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European Fascism Under the Banner of Islam!

proud kafir | 26.04.2004 21:06 | Analysis | Globalisation | London | World

islamic fascism
islamic fascism


FASCISM IN MUSLIM COUNTRIES
by Amir Taheri
NCAFP
April 20, 2004
THIS ARTICLE APPEARED IN "AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY" VOL. 26, NUMBER 1, FEBRUARY 2004

« An explosion of spiritual energy in the streets... A sudden intrusion of religion in the affairs of the city..."

It was in these eulogising terms that Michel Foucault, the late French historian and amateur politologue -but then aren't all French intellectuals polyvalent?- described his experience in Tehran in the days of what was to be known as "the Islamic Revolution" in 1978.

Foucault, of course, later changed his mind, especially when the mullahs who had seized power thanks to that "spiritual energy", started hanging his homosexual friends, alongside everyone else, in the streets of Tehran and other major cities. (1)

Interestingly, Foucault had not noticed that the so-called "intrusion of religion in the affairs of the city" was not confined to manifestations of "spiritual energy". The active phase of the revolution lasted no more than four months. In those months the self-styled "soldiers of Allah" robbed numerous banks, cut the throats of several lowly officials, including some traffic wardens, disfigured scores of women by throwing vitriol at their unveiled faces, and set fire to hundreds of cinemas, bookshops, concert halls, girls' schools, restaurants, and other "places of sin". In a single incident in August 1978 some 600 people were burnt alive at Cinema Rex in Abadan that was set on fire by one of the commandos that Foucault had admired. The commando had blocked the emergency exits from the outside, and destroyed fire-fighting equipment, to make sure that a maximum number of people would die.

The "Supreme Guide" of the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, dismissed the incident as "another sign of the anger of our youth." (2)

The label "Islamic" chosen to describe the events of 1978, somehow stuck. Subsequently it gained wider circulation when applied to other violent groups, including the various Algerian terrorist outfits, and Osama Ben Laden's Al Qaeda organisation.

Originally, the leaders of the Khomeinist revolution in Iran had hesitated to use the label. Instead, they spoke of a "popular uprising" (qiyam mardomi). That appellation did not please the Western intellectuals who were, at that time, still mostly seduced by various brands of leftist and/ or fellow traveller ideologies.

Their Iranian counterparts, in the various Communist outfits –from Moscow-backing to Mao-adulating to Fidel-adoring to Trotsky-nostalgic and Titophile- preferred to use the label "Islamic". A "people's revolution" was, after all their business not that of the mullahs who were clearly leading the Iranian revolt at the time. The "Islamic Revolution" was, to those leftist ideologues, an Oriental version of the bourgeois-democratic revolutions dreamed of in the West, and represented the resolution of contradictions between the nation and imperialism, thus paving the way for a genuine "popular revolution" later. (3)

At any rate the label "Islamic" stuck. Since then it has made a proper understanding of what has happened in Iran for the past 25 years difficult. It has also prevented a correct analysis of similar conjectures in other Muslim countries. Those who later became conscious of the inadequacy, not to say outright impropriety, of the term "Islamic" to describe the Iranian revolution, and the government that it produced, have tried to further complicate matters by injecting the term "fundamentalism" or "intégrisme" in French.

The revolution and the system that it produced were, however, neither Islamic nor fundamentalist nor Islamic-fundamentalist.

In 1978 Iran was already a Muslim nation-state and had been so for almost 14 centuries. It had a constitution under which no legislation that contravened Islamic principles could be enacted. No non-Muslim could attain high positions in the civil or armed services. Iran sent the single biggest contingent of pilgrims to Mecca every year. More than 10 million pilgrims went to the "holy" city of Mashhad each year. All children of secondary school had to study classical Arabic to read the Koran, and religious education was compulsory. The state-owned radio and television networks allocated countless hours to religious programmes. There were more than 80 high-level theological seminaries plus full faculties of divinity offering courses up to and including Ph.D. levels. Iran also ranked high in the number of books published on Islam and boasted the production of some of the most beautiful Korans in history.

