Dear friends,

During the last 48 hours two Israeli Prime Ministers, one current and one past, have written op-eds pieces in major US papers, the Washington Post and the New York Times. Thedangerous ideas presented by both pose a clear and concentrated effort to effect US
policy as President Bush prepares to announce a new initiative this week.

More serious is Sharon's dropping the 1967 borders as a reference point to a future settlement and Barak's belief that Israeli occupation is not the problem at the source of Palestinian outrage. These statements, coupled with the US talking about the need for
Palestinians to drop there Right of Return in return for Israeli dismantling of illegal settlements, are non-starters and will move the area into another vicious cycle of violence.

I paste below the two op-eds, one by Sharon and another by Barak. I urge all to send in letters to the editors to answer these two Israeli
generals.

Washington Post:  letters@washpost.com

New York Times:  letters@nytimes.com

Letter should be 100-150 words only and include your contact details.

Rgds, Sam

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 http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/09/opinion/09SHAR.html

June 9, 2002
The Way Forward in the Middle East
By ARIEL SHARON

JERUSALEM - Thirty-five years ago, on June 5, 1967, the start of
the Six Day War, Israel faced a threat to its very existence as a
coalition of Arab armies massed their troops along the fragile
armistice lines that had separated Arab and Israeli forces since 1949.
Along the hills of the West Bank, which had been occupied by the
Jordanians, armored and infantry units were deployed, ready to cut
Israel's narrow coastal plain, which was only eight miles wide at
Netanya. A third of the Iraqi army was crossing Jordanian territory,
ready to join the coalition against Israel. The declared goal of the
attack was Israel's elimination.

Israel entered the West Bank only after its cities and airports had
come under heavy fire. Isr
aeli actions were legal - resulting from a
clear-cut war of self-defense. For that reason, the United Nations
Security Council determined in a historic decision, Resolution 242,
that Israel was entitled to "secure and recognized boundaries" and

was not expected to withdraw from all the territories that its forces
had entered - and from which it was attacked - in the Six Day War. In
effect, the resolution established that these were disputed territories
where Israel had legitimate rights to defensible borders, besides the
claims of the Arab parties to the conflict.

Under Resolution 242, which became the cornerstone of
peacemaking, Israel withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula in
accordance with the 1979 peace treaty with Egypt. It was under the
principles of Resolution 242 that Israel attended the 1991 Madrid
peace conference where President George H. W. Bush spoke about
a "territorial compromise" between the parties. And again in line
with
Resolution 242, Israel, operating under the 1993 Oslo agreement,
withdrew its military government over the Palestinian population so
that by 1999, 98 percent of the Palestinians in the West Bank and
Gaza were under Palestinian rule.

Nonetheless, the Palestinian leadership decided to initiate the
current war against Israel after the failure of the Camp David summit
in July 2000. Rather than resolve Israeli-Palestinian differences
peacefully, it deliberately promoted a wave of terrorist attacks
against the people of Israel. It failed to implement its written
obligations to dismantle international terrorist groups like Hamas and
Islamic Jihad. Instead it provided them with sanctuary in the area
under its jurisdiction. It also unleashed some of its most loyal forces,
like the Tanzim militia of the Fatah movement and the presidential
guard, Force 17, against Israeli civilians. Finally, Yasir Arafat's
personal financial adviser, Fuad Shubaki, not only paid for many of
these attacks, but also organized a consortium of Middle Eastern
terrorism built on t
he Palestinian Authority, Iraq and Iran.

Despite this situation, there is a way forward. First, Israel must defeat
terrorism; it cannot negotiate under fire. Israel has made painful
concessions for peace before and will demonstrate diplomatic
flexibility to make peace again, but it requires first and foremost a
reliable partner for peace. In 1977, when Egyptian President Anwar
el-Sadat came to Jerusalem, he told the people of Israel, "No more
wars." From that point onward, the threat of violence was removed
from the Egyptian-Israeli relationship as both negotiated their 1979
Treaty of Peace. King Hussein of Jordan followed the same pattern
in 1994. This elementary commitment to permanently renouncing
violence in the resolution of political differences has unfortunately
not been kept by the present Palestinian leadership.

Second, when Israel and the Palestinians eventually re-engage in
negotiations, diplomacy must be based on realism. The race to a
permanent-status agreement at Camp David and in talks at Taba,
Egypt, in January 2001 failed because the gaps between the parties
were too wide. The only serious option for a successful negotiated
settlement is one based on a long-term interim agreement that sets
aside for the future issues that cannot be bridged at present.

In the nearly two years of the Palestinian intifada, the people of
Israel have seen Israel's vulnerabilities exploited, its holy sites
desecrated and massive weaponry smuggled and used against
Israel's cities. For this reason, Israel will not return to the vulnerable

1967 armistice lines, redivide Jerusalem or concede its right to
defensible borders under Resolution 242. Movement from a long-
term interim agreement to a permanent settlement can only be
guided by changes in the reality of Israeli-Palestinian relations on the
ground and not by a rigid timetable.

Finally, in order to reach a stable peace there has to be regional
scope to diplomacy. In the Six Day War, Israel faced a coalition of
Arab states.
It is logical that Israel cannot reach a permanent peace
with the Palestinians in isolation. Israel needs peace with the entire
Arab world. For this reason, Israel has proposed a regional peace
conference of like-minded Middle Eastern states that reject terrorism
and seek to enhance regional stability. The idea of the conference is
based on the principle that eradicating terrorism will set the stage for
peacemaking, and not the reverse.

