized and its credibility damaged, since the Agency was obliged to deliver the material to Iran in accordance with the Work Plan (INFCIRC/711) agreed upon by the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Agency. One could easily notice the criticism of the former Director General in this respect.

9- It should be recalled that there were only six past outstanding issues which had been included in the agreed Work Plan (INFCIRC/711) and that all of them have been resolved. Also the part IV. 1 of the Work Plan
reads as follows: “These modalities cover all remaining issues and the Agency confirmed that there are no other remaining issues and ambiguities regarding Iran's past nuclear program and activities.” Therefore, no new issues should be raised such as “possible military dimension”.

10- According to the Work Plan agreed upon by Iran and the Agency on 21 August 2007 (INFCIRC/711), the Alleged Studies have been fully dealt with by Iran and the item in the Work Plan is concluded. Any
expectation of another round of substantive discussion or the Agency's request for providing information and access is absolutely in contravention with the spirit and the letter of such an agreement which both parties have been committed to. It should be recalled that the agreed Work Plan is the outcome of fruitful and intensive negotiations by three top officials in charge of Safeguards, Legal and Policy Making Organs of the Agency with Iran and eventually acknowledged by the Board of Governors. Therefore, it is highly expected that the Agency respects its agreement with Member States, otherwise the mutual trust and confidence which is essential for the sustainable cooperation shall be put in jeopardy.


II- SPECIFIC REMARKS

1- Comments on paragraphs 8 to 13 of the report on starting enrichment up to 20%:

All 20% enrichment activities have been declared to the Agency before taking any action. After official communications and in the presence of the Agency inspectors and under continuous surveillance of the Agency,
the activities to produce up to 20% enrichment uranium in order to provide required material for the Tehran Research Reactor fuel were started. In this respect, immediately pursuant to the instruction for launching fuel
production for the Tehran Research Reactor, the DIQ of PFEP facility was updated on 7 February 2010 and submitted to the IAEA before taking any action. Iran notified the IAEA through a letter that was responded and
confirmed by the Agency on the same day (8 February 2010), that a small cylinder containing LEU was introduced to PFEP and connected to its feeding line in the presence of the Agency inspectors on 9th February
2010 and remained under the Agency's seal and surveillance. Moreover, the IAEA monitoring system, including cameras and seals are in place since 2003 and, therefore, the connection of the LEU cylinder to the system, besides the presence of the Agency inspectors, is also covered by continuous monitoring of the Agency's cameras as well as Agency seals. As a matter of fact, all the safeguards measures have been completely met for 20% enrichment process.

A draft safeguards approach for PFEP was presented in 2003. This draft was discussed through subsequent meetings and has not yet been finalized besides there was no need to stop the enrichment activities. Nevertheless,
basically the foreseen measures are implemented and the Agency was informed of the 20% enrichment activities in advance and therefore there was no need to stop the work of this activity before finalizing the safeguards approach agreement while safeguards measures are in place.

As explained above, this facility is running as before under the Agency surveillance, Agency inspectors access, performing Agency's inspections, visual inspectors' observations, Agency's cameras and seals application while the safeguards approach review and its facility attachment is under discussion.


2- Comments on paragraphs 19-24 of the report regarding Heavy Water Related Projects:

1- UNSC resolutions against Islamic Republic of Iran had been issued illegally and have no legal basis; therefore they are not obligatory to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

2- The Agency's requests are even beyond the illegal UNSC resolutions since it just requesting to suspend the heavy water-related projects and the suspension be verified by the Agency. The resolutions have not requested the collection of information such as origin of the drums and production, taking DA samples, weight and amount of heavy water, etc. These are beyond the illegal UNSC resolutions and create ambiguities that whether the Agency's intention is gathering information for other purposes.

3- The Islamic Republic of Iran has officially announced on several occasions that no suspension including heavy water production is accepted. It has announced that the Agency be sure that the activities are continuing. Therefore, verification of suspension is not required. And it is not clear that why the Agency keeps intending to collect detailed information by requesting to have access to facilities and non nuclear materials.

4- Having considered that the Safeguards Agreement between the Agency and the Islamic Republic of Iran (INFCIRC/214) is governing the relation between the Agency and Iran it constitutes the legal basis for
cooperation and the Agency's requests should be based on that Agreement. Thus, it is not clear why the Agency's requests goes beyond the Safeguards Agreement and even beyond the Additional Protocol, although the latter is not being implemented by Iran.

5- Accordingly, the Agency's request to take DA samples from the Heavy Water stored at UCF has no justification referred to Iran's Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/214). However, the Agency inspectors
were allowed to perform their attribute test in order to confirm that they are not nuclear materials.