No one could deny Iran's existential reality as a Muslim nation-state. There is, of course, no universal model for such a state. Each Muslim nation has, and will continue, to live its own existence within Islam. In the case of Iran its pre-Islamic past remained present –partly through certain aspects of the duodecimal faith (mazhab e ithna-ashari)(4). Iran also had a history of more than four centuries of contact, often conflict-ridden with conflict, but at times also friendly and fruitful, with the Western nations, and had borrowed heavily from the West. Its first constitution, promulgated in 1906, had been modelled on that of Belgium, with necessary alterations to take into account the principles of Islam. It had a parliament that, though manipulated by the powers that be, had secured its place in the national conscience as an important institution. Since 1911 there had been regular general elections, first every two years, then every four years. There was a privately owned press with a history of over 150 years. Iran had also come into contact with Western ideologies. In the 1950s the Iranian Communist Party, the Tudeh (masses), had become one of the largest communist organisations outside the Soviet bloc. Liberals, democrats, social democrats, nationalists, nihilists and others had all made their contributions to the Iranian collective consciousness at different times and in different ways. There were Western-style universities, some of them linked with leading American universities.

Whether Iran was or was not an Islamic country was never an issue. It was a given of the Iranian situation. None of the opponents of the regime, not even Khomeini, had ever claimed that Iran had abandoned Islam. They couched their criticism of the regime in nationalist, tiersmondiste, and populist terms.

The use of the term "Islamic" was, therefore, a conjectural stratagem in what became a struggle for power.

In the 1978-79 revolution, the Shah's regime had faced three parallel currents of opposition.

One belonged to the various leftist groups, some of them armed, who, leaving aside their internecine feuds, dreamed of a "proletarian revolution".

The other current was that of Westernised middle classes who, having secured economic power, sought political power against an authoritarian regime.

The third current belonged to what can only be described as the forces of fascism in Iranian society. These forces used an "Islamic" terminology.

The leftist camp knew that it could never mobilise enough muscle in the streets to neutralise the Shah's army and police. The middle class opposition also lacked muscle power and, more importantly, was itself afraid of the street. In the final analysis, the "street" could be mobilised only in the name of religion.

This was how Iran's communists, socialists, social-democrats, democrats, liberals, etc., all rallied to the banner of Khomeini while claiming, and some of them even believing, that they were fighting for greater individual and public liberties.

In other words, in order to fight an authoritarian regime they handed their power to a fascist force led by a small group of mullahs and their non-clerical associates.

It was a sight to see: comical and tragic at once. Socialists, liberals, secularist democrats, etc., started growing beards, buying carnelian rosaries, and even conjuring a patch of piety on their foreheads. They started peppering their discourse with Koranic quotations, often with comical effects because there are many Arabic letters that Persians cannot pronounce, and made a point of making an appearance at the mosque at least on Fridays. High society ladies who used to fly to Paris to renew their wardrobes adopted the newly-fangled revolutionary headgear, invented by Imam Musa Sadr in the 1970s and inspired by the headgear of Christian nuns in Lebanon, and launched the fashion of organising "holy sofra" parties (5) in which they communicated with the Hidden Imam.

The entire country became a vast theatre stage on which tens of thousands of men and women were improvising actors playing "Islamic" roles. Foucault and other Western return ticket revolutionaries came and were fascinated by what they believed was a resumption of Iran's Islamic identity. Iran, they told the world, was re-discovering its "identity", whatever that meant.

They projected their revolutionary fantasies, no longer realisable in their own anchored-in and top-heavy Western societies, into the so-called Third World of which Iran, momentarily, had become the centre.

It is only if we set aside the terms "Islamic" and/or "fundamentalist" that we may gain an insight into the Iranian situation. This situation cannot even be explained in terms of Shi'ism as an offshoot of Islam.

The revolution of 1978-79 and the system it created must be regarded as the product of a large-scale mimetic enterprise. It is a violent intrusion into Iranian reality of Western dystopic ideas and methods, which could be properly explained with reference to ur-fascism or generic fascism.

This assertion could, of course, provoke a riposte that Nazism, usually pagan and anti-monotheist, is worlds away from the present system in Iran.

