Middle East Nuclear Holocaust to Defend "The Western Way of Life"
GRC | 11.02.2008 17:16 | Anti-militarism | Anti-racism | Terror War | World
The Western media is involved in a diabolical disinformation campaign, the purpose of which is to persuade public opinion that the only way to "create a nuclear free World" is to use nuclear weapons on a preemptive basis, against countries which "threaten our Western Way of Life." We are a dangerous crossroads: military planners believe their own propaganda. The military manuals state that this new generation of nuclear weapons are "safe" for use in the battlefield. They are no longer a weapon of last resort. There are no impediments or political obstacles to their use.
The US-NATO Preemptive Nuclear Doctrine: Trigger a Middle East Nuclear Holocaust to Defend "The Western Way of Life"
By Michel Chossudovsky
Global Research, February 11, 2008
What the Western allies face is a long, sustained and proactive defence of their societies and way of life. To that end, they must keep risks at a distance, while at the same time protecting their homelands.
International terrorism today aims to disrupt and destroy our societies, our economies and our way of life. ...
These different sources of [Islamist] propaganda and/or violence vary in their intellectual underpinnings, sectarian and political aims, ... . But what they have in common is an assault on the values of the West – on its democratic processes and its freedom of religion...
Notwithstanding the common perception in the West, the origin of Islamist terrorism is not victimhood, nor an inferiority complex, but a well-financed superiority complex grounded in a violent political ideology.
If the irrational and fanatical [Islamist organizations] get out of hand, there is a risk that, ... the rise of fundamentalisms and despotisms will usher in a new, illiberal age, in which the liberties that Western societies enjoy are seriously jeopardized.
The threats that the West and its partners face today are a combination of violent terrorism against civilians and institutions, wars fought by proxy by states that sponsor terrorism, the behaviour of rogue states, the actions of organised international crime, and the coordination of hostile action through abuse of non-military means.
Towards a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World: Renewing Transatlantic Partnership".
Group report by former chiefs of staff General John Shalikashvili, (US), General Klaus Naumann (Germany), Field Marshal Lord Inge (UK), Admiral Jacques Lanxade (France) and Henk van den Breemen (The Netherlands), published by the Netherlands based Noaber Foundation, December 2007, (emphasis added)
The controversial NATO sponsored report entitled “Towards a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World: Renewing Transatlantic Partnership". calls for a first strike use of nuclear weapons. The preemptive use of nukes would also be used to undermine an "increasingly brutal World" as a means to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction:
"They [the authors of the report] consider that nuclear war might soon become possible in an increasingly brutal world. They propose the first use of nuclear weapons must remain "in the quiver of escalation as the ultimate instrument to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction". (Paul Dibb, Sidney Morning Herald, 11 February 2008)
The group, insists that the option of first strike of nuclear weapons is "indispensable, since there is simply no realistic prospect of a nuclear-free world." (Report, p. 97, emphasis added):
Nuclear weapons are the ultimate instrument of an asymmetric response – and at the same time the ultimate tool of escalation. Yet they are also more than an instrument, since they transform the nature of any conflict and widen its scope from the regional to the global. ...
...Nuclear weapons remain indispensable, and nuclear escalation continues to remain an element of any modern strategy.
Nuclear escalation is the ultimate step in responding asymmetrically, and at the same time the most powerful way of inducing uncertainty in an opponent’s mind. (Ibid, emphasis added)
The Group's Report identifies six key "challenges", which may often result as potential threats to global security:
• Demography. Population growth and change across the globe will swiftly change the world we knew. The challenge this poses for welfare, good governance and energy security (among other things) is vast.
• Climate change. This greatly threatens physical certainty, and is leading to a whole new type of politics – one predicated, perhaps more than ever, on our collective future.
• Energy security continues to absorb us. The supply and demand of individual nations and the weakening of the international market infrastructure for energy distribution make the situation more precarious than ever.
• There is also the more philosophic problem of the rise of the irrational – the discounting of the rational. Though seemingly abstract, this problem is demonstrated in deeply practical ways. [These include] the decline of respect for logical argument and evidence, a drift away from science in a civilization that is deeply technological. The ultimate example is the rise of religious fundamentalism, which, as political fanaticism, presents itself as the only source of certainty.
• The weakening of the nation state. This coincides with the weakening of world institutions, including the United Nations and regional organizations such as the European Union, NATO and others.
• The dark side of globalization ... These include internationalized terrorism, organized crime and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, but also asymmetric threats from proxy actors or the abuse of financial and energy leverage. (Ibid)
Deterrence and Pre-emption
According to the Report, a new concept of deterrence is required directed against both State and non-state actors, This "new deterrence" is based on pre-emption as well as on the ability to "restore deterrence through [military] escalation". In this context, the Report contemplates, what it describes as:
“escalation dominance, the use of a full bag of both carrots and sticks—and indeed all instruments of soft and hard power, ranging from the diplomatic protest to nuclear weapons.” (Report, op city, emphasis added).
Iran
In much the same terms as the Bush administration, the NATO sponsored report states, without evidence, that Iran constitutes "a major strategic threat":
"An Iranian nuclear weapons capability would pose a major strategic threat – not only to Israel, which it has threatened to destroy, but also to the region as a whole, to Europe and to the United States. Secondly, it could be the beginning of a new multi-polar nuclear arms race in the most volatile region of the world." (Report, op. cit., p. 45)
Careful timing? The controversial NATO sponsored report calling for a preemptive nuclear attack on Iran was released shortly after the publication of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) report entitled Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities. The latter denies Iran's nuclear capabilities. The NIE report, based on the assessments of sixteen US intelligence agencies, refutes the Bush administration's main justification for waging a preemptive nuclear war on Iran. The NIE report confirms that Iran “halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003.”
"These findings constitute a damning indictment of the Bush administration’s relentless fear-mongering in relation to an alleged nuclear threat from Iran. They demonstrate that just as in the buildup to the war against Iraq five years ago, the White House has been engaged in a systematic campaign to drag the American people into another war based on lies." (See Bill van Auken, 24 January 2008)
It should be noted that this recently declassified intelligence ( pertaining to Iran contained in the 2007 NIE report) was known by the White House, the Pentagon and most probably NATO since September 2003. Ironically, US military documents confirm that the Bush Administration initiated its war preparations against Iran in July 2003, two months prior to the confirmation by US intelligence that Iran did not constitute a nuclear threat.
The July 2003 war scenarios were launched under TIRANNT: Theater Iran Near Term.
The justification for TIRANNT as well as for subsequent US war plans directed against Iran ( which as of 2004 included the active participation of NATO and Israel), has always been that Iran is developing nuclear weapons and plans to use them against us.
Following the publication of the 2007 NIE in early December, there has been an avalanche of media propaganda directed against Tehran, essentially with a view to invalidating the statements of the NIE concerning Tehran's nuclear program.
