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American domination-read this!

ser | 14.06.2003 14:10

An interesting document from those who rule the USA and soon the world.

The Road to War . . . and Beyond

March 21, 2003

UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT

8:15 a.m. Registration
8:30 Briefing: Richard Perle, AEI
Thomas Donnelly, AEI
Bill Kristol, Project for the New American Century and the Weekly Standard
Michael A. Ledeen, AEI
Radek Sikorski, AEI's New Atlantic Initiative
10:00 Adjournment


Proceedings:

MR. DONNELLY: I'd like to welcome everybody to--I don't know what number in this series of briefings that we've had this is. But certainly this is the most timely of all of them. And there's a huge number of issues to try to get through, and we have a really very distinguished panel, and I would like to get to your questions surely as fast as possible. So I'm going to just say that the batting order will be, first, Richard Perle, then Bill Kristol, Michael Ledeen, then Radek Sikorski, and then I'll give a very brief attempt to frame some of the military questions.

The breadth of expertise on this panel is really almost breath-taking, so let's have me be quiet and get to the meat of the matter.

Richard, if you will make some brief opening remarks, I'd appreciate it. Thank you.

MR. PERLE: It's difficult to add to what we are all seeing in the television coverage of the war. My impression is the same as I imagine most of you have: that this war is going well, that the resistance has been minimal. That doesn't surprise me. I think it doesn't surprise our planners. We've been saying now for a very long time that there are very few people who were prepared to fight for Saddam and even fewer who were prepared to die for Saddam. And there's a certain irony in, as far as I could tell watching the television news this morning, there are more demonstrators in San Francisco than there are people prepared to fight for Saddam in Iraq.

I hope attention will turn now to what this means for the people of Iraq, which has always been fundamental, even when it was considered ill-advised to talk about regime change, because we were so focused on the international legal mandate which was closely associated with Saddam's weapons of mass destruction. And so we went through a rather long period in the runup to this war in which we stopped talking about or largely stopped talking about what this war is really about.

It's not just about ferreting out and destroying weapons of mass destruction, although that will happen in due course and we'll settle once and for all the debate about whether Saddam has these weapons or not.

This war is about liberating a country that is--whose population has been subjected to a measure of brutality that is almost unimaginable. And I think the world will be shocked when we have the firsthand testimony of Iraqis who have not been free to talk about what life has been like under that regime.

And so I'm rather optimistic that all of these divisions and debates in the United Nations and elsewhere will be resolved in a general recognition that high moral purpose has been achieved here: millions of people have been liberated. The task of reconstruction will be a difficult one, a long one, no doubt. I don't believe it will entail a long occupation. The Iraqis are going to show, I believe, that they are far more capable of implementing a humane government than some people have believed.

And when this is over, I hope we'll look back, look back at the theories that were advanced in the course of the debate about whether we should go to this war, look back at the estimates that were made about what we be getting ourselves into if we got into it.

All of these remarks I've just made may be a little bit incautious. This war is still going on, and it would be foolish to assume that it will go to the end as smoothly as it appears to have gone up until now. And we have had, sadly, some few casualties already. But, by and large, it now seems clear that this regime of Saddam Hussein is finished by a coalition of more than 40 countries--and the number is growing, by the way. I expect we'll be adding countries right up until the last minute, maybe even after that. In fact, I'm sure we'll be adding them after that, which gives the lie to the argument that this is unilateralist, that we are going it alone.

In Europe, for example, there are rather more countries on our side and participating in the liberation of Iraq than there are opposing the liberation of Iraq.

My colleagues have lots of interesting things to say, so that's all I want to say by way of introduction.

MR. DONNELLY: Thanks.

Bill?

MR. KRISTOL: Thank you, Tom and Richard.

I'd like to say a word about presidential leadership. First, looking backwards, a lot of headlines over this past weekend, diplomatic failures on the part of the Bush administration, UN process, disaster, et cetera, et cetera. I think it's not true, and I just--though we're now in a new phase, it is worth just trying to set the record straight on this.