True. But Nazism is just one manifestation of the generic fascism and its dystopic discourse.

General Franco's hyper-Catholic Phalangist movement and system could not be described as Nazi. But they were fascist. The Afrikaaner Church backed the Apartheid regime in South Africa in the name of "true Christianity". But it was fascist. Dr. Salazar and most of his associates were deeply religious men. But they were fascists. The Ustashis in the Balkans put their Catholicism at the centre of their "ipseity". They were fascists nonetheless.

Latin Americans divide dictatorships into "dictadura" and "dictablanda", a word play, which distinguishes "hard" military regimes from "soft" ones. One could also speak of "hard" and "soft" fascism, as one speaks of "hard" or "soft" pornography.

A movement, a system, need not fulfil all the conditions set by say Adolph Hitler or Benito Mussolini or, in a different context, Juan Peron, to be described as fascist. Two brothers or two cousins may look and even behave differently. But in the final analysis they bear family resemblances –un air de famille, as the French say.

What are the main characteristics of generic fascism and how they apply to Islamism ?

The first characteristic of generic fascism is its totalitarianism. Not all totalitarian movements and systems are fascist. But all fascist movements and systems are totalitarian inasmuch as they seek to seize control of all aspects of individual and community life. They are one-party system. In Iran the slogans is "Only one Party : the Hezballah !". They reject diversity and scorn alternative life-styles. The state and the dominant party must dictate every movement of all citizens at all times. Khomeini's magnum opus "Hal al-Masa'el" includes more than 6000 fatwas regulating every issue –from one's Weltanschauung to rules for urinating.

The totalitarian state wants to control the past, the present and the future, stopping history at points it deems suitable to its own designs.

The second characteristic of generic fascism is that, even when it believes it is religious, it is, in fact, deeply anti-religious. In Iran the mosques have been turned into supermarkets and centres for distributing consumer durables. A Tehran joke puts it well : Before the mullahs we used to pray in private and drink in public. Now we drink in private and pray in public! Numerous mosques are used as offices of the "Imam Committees" (known as ‘Komiteh' in Persian), the parallel police created by Khomeini in the early days of the regime. On occasions mosques are used as temporary prisons for political opponents of the regime and ordinary criminals. The government has made a mockery of Shi'ite rules for choosing the "maraje taqlid" –rules that go back more than three centuries. More than 300 mullahs and students of theology have been executed and some 2000 are in prison. Thousands of others have fled into exile. Koranic and religious studies have been cut from six hours a week to four hours. The remaining two hours are used for a study of "the political thoughts and acts of Imam Khomeini". More than 100 religious seminaries have been closed, and all of Iran's grand ayatollahs are under house arrest. People going to Mecca for Hajj are chosen in accordance with quotas fixed by revolutionary organisations. More than a million Muslims died in the Iran-Iraq war and tens of thousands of Muslims have been executed or killed in clashes with government forces.

The third characteristic of generic fascism is the cult of tradition. This assumes that all that is there for man to learn is already there, contained in some cryptic message of either religious or pagan provenance. The idea is to return to the source, which could be ancient Hellas, the Rome of Caesars, or the imagined Medina of the seventh century. The past is idealised, the present vilified and the future dreamified.

It is interesting that a huge market has developed for all kinds of esoteric oeuvres under the supposedly Islamic Republic. Nostradamus, Joseph de Maistre, the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, biographies of Pythagoras and Cagliostro, books on alchemy, etc. There is even Khomeini's own assessment of ancient Greek philosophy. In it he presents Socrates as the first "monotheist Muslim" who was murdered in a Jewish conspiracy" (sic).

The idea is to reject rationalism and to inject in society a syncretism in which rulers run a supermarket of superstitions.