Moreover, a third sanctions resolution by the UN Security Council, was initiated with a view to forcing Iran to halt uranium enrichment. The proposed UNSC resolution, which is opposed by China and Russia includes a travel ban on Iranian officials involved in the country's nuclear programs, and inspections of shipments to and from Iran "if there are suspicions of prohibited goods" (AFP, 11 February 2008). Meanwhile, French President Nicolas Sarkozy together with British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, have been calling for a unified EU sanctions regime against Iran.
Contradicting the US national intelligence estimate (NIE), Bush's most recent speeches continue to portray Iran as a nuclear threat:
"I feel pretty good about making sure that we keep the pressure on Iran to pressure them so they understand they're isolated, to pressure them to affect their economy, to pressure them to the point that we hope somebody rational shows up and says, okay, it's not worth it anymore," Bush said.
Threat to "The Western Way of Life"
The Western media is involved in a diabolical disinformation campaign, the purpose of which is to persuade public opinion that the only way to "create a nuclear free World" is to use nuclear weapons on a preemptive basis, against countries which "threaten our Western Way of Life."
The Western world is threatened. The NATO report, according to Paul Dibb: "paint(s) an alarming picture of the threats confronting the West, arguing that its values and way of life are under threat and that we are struggling to summon the will to defend them."(Dibb, op cit)
A preemptive nuclear attack -- geographically confined to Middle East (minus Israel?)-- is the proposed end-game. The attack would use US tactical nuclear weapons, which, according to "scientific opinion" (on contract to the Pentagon) are "harmless to the surrounding civilian population because the explosion is underground". (See Michel Chossudovsky The Dangers of a Middle East Nuclear Holocaust, Global Research, 17 February 2006)
B61-11 bunker buster bombs with nuclear warheads Made in America, with an explosive capacity between one third to six times a Hiroshima bomb, are presented as bona fide humanitarian bombs, which minimize the dangers of "collateral damage".
These in-house "scientific" Pentagon assessments regarding the mini-nukes are refuted by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS):
Any attempt to use a [B61-11 bunker buster nuclear bomb] in an urban environment would result in massive civilian casualties. Even at the low end of its 0.3-300 kiloton yield range, the nuclear blast will simply blow out a huge crater of radioactive material, creating a lethal gamma-radiation field over a large area " (Low-Yield Earth-Penetrating Nuclear Weapons by Robert W. Nelson, Federation of American Scientists, 2001 ).
Professor Paul Dibb is a former Australian Deputy Secretary of Defense., who has over the years also occupied key positions in Australia's defense and intelligence establishment. Dibb carefully overlooks the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons in a conventional war theater. According to Dibb, NATO preemptive nuclear doctrine, which replicates that of the Pentagon, constitutes a significant and positive initiative to "halt the imminent spread of nuclear weapons". .
"They [the group] believe that the West must be ready to resort to a pre-emptive nuclear attack to try to halt the imminent spread of nuclear weapons."
Never mind the nuclear holocaust and resulting radioactive contamination, which would spread Worldwide and threaten, in a real sense, the "way of life".
There is no "way of life" in a World contaminated with deadly radioactive material. But this is something that is rarely discussed in the corridors of NATO or in strategic studies programs in Western universities.
Nukes: Just Another Tool in the Military Toolbox
What is frightening in Professor Dibb's article is that he is not expressing an opinion, nor is he analyzing the use of nuclear weapons from an academic research point of view.
In his article, there is neither research on nuclear weapons nor is there an understanding of the complex geopolitics of the Middle East war. Dibb is essentially repeating verbatim the statements contained in NATO/Pentagon military documents. His article is a "copy and paste" summary of Western nuclear doctrine, which in practice calls for the launching of a nuclear holocaust.
The stated objective of a Middle East nuclear holocaust is "to prevent the occurrence of a nuclear war". An insidious logic which certainly out- dwarfs the darkest period of the Spanish inquisition...
Neither NATO nor the Pentagon use the term nuclear holocaust. Moreover, they presume that the "collateral damage" of a nuclear war will in any event be confined geographically to the Middle East and that Westerners will be spared...
But since their in-house scientists have confirmed that tactical nuclear weapons are "safe for civilians", the labels on the bombs have been switched much in the same way as the label on a packet of cigarettes: "This nuclear bomb is safe for civilians"
The new definition of a nuclear warhead has blurred the distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons:
'It's a package (of nuclear and conventional weapons). The implication of this obviously is that nuclear weapons are being brought down from a special category of being a last resort, or sort of the ultimate weapon, to being just another tool in the toolbox," (Japan Economic News Wire, op cit)
This re-categorization has been carried out. The " green light" for the use of tactical nuclear weapons has been granted by the US Congress. . " Let's use them, they are part of the military toolbox."
We are a dangerous crossroads: military planners believe their own propaganda. The military manuals state that this new generation of nuclear weapons are "safe" for use in the battlefield. They are no longer a weapon of last resort. There are no impediments or political obstacles to their use. In this context, Senator Edward Kennedy has accused the Bush Administration for having developed "a generation of more useable nuclear weapons."
Russia and China
Who else constitutes a threat to " the Western way of life"?
Nukes are also slated to be used against Russia and China, former enemies of the Cold War era.
This post Cold War logic was first revealed, when the Pentagon's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) was leaked to The Los Angeles Times in January 2002. The NPR includes China and Russia alongside the rogue states as potential targets for a first strike nuclear attack. According to William Arkin, the NPR "offers a chilling glimpse into the world of nuclear-war planners: With a Strangelovian genius, they cover every conceivable circumstance in which the president might wish to use nuclear weapons-planning in great detail." (Los Angeles Times, March 10, 2002)
"Decapitate Their Leadership and Destroy their Countries as Functioning Societies"
The use of nukes against "rogue states", including Iran and North Korea (which lost more than a quarter of its population in US bombings during the Korean war) is justified because these countries could act in an "irrational" way. It therefore makes sense to "take em out" before they do something irrational. The objective is: "decapitate their leadership and destroy their countries as functioning societies":
"One line of reasoning is that so-called rogue states, such as Iran and North Korea, are sufficiently irrational to risk a pre-emptive nuclear strike on the US or its allies, such as Israel and South Korea.
The supposition here is that deterrence - that is, threatening the other side with obliteration - no longer works. But even the nasty regimes in Tehran and Pyongyang must know that the US reserves the right to use its overwhelming nuclear force to decapitate the leadership and destroy their countries as modern functioning societies. (Dibb, op cit., emphasis added)
Use nuclear weapons to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction.
But of course, lest we forget, America's nuclear arsenal as well as that of France, Britain and Israel are not categorized as "weapons of mass destruction", in comparison with Iran's deadly nonexistent nuclear weapons program.
Bin Laden's Nuclear Program
Now comes the authoritative part of the NATO sponsored report: We need to use nukes against bin Laden, because Islamic "fanatics" can actually make a nuclear weapons or buy them from the Russians in the black market.
The Report calls for a first strike nuclear attack directed against Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda, which has the ability, according to expert opinion, of actually producing small nuclear bombs, which could be used in a Second 9/11 attack on America: .