3- Comments on paragraph 28-35 of the report regarding design information (code 3.1)

1- Modified code 3.1 of Subsidiary Arrangement: Iran was implementing voluntarily the modified code 3.1 since 2003, but because of the illegal UNSC resolutions against Iran's peaceful nuclear activities, the implementation of modified code 3.1 was suspended. However, Iran currently is implementing code 3.1 of Subsidiary Arrangement.

2- In respect of FFEP DIQ (Fordow Site), Iran is committed to declare a facility to the Agency 180 days prior to introducing nuclear materials to it. However, Iran has voluntarily informed 18 months prior to introduction
of materials to the site. Iran, in addition, provided its DIQ, granted unlimited access to the facility, held meetings and provided detailed information, permitted taking swipe samples and reference photos which under the provision of code 3.1 of 1976, Iran is not obliged to do so.

3- In respect of providing information on other new facilities, Iran will inform the Agency in accordance with the code 3.1 of 1976 and will provide the Agency with the required design information in its due time.

4- Any request of Design Information on Darkhovain NPP, Arak IR40, new enrichment facilities, etc, by the Agency should be in accordance with the code 3.1 of 1976.


4- Comments on paragraphs 37 of the report about Pyroprocessing R&D activities and Agency's request for providing information in this respect:

In fact there is not pyroprocessing R&D activity and the question raised has been a misinterpretation by the Agency inspectors on the scope of a research on studying electrochemical behaviour of uranyl nitrate in ionic liquid media. Therefore, requesting information on non-existed activity is meaningless.


5- Comments on paragraph 39 of the report about requesting access to additional locations (Additional Protocol):

The Additional Protocol is not a legally binding instrument and is voluntary in nature. Hence, many Member States including Iran are not implementing this voluntary protocol. Requesting Iran to ratify or implement the Additional Protocol, being a non-legally binding instrument, is in contravention with international law and the sovereign decision of any Member State. Therefore, suspension of implementation of the Additional Protocol does not constitute violation of its NPT Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/214) and any request by the Agency in
the framework of the Additional Protocol is not legally justified.

Although the Islamic Republic of Iran voluntarily implemented the Additional Protocol for more than two and a half years, a few western countries in an opposite direction to this and other voluntary measures carried out by the Islamic Republic of Iran, illegally conveyed Iran's nuclear issue to the United Nations Security Council. Afterwards, Iran's voluntary measures were suspended based on the law adopted by the Iranian Parliament. Therefore, Iran should not be blamed for, but those countries which conveyed the issue to the UN Security Council instead.


6- Comments on paragraph 40-45 of the report on Possible Military Dimension:

1- Referring to the para 54 of the former DG report GOV/2008/4 that reads “However, it should be noted that the Agency has not detected the use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies, nor does it have credible information in this regard” that clearly rejected use of nuclear material and credible information in alleged studies. Therefore, the first sentence of para 40 of GOV/2010/10 is obviously contradicting the above assessment of the Agency. And also creating any linkage between the peaceful nuclear materials in Iran with absence of possible military dimension is absolutely wrong.

2- In section E of GOV/2010/10, there are claims based on baseless allegations. The Agency should not judge without investigation of all aspects of the allegations but, regrettably, it has done so. It has also to be recalled that the para 24 of the former DG report GOV/2008/15 says “It should be noted that the Agency currently has no information – apart from the uranium metal document - on the actual design or manufacture by Iran of nuclear material components of a nuclear weapon or of certain other key components, such as initiators, or on related nuclear physics studies” which is missing in this report and even in fact in contradiction with the judgment in this report.

3- It has to be recalled that pursuant to the negotiations between the former Director General and the then Secretary of Supreme National Security Council of Iran in 2007, the Islamic Republic of Iran took an
important initiative in July 2007 to resolve all outstanding issues and remove any ambiguity concerning the nature of its peaceful nuclear activities in the past and present. It should be emphasized that the main objective of the subsequent Work Plan that was agreed between Iran and the Agency on 21 August 2007 (INFCIRC/711), was to resolve, in a step by step manner, all outstanding issues once and for all and to prevent the endless process from being dragged any further.

4- On the basis of the Work Plan, the Agency provided the Islamic Republic of Iran with a list of six outstanding issues as reflected in part II of INFCIRC/711. The six outstanding issues were: 1) Plutonium Experiments, 2) P1-P2 Centrifuges, 3) Source of Contamination in an equipment of a technical university, 4) Uranium Metal Document, 5) Polonium 210 and 6) Gachine Mine.

5- It was never the understanding of Iran and IAEA to categorize the so-called “Alleged Studies” summarily referred to in part III of INFCIRC/711 as an outstanding issue, otherwise the parties should have addressed it in part II of INFCIRC/711. One has to bear in mind the fact that the issues such high explosives and re-entry missile are outside the domain of the IAEA statutory mandate.