The fourth characteristic of generic fascism is its rejection of modernism. We see mullahs flying in helicopters and wearing glistening Colts under their abayas. But to them the modern world is the product of a "Judeo-Christian conspiracy". A more extremism version of this was given by Mahathir Mohamed, Malaysia's retiring Prime Minister, in October 2003. Addressing a summit of the Islamic Conference Organisation, he claimed that the modern world was a "Jewish creation". He also credited the Jews for having "invented" all modern ideas, including democracy, human rights and communism. Rejection of modernism means rejecting the achievements of humanism since the Enlightenment. This is why de Maistre's criticism of the French revolution is so appreciated by the ruling mullahs in Tehran. Modern ideas as the intrinsic worth of the individual, freedom of conscience, and the rule of law are rejected as "Western" or "colonial" values to be combated at all levels. In an address to the University of Florence in 1998, President Muhammad Khatami branded the Renaissance as the starting point of "human decline into barbarity." "The Renaissance," he said, "led to Imperialism and the burning of weak countries by the strong."

The fifth characteristic of generic fascism is the cult of the chief. There are, of course, many non-fascist systems that also practice the cult of the chief. (Emperor Bokassa for example). But there all you have to do is to obey the chief; you don't necessarily have to love him and accept him as a guide in all aspects of your life. In Iran, however, the cult of Khomeini developed into a veritable secular religion. He is called Imam, thus turning Twelver Sh'ism into a cult of the 13. His iconic image is grown in the shape of cedar forests on mountain slopes. His shrine south of Tehran is described as "the second Mecca". All prayers must start and finish with his name. His fatwas remain valid forever. The "Supreme Guide" of the day has the constitutional right to suspend the basic principles of Islam, but cannot cancel the fatwas of the dead chief. The slogans "Khoda, Koran, Khomeini" (God, Koran, Khomeini) and "Allah Akbar, Khomeini Rahbar" (God is One, Khomeini is the leader) remain the war cries of the Hezballah movement in Iran and other Muslim countries where the party has branches. Men, women and children march in front of 10-foot portraits of the "Imam" in Tehran and Beirut, taking the salute. The Fuehrer, Il Duce, the Caudillo, the Zaim (6) the Rais (7), and the Imam belong to the same tradition of political iconography.

The sixth characteristic of generic fascism is its exploitation of social and economic frustrations. It recruits its soldiers from among the lower middle classes, the peasants who have been driven into large cities, the lumpen proletarian elements, and pseudo-intellectuals who, because of a religious bend of mind, look for certainty and fear doubt. Hatred, envy, jealousy and suspicion are major themes in the discourse of generic fascism. The "dispossessed" (Mustadhafeen) are told that while they are suffering, others live fantastic lives of luxury. Well-to-do Iranian "protest intellectuals" used to buy second hand clothes in the bazaar to appear as one of the "mustadhafeen". Much is made of Osama bin Laden's decision to abandon his life of luxury and live in caves in Afghanistan. To look poor was part of the rites of passage. The incitement of sexual jealousy is another key theme. Such words as "rich" and "wealth" are used as terms of abuse. Inside the country the rich and the wealthy should be detested while foreign powers hostile to the regime are branded as "the rich ones" and "the wealthy nations". Thus fascism implicitly agrees that it will always keep the mass of the people stuck at a certain level of poverty. It does not, cannot, promise a good life, a life of comfort and ease, because once such a living standard is attained people will, almost automatically, seek pluralism and freedom.

The seventh characteristic of generic fascism is fear and hatred of the "other" and "otherness" (alterity) in general. The world is presented in terms of "us" and "them". Anti-Americanism is just one manifestation. So is fear of women. Xenophobia remains an appealing theme. To Hitler the Jewish people of course, represented the most hated. Mussolini warned the Italians that they might become "Africanised" and turned into "subhuman". But "otherness" need not be determined by race or ethnic background. The "other" could be defined by his different religious or political beliefs or his real or suspected ideological deviance. The "us" and "them" in question could be changeable. Anyone could cease being one of us and become one of them. What ensures the continuation of an us status is total obedience, a rejection of all doubt as to the legitimacy of the political line of the day.