The second line of reasoning [contained in the NATO sponsored report] is more difficult to refute. It argues that extreme fanatical terrorists, such as al-Qaeda, cannot be deterred because (a) they do not represent a country and therefore cannot be targeted and (b) they welcome death by suicide. So, we have to shift the concept of nuclear deterrence to the country or regime supplying the terrorists with fissile material.
Nuclear weapons require materials that can be made only with difficulty. Once these materials are obtained by terrorists, however, the barriers to fabricating a weapon are much lower. In that sense the nuclear threat today is greater than it was in the Cold War and it seems the terrorists cannot be deterred.( Dibb, op cit, emphasis added)
The alleged nuclear threat by Al Qaeda is taken very seriously. The Bush administration has responded with overall defense spending (budget plus war theater) in excess of one trillion dollars. This massive amount of public money has been allocated to financing the "Global War on Terrorism" (GWOT).
Confirmed by Pentagon documents, this military hardware including aircraft carriers, fighter jets, cruise missiles and nuclear bunker buster bombs, is slated to be used as part of the "Global War on Terrorism". In military jargon the US is involved in asymmetric warfare against non-State enemies. ( The concept of Asymmetric Warfare was defined in The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (2005)
"The American Hiroshima"
The US media has the distinct ability to turn realities upside down. The lies are upheld as indelible truths. The "Islamic terrorists" have abandoned their AK 47 kalashnikov rifles and stinger missiles; they are not only developing deadly chemical and biological weapons, they also have nuclear capabilities.
The fact, amply documented, that Al Qaeda is supported by the CIA and Britain's MI6 is beside the point.
The nuclear threat is not directed against the Middle East but against the USA, the perpetrators and architects of nuclear war are bin Laden's Al Qaeda, which is planning to launch a nuclear attack on an American city:
"U.S. government officials are contemplating what they consider to be an inevitable and much bigger assault on America, one likely to kill millions, destroy the economy and fundamentally alter the course of history,...
According to captured al-Qaida leaders and documents, the plan is called the "American Hiroshima" and involves the multiple detonation of nuclear weapons already smuggled into the U.S. over the Mexican border with the help of the MS-13 street gang and other organized crime groups. (World Net Daily, 11 July 2005, emphasis added)
The New York Times confirms that an Al Qaeda sponsored "American Hiroshima" "could happen" .
"Experts believe that such an attack, somewhere, is likely." (NYT, 11 August 2004)
According to the Aspen Strategy Group which is integrated among others, by Madeleine Albright, Richard Armitage, Philip D. Zelikow, Robert B. Zoellick, "the danger of nuclear terrorism is much greater than the public believes, and our government hasn't done nearly enough to reduce it.":
If a 10-kiloton nuclear weapon, a midget even smaller than the one that destroyed Hiroshima, exploded in Times Square, the fireball would reach tens of millions of degrees Fahrenheit. It would vaporize or destroy the theater district, Madison Square Garden, the Empire State Building, Grand Central Terminal and Carnegie Hall (along with me and my building). The blast would partly destroy a much larger area, including the United Nations. On a weekday some 500,000 people would be killed. (NYT, 11 August 2004)
"Threaten them with a devastating [nuclear] attack"
According to professor Dibb, nuclear deterrence should also apply in relation to Al Qaeda, by holding responsible the governments which help the terrorists to develop their nuclear weapons capabilities:
"Ashton Carter, a former US assistant secretary for defense, has recently argued, the realistic response is to hold responsible, as appropriate, the government from which the terrorists obtained the weapon or fissile materials and threaten them with a devastating [nuclear] strike. In other words, deterrence would work again. (Dibb, op cit)
The real nuclear threat is coming from bin Laden. The objective is to "to do away with our way of life":
None of this is to underestimate the impact of a nuclear weapon being detonated in an American city. It could be catastrophic, but it is highly unlikely to threaten the very survival of the US. To believe otherwise risks surrendering to the fear and intimidation that is precisely the terrorists' stock in trade.
General Richard Myers, another former chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, has claimed that if [Islamic] terrorists were able to kill 10,000 Americans in a nuclear attack, they would "do away with our way of life". But Hiroshima and Nagasaki incurred well over 100,000 instant deaths and that did not mean the end of the Japanese way of life. (Ibid, emphasis added)
In an utterly twisted and convoluted argument, professor Dibb transforms the US-NATO threat to wage a nuclear war on Iran into an Al Qaeda operation to attack an American city with nuclear weapon.
Dibb presents the US-NATO menace to trigger what would result in a Middle East nuclear holocaust as a humanitarian operation to save American lives. By implication, the Al Qaeda sponsored "American Hiroshima" would be supported by Iran's president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. and this in turn would immediately provide a juste cause (casus belli) for retaliation against Iran
"What a nuclear attack on a US city would mean, however, is an understandable American retaliation in kind. So, those countries that have slack control over their fissile nuclear materials and cozy relations with terrorists need to watch out. A wounded America would be under enormous pressure to respond in a wholly disproportionate manner.
And then we would be in a completely changed strategic situation in which the use of nuclear weapons might become commonplace. Ibid, emphasis added).
Dick Cheney's Second 9/11
The insinuation that Al Qaeda is preparing an attack on America has been on the lips of Vice President Dick Cheney for several years now. Cheney has stated on several occasions since 2004, that Al Qaeda is preparing a "Second 9/11": .
In August 2005, Vice President Dick Cheney is reported to have instructed USSTRATCOM, based at the Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska, to draw up a "Contingency Plan", "to be employed in response to another 9/11-type terrorist attack on the United States". (Philip Giraldi, Attack on Iran: Pre-emptive Nuclear War, The American Conservative, 2 August 2005)
Dick Cheney's "Contingency Plan" was predicated on the preemptive war doctrine. Implied in the "Contingency Plan" was the presumption that Iran would be behind the attacks.
The Pentagon in a parallel initiative has actually fine-tuned its military agenda to the point of actually envisaging a Second 9/11 scenario as a means to providing the US administration with a "credible" justification to attack Iran and Syria:
"Another [9/11 type terrorist] attack could create both a justification and an opportunity that is lacking today to retaliate against some known targets [Iran and Syria]" (Statement by Pentagon official, leaked to the Washington Post, 23 April 2006, emphasis added)
Meanwhile,. the US Congress is concerned that an "American Hiroshima" could potentially damage the US economy:
"What we do know is that our enemies want to inflict massive casualties and that terrorists have the expertise to invent a wide range of attacks, including those involving the use of chemical, biological, radiological and even nuclear weapons. ... [E]xploding a small nuclear weapon in a major city could do incalculable harm to hundreds of thousands of people, as well as to businesses and the economy,...(US Congress, House Financial Services Committee, June 21, 2007).
