Consider the intelligence of the average American [or Iranian psychologist]. Then consider the fact that half of them aren’t even that smart.
- with apologies to Mark Twain
(quoted in Graeber, 2005: 5).

My thankless task in this article is to begin with a potted history of Iranian psychology, its key figures and landmarks. This will entail investigating Iranian psychology’s conscious re-animation of premodern Irano-Islamic thought, the even more uncritical import of (US) modernist psychology and, finally, its more recent flirtations with (West European) postmodernist psychology.[4]

In the second section, I look at the eclectic applications of this psy-complex, including favoured psychotherapies and established clinical sub-disciplines. I will then discuss some of its seminal themes and demonstrate how most of them conspire to maintain the hegemony of the mullah-bourgeoisie. Having critiqued this sand-nigger psychology, I end the article by calling for a Radical ‘Iranian’ Critical Psychology (R‘I’CP) which will articulate and cement the opposition between house-sand-niggers and field-sand-niggers. The former consists of all those Iranian psychologists, psychiatrists, psychoanalysts, social workers and academics who maintain and strengthen the grip of their bourgeois masters, whilst the latter consists of those organising an open conspiracy against the present state of affairs.

Radical ‘Iranian’ Critical Psychology will be shaped by current proletarian struggles against capitalism and marked by rejuvenated feminist and atheistic currents. Whilst foolishly rushing in where previous angels have feared to tread, R‘I’CP also aims to supersede the limitations of both ‘western’ and ‘eastern’ versions of critical psychology. After all, there would be no point in dislodging the psy-complex for a fluffier version of the beast.

Contextualising the Iranian psy-complex
When religion and politics travel in the same cart, the riders believe nothing can stand in their way. The movement becomes headlong- faster and faster and faster. They put aside all thoughts of obstacles and forget that a precipice does not show itself to a man in a blind rush until it’s too late.
Frank Herbert, Dune (1988: 441).



Since the consolidation of the Islamic counter-revolution (1979-1981), every book published in Iran regardless of subject matter, has been obliged to begin with the self-serving Koranic gambit, ‘In the name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful’. This includes most psychology textbooks. In a society where the private-public divide is teetering on the verge of complete collapse and where an entire belief system is imploding under atheistic pressures from below, even this obligatory ritual is now routinely flouted by plucky translators/publishers (cf. Foucault, 2000; Marx, 1871[1993]; Trotsky, 2001).



Obligation, however, continues to play a pivotal role within the Iranian psy-complex.[5] This includes the obligation of children to their parents, the wife to her husband, the worker to his/her boss and the ‘inmate’ to society at large. This atavistic demiurge has condemned it to fall badly behind the rest of society. Its predilection for torturing unresponsive patients with ECT and the (almost) wholesale medicalistion of psychotherapy is the unsightly modernist underbelly of an authoritarian premodern mindset.[6] In a quest for legitimacy its self-appointed narrators seek ‘native’ heroes in place of foreign pioneers of psychology. Thus every account of the emergence of psychology in Iran begins with a mandatory homage to either ancient prophets (e.g., Zarathushtra) or scholars of the Middle Ages (e.g., Avicenna, Razi and Ibn Khaldun).



According to Birashk (2004: 381) in the earliest times, ‘people with mental illness were believed to be entrapped by wicked ghosts’. The treatment of choice was seclusion, restraint, torture, burning and trepanation (making a hole in the skull in order to release the resident poltergeist). Zarathushtra, by introducing the first monotheistic world religion, moralised the relationship in terms of the battle of Ahura Mazda [Light] against Ahriman [Darkness] (Cohn, 1993).



The humanistic dimension of Zarathushtra’s message gradually produced a different set of treatments for mental illness. Ghosts were now treated by the application of syrups, plants, concoction and spells (Birashk, 2004: 382). Misdeeds were not encouraged to fester in the psyche, meshing with guilt and eventually transforming into sins. Good deeds and not ascetic self-torment redeemed wrong-doming. Zarathushtra had sought a god that laughed and danced joyously. Sadness and gloom he associated with Darkness. However, with the advent of the Achaemenian dynasty (550-330 B.C.) and the later Sasanian (242-641 A.D.), Zarathushtra was institutionalised, his radicalism co-opted (Perlman, 1983). Magi (clergymen) came to monopolise the fight against mental illness. Since they were already the guardians of the state against subversion, the line between mental illness and rebellion became increasingly blurred.



The trail goes cold until the Middle Ages when ‘psychology’ (ilm-o-nafs) was studied in a philosophical/theological context. Personality development was now conceived of as a journey culminating in spiritual perfection (Kamarzarin, 2002: 5). Avicenna studied the interaction of mind and body in terms of psychology and neurology. ‘He believed that many disorders resulted from a lack of harmony between the brain and the body’ (Birashk, 2004: 382). Another Islamic physician, Razi, discussed medical ethics and employed crude conditioned reflexes in treating mental disorders. Birashk refers to him as the first Islamic ‘behaviour therapist’ (Birashk, 2004: 382). Jorjani’s description of psychiatric symptoms, such as delusion, hallucination and affective conditions, is considered very close to modern standards (Mohit, 2001: 342). The existence of the famous Jondi Shapoor (established 271 A.D. as a teaching hospital) and Dar al-Shafa (also known as house of insane) hospitals catalysed psychological/psychiatric interventions.[7]



But perhaps the most relevant premodern figure for our purposes remains Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406). Over the years, the work of this Tunisian Muslim thinker has gained the status of progenitor of modern ideas in historical materialism and group psychology (Al-Azmeh, 1990: vii). A cross between Machiavelli and Vico, Ibn Khaldun gave history (as the narrative of human habitation of the world) a crude primacy- the kind of crudeness that would centuries later impress Engels but not Marx. Ibn Khaldun discussed psychology by introducing the concept of asabiyya, which is usually defined as social cohesion or group solidarity. However, this was a remarkably absolutist concept which denied the possibility of contestation by dissenters. In Bakhtinian terminology, one could accuse Ibn Khaldun of privileging ‘official culture’ over ‘unofficial culture’. A recent promoter of Ibn Khaldun describes asabiyya in these terms:



Asabiyya binds groups together through a common language, culture, and code of behaviour and when there is conscious approximation of behaviour to an idea of the ideal, at different levels, family, clan, tribe, and kingdom or nation … Asabiyya is what traditional societies possess … but which is broken down in urbanised society (Ahmed, 2002: 27).



This distrust of urbanisation and its corrupting influence on morality and ‘psychic welfare’ is a recurring theme of many reactionary ideologies and not confined to (certain brands of) Islam but in them it finds its most ardent champions.[8]



Once sufficient obligatory praise is heaped upon ancient prophets and scholars of the Middle Ages, little else can be added regarding their contribution. The narration then usually hurls itself forward to the beginning of the twentieth century in search of modern Iranian psychology. Here all pretence of originality and native genius gives way to a rather meek and uncritical recounting of how modernist (mostly US) psychology was imported into Iran. The major mechanism in the early decades of the twentieth century was the translation of ‘western’ textbooks.



Ironically for a society renowned for its patriarchal tendencies, one of the very first psychology pamphlets was published by a woman called Badr-ol-molook in 1930 (Kamarzarin, 2002: 5).[9] The Minister of Culture ordered the establishment of the first psychology laboratory in 1933 under the supervision of A. A. Siassi. The first IQ tests were administered soon after in 1935 by M. B. Hushyar who was also responsible for publishing the first Iranian experimental psychology textbook in 1938 (Pereira, 2001). Until the 1940s ‘lunatic’ asylums (dar-ol-majanin) ‘with poor conditions existed in Tehran, Hamadan, Shiraz and Isfahan’ (Yasamy et al., 2001: 381). From the 1940s onwards ‘medical schools were established and psychiatry gradually emerged from them as a branch of modern medicine’ (Yasamy et al., 2001: 381). By 1950 a psychology programme was founded at Tehran University but the first psychology department was set up only in 1959 at the National Teacher's College in Tehran (Pereira, 2001).