6- Moreover, if the so-called Alleged Studies were an outstanding issue, Iran and IAEA should have developed and agreed on a detailed modality for dealing with it as they did with respect to the six outstanding issues addressed in part II of INFCIRC/711. As a result, Iran and IAEA decided to make a short reference to the Alleged Studies in part III of INFCIRC/711 and to agree on a different approach for addressing it as follows:

“Iran reiterated that it considers the following Alleged Studies as politically motivated and baseless allegations. The Agency will however provide Iran with access to the documentation it has in it possession ... As a sign of good will and cooperation with the Agency, upon receiving all related documents, Iran will review and inform the Agency of its assessment.” (Emphasis supplied).

7- According to the above understanding, the Agency was required to submit all documentation to Iran and then Iran was only expected to “inform the Agency of its assessment”. No visit, meeting, personal interview, swipe sampling were foreseen for addressing this matter. Notwithstanding the above and based on good faith and in a spirit of cooperation, Iran went beyond the above understanding by agreeing to hold discussions with the IAEA, provide necessary supporting documents and inform the Agency of its assessment. Meanwhile, by refusing to
submit all documentation to Iran concerning the so-called Alleged Studies, IAEA did not fulfil its obligation under part III of INFCIRC/711.

8- In the former DG reports of November 2007 and February 2008, it has been stated that all six outstanding issues had been resolved and the Islamic Republic of Iran had responded to all questions about the outstanding issues in accordance with the Work Plan. Following the successful implementation of the Work Plan which led to the resolution of all six outstanding issues, the Government of the United States being dissatisfied about the results, began a political campaign on a part of the Work Plan entitled the Alleged Studies. Therefore, by interfering in the work of the IAEA and exerting various political pressures the Government of the United States attempted to spoil the cooperative spirit between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA.

9- In spite of the fact that the so called Alleged Studies documents had not been delivered to Iran, the Islamic Republic of Iran carefully examined all the materials which have been prepared by US Government for power point presentations by the Agency, and informed the Agency of its assessment. In this context I recall the following important points:

i. The Agency has not delivered to Iran any official and authenticated document which contained documentary evidence related to Iran with regard to the Alleged Studies.

ii. The Government of the United States has not handed over original documents to the Agency since it does not in fact have any authenticated document and all it has are forged documents. The Agency didn't deliver any original documents to Iran and none of the documents and materials that were shown to Iran have authenticity and all proved to be fabricated, baseless allegations and false attributions to Iran.

iii. How can one make allegations against a country without provision of original documents with authenticity and ask the country concerned to prove its innocence or ask it to provide substantial explanations?

iv. The Agency has explicitly expressed in a written document dated 13 May 2008 that: “... no document establishing the administrative interconnections between “Green Salt” and the other remaining subjects on Alleged Studies, namely “Highly Explosive Testing” and “Re-entry Vehicle”, have been delivered or presented to Iran by the Agency”. This written document proves that in fact the documents related to the Alleged Studies lack any internal consistency and coherence in this regard. It is regrettable that this explicit fact expressed by the Agency has never been reflected in the DG reports.

10- Taking into account the above-mentioned facts, and that no original document exists on the Alleged Studies, and there is no valid and documentary evidence purporting to show any linkage between such fabricated allegations and Iran, and no use of any nuclear material in connection to the Alleged Studies (because they do not exist in reality), also bearing in mind the fact that Iran has fulfilled its obligation to provide information to the Agency, and its assessment, and the fact that former DG already indicated in his reports in June, September and
November 2008 that the Agency has no information on the actual design or manufacture by Iran of nuclear material components of a nuclear weapon or of certain other key components, such as initiators, or on related nuclear physics studies, therefore this subject must be closed.

11- If it was intended to raise other issues in addition to the Alleged Studies (Green Salt, Re-entry Missile, High Explosive Test) such as possible military dimension, since all outstanding issues have been incorporated in the exhausted list prepared by the IAEA during the negotiations, then it should have been raised by the Agency in the course of the negotiations on the Work Plan. One can clearly notice that no issue and item entitled “possible military dimension” exists in the modalities.

12- According to the former DG report of GOV/2009/55, the Agency expressed that the authenticity of the documentation that forms the basis of the Alleged Studies cannot be confirmed. This proved the assessment
of the Islamic Republic of Iran that the Alleged Studies are politically motivated and baseless allegations.

13- In accordance to the first paragraph of chapter IV of the Work Plan which reads that “These modalities cover all remaining issues and the Agency confirmed that there are no other remaining issues and ambiguities regarding Iran's past nuclear program and activities”, introducing a new issue under the title of “possible military dimension” is contrary to the Work Plan.