As far as sensitizing public opinion to the dangers of US sponsored nuclear war, there is, with a few exceptions, a scientific and intellectual vacuum: No research, no analysis, no comprehension of the meaning of a nuclear holocaust which in a real sense threatens the future of humanity. This detachment and lack of concern of prominent intellectuals characterizes an evolving trend in many universities and research institutes in the strategic studies, the sciences and social sciences.
Academics increasingly tow the line. They remain mum on the issue of a US sponsored nuclear war. There is a tacit acceptance of a diabolical and criminal military agenda, which in a very sense threatens life on this planet. The US-NATO doctrine to use nukes on a preemptive basis with a view to "saving the Western World's way of life" is not challenged in any meaningful way either by academics or media experts in strategic studies.
The url address of this article is: www.globalresearch.ca/PrintArticle.php?articleId=8048
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By Michel Chossudovsky
Global Research, February 11, 2008
What the Western allies face is a long, sustained and proactive defence of their societies and way of life. To that end, they must keep risks at a distance, while at the same time protecting their homelands.
International terrorism today aims to disrupt and destroy our societies, our economies and our way of life. ...
These different sources of [Islamist] propaganda and/or violence vary in their intellectual underpinnings, sectarian and political aims, ... . But what they have in common is an assault on the values of the West – on its democratic processes and its freedom of religion...
Notwithstanding the common perception in the West, the origin of Islamist terrorism is not victimhood, nor an inferiority complex, but a well-financed superiority complex grounded in a violent political ideology.
If the irrational and fanatical [Islamist organizations] get out of hand, there is a risk that, ... the rise of fundamentalisms and despotisms will usher in a new, illiberal age, in which the liberties that Western societies enjoy are seriously jeopardized.
The threats that the West and its partners face today are a combination of violent terrorism against civilians and institutions, wars fought by proxy by states that sponsor terrorism, the behaviour of rogue states, the actions of organised international crime, and the coordination of hostile action through abuse of non-military means.
Towards a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World: Renewing Transatlantic Partnership".
Group report by former chiefs of staff General John Shalikashvili, (US), General Klaus Naumann (Germany), Field Marshal Lord Inge (UK), Admiral Jacques Lanxade (France) and Henk van den Breemen (The Netherlands), published by the Netherlands based Noaber Foundation, December 2007, (emphasis added)
The controversial NATO sponsored report entitled “Towards a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World: Renewing Transatlantic Partnership". calls for a first strike use of nuclear weapons. The preemptive use of nukes would also be used to undermine an "increasingly brutal World" as a means to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction:
"They [the authors of the report] consider that nuclear war might soon become possible in an increasingly brutal world. They propose the first use of nuclear weapons must remain "in the quiver of escalation as the ultimate instrument to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction". (Paul Dibb, Sidney Morning Herald, 11 February 2008)
The group, insists that the option of first strike of nuclear weapons is "indispensable, since there is simply no realistic prospect of a nuclear-free world." (Report, p. 97, emphasis added):
Nuclear weapons are the ultimate instrument of an asymmetric response – and at the same time the ultimate tool of escalation. Yet they are also more than an instrument, since they transform the nature of any conflict and widen its scope from the regional to the global. ...
...Nuclear weapons remain indispensable, and nuclear escalation continues to remain an element of any modern strategy.
Nuclear escalation is the ultimate step in responding asymmetrically, and at the same time the most powerful way of inducing uncertainty in an opponent’s mind. (Ibid, emphasis added)
The Group's Report identifies six key "challenges", which may often result as potential threats to global security:
• Demography. Population growth and change across the globe will swiftly change the world we knew. The challenge this poses for welfare, good governance and energy security (among other things) is vast.
• Climate change. This greatly threatens physical certainty, and is leading to a whole new type of politics – one predicated, perhaps more than ever, on our collective future.
• Energy security continues to absorb us. The supply and demand of individual nations and the weakening of the international market infrastructure for energy distribution make the situation more precarious than ever.
• There is also the more philosophic problem of the rise of the irrational – the discounting of the rational. Though seemingly abstract, this problem is demonstrated in deeply practical ways. [These include] the decline of respect for logical argument and evidence, a drift away from science in a civilization that is deeply technological. The ultimate example is the rise of religious fundamentalism, which, as political fanaticism, presents itself as the only source of certainty.
• The weakening of the nation state. This coincides with the weakening of world institutions, including the United Nations and regional organizations such as the European Union, NATO and others.
• The dark side of globalization ... These include internationalized terrorism, organized crime and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, but also asymmetric threats from proxy actors or the abuse of financial and energy leverage. (Ibid)
Deterrence and Pre-emption
According to the Report, a new concept of deterrence is required directed against both State and non-state actors, This "new deterrence" is based on pre-emption as well as on the ability to "restore deterrence through [military] escalation". In this context, the Report contemplates, what it describes as:
“escalation dominance, the use of a full bag of both carrots and sticks—and indeed all instruments of soft and hard power, ranging from the diplomatic protest to nuclear weapons.” (Report, op city, emphasis added).
Iran
In much the same terms as the Bush administration, the NATO sponsored report states, without evidence, that Iran constitutes "a major strategic threat":
"An Iranian nuclear weapons capability would pose a major strategic threat – not only to Israel, which it has threatened to destroy, but also to the region as a whole, to Europe and to the United States. Secondly, it could be the beginning of a new multi-polar nuclear arms race in the most volatile region of the world." (Report, op. cit., p. 45)
Careful timing? The controversial NATO sponsored report calling for a preemptive nuclear attack on Iran was released shortly after the publication of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) report entitled Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities. The latter denies Iran's nuclear capabilities. The NIE report, based on the assessments of sixteen US intelligence agencies, refutes the Bush administration's main justification for waging a preemptive nuclear war on Iran. The NIE report confirms that Iran “halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003.”
"These findings constitute a damning indictment of the Bush administration’s relentless fear-mongering in relation to an alleged nuclear threat from Iran. They demonstrate that just as in the buildup to the war against Iraq five years ago, the White House has been engaged in a systematic campaign to drag the American people into another war based on lies." (See Bill van Auken, 24 January 2008)
It should be noted that this recently declassified intelligence ( pertaining to Iran contained in the 2007 NIE report) was known by the White House, the Pentagon and most probably NATO since September 2003. Ironically, US military documents confirm that the Bush Administration initiated its war preparations against Iran in July 2003, two months prior to the confirmation by US intelligence that Iran did not constitute a nuclear threat.
The July 2003 war scenarios were launched under TIRANNT: Theater Iran Near Term.
The justification for TIRANNT as well as for subsequent US war plans directed against Iran ( which as of 2004 included the active participation of NATO and Israel), has always been that Iran is developing nuclear weapons and plans to use them against us.
Following the publication of the 2007 NIE in early December, there has been an avalanche of media propaganda directed against Tehran, essentially with a view to invalidating the statements of the NIE concerning Tehran's nuclear program.