The Psychological Association of Iran was established in 1968 under the Shah’s regime but stopped its activities after the Islamic ‘revolution’. In the 1970s a series of epidemiological research projects were initiated, new psychiatric hospitals built and the Tehran Psychiatric Institute formed in 1979, in the midst of the upheavals (Yasamy et al., 2001: 382). The war with Iraq during the 1980s acted as a catalyst for the establishment of a comprehensive National Programme of Mental Health which was then integrated into the primary health care system in pursuit of ‘efficiency’ (Yasamy et al., 2001: 381-382). At present there exist four nongovernmental psychology bodies which have taken over from the Shah’s Psychological Association of Iran. A somewhat hazy division of labour has been erected so that different professionals, such as clinical psychologists, counsellors and educational psychologists, can run their respective guilds (Birashk, 2004: 384).



This modernist psy-complex has been successful in marginalising premodern rivals such as shamans and traditional healers. For instance, ‘seeking help from traditional healers as first contact has shifted from 40.2% in 1990 to … 15.6% in 2000’ (Yasamy et al., 2001: 383). Rapid urbanisation may be seen as a corrupting influence on people but the psy-complex is also aware of its potential windfalls for expanding its power-base. Whereas rural areas have a ‘community’ based approach to mental health, urban areas rely more on the private sector and NGOs. Recently the creation of catchments areas around university hospitals with psychiatry services has been promoted in a bid to co-ordinate intervention (Yasamy et al., 2001: 383). Despite such concessions to the private sector, the state remains in overall charge of the nation’s ‘mental health’, since the reproduction of labour power is a central plank of the regime’s survival strategy. Form 1985 onwards, one week at the end of October has been designated ‘mental health week’ (Yasamy et al., 2001: 385). In a society where national calendars are instrumentals in imposing ‘official culture’ (Bakhtin) on the proletariat, this represents both recognition of the scale of the problem and a feather in the cap of the psy-complex’s lobbyists. Yasamy et al. (2001: 385), for instance, claims that ‘during the mental health week in 2001, 245 mental health meetings and seminars and 4100 training sessions were held, and widespread news coverage of the week was found on national radio, televisions and other media’.



Although the majority of Muslim state officials have their roots in the natural sciences, the social sciences have witnessed a tremendous expansion in recent years. According to Birashk (2004: 385) there are currently about 17,650 students studying psychology. Around 4500 new students are accepted each academic year. As far as gender differences are concerned, ‘there are four female students at the BA level for every male student; however, there are no significant differences in the number of female and male students at the MA and PhD levels’ (Birashk, 2004: 385). The government still controls the course syllabi[10] but internet and satellite access has forced modifications.



Without wishing to overwhelm the reader with statistics, let me just add the following note in order to give a more coherent picture of the Iranian psy-complex: Overall there are 9.3 psychologists for every 100,000 people in Iran (Ghobari and Bolhari, 2001). Most clinical psychologists or psychotherapists ‘prefer rational-emptive behaviour therapy (REBT), cognitive-behavioural, client-centred, or analytical approaches’ (Birashk, 2004: 390). Psychiatrists are accredited with more organisational power than their ‘inferior’ psychologist colleagues and this is bitterly resented by the latter. This power imbalance is partly due to psychiatrists’ greater numbers. There are around 735 psychiatrists in Iran and 50 new ones graduate each year (Mehrabi et al., 2000). By contrast there are only 25 clinical psychologists with doctorates and 389 with master’s degrees. In total around 7850 beds are earmarked for psychiatric patients (Yasamy et al., 2001).[11]



The octopus’s tentacles



Well, you see, Mr Skaggs, none are so dull as the people who think they think.

- Paul Laurence Dunbar, The Sport of the Gods (1901[2005]: 255).



Just like its marine brethren, the psy-complex has tentacles with which it engulfs its terrified victims, paralysing them with stinging poison. When feeling threatened it releases a black jet as cover for a fast getaway. I aim to look at some of its many tentacles in this section.

Birashk (2004: 385) insists that Iranian psychology has seven branches. He then goes on to list them: general (taught at 16 universities), educational (8 universities), clinical (13 universities), exceptional (7 universities), industrial and measurement (3 universities), and health psychology (at 1 university). These are regulated by two government ministries. To this list we should add psychiatry, social work and psychotherapy/counselling. Together they form the ten tentacles of the beast. Below I critically discuss some of them.



The psy-complex retained its sand-nigger status both under the Shah and the Ayatollahs. There was, however, a concerted attempt to islamicise all branches of the psy-complex after the consolidation of Islamic Fascism. These moves have been partially countered in recent times by secular critics but psychotherapy and counselling are still heavily tinged by an Islamic imperative. Overall religion does sadly permeate most other fields of the psy-complex, especially social work. Islamic therapists openly borrow from that other cul-de-sac of thought and reflection- Christian therapy.



The great charade carried out by psycho-religious therapy is threefold. First, psycho-religious therapy erects metaphysical entities such as morality instead of investigating the socio-economic background of mental problems. During the second move, it links morality with religion and, finally, it imposes this religious morality on the patient. Whilst Christian therapists have years of experience in expressing these manoeuvrings with subtlety, their Islamic counterparts dispense with all diplomacy and tact.[12] Hashemian (n.d.) is a typical example. He writes: ‘there are close links between morality and religion … morality is valuing and seeking certain goals rather than others, obeying certain rules, being able to resist temptations … religions reinforce natural moral tendencies …’. Ominously Hashemian (n.d.: 3) warns that ‘religion can affect behaviours via fear of punishment …’.



Rebellion is conceived as ‘incompleteness’ or ‘transgression’ from the divine and this separation brings the rebel pain and suffering. Therapeutic techniques such as ‘free-association, structured interviewing, persuasion, dream interpretation, hypnosis, psychodrama and role play’ are then used to help the patient rediscover his/her ‘inner feelings’ (Hashemian, n.d.: 7). Prayer and confession are also staple techniques of securing the power of the religious therapist/counsellor over the patient. Psycho-religious therapy is considered particularly useful for alcoholism, drug addiction, behaviour modification, conflict resolution and neurosis.



Having explained that most forms of therapy are imported from the US, Shamloo (n.d.: 4) goes on to describe certain native forms of therapy. The technique of storytelling is all about reading a story relevant to the problems faced by the patient and using it to offer insights and possible solutions.[13] Poetry too is often used with the same aim. Iranian psychotherapists claim positive clinical evidence for this method (Farvardin, 1984). Meditation and mantras have also become fashionable relaxation techniques in some quarters (Rizvi, 1988).



One of the most hideous examples of therapy is the use of ‘integration therapy’ in prisons.[14] Tehrani (1997: 92) describes his version of integration therapy as follows: ‘This therapy, based on humanistic psychological theory and the Islamic theory of the Unity of God and of all creation, recognizes that the healthy human can achieve harmonious integration of different subsystems’. Tehrani takes pride in foregrounding his anti-working class credentials. The following is a representative example of his viewpoint: ‘A human being in prison is a human being in conflict with the rules of society. Conflict with the environment often reflects a conflict within the self, marked by emotional turmoil, irrational thoughts, erratic (maladaptive) behaviours, and spiritual distress’ (Tehrani, 1997: 92).



Tehrani claims support from earlier works on ‘quest for meaning’ (Jung, 1933), ‘trust in God’ (Frankl, 1969), and the need to reverse the youth’s rejection of religion (cf. Seligman, 1988). Synthesising these writers with his own Islamic predilections, he states, ‘Not submitting to God not only eliminates all hope of perfection, but brings about disharmony and disintegration’ (Tehrani, 1997: 96). He even has the effrontery to claim, ‘our acceptance of faith in the power of spirituality and religious belief … in no way means that we preach, coerce, or unduly try to influence the inmates’ (Tehrani, 1997: 101). There is worse to come. ‘The inmates and staff’, he patronisingly reassures his readers, ‘tend to exist together in an atmosphere of care and sympathy’ (Tehrani, 1997: 102). The fact that this fatuous, disingenuous Islamic fascist discourse (with a human face) is given credibility by a prestigious journal such as The Journal of Humanistic Psychology is indicative of how the mighty have fallen.