14- Paragraph 5 of Chapter IV of the Work Plan reads: “The Agency and Iran agreed that after the implementation of the above Work Plan and the agreed modalities for resolving the outstanding issues, the implementation of safeguards in Iran will be conducted in a routine manner.”

15- In Paragraph 3, chapter IV of the Work Plan, the Agency has acknowledged that “the Agency's delegation is of the view that the agreement on the above issues shall further promote the efficiency of the implementation of safeguards in Iran and its ability to conclude the exclusive peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear activities”. On this basis, while the Work Plan has been implemented, the Agency is obliged to confirm the exclusive peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear activities.

16- The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Agency have fully implemented the tasks agreed upon in the Work Plan; in doing so, Iran has taken voluntary steps beyond its legal obligation under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.

17- The report GOV/2009/55 confirmed that Iran has completed its obligation on the Alleged Studies by informing the Agency its assessment, the Agency is hereby highly expected to announce that the safeguards implementation in Iran shall be conducted in a routine manner in accordance with the last paragraph of the work Plan (INFCIRC/711).


7- Comments on paragraph 48-49 of the report about suspension:

Uranium enrichment and heavy water research reactor are not suspended, since there is no logical and legal justification to suspend such peaceful activities which are in the framework of the IAEA's Statute and the NPT and under surveillance of the Agency. It should be reminded that Iran implemented suspension for more than 2.5 years voluntarily, as a non-legally binding and confidence building measure.


III- Iran's full cooperation with the Agency

The report prepared by the Safeguards department of the Agency for the new Director General on Implementation of the Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic

Republic of Iran, despite of deficiencies explained above, once again confirmed Iran's cooperation with the Agency. The following are examples of Iran's cooperation which are reflected in the report (GOV/2010/10):


A) Full-scope safeguards of the nuclear enrichment activities and materials in Natanz:

1. “The nuclear material at FEP (including the feed, product and tails), as well as all installed cascades and the feed and withdrawal stations, are subject to Agency containment and surveillance.” (para 5)

2. “The results of the environmental samples taken at FEP as of 21 November 2009 indicate that the maximum enrichment level as declared by Iran in the relevant Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) (i.e. less than 5.0% U-235 enrichment) has not been exceeded at that plant.” (para 6)

3. “Since the last report, the Agency has successfully conducted 4 unannounced inspections at FEP, making a total of 35 such inspections since March 2007.” (para 6)

4. “Between 14 and 16 September 2009, the Agency conducted a PIV at the PFEP, the results of which confirmed the inventory as declared by Iran.” (para 7)

5. “On 14 February 2010, Iran, in the presence of Agency inspectors, moved approximately 1950 kg of low enriched UF6 from FEP to the PFEP feed station.” (para 12)

6. “The Agency inspectors sealed the cylinder containing the material to the feed station. Iran provided the Agency with mass spectrometry results.” (para 12)


B) Verification activities in Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP)

7. “The Agency met with Iran between 25 and 28 October 2009, at which time it carried out design information verification (DIV) at FFEP...” (para 14).

“Since 26 October 2009, the Agency has conducted five DIVs at FFEP.” (para 17)

8. “During three of these five DIVs, the Agency took environmental samples.” (para 17)


C) Reprocessing Activities

9. “The Agency has continued to monitor the use and construction of hot cells at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility.” (para 18)

10. “The Agency carried out an inspection and a DIV at TRR on 11 November 2009, and on 23 January 2010 at the MIX facility. There were no indications of ongoing reprocessing related activities at those facilities.” (para 18)


D) Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP)

11. “On 13 January 2010, the Agency carried out a DIV at the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP). It confirmed that no new process equipment had been installed at the facility and that no new assemblies, rods or pellets had been
produced since May 2009.” (para 22)


E) Other areas

12. “On 8 February 2010, the Agency carried out a DIV at the IR-40 reactor at Arak. The Agency verified that the construction of the facility was ongoing.” (para 23)

13. “Under cover of a letter dated 11 February 2010, Iran submitted an updated DIQ for UCF...” (para 25)

14. “Under cover of a letter dated 13 December 2009, Iran submitted an updated DIQ for UCF which included, inter alia, the layout of the laboratory.”(para 26)

15. “On 17 January 2010, the Agency carried out an inspection and a DIV at UCF.” (para 27)

16. “The total amount of uranium in the form of UF6 produced at UCF ... remains subject to Agency containment and surveillance.” (para 27)

17. “On 9 January 2010, the Agency conducted a DIV at the Jaber Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Research Laboratory (JHL) in Tehran....” (para 37)

18. The continued cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Agency has resulted that “the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran...” (para 46)