Six months ago, basically the end of August, beginning of September, the President decided to go to the United Nations and to deploy troops to the Gulf. If you had said on Labor Day that we would have the following situation in early/mid-March, the successful and uneventful deployment of a quarter million troops to the Gulf, a rise in public support for the President here at home, with the successful passage of a congressional resolution with about half the Democrats and all of the Republicans authorizing war, passage unanimously by the UN Security Council of a resolution demanding that Saddam disarm, and the failure to be able to pass a second resolution because of the French but, still, enough progress in the UN to actually help the President here at home--I may not personally think that the UN matters much, but a certain number of the American people do. And it's perfectly clear that among some swing number, 10, 15 percent of Americans who were uncertain about the war back on Labor Day, they were reassured by the President making a good-faith effort at the UN and ended up blaming the French for the fact that that effort fell short at the end, not the Bush administration.

Tony Blair, in great political trouble, survives and, in fact, survives quite well, probably because we were willing to go the extra mile at the UN. We did a very good job of rounding up support among Arab governments, apparently, seem to have pretty much all the cooperation we need. No big problems from the Arab street. Problems with Turkey that maybe--I don't know if that was avoidable or not, a new government there, et cetera, but that would be, I suppose, the one diplomatic bump in the road that the administration didn't navigate successfully. No terror to speak of, knock on wood, over the past six months directed at American--at the homeland or at American troops in the region. And, indeed, great progress in the war on terror, some apparently with the--especially with the capture of Shaikh Mohammed. Great progress, apparently, in the war on terror at the same time as we have the buildup against Iraq.

Now, if you had said--now, for all the messiness of the UN process, for all the bumps in the road, for all the zigs and zags and, you know, should we go for a second resolution or shouldn't we, and can we get the votes of Cameroon and Guinea or can't we, and who mishandled Chile and Mexico, for all of that nonsense, if you step back and look at the administration's conduct of its overall grand strategy in the six months running up to the war, it's pretty impressive. Bush did everything he needed to do. He strengthened--he got the troops there. He strengthened himself at home. He got the foreign governments he needed. He saved--he didn't save. He helped Blair survive politically and survive quite well. And I think in the rift in Europe, he rallied many European governments to his side--or they rallied to his side, to be fair. And the rift with the French and the Germans I think was unavoidable given the platform Schroeder had run on and given the genuine French view of the matter.

So I think it is worth just setting the record straight that if one steps back from sort of did--you know, gee, Bush said that everyone should play their cards, and then he backed out of a vote at the Security Council. He stepped back from that level of micro analysis and say as a matter of political leadership over six months in laying the groundwork for greater chances of success in removing Saddam as opposed to less chance--fewer chances of success. It's a pretty impressive performance.

Second point, related, in the conduct of the war obviously we don't want to--it would be foolish to judge anything at this point, but, of course, what is most striking is that, as with the diplomacy before the war, this is George Bush's war. And he did not go with the automatic sort of--not automatic. That's not fair. He didn't go with what would have been the easiest, I take it, military plan to go with, the much touted "shock and awe." Aren't we a little sick of that phrase by now? It's really gotten a little ridiculous. He's held off on that at least up until now, and the reason he's held off on it is that he seems to understand, better than many Presidents, I would say, the lesson of our friend Eliot Cohen's book of about a year ago, "Supreme Command," that political strategy should drive military strategy. And the political strategy is that this is a war of liberation and, therefore, we would like to remove Saddam's regime with as little destruction of the Iraqi infrastructure and as few--obviously as little killing of Iraqi civilians as possible. And, therefore, if we can do it with the threat of the all-out attack, but, in fact, with much more limited strikes against leadership positions in Baghdad and with ground troops going up into Iraq, so far not, you know, opposed--not too vigorously opposed, if we can hold back from the all-out military assault, that's, of course, a better way to win the war.

And this--obviously General Franks, I would take it, deserves credit for structuring the options for the President in a way that he had these options. He didn't just have one plan that he could sign off on, on, you know, the execute order two days ago--he signed the execute order on two days ago. But the President deserves credit for presumably insisting on having these options, and one gathers for calling (?) two days ago in the Oval Office and deciding to hold off on the all-out attack.

Additionally, with the initial attack on Saddam, presumably, and his sons, and then even as of now, I guess, as of last night, at least, holding off a second day on the all-out attack with the hope that, I take it, with a lot of work being done to try to topple the regime without such a great use of military force.