Far more realistic are accounts by investigators such as Baghai (2004) from a Vygotskian perspective about the incarceration of children and their mothers. He has looked at three groups: children born in prisons to ‘politically active’ mothers, toddlers moved to prison when the mother is arrested and those children arrested for political activity such as distributing leaflets or anti-government graffiti. Baghai rightly points out how these children are in effect hostages. In many cases the intended target is the father who has fled or living underground fearing immediate execution. Their misbehaviour is politicised by a regime which views all transgressions as ‘westoxication’.[15] Anecdotal evidence suggests that children around the age 5-6 suffer most of all, since they are old enough to sense the limitations of prison but too young to comprehend the reasons for their captivity (Baghai, 2004: 5). This is an inmate’s account of a game children play in the dungeons of the Islamic Republic: ‘the kids apply anti-septic balm on each other’s feet and bandage [imaginary] wounds, then nurse each other to health’ (Baghai, 2004: 6).



Due to their lack of contact with the outside world, some of these children do not comprehend the meaning of everyday concepts such as ‘sandwich’, ‘ice-cream’, and ‘park’. Since sometimes the mother’s interrogations lasts for months on end, the child is placed in solitary confinement. This is the hell Tehrani and the Journal of Humanistic Psychology attempt to sanitise.



Understandably the torrid times experienced by both incarcerated and non-incarcerated children in the Islamic Republic have led to the emergence of a loose childsaving movement. This is by and large a modernist secular response, although it also contains a minor religious reformist faction exemplified by the 2003 Noble Prize winner Shirin Ebadi, and filmmaker Samir Makhmalbaf’s social work documentaries. It unites both internal and external dissidents who find in the plight of the child a useful site for contesting absolutist Islamic injunctions. Filmmakers such as Kiarostami document the lack of choice and opportunity for Iranian children (Fozooni, 2004: 86). Academics such as Darius Rejali (1994) brilliantly chart the moral geography of Iran and demonstrate how institutions are geared toward socialising working class children and saving upper and middle class children from sin and corruption. Lawyer-activists such as Mehrangiz Kar foreground and criticise the extensive networks of child labour which produce considerable profits for the mullah-bourgeoisie. Leftist political organisations abroad concentrate on exposing the sexual exploitation of children, whether this exploitation is carried out under the auspices of Shari’a law or not.



However, it is not in the interest of this childsaving movement to question either the concept of childhood or the sub-discipline of developmental psychology.[16] In fact the images of suffering children serve to reinforce precisely those qualities of powerlessness, passivity and dependence that define childhood (cf. Burman, 1994: 30). Iranian Leftist organisations abroad redefine the deprivation of childhood as a violation of ‘human right’. Thus a bourgeois concept is consciously imported into discourse in pursuit of short term political expediency. This is exacerbated through the occasional (and usually politically motivated) charity campaigns launched by Iranians abroad in response to earthquakes, floods and drug addiction amongst the youth ‘back home’. Here the discourse of childsaving is riding the crest of an earlier paternalistic discourse based on the poor.[17] The secular childsaving movement, therefore, is as zealous in its desire to see the entrenchment of schooling, social work, medicine and health psychology as its religious counterpart. Critical perspectives are easily squeezed out as impractical and quixotic.



Other sub-disciplines of the psy-complex have enjoyed a boost to their public portfolio and received generous budget allocations thanks to extraordinary events. For instance, neuropsychology gained prominence only after war broke out between Iran and Iraq in 1980 (Roozbehani, 2003: 1). This led to the first neuropsychology symposium in 1986 and closer ties to psychometrics and child and educational psychology thereafter (Roozbehani, 2003: 2). There is as yet only one dedicated neuropsychology research centre in Iran and only around 11% of psychology masters submitted are neuropsychology related but interestingly ‘the most emphasized neuropsychology textbooks were those of Alexander Luria and Lev Vygotsky’ (Roozbehani, 2003: 2).



Another sub-discipline enjoying a revival as a result of having to deal with a huge number of physically impaired war veterans is occupational therapy. Its origins in Iran are to be found in a World Heath Organisation initiative in 1971. There are now training courses in occupational, speech and physical therapies although trainees tend to complete their education abroad (Fallahpour, 2004: 1). It is claimed there are some 2,000 graduates in occupational therapy (Fallahpour, 2004: 1). The website for the Iranian Occupational Therapy Association ( http://www.irota.org/index.htm) mentions Leuret in approving terms. Leuret’s Moral Treatment (1840) was a mixture of paternal charisma and individual accountability usually backed up with narcotics such as morphine and opium.



To my knowledge Iranian occupational therapists have not shown any interest in the social model of disability which distinguishes between ‘impairment’ (i.e. the loss or lack of some functioning part of the body) and ‘disability’ (the way society turns impairment into exclusion, disadvantage and discrimination). In relation to Britain Chappell et al. (2001: 46) write, ‘great efforts have been put into dividing disabled people from each other as they are channelled into segregated services aimed at specific impairment. By contrast, the social model emphasizes the re-casting of disability by disabled people and the importance of collective action’.



Most Iranian occupational therapists collude with authorities in concealing the political economy of disablement. Russell (2001: 87) has shown how ‘industrial capitalism imposed disablement upon those nonconforming bodies deemed less or not exploitable by the owners of the means of production. The prevailing rate of exploitation of labor determines who is disabled and who is not’. The poverty rate amongst ‘disabled’ working class people has been increasing even in rich parts of the world such as the USA (Russell, 2001: 88). Their plight is even more acute in Iran, despite the fact that many constitute the regime’s power-base. This is nowadays mostly a financial and no longer an ideological dependence. However, the co-option of impaired veterans through limited social services and sporting spectacles can no longer be taken for granted. Once disabled people begin collective protest, the mullah-bourgeoisie will lose a great deal of its remaining legitimacy.



Overall the Iranian psy-complex, therefore, seems to be a mostly imported US octopus. This rather uncritical transfer of psychological knowledge from one fundamentalist society to another should not surprise us unduly (cf. Moghaddam, 1987). Iran and the USA have a great deal of commonality. Both societies display a number of extreme divisions: the widening division between the ruling class and the proletariat; the increasingly unsustainable division between the private and public spheres of living and the evermore antagonistic division between religion and atheism. In both societies the same value-ridden politics (cf. Graeber, 2005) creates a monologic discourse well suited to maintaining authoritarian bourgeois hegemony. The proletariat, however, is capable of creating its own dialogic, multi-voiced discourse. There is, naturally, far more information about the resistance of US proletarians to the psy-complex (manifested through the rejection of drugs, therapy, incarceration and ideology) than its Iranian counterpart. The following section attempts to foreground some of the emergent themes of the Iranian psy-complex. The importance attached to these themes is loosely commensurate with the subversive threat they pose for the regime.



The Iranian psy-complex: some themes and crevices



America is a great country with good people living in it. For this reason alone, I am optimistic that the necessary reforms will be embraced and our civilization renewed. However, as my grandmother taught me, God helps those who help themselves.

- Newt Gingrich, To Renew America (1995: 6).



Kirk: Spock, you want to know something? Everybody’s human.

Spock: I find that remark … insulting.

- (Star Trek, quoted in Bernardi, 1998: 69).