A little over a decade ago, the American victory in the Persian Gulf
war established the necessary conditions for convening the Madrid
peace conference. It was proved then that security is the prerequisite
of peace. Similarly, a victory in the war on terrorism today will
provide a new diplomatic basis for a stable Middle East peace.

Ariel Sharon is the prime minister of Israel.

Copyright 2002 The New York Times Company

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 http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A15147-2002Jun7

No Quick Fix

By Ehud Barak

Saturday, June 8, 2002; Page A21

The urgency of the Israel-Palestinian conflict -- and especially its
potential for derailing efforts to remove Saddam Hussein -- has
given birth to a variety of "quick fix" plans, all of which have
a
common core consisting of the following:

• Management of the conflict rather than attempts to resolve it.

• An interim agreement rather than a comprehensive one.

• Reorganization of the Palestinian Authority's (PA) security bodies
for more effective anti-terror action -- to be supported by
international forces.

• Reform in the accountability of PA bodies.

• A Palestinian state created and recognized by the world
community.

Once these changes in the Palestinian situation were in place, talks
on a permanent agreement would be opened, based on the Saudi
peace plan. Saudi Arabia and Egypt would "deliver" Yasser Arafat,

and the United States would do the same with Israel. An international
conference, a sort of "Madrid II," would pave the way for this.



But however attractive this "quick fix" may be on its surface, it
is
seriously -- probably fatally -- flawed.

First, the idea that the Palestinian Authority could conduct an
effective anti-terror campaign (arrest terrorists, dismantle Hamas
and Islamic Jihad, stop Tanzim operations) and carry out real reform
(rule of law, open political system, reduced corruption) is an illusion
so long as Arafat is in power. Arafat is the embodiment of all that
stands in contrast to these objectives and values. How do I know?
>From the dealings with him over eight years by four Israeli prime
ministers, including me. In all that time, commitment to these
objectives never got past rhetoric.

Second, the Arab leaders do not have real leverage on Arafat. Arafat
is empowered by the continuous stream of TV coverage of events.
His ability to stir the Arab streets actually gives him considerable
leverage upon them.

There is also a serious strategic mistake in this plan: It rewards
terror. Arafat has tried for 20 months now to dictate to Israel and the
world, using suicide bombing as a diplomatic tool. Israel will never
yield to this, nor should the United States. Arafat needs to recognize
that he cannot gain a single inch through his deliberate and
conscious turn to mass killing of innocent civilians. It's all about
terror. Were it about "occupation" we could have already been well

into the end of it in July 2000, following the Camp David summit.

The Saudi plan is, on historical and symbolic levels, a significant and
important step in the right direction: Israel strikes at Palestinian terror

and Saudi Arabia steps forward with a "peace plan," something that

would have been inconceivable 30 years ago.

But the devil is in the details. Basically this plan is the old Arab
position in an extreme version. It calls for the 1967 borders rather
than secure and recognized ones. It does not mention recognizing
Israel as a Jewish state or acknowledging that the right of return
would apply only to the Palest
inian state -- not to Israel.

Adoption of such a plan "as is" by the international community would

amount to a major reward to terror and would, I believe, be rejected
by Israel as a nonstarter and a threat to the country's future and
security.

Moreover, I believe an international attempt to impose such a plan
on Israel would send a shock wave through the American public.
Freedom-loving, honest Americans might see it, and rightly so, as a
capitulation that breaks the moral and strategic backbone of the
American war against terror in its first real trial. The only existing
relevant basis for a new plan, if it is to be congruent with President
Bush's principle of no yielding to terror, is the Camp David principles,
under whatever name.

As for dealing with Arafat, consider some precedents. Americans
negotiated with Saddam Hussein until it became clear the Iraqi ruler
was trying to eliminate Kuwait from the map. Then the United States
and its allies acted. Americans negotiated with Slobodan Milosevic
during the breakup of Yugoslavia, but when the nature of his
intentions, actions and atrocities in Kosovo became clear, there was
no philosophizing about his being the "elected leader" of his people
-
- there was action against him. Many in Israel believe the time has
come for the world to pass judgment on Yasser Arafat as well.

What, then, should America do? It should, first of all, focus on Iraq
and the removal of Saddam Hussein. Once he is gone there will be a
different Arab world and, in time, a different Palestinian leadership.
Right now the only other regional player with whom Arafat acts in
harmony is Hussein. Rising Israeli-Palestinian conflict serves, from
Hussein's point of view, to deflect the U.S. focus on ousting him in
Iraq and to weaken the political stamina of those in the West who
would remove him.

There needs to be a solid, unified world position vis-a-vis Arafat.
Otherwise he will never move. Bring the European, U.N. and
Russian positions closer to the White Hou
se's -- not the other way
around.

As for Israel's role, the United States should back us in a "three-legs

strategy" consisting of (1) tough struggle against terror, not against

the Palestinian people; (2) the opening of a door to negotiation at
any time based on the principles of Camp David -- without any
precondition other than the absence of violence; and (3) security
fences around Israel and the main settlement blocks as part of a
unilateral disengagement, as long as there is no Palestinian partner
for a peace agreement.

Arab leaders ought to be told the truth. They are serious people.
They realize that however frustrating that truth is today, living by it
will serve them tomorrow. And the truth is that enough is enough.

The writer is a former prime minister of Israel.

© 2002 The Washington Post Company