Moreover, a third sanctions resolution by the UN Security Council, was initiated with a view to forcing Iran to halt uranium enrichment. The proposed UNSC resolution, which is opposed by China and Russia includes a travel ban on Iranian officials involved in the country's nuclear programs, and inspections of shipments to and from Iran "if there are suspicions of prohibited goods" (AFP, 11 February 2008). Meanwhile, French President Nicolas Sarkozy together with British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, have been calling for a unified EU sanctions regime against Iran.
Contradicting the US national intelligence estimate (NIE), Bush's most recent speeches continue to portray Iran as a nuclear threat:
"I feel pretty good about making sure that we keep the pressure on Iran to pressure them so they understand they're isolated, to pressure them to affect their economy, to pressure them to the point that we hope somebody rational shows up and says, okay, it's not worth it anymore," Bush said.
Threat to "The Western Way of Life"
The Western media is involved in a diabolical disinformation campaign, the purpose of which is to persuade public opinion that the only way to "create a nuclear free World" is to use nuclear weapons on a preemptive basis, against countries which "threaten our Western Way of Life."
The Western world is threatened. The NATO report, according to Paul Dibb: "paint(s) an alarming picture of the threats confronting the West, arguing that its values and way of life are under threat and that we are struggling to summon the will to defend them."(Dibb, op cit)
A preemptive nuclear attack -- geographically confined to Middle East (minus Israel?)-- is the proposed end-game. The attack would use US tactical nuclear weapons, which, according to "scientific opinion" (on contract to the Pentagon) are "harmless to the surrounding civilian population because the explosion is underground". (See Michel Chossudovsky The Dangers of a Middle East Nuclear Holocaust, Global Research, 17 February 2006)
B61-11 bunker buster bombs with nuclear warheads Made in America, with an explosive capacity between one third to six times a Hiroshima bomb, are presented as bona fide humanitarian bombs, which minimize the dangers of "collateral damage".
These in-house "scientific" Pentagon assessments regarding the mini-nukes are refuted by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS):
Any attempt to use a [B61-11 bunker buster nuclear bomb] in an urban environment would result in massive civilian casualties. Even at the low end of its 0.3-300 kiloton yield range, the nuclear blast will simply blow out a huge crater of radioactive material, creating a lethal gamma-radiation field over a large area " (Low-Yield Earth-Penetrating Nuclear Weapons by Robert W. Nelson, Federation of American Scientists, 2001 ).
Professor Paul Dibb is a former Australian Deputy Secretary of Defense., who has over the years also occupied key positions in Australia's defense and intelligence establishment. Dibb carefully overlooks the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons in a conventional war theater. According to Dibb, NATO preemptive nuclear doctrine, which replicates that of the Pentagon, constitutes a significant and positive initiative to "halt the imminent spread of nuclear weapons". .
"They [the group] believe that the West must be ready to resort to a pre-emptive nuclear attack to try to halt the imminent spread of nuclear weapons."
Never mind the nuclear holocaust and resulting radioactive contamination, which would spread Worldwide and threaten, in a real sense, the "way of life".
There is no "way of life" in a World contaminated with deadly radioactive material. But this is something that is rarely discussed in the corridors of NATO or in strategic studies programs in Western universities.
Nukes: Just Another Tool in the Military Toolbox
What is frightening in Professor Dibb's article is that he is not expressing an opinion, nor is he analyzing the use of nuclear weapons from an academic research point of view.
In his article, there is neither research on nuclear weapons nor is there an understanding of the complex geopolitics of the Middle East war. Dibb is essentially repeating verbatim the statements contained in NATO/Pentagon military documents. His article is a "copy and paste" summary of Western nuclear doctrine, which in practice calls for the launching of a nuclear holocaust.
The stated objective of a Middle East nuclear holocaust is "to prevent the occurrence of a nuclear war". An insidious logic which certainly out- dwarfs the darkest period of the Spanish inquisition...
Neither NATO nor the Pentagon use the term nuclear holocaust. Moreover, they presume that the "collateral damage" of a nuclear war will in any event be confined geographically to the Middle East and that Westerners will be spared...
But since their in-house scientists have confirmed that tactical nuclear weapons are "safe for civilians", the labels on the bombs have been switched much in the same way as the label on a packet of cigarettes: "This nuclear bomb is safe for civilians"
The new definition of a nuclear warhead has blurred the distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons:
'It's a package (of nuclear and conventional weapons). The implication of this obviously is that nuclear weapons are being brought down from a special category of being a last resort, or sort of the ultimate weapon, to being just another tool in the toolbox," (Japan Economic News Wire, op cit)
This re-categorization has been carried out. The " green light" for the use of tactical nuclear weapons has been granted by the US Congress. . " Let's use them, they are part of the military toolbox."
We are a dangerous crossroads: military planners believe their own propaganda. The military manuals state that this new generation of nuclear weapons are "safe" for use in the battlefield. They are no longer a weapon of last resort. There are no impediments or political obstacles to their use. In this context, Senator Edward Kennedy has accused the Bush Administration for having developed "a generation of more useable nuclear weapons."
Russia and China
Who else constitutes a threat to " the Western way of life"?
Nukes are also slated to be used against Russia and China, former enemies of the Cold War era.
This post Cold War logic was first revealed, when the Pentagon's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) was leaked to The Los Angeles Times in January 2002. The NPR includes China and Russia alongside the rogue states as potential targets for a first strike nuclear attack. According to William Arkin, the NPR "offers a chilling glimpse into the world of nuclear-war planners: With a Strangelovian genius, they cover every conceivable circumstance in which the president might wish to use nuclear weapons-planning in great detail." (Los Angeles Times, March 10, 2002)
"Decapitate Their Leadership and Destroy their Countries as Functioning Societies"
The use of nukes against "rogue states", including Iran and North Korea (which lost more than a quarter of its population in US bombings during the Korean war) is justified because these countries could act in an "irrational" way. It therefore makes sense to "take em out" before they do something irrational. The objective is: "decapitate their leadership and destroy their countries as functioning societies":
"One line of reasoning is that so-called rogue states, such as Iran and North Korea, are sufficiently irrational to risk a pre-emptive nuclear strike on the US or its allies, such as Israel and South Korea.
The supposition here is that deterrence - that is, threatening the other side with obliteration - no longer works. But even the nasty regimes in Tehran and Pyongyang must know that the US reserves the right to use its overwhelming nuclear force to decapitate the leadership and destroy their countries as modern functioning societies. (Dibb, op cit., emphasis added)
Use nuclear weapons to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction.
But of course, lest we forget, America's nuclear arsenal as well as that of France, Britain and Israel are not categorized as "weapons of mass destruction", in comparison with Iran's deadly nonexistent nuclear weapons program.
Bin Laden's Nuclear Program
Now comes the authoritative part of the NATO sponsored report: We need to use nukes against bin Laden, because Islamic "fanatics" can actually make a nuclear weapons or buy them from the Russians in the black market.
The Report calls for a first strike nuclear attack directed against Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda, which has the ability, according to expert opinion, of actually producing small nuclear bombs, which could be used in a Second 9/11 attack on America: .