Lately the Iranian psy-complex has been stretching its tentacles. There are few taboo subjects beyond its reach. The Iran Statistical Centre has conducted studies in contraception usage and family planning. Abortion has been frowned upon since the emergence of the Islamic Republic and ‘population growth’ was ignored until 1988 when the government became concerned about long-term trends (Aghajanian, 1994: 67). Family planning, including contraceptive supplies, is now a major plank of the government’s educational policy. False advertising is condemned by psychologists for undermining consumer confidence. These condemnations are posited in terms of skull-numbing ethical advice. For instance, one consumer psychologist advises ‘Before advertising a product make sure you actually have it in stock’! (Mohammadian, 2005). The eating habits of teenagers are classified according to western notions of ‘obsessive compulsive’ behaviour and dieting (Mohammadi, et al., 2004). Ironic since in the ‘West’ anorexia was considered a theological matter until the Georgian and Victorian eras when medicine created its own discourse around the subject (Hepburn, 2003: 112). Iranian psychologists abroad concentrate on how women immigrants adapt better to new circumstances than their husbands and discuss marital conflict and second-generation cultural conflicts (Darvishpour, 2002). Although these are all topics worthy of further investigation, I have chosen to foreground the following themes since they seem to be of greater urgency to the psy-complex itself.



Personal relations



Pop psychology plays an inordinately vital role in shaping the agenda of the Iranian psy-complex. In a way, pop psychology is merely courting and then mediating the concerns of real people in the same manner the media employs vox pop techniques to gather intelligence whilst strengthening the grip of (bourgeois) common sense. At the top of pop psychology’s list of concerns is the issue of personal relations. In most other societies this would be a subject unworthy of serious attention. But the lack of public forums and civil societal modes of expression makes it an essential conduit of information in the Iranian context.



Take a reactionary pap like Men Are From Mars, Women Are From Venus (Gray, 1992). According to a recent report this is a bestseller in Iran with most of its 60,000 copies being purchased by 18- to 24-year-olds (Psychology Today, 2005). Fathali M. Moghaddam maintains that although most of the readers consider themselves part of the ‘secular educated class, the idea of relationship self-help is an integral part of Islam’ (Psychology Today, 2005). He also points out an irony we have already alluded to above- that whilst Iran’s universities were being purged of ‘Western-educated psychologists after the revolution, [today], American psychology is more dominant than before the revolution … In addition, more than half of the psych professors are women’ (Psychology Today, 2005).



The mullah-bourgeoisie comprehends the need to regulate and police affective labor and since it has already fetishized women as unique repositories of affective labor, it stands to reason that it should employ them for the delicate task of managing personal relations. Not surprisingly in a society where men hide their inadequacies behind Islamic laws, another pop psychology bestseller, All Men Are Jerks Until Proven Otherwise (Schwartz, 1999) was banned by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance.



Islamic discourse moralises every aspect of personal relationships, from lonely heart ads (which have lost some of their business-like stuffiness and become as playful as their western examples perhaps due to the influence of the Net) to prostitution (which is attacked periodically as part of the regime’s anti-women and anti-working class moral crusades). In fact, it could (and has) been argued that Islam whilst coming down hard on open prostitution and paedophilia, has institutionalised both within a strict set of protocols. The Islamic attitude toward prostitution and paedophilia not only goes to the heart of its hypocrisy but it also exposes the fascist ideals at the heart of regime’s scholars.[18] University Professor, Mohammad Hussein Farjad is a particularly odious example. In an interview he provides us with the following nuggets of wisdom:



Prostitution is an anti-social phenomenon threatening the health of the individual, family and the whole society … Sometimes, mental disorders in men and women lay the groundwork for the scourge of prostitution … poverty does not lead to prostitution … social welfare may result in prostitution … City Hall […] should air music and stage plays and films [for the youth in order to discharge their energies positively] … Prostitution is the major reason for AIDS … (Entekhab, 2002).



This vile attack on sex-workers is related to the rulers’ loss of control over undesirable sexual liaisons. A new liberated verbal and gestural language of desires is being forged in contemporary Iran. The attacks on prostitution and homosexuality are in reality attempts to curb this emerging sexuality.[19] The resistance of sex-workers and gay proletarians to draconian Islamic prescriptions ought to serve as a source of inspiration for the rest of the class.



A few dissident voices here and there are trying to give voice to this oppositional sexuality. For example, the Scandinavian–based journal Homan ( http://www.homanla.org/) defends the rights of Iranian gays and lesbians with informative well-researched articles from a (mostly) social-democratic perspective. The German-based Shahrzad specialises in erotic Persian literature and poetry and from a modernist Feminist-Leninist perspective (which is to say atavistic) magazines like Medusa ( http://www.medusa2000.com/) chart the relationship between religion and prostitution. There are also gay and lesbian Iranian groups in the USA and West European countries. These groups, by and large, confine their activities to educating other Iranians about homosexuality, domestic violence, honour killings, exposing some of the myths circulated by reactionary propagandists (both religious and secular), lobbying and the occasional public demonstration.



Authoritarian vs. democratic personality



Another discursive theme that permeates the fabric of society is the clash between the authoritarian personality and its democratic opposite. This discourse began life as a translation project of works by the Frankfurt school. It then found a resonance within discussions of Fanon, colonialism, dependency, conspiracy theory and paranoia in the 1960s and 70s. Today it can be observed in the strangest of crevices, especially as it seems to be in a symbiotic relationship with the renewed interest in Freudian sexuality.



Even pop psychology is getting on the act. Ashtiani (2003) compares the authoritarian personality and the uncritical reverence such an individual may feel for the leader with the respect the child bestows upon the parent. This cross-fertilisation between social and developmental psychology may seem atavistic and methodologically unsound by the standards of ‘western critical psychology’ but it is noteworthy how readily even such banalities can generate political implications in present-day Iran. The democratic person, Ashtiani (2003) goes on to explain, is akin to a rebellious teenager who emphasises group decision making in order to disempower the Father.



At a higher level of academic rigour there has always been a general interest in writers such as Freud, Fromm, Adorno, Horkheimer, Benjamin, Brecht, Korsch, Marcuse, Habermas, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. The recent additions to this canon are also illuminating: Reich, Foucault and Wittgenstein. Reich’s work on fascism and sexuality has been debated for perhaps the first time amongst Iranian intellectuals and Foucault[20] and Wittgenstein have inserted a postmodernist note on debates surrounding incarceration, absolute knowledge, word-games and the expansive definition of freedom. In my view, the addition of Michael Billig’s early work on fascism (1978) and more recent investigation into ‘banal nationalism’ (1995) would be a great way of updating this debate. From a different perspective the translation of works by Vygotsky, Bakhtin and Todorov has created a whirlpool of relevant ideas. Chomsky is read both as a linguist and a libertarian socialist and Negri’s warm reception in Iran during a recent conference is indicative of ideological affinities (Power, 2005). Last but by no means least, one should mention the excellent translation of Marx and a number of anarchists whose output was either unknown or studied through biased intermediaries.



The authoritarian vs. democratic personality debate has had at least three interesting side-effects. Firstly, certain criticisms that would not have been tolerated by the regime in any other context have been aired under the auspices of the psy-complex. The reasons for such a manoeuvre are unclear to me. Clearly the liberal wing of the mullah-bourgeoisie has been trying to liberalise society as a matter of survival. This recent ‘tolerance’ may be part of the same top-down process of liberalisation witnessed in other fields. Alternatively, one should never underestimate the intellectual tardiness of the Islamic elite. It could very well be that their censorial radar is simply too crude to pick up on various subtle critical discourses circulating in and around this debate.



Secondly, critics of Iranian racism directed against Afghani, Kurdish and Arab citizens and foreigners in general have also been active in this debate through promoting the democratic personality as an ideal worthy of pursuit. If would be interesting to see whether this debate within the psy-complex can catalyse a more radical critique of Iranian racism in the future.[21]



Finally, it is crucial to remember that the debate has not been an unbridled success for the advocates of democratic personality. Both Nietzsche and Jung have been mobilised (sometimes unfairly) in order to cement the arguments of the other camp which still believes passionately in divine authority, hierarchy, patriarchy and charismatic leadership.