The eighth characteristic of generic fascism is its cult of death. From "Viva la Muerte" of the Phalangists to the love of the Nazis for the scalp symbol to the passion of the Iranian fascists for martyrdom, we see a love of death at work. This is often linked to hero worship. The martyr instantly goes to paradise. Teenage Iranians were given plastic keys, made in Taiwan, to hang from their necks when being sent onto the minefields during the 1980-88 war against Iraq. These were called "mafatih al-jinan" (keys to paradise). The hero-martyr, on arrival in paradise would instantly have access to 72 perpetual virgins. Khomeini's most favoured dictum is "To kill and get killed are the supreme duties of Muslims." The religious fascist often wears shrouds during street demonstrations, to underline his readiness to die at any moment. The arrogance of the assumption that individuals could choose to become martyrs is conveniently ignored. Also, it is forgotten that if everyone in a society were to die a martyr there would be no one left to honour the martyrs! The religious fascist never names a street or any public edifice after a living person: only those who were killed and died in the service of the movement are honoured. For example, the street on which the Egyptian embassy in Tehran is located is named after Khalid Showqi al-Islambouli, President Anwar Sadat's assassin. Neguib Mahfouz, the Egyptian Nobel Prize laureate is, of course, never named except to be insulted. One of bin Laden's favourite poems is entitled: "The Sweet Nectar of Death." According to Khamenehi it is "by dying for his faith that a Muslim becomes truly alive." (8) In other words: I die, therefore I am!

The ninth characteristic of generic fascism is its profound fear and hatred of democracy. The chimera labelled "the people" is presented to prevent citizens from individual and collective initiative. There is no system of delegating power and, ipso facto, no accountability. The "just" government cannot be replaced through elections. Khomeini called democracy "a form of prostitution". His argument is that democracy acts like a prostitute because it could take power from one party and give it to another through elections. Khomeini admitted that his chief motive in fighting the Shah's regime was that the hated system might have eventually evolved into a Western-style democracy.

"The people" or "Das Volk" or "Umma" is a theatrical concoction. Interestingly Khomeini and his successors have used the term "the Umma that is always present on the stage to play the role required of it." The generic fascist hates parliaments, political parties and institutional politics. He feels at home in mass rallies, street marches and flag-waving shows. People appear in theatrical costumes, mullahs wearing turbans of different colours, shapes and sizes denoting their ranks, volunteers for martyrdom wear shrouds and crimson headbands; women are hidden under a mass of black drapery. Even the beard is a mask that might recall Kabuki or Kathakali make-ups.

One is reminded of the Nazis' passion for uniforms and choreographed mass gatherings. Key government decisions are announced not at the parliament but at gatherings of militants at Friday prayer sessions at the Tehran University campus. The principal yardstick in choosing officials is loyalty not expertise. Khomeini used to say: "Don't talk to me about economists. Economics is for donkeys." His successor, Ali Khamenehi, has made a castigating attack on those who had dared suggest that the nation might need specialists to rebuild its shattered economy. "We need devoted people" he said. "We need people who believe in our system. A specialist who doubts is worse than any enemy."

The tenth characteristic of generic fascism is the cult of war, both foreign and civil wars. It conceives of existence as a Manichean struggle between Good and Evil. Other messianic movements may also provoke wars. But in the case of generic fascism war is a highly desirable tool in creating the new man and the ideal society. Khomeini described war as "a divine blessing". Where direct war is impossible, perhaps because one is not sure of winning, it is necessary to maintain the "war spirit" by provoking conflicts. Not surprisingly talk of forming a "war Cabinet" is a recurrent theme in the Khomeinist political discourse. But the generic fascist must be careful to pick adversaries whose choice can show him up as a hero. The Iran-Iraq war, for example, was not presented as a conflict with Saddam Hussein, described by Khomeini as "nincompoop who had better commit suicide". No, Iraq and Saddam were too small for a great heroic revolution! Khomeinism said it was at war against the United States, later even going higher and using the word "world arrogance". The slogan was "War, war until victory!". The fact that the US and Israel, at a crucial stage helped Iran get the weapons it needed to continue the war and avoid defeat by Iraq was conveniently ignored. Iran, we were told, was fighting to defeat the US and liberate Palestine!