Now, whether it works or not, we don't know. Maybe there are costs to be paid for holding out, holding back on the all-out attack, though it's hard to see what they are at this point. I mean, we still could have--we could still launch the thousand missiles and drop 3,000--attack 3,000 targets, you know, tonight or tomorrow night if that's what has to be done. It's hard to see that any cost has been paid for holding back a couple of days, and the advantages, if this works, are really pretty immense, I think, in terms of the overall political strategy of the war.

So this fundamental point that Eliot makes in his book, that, you know, political strategy has to drive military strategy and that the civilian commanders, the President and the Secretary of Defense, need to work closely with the military but not simply, you know, accept the easiest, let's say, most simple military option, I think the President--the President was seen with Eliot's book in August in Crawford, Texas. I don't take any credit for this, but I would say that presciently I blurbed Eliot's book and said that if the President were to read any book this year, he should read Eliot Cohen's book. And I don't think that's why he read it, but--and I don't know that--he says he read it, so I trust that he did.

But, no, seriously, as a matter of political presidential leadership, both in the runup to the war and so far in the conduct of the war, this is a pretty impressive performance.

MR. DONNELLY: Thank you, Bill.

Michael, would you continue, please?

MR. LEDEEN: Just a handful of scattered thoughts.

First is Arab street. I hope by now we're past the myth of the Arab street, which is a part of the very widespread racist approach to the Arab and Muslim world, the tacit assumption being that these are people incapable of understanding what freedom and democracy are all about, will never embrace it, cannot support it, and left to their own devices, will riot in the streets against civilization, and if they can't kill us, will kill one another.

That's nonsense. Those are ideas held by people who don't know anything about the history of Islam, the history of the Middle East, and who just simply think that there's something that's gone wrong in Arab or Muslim DNA which renders them incapable of civilized behavior. And I think we'd all do very well to banish the phrase "Arab street" from public vocabulary.

Two, is it possible to wage the war on terrorism and bring down Saddam Hussein at the same time? Well, we did it. That is, when we struck that compound and bunker in Baghdad Wednesday night in an attempt to decapitate the regime, we willy-nilly wiped out Lieutenant Al-Baz (ph) of the Palestine Liberation Front. This information comes to you courtesy of the Palestine Liberation Front itself, which issued a press release yesterday from occupied Lebanon, Syria and occupied Lebanon, explaining Lieutenant Al-Baz was killed in that attack.

Now, the Palestine Liberation Front is an organization that you probably don't recognize, but I do, and we all should, because it is the group headed by Abu Abbas that hijacked the cruise ship, the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro, I think it was 1985, then segregated the Americans from the Europeans, and then segregated the Jews from the non-Jews among the Americans, and then selected the toughest target, Leon Klinghoffer, an elderly paraplegic in a wheelchair, and pushed him overboard.

I was already enthusiastic about attacking Saddam's bunker, but I was even more delighted when I heard that Lieutenant Al-Baz had been killed, and it's a pity Abu Abbas wasn't there, at least so far as we know. Maybe we got lucky and he was there, too.

The point being twofold: In the process of fighting and bringing down the regimes that sponsor terrorist organizations, we will just in the normal course of events get a lot of terrorists, because the two worlds--the two things are inseparable. They are one and the same thing. The terrorist network cannot survive without these people, and these people, the nature of these people is such that they support terrorists. And so you always find them together. You find them together all the time.

And in case you were wondering, Abu Abbas had gone to live in the Palestinian Authority for a while, but then got frightened of Ariel Sharon and went back to Baghdad, where he'd been living all along. So someone should tell the Democrats' Senate leader that actually you can do both at the same time and that this war is going rather better than a lot of people expected.