Drugs, self-burning and suicide



Youth as a construct has pushed its way up the list of issues causing concern to the mullah-bourgeoisie. A great deal of paternalistic energy is consumed in defining, guiding, educating and disciplining the youth. The so-called opposition reaffirms this constituency through epidemiology and statistics and in the process positions itself as the youth’s natural ally.



The majority of the youth are, of course, young proletarians as alienated from the product of their labour as they are from theocracy. Their rejection of the present state of affairs seems total: football fans that use the game to destroy government properties; students who refuse religious accounts of history; party animals who live through a haze of ‘recreational’ drugs, music and sex; youngsters who run away from home instead of tolerating sexual abuse; those who reject Islamic dress-codes, Friday prayers and military service; and finally those who ‘drop out’ by either using stronger drugs or through the ultimate act of defiance- suicide.



The same hypocrisy at the heart of ‘Western’ attitudes toward drugs is to be found amongst the mullah-bourgeoisie. Whilst drugs such as opium and nicotine have been socialised and distributed through mafia-like cartels supported by some elements from within the regime, alcohol is associated with ‘Western decadence’ and prohibited. The bravado is as farcical as the 1920 US prohibition and has proved a bonanza for a number of Islamic families.



The role of the psy-complex in dealing with addiction, with considerable help from foreign NGOs and UN agencies one might add, has been threefold: First, there has been a concerted effort to bamboozle the public with figures and statistics as opposed to the mullah-bourgeoisie’s preferred tactics of suppressing relevant information; second, the psy-complex acts to de-contextualise drug usage by suppressing the economic, cultural and political reasons behind the ‘turn to drugs’[22]; and third, the psy-complex offers a range of reductionist and instrumentalist therapies as a way of earning its keep.



The above criticisms should not be read as an attempt to belittle the scale of the problem. According to (ideologically loaded) figures from a 2005 UN report, Iran is the highest ranking country in terms of drug addiction (some 2.8% of the 70 million population are classified as addicts). The number of ‘youth’ considered ‘addicted’ to heroin is around 200,000 (Kayhan, 2005). Opium is used by 37% of the ‘addict population’, followed by cannabis and heroin with rates of 21% and 19% respectively (Yasamy et al., 2002: 385).



At the beginning of the reign of the mullahs, government policy was geared towards supply-reduction strategies. When it became apparent that such a strategy was as effective as drug policies in neighbouring Afghanistan, supply-reduction was complimented with demand-reduction programmes. There are now about 130 outpatient clinics and some 300 beds reserved for the treatment of drug users and a concurrent Narcotics (semi)Anonymous self-help group with 10,000 members (Yasamy et al., 2002: 385). One does not wish to be flippant about a serious issue but it is becoming increasingly apparent that these demand-reduction strategies too are proving as helpful as Nancy-Just Say No- Reagan’s 1980s PR campaign. Capitalism, whether western or eastern, does not possess the desire, the theoretical know-how or the practical resources to come to terms with this complex problem.



What the psy-complex euphemistically calls ‘self-harm’ finds another macabre manifestation in the practice of self-burning. In the Mazandaran province alone (adjacent to the Caspian Sea) there were 318 recorded cases of self-burning in a 3 year period. The average age was 27 and 83% of victims were female. The major motive was described by the investigators as ‘marital conflict’ (Zarghami et al., 2002: 115). Once the problem is identified as ‘self-harm’ due to ‘marital conflict’ the psy-complex then takes refuge in inane positivist investigation which have already proved the high correlation between Islamic counselling (independent variable) and marital adjustment (dependent variable) (Danesh, n.d.). Before leaving the subject it is worth speculating how many of these cases are acts of ‘self-burning’ and how many are, in fact, murders committed by hateful husbands/in-laws dressed up as suicide. For the present we are unable to establish a more accurate picture.



Unnatural disasters: Earthquakes and traffic accidents



Hurricane Katrina exposed many things, chief amongst them the increasing gulf between the collective consciousness and humanity of the US proletariat and their bourgeois masters. The frequent tectonic eruptions experienced by Iran, especially the disastrous 2003 Bam earthquake played a similar function. Whilst the proletariat understood the culpability of capitalism in failing to warn, take preventive measures, treat the injured and reconstruct shattered lives, the mullah-bourgeoisie responded with a mixture of religious fatalism, pie in the sky platitudes and psycho-babble.



The psycho-babble became an opportunity for Iranian psy-complex to find a new niche for itself. Its professionals descended on the hapless equipped with their ‘multi-stage stratified sampling methods’ and ‘General Health Questioannire-12 measures’ to ingeniously conclude that people with old age, females, less educated individuals, divorced or widowed and unemployed respondents, and those with loss of more family members in the earthquake reported more severe psychological distress (Montazeri et al., 2005).





The sceptic might interject that the volume of Methadone shipped to Bam (apparently 30% of the survivors are on Methadone- Kayhan, 2005) was a clear enough indication of levels of distress. One must expect future disasters to further enhance psy-complex’s profile. Whether the depoliticised, asinine interventions earthquake victims have had to endure thus far will continue unabated or not remains to be seen.



Another problem that has attracted the attention of Iranian psychologists is traffic accidents. Seventy people are killed in traffic accidents on a daily basis, giving Iran another notorious world top ranking (BBC.Persian.com, 2005). Some 75% of these accidents are apparently due to ‘driver error’ with car problems and dangerous roads accounting for 14% and 11% respectively (Note that none of these deaths are accredited to capitalism!). The capital (Tehran) is a world-beater when it comes to the number of motorcycles on the road, currently standing at around 2,000,000. Naturally enough, cognitive psychologists have found this a lucrative field of endeavour.



By way of conclusion: a brief proposal for a Radical ‘Iranian’ Critical Psychology (R‘I’CP)



The voice of our complaint implies a vengeance.

- Ottobah Cuguoano, quoted in Sakolsky and Koehnline, Gone to Croatan (1993: 148).



You think I have visions

Because I am an Indian.



I have visions because

There are visions to be seen.

- Buffy Sainte-Marie, quoted in Zinn, A People’s History of the United States (2003: 536).



I am a sand-nigger. This much I know since almost every time a Tony Blair, a Donald Rumsfeld or a Condoleezza Rice open their mouth, I find my sand-nigger status reconfirmed. Similarly, the Iranian psy-complex in its present state is no more than sand-nigger psychology- derided, dependent, infantilised, subservient and second-class. The preceding pages have charted its evolution and the collusion of its practitioners with dominant modes of psychology. Whether this collusion is practiced intentionally or inadvertently is in many ways a moot point.



However, no official culture is monologic enough to be able to dispense indefinitely with proletarian re-accentuation. In this context I choose to re-accentuate this unsolicited identity by polarising sand-niggers to include both house-sand-niggers and field-sand-niggers.[23] I despise the former and belong to the latter. This much I can do since the contours of this antagonism are already with us. House-sand-niggers are apologists for Islamic capitalism who preside over the Iranian psy-complex. Field-sand-niggers comprise all ‘professionals’ and ‘users’ within and outwith the psy-complex who have a stake in subverting its activities. The term ‘sand-nigger psychology’ is thus the perfect description and analysis of the status quo. In its re-accentuated form, it also provides us with a fight-back strategy.



Precisely because ‘Iranian’ Critical Psychology is emerging with a time lag compared to its counterparts in other parts of the globe, it must aim to be better, much better. All the more so since the class struggle in Iran is approaching the point of no return. This much is self-evident to me.



I wish to end this article by proposing an alternative to the status quo. Without wishing to pre-empt the nascent Radical ‘Iranian’ Critical Psychology (R’I’CP), the following general characteristics strike me as a sensible starting point:



1. R‘I’CP should be nurtured from the most radical social struggles being waged against the psy-complex, whether in Iran or elsewhere. These struggles will benefit from Luria’s notion of living spontaneity (Luria, 1961) and Vygotsky’s concept of joint action (Vygotsky, 1962). As such R‘I’CP recognises no artificial national boundaries and welcomes contributors from all fields and nationalities. It does, however, aim to concentrate on Iran in the hope that gains in that part of the world would enhance Critical Psychology worldwide.



