While reports circulate of potential action against North Korea, as part of the U.S. anti-terrorism campaign, Pyongyang has warned Washington not to give it the same treatment it gave Afghanistan. A commentary in the official Rodong Sinmun Dec. 5 said, "If the U.S. imperialists try to test their logic of strength on the DPRK, as they are using it against some countries, they will be annihilated to the last man." The warning comes amid a renewed flood of anti-U.S. rhetoric coming out of North Korea, where the government is suggesting it will continue to develop and deploy new and better missiles.

Faced with a sustained slowdown in inter-Korean reconciliation, Pyongyang is returning to its usual diplomatic tactics: alternately slinging threats and dropping hints about renewed talks with the United States. But Pyongyang may be miscalculating Washington's priorities and tolerances in the post-Sept. 11 world, and this could only further complicate its international relations.

North Korea's nuclear and biological weapons programs have been under increased scrutiny since Sept. 11. Pyongyang is actually hoping to benefit from this renewed attention by using it to restart talks with the United States and South Korea and gain the upper hand at the bargaining table.

However, for South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, already weakened by party politics and term limits, Pyongyang's belligerent tone does little to spur his flagging Sunshine Policy of strategic engagement with the North. It may also embolden elements in Washington already predisposed against further aid or concessions to the North Korean regime.

Washington and its close allies have accused North Korea over the past few weeks of selling long-range missiles to Egypt, possessing nuclear weapons and producing large stockpiles of biological weapons. U.S. President George W. Bush bluntly told Pyongyang to allow international inspection of its nuclear facilities and to stop selling missiles. Bush linked ending missile proliferation and programs to build weapons of mass destruction to the war on terror, raising speculation that North Korea was on his short list of targets after Afghanistan.

At the same time, pressure is also building against the regime from other quarters. Japanese officials Nov. 28 raided the offices of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryun), a pro-Pyongyang group that funnels money from credit unions and other sources to North Korea. In South Korea the highly touted Mount Kumkang tourism project, the first to schedule regular trips for South Koreans to the North, is near collapse despite government intervention.

Furthermore, the delay in inter-Korean reconciliation since the beginning of the year has left many of South Korea's biggest businesses reconsidering their planned investments in the North, according to the online NK Chosun. South Korean firms were owed nearly $14.3 million by North Korea as of the end of November, according to the South Korean Unification Ministry.

Pyongyang has made several provocative moves in recent weeks. North Korean border guards on Nov. 27 fired three shots across the DMZ, the highly militarized border that separates North and South Korea. The shooting incident, the first in more than three years along the border, triggered a brief return of fire by South Korean troops. A preliminary investigation determined the North Korean shots were fired from a 7.62 mm machine gun, banned from use in the area by the armistice agreement that ended the Korean War, according to a release by South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff.

South Korean officials Nov. 27 also revealed that Pyongyang requested that the members of the U.N. Military Armistice Commission withdraw from the body, which is tasked with resolving violations of the armistice agreement. Pyongyang has tried several times to dissolve the commission but stopped such attempts during the period of inter-Korean contact in 2000.

Pyongyang's new demand is an attempt to spur direct peace negotiations with Washington. If there is no committee to oversee the armistice agreement, the United States will have little choice but to resume talks with North Korea.

North Korea has also renewed a rhetorical battle against the United States and South Korea. Through official media outlets, Pyongyang has accused Washington of taking advantage of Sept. 11 to try to threaten the regime. The government also responded to these so-called U.S. threats by saying it will rely on its strong leader, step up military readiness, and prepare and develop missiles to "smash the imperialists' moves to stifle the DPRK."

Yet amid the rhetoric and provocative actions, Pyongyang has still taken several steps to encourage a resumption of dialogue with the United States. North Korea's foreign minister told a visiting Western diplomat in October that Pyongyang had expelled members of the Japanese Red Army, who for decades took refuge in North Korea.

Pyongyang also recently signed two U.N. treaties against terrorism: the 1999 convention to control financing for terrorists and the 1979 international convention against the taking of hostages. Both moves were made to get North Korea removed from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism. Being on this list has seriously hindered Pyongyang's economic and political relations.

Other less-visible steps have also revealed Pyongyang's interest in restarting talks with Washington or even Seoul. North Korea has relaxed its strong objection to being called the "No. 1 enemy" in South Korea's defense white papers, a label that has been a point of contention cited for the delay of past talks. North Korea last month asked that the label simply be changed, a step back from previous demands that it be abolished.

The government also has offered to open the Isotope Production Laboratory in Yeongbyeon to inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency, according to the JoongAng Ilbo. And Pyongyang signed an accord with the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) that establishes warranties and quality assurances on light water reactors the organization is constructing in North Korea. The KEDO projects, which are years behind schedule, were the result of the 1994 agreement under which North Korea abandoned its nuclear programs in exchange for internationally built nuclear energy plants that do not produce weapons-grade plutonium.

On the diplomatic front, Pyongyang has continued to engage European nations for political and economic support. North Korea also replaced its ambassador to the United Nations with Pak Gil Yon, the former vice foreign minister. Pak is known to be one of Pyongyang's key U.S. experts and served as North Korea's first U.N. ambassador from 1991 to 1996. In addition, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il recently held an unusual personal meeting with the new Russian ambassador to Pyongyang, a move that suggests Pyongyang is seeking Moscow's advice on dealing with Washington after Sept. 11.

Strategic Miscalculation

This answer to the question of how to deal with Washington in the new geopolitical environment is one that is apparently eluding North Korean officials. Pyongyang was already having enough trouble deciphering the Bush administration's policies after the remarkably conciliatory administration of former U.S. President Bill Clinton. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon left North Korea further guessing about Washington's intentions.

The North Korean regime has little chance to reinvigorate direct North-South relations due to Seoul's internal political bickering and economic problems. Pyongyang is instead using its old tactic of combining belligerence, hints of social instability and implications that there is a small opening for talks.

In the past this has worked well. When it felt ignored, North Korea would threaten drastic action and even demonstrate some of its capabilities. For instance, on one occasion, Pyongyang made no attempt to hide some suspected nuclear reprocessing facilities from satellites, and on another, it boldly launched a multi-stage rocket over Japan.

However, each of these incidents -- which could have brought direct military reprisal from the United States -- was matched with a show of weakness inside North Korea. For example, the ongoing famine gave the appearance that North Korea was near collapse anyway and that there was little reason to accelerate its demise.

What helped preserve the regime was the ever-present fear that North Korea's leaders, if pushed to the wall, would resort to drastic actions. North Korea's gambit of projecting weakness along with political instability managed not only to perpetuate the North Korean government but also to get other states to send food aid and make conciliatory gestures.

The difference now, however, is that Washington has little patience for such games. The attacks on U.S. soil brought home a real and pressing threat and gave the U.S. government tremendous leeway in international affairs. The Bush administration barely tolerates concerns from even its own allies now, let alone belligerency from an old foe.

If Pyongyang presses too hard, it may find itself completely isolated once again. As a lame-duck president, Kim Dae Jung is in no position to pressure Washington to be more conciliatory toward Pyongyang. Seoul's opposition Grand National Party, looking forward to increasing its power in the 2002 elections, will itself further goad Washington into taking stricter actions against Pyongyang.

Japan also appears ready to address the North Korean issue more forcefully. Even Russia and China, looking respectively at potential integration with Europe and the international economic community, may be reluctant to step out and defend North Korea.

This situation means that while Pyongyang's strategy has worked in the past at winning recognition and concessions, it may backfire this time around.