http://www.aeronautics.ru/news/news002/news079.htm

March 26, 2003, 1230hrs MSK (GMT +3), Moscow - As of the morning March 26 fierce battles
have resumed in Iraq along the entire front. As was previously expected the sand storm has
halted the advance of the coalition forces. Additionally, the coalition troops were in serious need of
rest, resupply and reinforcement.
For much of the day unfavorable weather paralyzed combat activities of one of the main attack
groups of the coalition - the 101st Airborne Division, which was forced to completely curtail all of
its combat operations. Combat readiness of this division is of strategic importance to the entire
coalition force primarily due to the fact that the division operates 290 helicopters of various types,
including the 72 Apache attack helicopters. The 101st Airborne Division along with the 82nd
Airborne Division and the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) forms the backbone of the XVIII
Airborne Corps - the main strike force of the coalition.
In essence, the 101st Airborne Division provides suppression of the enemy while simultaneously
conducting aerial reconnaissance and suppression of any newly-discovered enemy forces. It
maintain constant contact with the enemy and contains the enemy until the main forces arrive.
Currently the coalition's main forces are conducting combat operations along the approaches to
the towns of Karabela and An-Najaf.
During the past 24 hours the coalition units in these areas sustained 4 killed and up to 10
wounded. All indications are that one coalition special operations helicopter was lost and no
communication with the helicopter could be established. The faith of its crew and the troops it
carried is still being investigated. Another two coalition helicopters made emergency landings in
areas controlled by friendly forces. Aircraft engines were found to be extremely susceptible to the
effects of sand.
As was determined by our [GRU] intelligence even before the start of combat operations, the
primary goal of the coalition command was an energetic advance across the desert along the right
bank of the Euphrates river, reaching the central Iraq with a further thrust toward Baghdad through
Karabela. Another strategic attack was to go around Basra through An-Nasiriya toward
Al-Ammara followed by a full isolation of the southern [Iraqi] forces, effectively splitting Iraq in half.
The first part of the plan - a march across the desert toward Karabela - was achieved, albeit with
serious delays. The second part of the plan in essence has failed. Up to this moment the coalition
troops were unable to punch through the Iraqi defenses near An-Nasiriya and to force the Iraqis
toward Al-Ammara, which would have allowed the coalition to clear the way to Baghdad along the
strategically important Mesopotamian river valley with Tigris and Euphrates covering the flanks of
the advancing forces. So far only a few coalition units were able to get to the left bank of the
Euphrates, where they are trying to widen their staging areas.
Additionally, the prolonged fighting near An-Nasiriya allowed the Iraqis to withdraw most of their
forces from Basra region and to avoid being surrounded.
Currently the coalition forces are trying to get across the river near An-Najaf and Karabela, where,
all indications are, heavy combat will continue during the next two days.
Harsh criticism from the top US military leadership and pressure from Washington forced the
coalition command to resort to more energetic actions. In addition to that the shock of the first
days of war among the coalition troops, when they expected an easy trek across Iraq but
encountered stiff resistance, is now wearing off. They are now being "absorbed" into the war. Now
the coalition actions are becoming more coherent and adequate. The coalition command is
gradually taking the initiative away from the Iraqis, which is in part due to the reliance of the Iraqi
command on inflexible defensive tactics.
Now the main tactical move of the US troops is to use their aerial and ground reconnaissance
forces to test the Iraqi defenses, to open them up and, without entering direct close combat, to
deliver maximum damage using artillery and ground attack aircraft. The coalition has finally
stopped pointlessly moving around in convoys, as was characteristic of the first three days of the
ground war.
The tactics allowed for increased combat effectiveness and considerably increased losses of the
Iraqi side. Due to such attacks by the coalition during the previous night and today's early morning
the Iraqis have lost 250 troops killed and up to 500 wounded. Up to 10 Iraqi tanks were destroyed
and up to three Iraqi artillery batteries were suppressed.
However, despite of the increased combat effectiveness, the coalition forces have so far failed to
capture a single sizable town in Iraq. Only by the end of the sixth day the British marine infantry
was able to establish tentative control over the tiny town of Umm Qasr. During the hours of
darkness all movement around the town is stopped and the occupying troops withdraw to
defensive positions. Constant exchanges of fire take place throughout the town. Out of more than
1,500-strong local garrison the British managed to capture only 150 Iraqis. The rest has either
withdrew toward Basra or changed into civilian clothes and resorted to partisan actions.
Near Basra the British forces in essence are laying a Middle Ages-style siege of a city with the
population of two million. Artillery fire has destroyed most of the city's life-supporting infrastructure
and artillery is used continuously against the positions of the defending units. The main goal of the
British is two maintain a strict blockade of Basra. Their command is confident that the situation in
the city can be destabilized and lack of food, electricity and water will prompt the local population
to cause the surrender of the defending forces. Analysts point out that capture of Basra is viewed
by the coalition command as being exceptionally important and as a model for the future
"bloodless" takeover of Baghdad.
So far, however, this approach does not work and the city's garrison is actively defending its
territory. Just during the past night at least three British soldiers were killed and eight more were
wounded in the exchange of fire [near Basra].
It is difficult not to not to notice the extremely overstretched frontline of the coalition. This frontline
is stretching toward Baghdad through An-Najaf and Karabela and its right flank goes all the way
along the Euphrates and is completely exposed. All main supply and communication lines of the
coalition are going through unprotected desert. Already the supply routes are stretching for more
than 350 kilometers and are used to deliver 800 tonnes of fuel and up to 1,000 tonnes of
ammunition, food and other supplies daily to the advancing forces.
If the Iraqis deliver a decisive strike at the base of this front, the coalition will find itself in a very
difficult situation, with its main forces, cutoff from the resupply units, losing their combat readiness
and mobility and falling an easy pray to the Iraqis.
It is possible that the Americans are relying on the power of their aviation that should prevent any
such developments. It is also possible that this kind of self confidence may be very dangerous.
Massive numbers of disabled combat vehicles and other equipment becomes a strategic problem
for the coalition. Already, radio intercepts indicate, all available repair units have been deployed to
the front. Over 60% of all available spare parts have been already used and emergency additional
supplies are being requested.
The sand is literally "eating up" the equipment. Sand has a particularly serious effect on
electronics and transmissions of combat vehicles. Already more than 40 tanks and up to 69
armored personnel carriers have been disabled due to damaged engines; more than 150 armored
vehicles have lost the use of their heat-seeking targeting sights and night vision equipment. Fine
dust gets into all openings and clogs up all moving parts.
The coalition command has effectively acknowledged its defeat in the information war with the
strikes against the television center in Baghdad and now further strikes should be expected
against television and ground satellite transmitters. The coalition is attempting to leave the Iraqis
without information in order to demoralize them.
The extreme length of the resupply routes and the actions of the Iraqi reconnaissance units have
created a new problem: the coalition command is forced to admit that it has no information about
the conditions on the roads. Currently, as intercepted radio communications show, the coalition
command is trying to establish the whereabouts of more than 500 of its troops that fell behind
their units, departed with resupply convoys or were carrying out individual assignments. So far it
was not possible to establish how many of these troops are dead, captured or have successfully
reached other units.