2. R‘I’CP should not limit itself to mere criticism which can only humanise the psy-complex but a fully-fledged practical critique (cf. Korsch, 1971). Likewise, R‘I’CP should not limit itself to mere deconstruction but aim from the outset to reconstruct human relations based on a post-capitalist human community (cf. Camatte, 1978 and 1995).



3. R‘I’CP should reject the false choice offered critical psychologists between pre-modernism, modernism and post-modernism. Although willing to learn from any source that strengthens our praxis, we should remain deeply suspicious of ideologies not created by the world proletariat in the course of its struggle against wage-slavery and the state.



4. R‘I’CP should not only expose the positivist, empiricist, individualistic, reductionist and instrumentalist practice of the Iranian psy-complex but engage with all those topics deemed taboo: religion as a form of abuse and/or mystification; capitalist alienation and exploitation and its connection to mental problems; Iranian racism against ‘minorities’; the connection between the Mosque and paedophilia; sexual oppression and the inherent heterosexism of monotheistic religions (here the body of work on gay and lesbian issues in the ‘West’ will be of immense value); the function of politeness, shame and etiquette in repressing controversial issues from everyday discourse and the role played by drug companies and psychiatry in pacifying discontent.



A victory for R‘I’CP in the midst of a more general social revolution would have a tremendous impact on Critical Psychology worldwide. It will provide us with an opportunity to reject profit-seeking and alienation in favour of a reconstituted set of human relations based on genuine need and desire.



References



Afray, J. and Anderson, K. B. (2005). Foucault and the Iranian Revolution, Gender and the Seduction of Islamism. Chicago: University of Chicago.

Aghajanian, A. (1994). Family Planning and Contraceptive Use in Iran, 1967-1992. International Family Planning Perspectives, June, 20(2), 66-69.

Ahmed, A. S. (2002). Ibn Khaldun’s understanding of civilization and the dilemmas of Islam and the West today. The Middle East Journal, winter, 56(1): 20-46.

Al-Azmeh, A. (1990). Ibn Khaldun. London and New York: Routledge.

Ashtiani, A. F. (2003). The Root Psychology of Democracy. Social Psychology, no. 1, [Farsi].  http://www.jamee-psy.com/official/jameepsy/view.asp?ID=84056 (accessed 13 August 2005).

آشتیانی، علی فتحی. (1382) ریشه های روانشناختی دمکراسی. روانشناسی جامعه. شماره 1.

Baghai (2004). Prison and its effect on children’s development. [Farsi].  http://bidaran.com/article.php3?id_article=49 (accessed 11 August 2005).

بقایی، غلامرضا. (1383). زندان و تاثیر آن بر رشد کودکان: طرح یک تحقیق پیرامون کودکان زندانی در زندانهای سیاسی جمهوری اسلامی در دهه ی شصت خورشیدی.

BBC.Persian.com (2005). Iranian programme for reducing road accidents. [Farsi].  http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/business/story/2005/09/050911_ra-ka-iran-road-accidents.shtml (accessed 2 October 2005).

BBC.Persian.com (2005). برنامه های ايران برای کاهش تلفات و هزينه های تصادف. کاوه امیدوار.

Bernardi, D. L. (1998). Star Trek and History: Race-ing toward a white future. New Brunswick, New Jersey and London: Rutgers University Press.

Billig, M. (1978). Fascists: A social psychological view of the National Front. London: Academic Press.

Billig, M. (1995). Banal Nationalism. London: Sage.

Birashk, B. (2004). Psychology in Iran. In K. Pawlik and M. Rosezweig (eds) The Handbook of International Psychology. London: Sage. Chapter 23: 381-394.

Burman, E. (1994). poor children: charity appeals and ideologies of childhood. Changes, 12: 29-36.

Camatte, J. (1978). Community and Communism in Russia. London: Unpopular Books.

Camatte, J. (1995). This World We Must Leave and Other Essays. New York: Autonomedia.

Chappell, A. L., Goodley, D., and Lawthom, R. (2001). Making connections: the relevance of the social model of disability for people with learning difficulties. British Journal of Learning Disabilities, June, 29(2): 45.

Cohen, N. (1993). Cosmos, Chaos and the World to Come: The Ancient Roots of Apocalyptic Faith. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Danesh, E. (n.d.). The efficacy of Islamic counselling on improving marital adjustment levels of incompatible couples.  http://www.iranpa.org/pdf/054.pdf (accessed 23 august 2005).

Darvishpour, M. (2002). Immigrant women challenge the role of men: how the changing power relationship within Iranian families in Sweden intensifies family conflicts after immigration. Journal of Comparative Family Studies, Spring, 33(2), 271-301.

Dunbar, P. L. (1901[2005]). The Sport of the God: and Other Essential Writings. Modern Library.

Entekhab (2002). Prostitution in Iran: An interview with Professor Mohammad Hossein Farjad. Entekhab (Persian Morning Daily), Tuesday, June 11, Vol. 4, No. 898.

Farvardin, A. (1984). Poetry Therapy. Dehkhoda Press.

Fozooni, B. (2004). Kiarostami debunked! New Cinemas: Journal of Contemporary Film, 2(2): 73-89.

Fallahpour, M. (2004). A Review of Occupational Therapy in Iran.  http://www.uswr.ac.ir/IRJ/Lpublished/Areview.htm (accessed 23 September 2005).

Foucault, M. (2000). Iran: The Spirit of a World Without Spirit and 9 Other Interviews. [Farsi]. Tehran: Nay Publications.

فوکو، میشل. (1379). ایران: روح یک جهان بی روح و 9 گفتگوی دیگر. ترجمه نیکو سرخوش و افشین جهاندیده. تهران: نشر نی.

Frankl, V. (1969). The will to meaning. New York: New American Library.

Ghobari, B. and Bolhari, J. (2001). The current state of medical psychology in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Journal of clinical psychology in medical settings, 8(1): 39-43.

Gingrich, N. (1995). To Renew America. New York: HarperCollins Publishers.

Graeber, D. (2005). Preface: Spring 2005. thecommoner: a web journal for other values, 10: 4-65. www.thecommoner.org (accessed 26 August 2005).

Gray, J. (1992). Men Are from Mars, Women Are from Venus: A Practical Guide for Improving Communication and Getting What You Want in Your Relationships. HarperCollins Publishers.

Hardt, M. and Negri, A. (2004). Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire. New York: The Penguin Press.

Hashemian, K. (n.d.). A Comparative Analysis of Islamic and Christian Psychotherapies.  http://www.iranpa.org/pdf/042.pdf (accessed 21 September 2005).

Hekma, G. (2002). Imams and Homosexuality: A Post-gay Debate in the Netherlands. Sexualities, 5(2): 237-248.

Hepburn, A. (2003). An Introduction to Critical Social Psychology. London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage Publication in association with Open University.

Herbert, F. (1965[1988]). Dune. London: Hodder & Stoughton.

Holland, P. (1992). What is a child? Popular images of childhood. London: Pandora Press.

Johnstone, L. (2003). A shocking treatment? The Psychologist, 16(5): 236-239.

Jung, C. G. (1933). Modern man in search of a soul. New York: Harcourt Brace & World.

Kalafi, Y., Hagh-Shenas, H. and Ostovar, A. (2002). Mental health among Afghan refugees settled in Shiraz, Iran. Psychological Report, February, 90(1): 262-266.

Kamarzarin, H. (2002). Country Profile: Iran. Psychology International, American Psychological Association Office of International Affairs, winter, 13(1): 5.

Kayhan (2005). Based on the number of addicts, Iran becomes the highest ranking country in the world. [Farsi].