The second line of reasoning [contained in the NATO sponsored report] is more difficult to refute. It argues that extreme fanatical terrorists, such as al-Qaeda, cannot be deterred because (a) they do not represent a country and therefore cannot be targeted and (b) they welcome death by suicide. So, we have to shift the concept of nuclear deterrence to the country or regime supplying the terrorists with fissile material.
Nuclear weapons require materials that can be made only with difficulty. Once these materials are obtained by terrorists, however, the barriers to fabricating a weapon are much lower. In that sense the nuclear threat today is greater than it was in the Cold War and it seems the terrorists cannot be deterred.( Dibb, op cit, emphasis added)
The alleged nuclear threat by Al Qaeda is taken very seriously. The Bush administration has responded with overall defense spending (budget plus war theater) in excess of one trillion dollars. This massive amount of public money has been allocated to financing the "Global War on Terrorism" (GWOT).
Confirmed by Pentagon documents, this military hardware including aircraft carriers, fighter jets, cruise missiles and nuclear bunker buster bombs, is slated to be used as part of the "Global War on Terrorism". In military jargon the US is involved in asymmetric warfare against non-State enemies. ( The concept of Asymmetric Warfare was defined in The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (2005)
"The American Hiroshima"
The US media has the distinct ability to turn realities upside down. The lies are upheld as indelible truths. The "Islamic terrorists" have abandoned their AK 47 kalashnikov rifles and stinger missiles; they are not only developing deadly chemical and biological weapons, they also have nuclear capabilities.
The fact, amply documented, that Al Qaeda is supported by the CIA and Britain's MI6 is beside the point.
The nuclear threat is not directed against the Middle East but against the USA, the perpetrators and architects of nuclear war are bin Laden's Al Qaeda, which is planning to launch a nuclear attack on an American city:
"U.S. government officials are contemplating what they consider to be an inevitable and much bigger assault on America, one likely to kill millions, destroy the economy and fundamentally alter the course of history,...
According to captured al-Qaida leaders and documents, the plan is called the "American Hiroshima" and involves the multiple detonation of nuclear weapons already smuggled into the U.S. over the Mexican border with the help of the MS-13 street gang and other organized crime groups. (World Net Daily, 11 July 2005, emphasis added)
The New York Times confirms that an Al Qaeda sponsored "American Hiroshima" "could happen" .
"Experts believe that such an attack, somewhere, is likely." (NYT, 11 August 2004)
According to the Aspen Strategy Group which is integrated among others, by Madeleine Albright, Richard Armitage, Philip D. Zelikow, Robert B. Zoellick, "the danger of nuclear terrorism is much greater than the public believes, and our government hasn't done nearly enough to reduce it.":
If a 10-kiloton nuclear weapon, a midget even smaller than the one that destroyed Hiroshima, exploded in Times Square, the fireball would reach tens of millions of degrees Fahrenheit. It would vaporize or destroy the theater district, Madison Square Garden, the Empire State Building, Grand Central Terminal and Carnegie Hall (along with me and my building). The blast would partly destroy a much larger area, including the United Nations. On a weekday some 500,000 people would be killed. (NYT, 11 August 2004)
"Threaten them with a devastating [nuclear] attack"
According to professor Dibb, nuclear deterrence should also apply in relation to Al Qaeda, by holding responsible the governments which help the terrorists to develop their nuclear weapons capabilities:
"Ashton Carter, a former US assistant secretary for defense, has recently argued, the realistic response is to hold responsible, as appropriate, the government from which the terrorists obtained the weapon or fissile materials and threaten them with a devastating [nuclear] strike. In other words, deterrence would work again. (Dibb, op cit)
The real nuclear threat is coming from bin Laden. The objective is to "to do away with our way of life":
None of this is to underestimate the impact of a nuclear weapon being detonated in an American city. It could be catastrophic, but it is highly unlikely to threaten the very survival of the US. To believe otherwise risks surrendering to the fear and intimidation that is precisely the terrorists' stock in trade.
General Richard Myers, another former chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, has claimed that if [Islamic] terrorists were able to kill 10,000 Americans in a nuclear attack, they would "do away with our way of life". But Hiroshima and Nagasaki incurred well over 100,000 instant deaths and that did not mean the end of the Japanese way of life. (Ibid, emphasis added)
In an utterly twisted and convoluted argument, professor Dibb transforms the US-NATO threat to wage a nuclear war on Iran into an Al Qaeda operation to attack an American city with nuclear weapon.
Dibb presents the US-NATO menace to trigger what would result in a Middle East nuclear holocaust as a humanitarian operation to save American lives. By implication, the Al Qaeda sponsored "American Hiroshima" would be supported by Iran's president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. and this in turn would immediately provide a juste cause (casus belli) for retaliation against Iran
"What a nuclear attack on a US city would mean, however, is an understandable American retaliation in kind. So, those countries that have slack control over their fissile nuclear materials and cozy relations with terrorists need to watch out. A wounded America would be under enormous pressure to respond in a wholly disproportionate manner.
And then we would be in a completely changed strategic situation in which the use of nuclear weapons might become commonplace. Ibid, emphasis added).
Dick Cheney's Second 9/11
The insinuation that Al Qaeda is preparing an attack on America has been on the lips of Vice President Dick Cheney for several years now. Cheney has stated on several occasions since 2004, that Al Qaeda is preparing a "Second 9/11": .
In August 2005, Vice President Dick Cheney is reported to have instructed USSTRATCOM, based at the Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska, to draw up a "Contingency Plan", "to be employed in response to another 9/11-type terrorist attack on the United States". (Philip Giraldi, Attack on Iran: Pre-emptive Nuclear War, The American Conservative, 2 August 2005)
Dick Cheney's "Contingency Plan" was predicated on the preemptive war doctrine. Implied in the "Contingency Plan" was the presumption that Iran would be behind the attacks.
The Pentagon in a parallel initiative has actually fine-tuned its military agenda to the point of actually envisaging a Second 9/11 scenario as a means to providing the US administration with a "credible" justification to attack Iran and Syria:
"Another [9/11 type terrorist] attack could create both a justification and an opportunity that is lacking today to retaliate against some known targets [Iran and Syria]" (Statement by Pentagon official, leaked to the Washington Post, 23 April 2006, emphasis added)
Meanwhile,. the US Congress is concerned that an "American Hiroshima" could potentially damage the US economy:
"What we do know is that our enemies want to inflict massive casualties and that terrorists have the expertise to invent a wide range of attacks, including those involving the use of chemical, biological, radiological and even nuclear weapons. ... [E]xploding a small nuclear weapon in a major city could do incalculable harm to hundreds of thousands of people, as well as to businesses and the economy,...(US Congress, House Financial Services Committee, June 21, 2007).
As far as sensitizing public opinion to the dangers of US sponsored nuclear war, there is, with a few exceptions, a scientific and intellectual vacuum: No research, no analysis, no comprehension of the meaning of a nuclear holocaust which in a real sense threatens the future of humanity. This detachment and lack of concern of prominent intellectuals characterizes an evolving trend in many universities and research institutes in the strategic studies, the sciences and social sciences.
