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Missile Defence discussion paper

goatchurch | 17.12.2002 16:45

Accurate excerpts from the Missile Defence
discussion paper. Have your say.

 http://www.mod.uk/issues/cooperation/missile_defence.htm


THE (LACK OF) THREAT

8. Threat is a factor of both capability and intention. We do not have any evidence that any state with ballistic missiles currently has the intention specifically to target them at the UK, or UK interests...

9. We currently assess that at present there is no significant threat to the UK from ballistic missiles...

19. Ballistic missiles owned and operated by states of concern tend to lack accuracy, and in general have more political than military utility...

20. We assess that there is no immediate significant ballistic missile threat to the UK...

32. Libya has an ageing force of SCUDs... Libya has subscribed to the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.

33. As the Prime Minister has stated, there is a clear link between the terrorist threat and weapons of mass destruction. However, using long-range ballistic missiles as a means of delivering terrorist weapons is less likely. Developing ballistic missiles from scratch would be beyond the means of a terrorist organisation. Acquisition of a capability off-the-shelf is conceivable, but unlikely in the absence of state sponsorship or complicity. Likewise, a non-state entity is very unlikely to be in a position to operate a ballistic missile force without extensive state-sponsored or state-condoned assistance with land, training, maintenance and spares support. Operating liquid-propellant systems is particularly demanding, because of the need to acquire, store and handle the propellants; but even solid-propellant ballistic missile systems require extensive in-service support. As such, ballistic missiles are a more attractive capability for state actors than for non-state actors. The latter are more likely to seek covert means of delivering weapons of mass destruction, a potential threat we also take very seriously.


THE RESPONSE TO THE "THREAT"

36. Diplomacy will remain the first means of countering a threat. We are already pursuing many diplomatic means to address the drivers of missile proliferation, not least by seeking to alleviate regional insecurities and tensions...

38. The issue on missile defence is therefore essentially whether it could provide an effective addition to the responses available to the UK and its allies and partners...

39. Soon, however, we will need to decide whether we want to move beyond support for the development programme to actual involvement in deployed systems. This raises important issues of policy. But these cannot sensibly be addressed without a better understanding of the technologies involved, and what may, and may not, be realistically feasible by way of missile defence systems, in what timescales.

52. ... Whilst the ability to hit the incoming missile with an interceptor has been proved, there are still some key technical questions which require further study. These include issues concerning debris, whether from destroyed ballistic missiles or indeed from interceptors ...

53. Ballistic missile defence is a vast enterprise...

57. ...Defence of the US eastern seaboard would thus be further improved by an Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR) in north-western Europe, and so the US are considering asking for the radar at RAF Fylingdales to be upgraded to UEWR standard. The additional warning time provided by RAF Fylingdales for a Middle Eastern threat is very substantial.

84. As with all investment decisions, the UK will need to assess the cost and operational effectiveness of a missile defence capability. There is no doubt that missile defence is an expensive capability. It is too early to estimate the cost of acquiring missile defence protection for UK territory at the present time...

90. Please send any views and opinions on the issues raised in this document to the Ministry of Defence at: Policy Director, Ministry of Defence, Metropole Building, Whitehall, London, WC2N 5BP, United Kingdom or by electronic mail to  missile-defence@mod.gsi.gov.uk.




MY LETTER TO THE POLICY DIRECTOR

Dear Policy Director,

I have been following the story behind Missile Defence for some years now. It has mainly been seen as a gravy train for Lockheed Martin and other vast American defence contractors who hold the US government, and therefore the UK government, in the palms of their hands. The evidence is clear that such a system does not work because the counter-measures, such as chaff decoys around the warheads, are too cheap. Many of the technologies touted over the years, such as X-ray lasers and “brilliant pebbles”, are failures. I am also aware that the Patriot Missile system, a fore-runner of the Missile Defence system, deployed against SCUD missiles in the Gulf war, hit fewer than nine percent of the warheads it engaged (the army initially claimed they were 96 percent successful).

I wish to register my lack of confidence in the Ministry of Defence to look after the interests of this nation if it chooses to cooperate with this project. Not only is the machinery dangerous and not likely to work, but it is a colossal misappropriation of our irreplaceable national wealth and expertise. Without the tacit support of the British government, the Federation of American Scientists an other concerned citizens of that nation would find it less difficult to resist this incredible theft of our technical wealth.

A true project of national security in this area would be to build a complete and integrated, state funded air traffic control system. This would be in response to an actual perceived threat that does exist as of last year. A full system would need to know where all the aircraft are supposed to be so that it could respond to ones that were where they did not belong. Not only that, it would have a civilian use.

Of course, our current NATS system has been privatized, so this type of defence is ruled out. The MoD could have vetoed the privatization in the name of national security, but chose not to. Instead, we get this expensive, ineffective and discredited system imposed on us. Policy appears to be made merely on the basis of money: how to move as much of it as possible into the hands of rich corporate Americans regardless of the harm and expense to our well-being and security.

Please do the right thing and refuse to support the Missile Defence system.


Yours Sincerely


goatchurch

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  1. snake oil sham scam... — this thing here
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