کیهان (1384). از لحاظ تعداد معتادان، ایران در جهان اول شد. شماره 1075، 13 مهر ماه 1384 خورشیدی، صفحه 3

Korsch, K. (1971). Three Essays on Marxism. London: Pluto.

Leuret, F. (1840). Du Traitement Moral de la Folie. Paris.

Luria, A. R. (1961). Speech and the Regulation of Behaviour. London: Pergamon Press.

Makarov, V. V. and Tukaev, R. D. (n.d.). The integrative movement in psychotherapy.  http://www.iranpa.org/pdf/095.pdf (accessed 24 August 2005).

Marx, K. (1871[1993]). The Civil War in France. [Farsi]. New York: International Publishers.

مارکس، کارل. )1380). جنگ داخلی در فرانسه. ترجمه باقرپرهام. تهران: نشر مرکز.

Mir-Fetrous, A. (1989). Contribution Aux Études Islamiques. [Farsi]. Montréal : Farhang.

میرفطروس، علی (1368). اسلامشناسی: پرتوی در مطالعات اسلامی. مونترال: انتشارات فرهنگ.

Mehrabi, F., Bayanzadeh, S. A., Atef-Vahid, M. K., Bolhari, J., Shahmohammadi, D. and Vaezi, S. A. (2000). Mental health in Iran. In I. Al-Issa (ed) Al-Junun: Mental Illness in the Islamic World (pp. 139-161). Madison, CT: International Universities Press.

M. J. (1998). Men are from Tehran … women are from Isfahan. Psychology Today.  http://cms.psychologytoday.com/articles/pto-19980501-000002.html (accessed 14 October 2005).

Moghaddam, F. M. (1987). Psychology in the three worlds: as reflected by the crisis in social psychology and the move toward indigenous third world psychology. American Psychologist, 42: 912-920.

Mohammad (n.d. [1974]). The Koran. London: Penguin Books.

Mohammadi, M. R. et al. (2004). Prevalence of obsessive-compulsive disorder in Iran. BMC Psychiatry, 4: 2.

Mohammadian, M. (2003). False advertising. ُSocial Psychology, no. 1, [Farsi].  http://www.jamee-psy.com/official/jameepsy/view.asp?ID=84179 (accessed 6 July 2005).

محمدیان، محمود. (1382). کجروی ها و انحرافات در تبلیغ. روانشناسی جامعه. شماره 1.

Mohit, A. (2001). Mental health and psychiatry in the Middle East: historical development. Eastern Mediterranean Health Journal, 7(3): 336-347.

Montazeri, A. et al. (2005). Psychological distress among Bam earthquake survivors in Iran: a population-based study. BMC Public Health, 5: 4.

Mottahedeh, R. (1987). The Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Politics in Iran. Peregrine Books.

Pereira, M. E. (2001). History of the Psychology: A TimeLine of Psychological Ideas.  http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Delphi/6061/en_linha2.htm (accessed 14 July 2005).

Perlman, F. (1983). Against His-story, Against Leviathan! Detroit: Black & Red.

Power, N. (2005). Persian Empire. Radical Philosophy, March-April, Issue 130.  http://www.radicalphilosophy.com/default.asp?channel_id=2193&editorial_id=17194 (accessed 10 July 2005).

Rejali, D. (2001). Electricity: The Global History of a Torture Technology. Originally appeared in art.politics.theory.practice, June, 101-109. Also available at  http://academic.reed.edu/poli_sci/faculty/rejali/rejali/articles/History_of_Electric_Torture.htm (accessed 10 September 2005).

Rejali, D. (1994). Torture & Modernity: Self, Society and State in Modern Iran. Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press.

Rizvi, S. A. A. (1988). Muslim Tradition in Psychotherapy. Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture.

Rodinson, M. (1973). Mohammed. London: Penguin Books.

Roozbehani, A. (2003). Neuropsychology in Iran. International Neuropsychological Society Liaison Committee Newsletter, summer, 12: 1.

Rose, N. (1985). The psychological complex: Psychology, politics and society in England 1869-1939. London, Boston, Melbourne and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Russell, M. (2001). Disablement, Oppression, and the Political Economy. Journal of Disability Policy Studies, Fall, 12(2): 87.

Sakolsky, R. and Koehnline, J. (1993). Gone to Croatan: origins of North American dropout culture. New York and Edinburgh: Autonomedia and AK Press.

Schwartz, D. D. (1999). All Men Are Jerks Until Proven Otherwise: A Woman's Guide to Understanding Men. Adams Media Corporation.

Seligman, M. E. P. (1988). Boomer blues. Psychology Today, October, 50-55.

Shamloo, S. (n.d.). Psychotherapy in Iran.  http://www.iranpa.org/pdf/007.pdf (accessed 12 October 2005).

Tokarev, S. (1989). History of Religion. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

Trotsky, L. (2001). Marxism and Terrorism. [Farsi]. Pathfinder Press.

تروتسکی، لئون (1380). مارکسیسم و تروریسم. ترجمه مسعود صابری. تهران: نشر طلایه پرسو.

Trouble & Strife (2002). Fundamentally Fascist, summer, 43: 46-53.

Vološinov, V. N. (1929[1986]). Marxism and the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press.

Vygotsky, L. S. (1962). Thought and Language. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Vygotsky, L. S. (1999). Mind and Society: The Development of Higher Psychological Processes. [Farsi]. Translation: Behrooz Azabdaftari. Tehran: Fatemi Press.

ویگوتسکی، لو سیمونوویچ. (1378). ذهن و جامعه: رشد فرایندهای روانشناختی عالی. ترجمه بهروز عزبدفتری. تهران: انتشارات فاطمی.

Williams. R. (1973). Base and superstructure in Marxist cultural theory. New Left Review, 82, Nov-Dec.

Yasamy, M. T., Shahmohammadi, D., Bagheri Yazdi, S.A., Layeghi, H., Bolhari, J., Razzaghi, E. M., Bina, M. and Mohit, A. (2001). Mental health in the Islamic Republic of Iran: achievements and areas of need. Eastern Mediterranean health Journal, May, 7(3): 381-391.

Zarghami, M. and Khalilian, A. (2002). Deliberate self-burning in Mazandaran, Iran. PubMed, March, 28(2): 115-119.

Zinn, H. (2003). A People’s History of the United States: 1492-Present. New York: HarperCollins Publications.

69



[1] Contact:  babakfozooni@hotmail.com

[2] I would like to thank the guest editors of the Annual Review of Critical Psychology for their encouraging comments. I am especially grateful to Professor Erica Burman for reviewing my article. Her criticisms improved the text greatly.

[3] The term is defined by Nikolas Rose as ‘a complex of discourses, practices, agents and techniques, deployed within schools, clinics, the judicial and penal processes, the factories and the army- which [provides] the basis for the generalisation and development of applied and clinical psychology …’ (Rose, 1985: 9).

[4] I do not care for terms like premodernism, modernism or postmodernism and try to avoid using them wherever possible. It is not the fact that they mean different things to different people, since all terms are sites of contestation (cf. Vološinov, 1929[1986]). Nor is the problem their constructedness, since truth need not be captured through an organic vocabulary. My concern is that they do not serve the interests of the working class and as such should be considered suspect. However, for the sake of brevity and since so many agents within the psy-complex perceive of their actions in terms of such concepts, I felt obliged to follow convention. As a critical psychologist, therefore, I am as much hostage to obligation as anyone else (see footnote 4).

[5] Obligation in this context is an example of what Raymond Williams referred to as ‘residual cultural artifacts’ (Williams, 1973: 41). It is a set of values and practices from a previous social formation (e.g. feudalism) which continue to shape human interaction within the psy-complex.