That said, I have insisted from the beginning that the two moments of maximum danger to us in this war would come before and then after the military operation itself. And the military operation is going well, and what impresses me most about the military operation, which few commentators have mentioned so far, is the astonishing ability of our armed forces to do an about-face on a dime and change strategy. Everybody--we all know how hard it is to get any bureaucracy to change strategy, even over several months. Imagine what it's like for people--I mean, the big war, the big assault had obviously been studied, analyzed, criticized by all the smartest people for months and months, and then drilled and practiced and rehearsed and coordinated and so forth. Then all of a sudden, an opportunity comes by, and full marks to the CIA for, A, finding it and, B, recommending it. And all honor to the President for accepting it and taking the chance and going for it. I mean, that's what we want from our leaders. We want people who want to win, not people who are always bound by caution.

But then the ability of our military commanders to say, okay, we're not going to go for the big war, we're going to wait to see the effect of this strike to see if, in fact, we have decapitated them, and if, therefore, a different strategy is called for. So I'm enormously impressed with that.

And my final caution, again, as I've said from the beginning, is that this is a battle in a longer war. Iraq is not the war. And the war is a regional war, and we cannot be successful in Iraq if we only do Iraq alone. And I think that the terror countries bordering Iraq, namely, Iran and Syria, know that. I think that Saddam's plan was to disappear into Syria, as Osama bin Laden disappeared into Iran at the end of--in the middle of the Afghan war. I think that the Iranians and the Syrians fully intend to do everything in their power to destabilize our efforts in Iraq once the war is over and once we're in stable positions on the ground. And there are two models for that. One is Lebanon in the 1980s and Afghanistan today. You probably noticed that at the same time the war is going on in Iraq, we have launched many hundreds if not thousands of soldiers in attacks against Iranian-sponsored terrorists in Afghanistan, who are trying to make sure that we don't have success there.

MR. DONNELLY: Michael, thanks very much.

Radek?

MR. SIKORSKI: First of all, I'd like to pass to my fellow panelists wishes of victory from a country, Poland, that is fighting in this war along with American troops. May your military be more subtle and more effective than your diplomacy.

[Laughter.]

MR. SIKORSKI: Europe is already paying a high cost for this conflict. Europe has split down the middle, roughly into two halves, with a European Europe led by France and Germany opposed to the war, and an Atlantic Europe--Britain, Spain, Denmark, Holland, Italy, and almost all of the post-communist Europe supporting it.

The crisis is so severe that at the European summit just yesterday and the day before, the discussion of drafting those parts of the European Treaty Convention which were to deal with common foreign and defense policy, discussion has been postponed for fear of ridicule.

Europe has split, and I guess that's better for the United States than Europe uniting on an anti-American basis. But it's still not good news in the long run. It's not good news because I certainly personally believe that fundamentally there is still far more that unites us than that which divides us. There are at least two important tasks that Europe and America should perform together. One is to clean up the debt which was left by the Soviet empire, to stabilize the post-Soviet space, and, two, we should act together to democratic the greater Middle East.

But Europe has not been helpful in this to the United States. We know about France and its Foreign Minister doing the rounds of Africa to lobby against the United States.

This morning I came into the possession of an apparent German diplomatic telegram in which the German Ambassador to the United Nations, Herr Pleuger, advocates the entrapment of the United States at the UN. He says that if we force the United States to go into this war unilaterally, they will have to come back on their knees to the UN afterwards to be helped. These are not the sentiments of a good ally.

But I hope that there may still be a silver lining out of this whole crisis and out of this war, namely, that even on an issue as controversial as this--because let's be clear, this war is not popular in Europe--it should be absolutely clear that the United States has enough staying power and enough friends in Europe to prevent the continent from uniting against itself.

That means that those who want to build European unity should now understand that we can either have a united Europe, which I think is a good thing, or we can have an anti-American geostrategic challenger to the United States, but we cannot have both. And I'd rather have a united Europe that is a partner and an ally of the United States.

Thank you.

MR. DONNELLY: Thank you, Radek.

Actually, it would appear that the strategy of containment has actually returned, gone to France and Germany. If you add Italy and Spain to your list of the axis of freedom in Europe, we've got a pretty good ring around those two.

I want to go really briefly through the military situation, as best we understand it, and sort of maybe sketch out what the move toward Baghdad might be like. This is based not just on my speculation but upon a plan that was--a contingency plan that was created at the end of the first Gulf War but never executed, but the basic geography and the facts of the situation are essentially the same.