Academics increasingly tow the line. They remain mum on the issue of a US sponsored nuclear war. There is a tacit acceptance of a diabolical and criminal military agenda, which in a very sense threatens life on this planet. The US-NATO doctrine to use nukes on a preemptive basis with a view to "saving the Western World's way of life" is not challenged in any meaningful way either by academics or media experts in strategic studies.
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11.02.2008 22:30
Chris
NATO "Grand Strategy" Chillingly Familiar
12.02.2008 03:26
16-Jan-08
Written by General (ret.) Dr. Klaus Naumann, Former Chief of the Defence Staff Germany, Former Chairman Military Committee NATO, General (ret.) John Shalikashvili, Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States of America, Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, Field Marshal The Lord Inge, Former Chief of the Defence Staff United Kingdom, Admiral (ret.) Jacques Lanxade, Former Chief of the Defence Staff France, Former Ambassador, and General (ret.) Henk van den Breemen, Former Chief of the Defence Staff the Netherlands
Executive summary
"We strongly recommend a maximum of NATO-owned and operational multinationally manned component forces, in particular in the areas of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance."
In every country, and at all times, we like to rely on certainty. But in a world of asymmetric threats and global challenges, our governments and peoples are uncertain about what the threats are and how they should face the complicated world before them.
After explaining the complexity of the threats, the authors assess current capabilities and analyse the deficiencies in existing institutions, concluding that no nation and no institution is capable of dealing with current and future problems on its own. The only way to deal with these threats and challenges is through an integrated and allied strategic approach, which includes both non-military and military capabilities.
Based on this, the authors propose a new grand strategy, which could be adopted by both organisations and nations, and then look for the options of how to implement such a strategy. They then conclude, given the challenges the world faces, that this is not the time to start from scratch. Thus, existing institutions, rather than new ones, are our best hope for dealing with current threats. The authors further conclude that, of the present institutions, NATO is the most appropriate to serve as a core element of a future security architecture, providing it fully transforms and adapts to meet the present challenges. NATO needs more non-military capabilities, and this underpins the need for better cooperation with the European Union.
Following that approach, the authors propose a short-, a medium- and a long-term agenda for change. For the short term, they focus on the critical situation for NATO in Afghanistan, where NATO is at a juncture and runs the risk of failure. For this reason, they propose a series of steps that should be taken in order to achieve success. These include improved cost-sharing and transfer of operational command. Most importantly, the authors stress that, for NATO nations to succeed, they must resource operations properly, share the risks and possess the political will to sustain operations.
As a medium-term agenda the authors propose the development of a new strategic concept for NATO. They offer ideas on how to solve the problem of the rivalry with the EU, and how to give NATO access to other than military instruments. They further propose bringing future enlargement and partnership into line with NATO’s strategic objectives and purpose.
In their long-term agenda the authors propose abandonment of the two-pillar concept of America and Europe cooperating, and they suggest aiming for the long-term vision of an alliance of democracies ranging from Finland to Alaska. To begin the process, they propose the establishment of a directorate consisting of the USA, the EU and NATO. Such a directorate should coordinate all cooperation in the common transatlantic sphere of interest.
The authors believe that the proposed agenda could be a first step towards a renewal of the transatlantic partnership, eventually leading to an alliance of democratic nations and an increase in certainty.
* * *
Preface
In every country, and at all times, we like to rely on certainty. Certainty about the past, the present and even the future. Yet certainty is based not on inevitability, but rather on social and intellectual needs. We seek to uphold a common and stable experience, shunning the arbitrary in favour of closure in debate. Certainty can promote strong society and social interdependence. While 100 per cent certainty may be unattainable, it is clear that in periods of great – even overwhelming – uncertainty something serious is happening to our institutions and our societies.
Certainty in our world is today being eroded by a proliferation of information, knowledge and choice. The erosion of certainty is accelerated by rapid technological, social and cultural change. On occasion, that change occurs too fast for some of our major institutions to cope with.
In certain important senses, we are today operating in a mist. Through that current mist a wide range of challenges are appearing. The challenges are acute, and no less so because our certainties are in retreat. If they were stronger, our resolve to address these problems might have stiffened. But the loss of familiar certainties reveals that we lack such resolve.
There are six principal challenges that the authors of this report identify as the prime challenges facing the global community today.
The first is demography. Population growth and change across the globe will swiftly change the world we knew. The challenge this poses for welfare, good governance and energy security (among other things) is vast.
Then there is climate change. This greatly threatens physical certainty, and is leading to a whole new type of politics – one predicated, perhaps more than ever, on our collective future.
Energy security continues to absorb us. The supply and demand of individual nations and the weakening of the international market infrastructure for energy distribution make the situation more precarious than ever.
There is also the more philosophic problem of the rise of the irrational – the discounting of the rational. Though seemingly abstract, this problem is demonstrated in deeply practical ways. There are soft examples, such as the cult of celebrity, which demonstrate the decline of reason. And then there are the harder examples, such as the decline of respect for logical argument and evidence, a drift away from science in a civilisation that is deeply technological. The ultimate example is the rise of religious fundamentalism, which, as political fanaticism, presents itself as the only source of certainty.
Another challenge is the weakening of the nation state. This coincides with the weakening of world institutions, including the United Nations and regional organisations such as the European Union, NATO and others.
Finally, there is what one might refer to as – despite all its benefits – the dark side of globalisation. Interconnectedness has its drawbacks. These include internationalised terrorism, organised crime and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, but also asymmetric threats from proxy actors or the abuse of financial and energy leverage. Migration continues to provide challenges across the world. And dramatic diseases such as HIV/AIDS and SARS have the potential to spread around the world faster than ever before. Taken together, globalised threats are wide in scale and unprecedented in complexity.
But identifying these problems is only the start. We must attempt to understand what might be next.
In considering issues likely to arise, we are mocked by predictions from the past that have failed to come true. But in themselves, these can offer a lesson. One widely made prediction, which can now be dismissed, was the issue of loss of identity through convergence. Against the backdrop of the troubles in the Middle East, and also the micro-national squabbles in the West, we can see that globalisation has not entirely eroded national identities. This re-emergence of identity politics might be held up as a warning to all potential seers.
Though there will be issues that stable states and properly functioning international organisations might be able to deal with, deeply challenging problems like those in the Middle East, Africa and Afghanistan, where Western credibility is at stake, may tempt us into either intervention or isolation. Either way, these problems will confront us. Isolationism is back as a political problem. Its previous expressions may appal, even as the desire to intervene appeals.
State failures, if they are allowed to happen, could yet combine with other factors such as urbanisation and the rise of fundamentalisms to usher in a new, illiberal age. That age would be not just uncertain but deeply perilous. It is a future that we must avoid; but in order to avoid it, we must first admit the uncomfortable fact that it is possible.