The eleventh characteristic of generic fascism is its readiness to use terrorism both before coming to power and after it has achieved it. Franquist death-squads remained in operation three decades after the victory of the Phalange. SS death squads were always on hand to eliminate real or imagined opponents long after Hitler had sat at the window that opened on the Under Den Linden. Khomeini issued his first death fatwa in 1946, against a leading intellectual (Ahmad Kasravi). His regime today has several death-squads known as Thar al-Allah ( Blood of Allah), Ansar Hezballah ( Victors of the Party of Allah) and Avengers of the Imam. Numerous prominent politicians and mullahs who had initially cooperated with the new regime have been assassinated in the past 22 years. Abroad 127 dissidents have been killed in 16 countries by death-squads dispatched from Tehran. Not all terrorist movements are fascist. But all fascist movements and states include a strong element of terrorism. Generic fascism leads to the creation of a kakistocracy, rule by the worst elements of society –elements who, when necessary, recourse to terrorism.

Finally, the twelfth characteristic of generic fascism is its rejection of the normal language of society. All brands of fascism invent their vocabularies and styles of prose and poetry. Mussolini's affected Latinism was, at times, rather hilarious while Ezra Pound's "pure Aryan lingo" was intriguing. The German used by Hitler and Goebbels was closer to the argot of Munich beer-houses than the oeuvres of von Kleist or Goethe. Jean-Marie Le Pen is careful about his imparfait du subjonctif. I have on my computer a list of over 300 words and terms, most of them new coinages that provide the backbone of the Khomeinist newspeak version of Persian. The total vocabulary of this newspeak is around 2000 words. That is quite sufficient for a generic fascist system. Anything more than that might lead people into the temptation of thinking. In Khomeinism, as in all forms of fascism, what matters is "zikr" (incantation of divine texts) not "fikr" (critical thought). Generic fascism destroys the normal syntax in an unconscious bid to pre-empt the development of rational thought and critical analysis. In imposing its vocabulary, generic fascism, of course, uses censorship. Khomeini censored his own collection of poems, which appeared in a limited edition only after his death, and his "Hall al-Masa'el" (Soltuion of Problems) was "purged of unsuitable ideas" before being published. The censorship list in Tehran reads like a who's who of Persian and world literature and thought. Even classics of Persian literature are "edited" to remove thoughts that might undermine the regime.

* To sum up what happened in Iran in 1978-79 and the system subsequently created have only an incidental relationship with Islam or Shi'ism or any fundamentalist versions thereof. The official calendar of the Islamic Republic marks out 27 days to be celebrated in connection with various phases of Khomeini's life and activities. The Prophet of Islam, however, does not get a single holiday –not even his birthday or the baathat (the day he was called by God to become a prophet). Official literature says with a straight face that Khomeini "revived" Islam that had been dead since the time of the First Imam, Ali Ibn Abi-Talib some 14 centuries ago. The Khomeinist system in a beda'a (innovation) opposed to Islamic and/or Persian philosophy, theology or political thought and practice. Its roots can be found in generic fascism, a largely Western product which has invaded Iran in a dramatic instance of mimetic madness. This mimetism is westernising Iran more than the nation's previous 150 years' experience with the gradual assimilation of some aspects of Western way of life. The problem is that the West is coming to Iran in its fascist version just as it had come to other developing nations in its socialist or communist versions. The use of an Islamic terminology does not amount even to a fig leaf for what is fascist movement and a fascist regime. Many Iranian intellectuals failed to recognise the wolf disguised as the grandmother. A mixture of political immaturity, opportunism and outright irresponsibility led Iranian liberals, democrats, socialists, social-democrats, etc., to transfer their powers to the generic fascist movement Iranian-style.

There are similar Khomeinist movements in other Muslim countries. The combat against this fascist movement, however, must not be seen as a fight against Islam or even a fundamentalist version of it. The beards, the turbans, the mishlahs ( a kind of shawl worn by men), the miswaks ( toothbrushes made of sandalwood), the piety-patches on foreheads, the qamis ( men's long shirt), the beards –pogonophilia taken to excess- should not lead us into believing that we are fighting an Islamic movement. (9)