Also, before I begin, I want to underscore a theme that's been running through my colleagues' comments, and that is that the performance of the American military and the performance of President Bush and his leadership team is really almost unprecedented in history. To be able to divert from obviously a hugely rehearsed and highly detailed initial strike plan to capture this target of opportunity is both, as Bill said, a credit to the President and to General Franks. Reprogramming a Tomahawk missile is not something you can do simply by punching a couple of buttons and having the 117s on stand-by to hit the targets. Again, obviously General Franks was responsive to direction from above, but he made sure that the President had options that he would not have had otherwise.

Real quickly, another fantasy moment for me, here's the region. We can, I guess, get a little bit closer to what's actually going on. And I'll do this really quickly. Maybe I can get a laser pointer.

Obviously the Marines are very close to capturing Basra or may already have done so by the time I'm speaking. They've sealed off the Al Faw peninsula where a lot of the oil terminals are. The important maneuver almost certainly is the maneuver of the 3rd Infantry Division, 5th Corps, and the 101st Airborne, which is now approximately, according to press reports, about 100 miles into Iraq, right about here, and very soon they're going to be facing a decision about which road to Baghdad they want to take.

The initial thing is to get across the Euphrates. There are three potential sites for doing it: one is at Nasiriyah, which is about here; the second is about halfway up at Samawa, which is right about here; and, finally, at Najaf, which is right about here. And there are pluses and minuses to both. The one that's farthest away has the most immediate access to this essentially military highway, six-lane highway that runs directly to Baghdad and was the main resupply route for the Iraqi army during the Iran-Iraq war. So for the ground forces, the armored forces--and this is a huge formation. It is technically a single division with some attachments, but already you're talking about thousands and thousands of vehicles, hundreds of tanks, hundreds of Bradley fight vehicles. It's really quite a powerful force. And, of course, you have the air mobility of the 101st Airborne.

There are also some options about where, if you wanted to, encircle Baghdad, which is, I think, the first step. There are essentially five major routes around Baghdad that you want to block off. So you need--the plan in 1991 was to put a brigade-size force on every one of those exit routes. And, again, if you can establish an operating base for the 101st Airborne near Najaf, the town of Najaf--this is what the plan was last time--then you can synchronize the movements of all these units and surround Baghdad very, very quickly.

So based on the progress that this ground force has made thus far, we could see ourselves in position to move on Baghdad I think within a matter of days. And we could be on the outskirts of Baghdad by the middle of next week in large force. And the decision obviously will be whether--you know, in many ways, what we've seen over the last couple days is virtual shock and awe. We haven't had to drop the bombs, but the effect on the Iraqi command structure and on Saddam's lieutenants has been functionally the same. This is clearly a regime and a power structure that's paralyzed and, you know, perhaps functionally destroyed if not physically destroyed. So in many ways, although we haven't had to actually kill so many people to do it, we've been able to achieve the effect that we set out to do.

Again, shock and awe is in effect in the mind of the opponent, and, again, who knows exactly what's going on inside the bunker in Baghdad. But based on the Iraqi inability to react to anything that we've done so far and the suggestions that the house of cards may be on the verge of collapse pretty immediately, I would say we have achieved shock and awe in terms of the effects that we've had on the Iraqi military and on the Ba'ath party.

So at that point, I'll also stop and turn it over to the audience for questioning. I would mention that Bill's got to go about 9:30, so at this time especially, please make sure when you ask a question, you do ask a question. Identify yourself and please keep your question brief because we've got a lot of folks who will no doubt want to ask questions.

Right here in the front row, please?

MR. : Jiya Shamdeen (ph), Kurdistan regional government representative in Washington. My question is: Where does Turkey now stand with regards to the present situation after the voting in the Turkish parliament about allowing them to come in unilaterally into Iraqi Kurdistan?

MR. PERLE: I notice I was advertised as addressing this issue, but I should have read the advertisement before I started to speak.

As I understand the current situation, the Turkish parliament has indeed voted both to allow U.S. overflight of Turkish territory and they have voted themselves the approval their constitution requires for operations outside Turkey.

We do not yet have overflight access, even though it has been voted by the parliament, because that will not be granted until the government, which has the authority to grant overflight, takes that action and they have not yet done that, unfortunately.