[6] I do not wish to give the impression that ECT is administrated only in underdeveloped and authoritarian parts of the globe. According to Johnstone (2003: 236) ‘[ECT] was given to approximately 11,340 patients in England in 1999, compared with a peak of around 28,000 in 1985’. Likewise, Rejali (2001: 101) has shown that ‘the spread of electric torture is part and parcel of the spread of democratization’, probably because electric torture does not leave a mark on the victim. Also it is worth remembering that ‘the CIA expressed considerable interest in ECT devices. During World War II, a chief CIA psychologist advised John Foster Dulles that each surviving German over the age of twelve should receive a short course of electroshock treatment to burn out any remaining vestige of Nazism’ (Rejali, 2001: 102). The point I am trying to make is that in other parts of the world there is at least a debate about ECT. In Iran there is only a debate about electric torture administered to political prisoners. Psychiatric patients are left at the mercy of reactionary psychiatrists with no qualms about using ECT as either treatment or punishment.

[7] In fact, it is fair to say that since Islamic Humanism enjoyed its heyday some 300 years prior to its European counterpart, psychiatric hospitals in the Middle East were also more advanced in terms of treatment (Mohit, 2001: 342). This relative superiority did not last very long and gradually patient care and psychiatry in general fell into decline. By the 17th century keeping patients chained up was quite common in Iran (Mohit, 2001: 343).

[8] I say ‘certain brands of Islam’ because according to some scholars, orthodox Islam was very much an urban movement. In fact, Arabistan in the seventh century consisted of a myriad of social formations ranging from Bedouin tribes, agricultural settlers, slaves and slave-owners, urban elites and merchants (Mir Fetrous, 1989: 13; Tokarev, 1989: 370; Rodinson, 1973: 36). Mohammad was a shrewd enough political operator to maintain the allegiances of all these factions but his reforms and those of the Caliphs who succeeded him were in general in favour of further urbanisation. Modern Islam is, with the exception of Afghanistan and one or two other cases, a mostly urban inspired movement. This is certainly true of its Iranian variant. And yet despite this objective interest in urbanisation, there remains a subjective undercurrent within Islamic thought deeply suspicious of cities and city mores.

[9] I have taken great care to cross-reference the dates mentioned in this section. However, since there is a certain amount of discrepancy in the original sources these dates should be treated as approximate tendencies and not absolute cut-off points. Since I have never been a practitioner within the Iranian psy-complex, I lay no claim to special insight. My critique has been generated from a distance and at times betrays its limitations.

[10] In addition, ‘students must pass a course entitled Muslim Scholars’ Views on Psychology’ (Birashk, 2004: 386).

[11] Mohit gives the figure of 9200 for psychiatric beds and 1000 for psychiatrists (Mohit, 2001: 345).

[12] Of course not all Christian reactionaries express their dogma with subtlety. Promise Keepers, for instance, is a right wing Christian organization founded in 1990 which blatantly calls for active male leadership to overcome women’s increasing autonomy (Hepburn, 2003: 98). Their Iranian counterparts cite verses from the Koran as ideological justification for various psychological techniques. For example, behaviour control and modification apparently find legitimation in the following Koranic verse: ‘Surely we have prepared for the unbelievers chains, fetters and a Blaze’ (Mohammad, n.d. [1974]: Man [76: 2-22]).

[13] Whether storytelling therapies ‘work’ or not depends on whether these stories are contextualised to take on board wider social and political issues. It also depends on the motivation of the therapist. Most Iranian therapists use storytelling as an extension of preaching during which the patient is imbued with a set of reactionary values and role models. Critical examples of storytelling by Iranian subjects for effecting change and producing new knowledge are rare. Dossa’s work with Iranian women in Vancouver (British Columbia) may represent one such example (Dossa, 2002).

[14] I do not claim to know much about the ‘integrative movement in psychotherapy’. It is my understanding that it has its origins in the works of Russian scholars, V. V. Makarov and R. D. Tukaev (n.d.). It is an eclectic synthesis of past forms of therapy including cognitive-behavioural and psychoanalytic therapies. Its attraction for (some) Iranian psychotherapists seems to be its ‘spiritual dimension’ and the fact that ‘native’ therapies can find a home within foreign forms of therapy. I suspect Tehrani’s version of integrative psychotherapy is a far cry from the original proposition.

[15] ‘Westoxication’ (gharbzadegi) or ‘West-stricken-ness’ or even ‘Euromania’ is a term popularised by a reactionary third rate intellectual called Jalal Al-e Ahmad. ‘I say that gharbzadegi’, he writes, ‘is like cholera [or] frostbite. But no. It is at least as bad as sawflies in the wheat fields. Have you ever seen how they infest wheat? From within. There’s a healthy skin in places, but it’s only a skin, just like the shell of a cicada on a tree’ (quoted in Mottahedeh, 1987: 296). Al-e Ahmad hid his ‘anti-modernist’, petty-bourgeois Islamic rants under a pseudo-Fanon discourse. Most Iranian intellectuals (both religious and secular) were initially impressed by such xenophobic nonsense. Its influence lingers on in certain parts of the psy-complex.

[16] The only exceptions I can find to this generalisation are the works of Darius Rejali from a post-Foucauldian perspective (cf. 1994) and the translation of works by Vygotsky by a number of Iranian psychologists/academics (cf. Vygotsky, 1999).

[17] ‘Children’ and the ‘poor’ (sometimes as a synonym for lumpenproletariat) are fused discursively in other ways. They are both considered ‘unproductive’ (even parasitic) and politically dangerous since unpredictable (cf. Hardt and Negri, 2004: 130). Significantly the same emotional responses poverty-stricken children elicit in us through charity ads (cf. Burman, 1994) couched in terms of sympathy, guilt and disgust are also encouraged by political discourse regarding the poor. This constant, insatiable demand on ‘our goodwill’ is instrumental in arousing feelings of sadism against both children and the poor (Holland, 1992: 154).

[18] See interview with Marieme Hélie-Lucas in Trouble & Strife (2002: 46-53) for an interesting Algerian perspective on Islamic Fascism.

[19] For a fascinating clash of opinion about homosexuality in the Netherlands between Muslims and the host society see Hekma (2002).

[20] The attention bestowed upon Foucault is a decidedly double-edged sword considering his naïve dalliance with Islamic fascism (cf. Afray and Anderson, 2005).

[21] Even well-intentioned Iranian psychologists are beginning to objectify ‘foreign minorities’ such as Afghans (cf. Kalafi et al., 2002) in a rerun of the way the American psy-complex treated descendants of slaves. We cannot ignore Iranian racism simply because Iranians themselves have become the sand-niggers of the world. Iranian racism must be combated not only because it is wrong but also because it undermines the class struggle. In my view, it has at least three distinct roots which occasionally forge an unofficial alliance to better assault the victim. These three ideological roots are: 1) the Islamic doctrine which bases its racism on cultural and religious discrimination; 2) the Zoroastrian religion as misinterpreted by Monarchists with its pretensions of Aryan supremacy; and, 3) parts of the secular-Left which employs crude ‘scientific socialism’ in order to conceal their anti-foreign prejudices.

[22] Occasionally a reductionist, sociological connection may be made with high levels of unemployment the way second-rate ‘western’ sociologists have habitually explained away the rise of fascism. The other traditional method of explaining away heavy drug use is to blame everything on the ‘other’, in this case Afghani drug dealers. As an aside I would like to add that I have been briefly stopped and searched as a suspected drug dealer in both Tehran and London. (OK, there was also that time when I was picked up as a possible ‘card-boy’ in Kings Cross, but we won’t go into that!) What struck me was the superiority of the political discussion that ensued with my Iranian interrogators. They seemed so much better informed and politically sophisticated compared to their swinish London brethrens.

[23] This is a political distinction and must not be mistaken for a geographical or occupational differentiation. In other words, I am not saying that Iranian psychologists living in Iran are house-sand-niggers and those of us living abroad are field-sand-niggers. No! I am introducing a political distinction between those who wish to perpetuate Islamic capitalism and those who stand in opposition to it. According to this criterion, the overwhelming majority of Iranian-American psychologists for example are also house-sand-niggers (whether they know it or not).