Fascism is most effectively fought through an extension of liberties, the creation and/or strengthening of political institutions. There can be no compromise with fascism, no give and take, no quest for consensus. Those who think they can ally themselves with fascism to win power against a regime that they do not like, have not heard the proverb about falling from the frying pan into the fire. Many of the intellectuals that the Shah used to put in detention for brief periods were shot, jailed or driven into exile by Khomeini despite the fact that they had signed the "devil's pact" with him or, may be, because they had. They did not realise, or did not wish to realise, that freedom, democracy and human rights are incompatible with fascism. They fought a regime that they disliked, rightly or wrongly, by supporting a movement which they should have disliked even more intensely. They did not realise that those who use religion as their stock-in-trade cannot offer pluralism and democracy even if they tried. The ayatollah, the Pope, the Hindu gurus or the Dalai Lama have no freedom and democracy to offer.

The first lesson that Muslim intellectuals must learn from the Iranian experience is that that ought to be themselves. They should not abandon their core political beliefs to forge an alliance with the fascists. Today, most regimes in the Muslim world are corrupt and despotic and, thus, must be fought as enemies of their people. But one must always fight them from positions that are more human, more progressive and more democratic than those of the regime in place. To try and bring down a bad regime only to replace it with something much worse is a costly error that I hope will not be repeated by intellectuals in other Muslim countries. What matters is the existential reality of Islam, the way Muslim peoples, generation after generation, have lived and developed their faith. Islam is not a brand name that any group could monopolise and turn into the stick of takfir ( anathema) against others.

The mere fact of wearing a turban, or a mufti's cap, and the growing of a beard, no matter how substantial, and the utterance of a few quotations from the Koran –often half understood- do not authorise anyone to decide who is a "good Muslim" and who a "bad one". The Shi'ite culture has the tradition of "marjaiyyah" ( Source of Religious Guidance) which means an individual could consult someone more learned than him in theological matters on specific questions of the practice of the faith. But the marjaa or guides are never appointed by any authority, let alone self-appointed. People choose them and people can discard them. Thus the system now in place in Iran is a pure invention that has violated every principle of Shi'ism. The Iranian people are the primary victims of Khomeinism just as the Germans were the first victims of Hitlerism and the Russians those of Leninism. Muslims must not allow the genuine grievances of the people, especially younger generations who often see the future as bleak, to be exploited by fascists using a populist discourse seasoned with pseudo-Islamic ingredients. The fight against fascism in the Muslim world is a political fight. It must, therefore, be essentially fought through political means. It is only the fresh air of freedom that could deliver the coup de grâce to the monster of fascism in its Islamist form. END



NOTES:

1- A selection of Foucault's writings on the Khomeinist evolution was published in Tehran in 1980 under the title of "Great French Philosopher Admits Superiority of Islam" (sic.)

2- Statement by Khomeini, broadcast by the BBC Persian service, 2 September 1978.

3- In its issue of 22 August 1978, the Weekly Navid (Good News), published by the Tudeh Party ran a long article on a Central Committee decision to acknowledge the " Islamic" character of the coming revolution.

4- Shi'ism is regarded by Sunnis, who account for 80 per cent of all Muslims, as a mild form of heresy. Shi'ites are in a majority in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain and Yemen.

5- These were, in fact, lavish dinner parties at which a mullah would call in the spirit of a saint to respond to the questions of the participants.

6- Zaim is an Arabic term, meaning " the leader" and has been used by several Arab fascist movements.

7- Rais, means "the head" and has been used to describe several Arab fascist leaders.

8- Tehran Radio broadcast, 11 February 1988. At the time Khamenehi was President of the Islamic Republic.

9- The items mentioned here are widely used as symbols of "piety" by Islamist fascists throughout the Muslim world.

Copyright: Amir Taheri 2004

* The above article was published in "American Foreign Policy Interests" Volume 26, Number 1, February 2004

proud kafir

Comments

Display the following 8 comments

  1. now in Iraq — Al
  2. Oh dear — Ian
  3. it can get worse — independant thinker
  4. MAMMA MIA WOT A LOAD OF OLD BOLLOX — Molotov
  5. Hmmm — Tom
  6. very strange — Captain Wardrobe
  7. working for REAL change — Captain Wardrobe
  8. taheri quote — cw
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