With respect to Turkish forces on Iraqi territory, I can only express my own view, which is that I think it unlikely that Turkish forces will take aggressive action. I know there are fears and concerns that they will, and it is a difficult, intense situation, and there is always the danger of a skirmish, a miscalculation. But I don't believe that Turkey will do some of the things that have been suggested in the press like seize or attempt to seize Kirkuk or Mosul.

We would be adamantly opposed to any such action if it were attempted, and I think we've made our own views as a government known to the Turks. And as I say, I don't expect that they will take any aggressive action. They say they are concerned about possible flows of refugees and the like, but given the way in which the war is unfolding, it seems to me quite unlikely that there will be the kind of humanitarian catastrophe that we've had in the past when Saddam attacked Kurds directly and created the problem of refugee flows.

MR. : Michael, did you have anything you wanted to add?

[No response.]

MR. DONNELLY: I thought I saw a couple hands back here. Yes, sir?

MR. WALLACE: David Wallace with Edelman Public relations, formerly of AEI. A question for Richard. What is your opinion of, I guess, the delay in the shock-and-awe phase of the bombing? Do you share your colleagues' opinion that it should be delayed? And who do you think that we're talking to as far as leadership or, I guess, alternative leadership is concerned?

MR. PERLE: Obviously if we can win this war with a minimum application of force, that would be a very good thing indeed. We shouldn't use a single bomb more than is necessary to accomplish the objective. And the objective is to remove Saddam Hussein's regime, to nurture its replacement with a decent and humane regime, to find the weapons of mass destruction that we know are there and remove them, with the cooperation of what will be a new government in Iraq. And so no one would wish to see us use a capability simply because we have it, although we do have it. And depending on how the campaign unfolds, it may be necessary to do rather more than has been necessary to do up until now. So I certainly wouldn't want to rule out the use of precision bombing to destroy military units and military facilities that might otherwise either help to sustain Saddam in power for a few days longer or inflict damage on coalition forces.

One of the things we are seeing and will be seeing is the extraordinary impact of advanced military technology that has been developed in this country and to a lesser degree in some other countries in recent years that relies significantly on important breakthroughs in communications technology. The kind of choreography we have been marveling at, the ability rapidly to change a plan and execute a new plan, and to do so in real time would not be possible--has not been possible in the past, would not be possible without the ability to collect information, analyze and disseminate information very rapidly.

This is changing the face of warfare, and I think we will never again have to fight in the way we have fought in the past. And it means tremendous economies of force--force applied with great precision only where it is necessary and only when it is necessary. This has a lot of implications, including humanitarian ones. It's no longer necessary to destroy vast infrastructures in order to deal effectively with the ability of an enemy to inflict damage on us.

It's the beginning of a revolution in military affairs. It is what the debate about transformation, military transformation, has been all about. It is an appreciation that Don Rumsfeld took with him to the Department of Defense and struggled for a while to get others to accept. I think the acceptance and transformation now will be about as rapid as the advance toward Baghdad. At least I hope so, because nothing settles these debates like a real encounter. And the real encounter is demonstrating the enormous utility of the transformation capabilities that we already possess and that we will possess in even greater degree as we make the investment necessary in the transformation of our capabilities.

MR. DONNELLY: Bill, do you want to--

MR. KRISTOL: Obviously none of us is in a position to really judge the tactics at this point, nor is the President or the Defense Department. They'll keep reassessing, so I want to make clear that I very much--I am very much impressed by the President's and the Secretary of Defense's willingness to lead, to rethink, to revise, but whether the particular decisions that have been made are the right ones or not, we can't know yet, though it's hard to see at this point what price has been paid for putting off the full--the all-out assault.

One thing that occurs to me is I suppose this will be called by the historians the Second Gulf War, but it's going to be misleading in the sense that it is in so many ways so different from and almost the opposite of the first Gulf War. I was in the Bush White House in the first Gulf War, and there was a pretty massive bombing campaign. It was what we had to do. We didn't a technological choice at that point. And we did try to spare civilians and has some successes, had some failures there, too.

But if you put together the fact that you had to have or we thought we had to have four or five weeks of

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