The present authors approach the challenges of today from a Western perspective. We also do so as military men – though military men who have worked happily across national lines over many years. It is a pleasure to be able to demonstrate that we can still do so.
In writing this paper, we do not aim, and would not presume, to offer a prescription for today’s world. Rather, we simply hope to share some thoughts on today’s world that have been gathered from experience – experience acquired over many years, marked by great movements of history, which happily never brought the ultimate challenge. We recognise this with deep gratitude – not least gratitude for the resolve of our joint nations and their prevailing will to stand together during the Cold War. If it is not presumptuous to do so, we hope that in this paper we offer something that might be helpful to those who now carry a heavy responsibility in demanding times, and hope, in gratitude, that we can pay a little back.
* * *
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
We see NATO as an organisation of particular importance, since it is the only organisation that commits the US and Europe, in a legally and mutually binding way, to defend each other collectively. NATO is a political organisation that can deploy military means. Today’s NATO is in the process of military transformation, and it has seen some political adaptation. But at its core, the political organisation is, to a large degree, still a Cold War organisation. The cumbersome political structure does not reflect how much the world has changed. It is little suited to the swift political–military requirements of the present era, and it simply cannot take advantage of transformed military capabilities, which would enable the alliance to respond at short notice and conduct operations at a high operational tempo. Today, rapid response is of the essence. Therefore the outdated and weighty stove-pipe systems of specified committees and bottom-up reporting structures need to be seriously reconsidered. As NATO is heavily involved in operations, we feel it is appropriate to differentiate in our agenda for change between immediate, medium-term and long-term steps.
The Immediate Agenda
"NATO is facing a real challenge in Afghanistan, where self-inflicted restrictions deprive NATO of a possible success"
In our opinion, the NATO political structure is crying out for review, adaptation and restructuring. At the core is restructuring of the decision-making process. The process that exists within NATO needs a radical overhaul. NATO needs to take political decisions jointly, i.e. based on a unanimous vote of all its members. It is not only for political but also for military reasons that such unity is required. This applies to decisions taken at the NATO Council level, but there is no need for unanimous decisions at all subordinate levels as well. If there are occasions on which allies disagree, the reasons for disagreement will, in the end, always be political in nature. The reasons should, therefore, be brought as expeditiously as possible to the attention of the one and only body that can take political decisions in NATO – the NATO Council. We therefore propose, as the first step in our agenda for change, that NATO should abandon the consensus principle at all levels below the NATO Council, and introduce at the committee and working-group levels a majority voting rule. This would enable NATO to take quick decisions in crises, when minutes matter.
A NATO Council decision has never constituted a binding obligation to commit forces or to contribute militarily. It has always been left to individual nations to contribute what capabilities or forces they can. But nations that do not contribute forces should also not have a say in the conduct of military operations. We therefore propose, as a second change, that only those nations that contribute to a mission – that is, military forces in a military operation – should have the right to a say in the process of the operation. This structure would highlight the need and the opportunity for commitment, and commitment would be rewarded at the table. Those who do not commit forces must, of course, be kept informed; but they would have no role to play, so long as the operation unfolds as politically authorised.
The next urgent step aims at improving NATO’s intelligence capabilities. It is our impression that, despite many improvements in recent years, too many of NATO’s current intelligence arrangements are still driven by Cold War procedures, in which NATO had some warning time and sufficient capabilities to detect the Warsaw Pact’s activities. Today, time is of the essence, and a threat may arise entirely unexpectedly, from any direction, surprising in both nature and scope. The existing intelligence provisions are not good enough. We therefore propose, as our step number three, a full- fledged review of NATO’s intelligence.
The next change we suggest in order to enhance NATO’s capabilities is the abolition of the system of national caveats, as far as this is possible. The system of national caveats has proved to be a major impediment to operations in the past and a major cost-driving factor. That said, we are well aware that the removal of all national caveats is an impossibility, requiring sovereignty to be voluntarily ceded; and this nations may not be willing to do.
Operational command
The three levels of command are Full Command, Operational Command and Operational Control. Full command includes full responsibility for the soldier, including recruitment, training, outfitting, but also personnel management. Operational command is the delegation of command within a particular theatre of operations. And operational control is the delegation of command in a theatre of operations for a specific mission.
While full command is an important element of national sovereignty, and should be left with nations, it is our view that NATO currently needs more operational command. Many nations do not give NATO commanders more than operational control and, furthermore, burden their contributions with national caveats. Unfortunately, such operational control limits the commander’s freedom of action and leads to inefficiencies, such as a duplication of tasks; it may even lead to mistrust on the ground.
We therefore propose that the NATO commander in theatre be given operational command. At the latest, this transfer of authority to the operational commander should be made the moment troops arrive in the theatre of operations. Nations should refrain from imposing caveats and should lift existing national caveats. This would require that, when they take decisions in the NATO Council, nations should agree on the political objectives of the operation and on the concept of operations, plus the associated rules of engagement. Nevertheless, it ought also to be stressed that there are some areas where national control cannot be delegated. The use of nuclear weapons must, of course, remain the prerogative of the nuclear powers.
The appointment of the operational commander and the representation in headquarters of participating nations should reflect national contributions and national preparedness to share the risks and burdens.
In addition, there are certain other areas in which pre-delegation of a response capability will be necessary to protect NATO, where we cannot wait for the NATO Council to decide on a course of action, such as the acute crisis of a missile attack or cyber attack. This will require the political decision to pre-delegate authority to a military commander to launch defensive measures. To this end, the NATO Council must consider the establishment of suitable NATO Command Forces, and must decide on the degree of pre-delegated authority to use force.
In addition to command and control issues, the administrative side of NATO requires review.
NATO administration
There is little doubt that the costs of the NATO Headquarters, the integrated command structure and subordinate jointly manned and funded agencies need to be funded collectively. But whether there is still a need for a common infrastructure budget is a question that should at least be raised. We could imagine that the infrastructure budget might be replaced by a common procurement budget for assets and capabilities that NATO may wish to fund, and later operate, collectively, as in the case of the badly needed Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system. Infrastructure, with the exception of headquarters, would thus become a national responsibility.
New procedures for funding NATO operations are urgently needed. The current cost-sharing system of ‘costs lie where they fall’ must be abandoned entirely. At present, that means that those who contribute are bearing both the risk of casualties and the financial burden, whereas those who simply talk are rewarded twice. Such a principle can erode NATO’s cohesion and it definitely reduces NATO’s ability to sustain operations. What is needed is a common cost-sharing formula, to which all allies contribute. We therefore recommend the creation of a commonly financed NATO operations budget. Such a budget could ensure that if NATO agrees something, then NATO will see it through properly.
Information operations
As NATO is engaged in operations in Afghanistan – operations which, in some places, are of an intensity that NATO forces have not seen before – one of the discrepancies of our time becomes obvious: some of our armed forces are fighting wars, but the societies from which they come live in peace. But as the world is interconnected through almost instantaneous communication, each and every event is immediately flashed up on the TV screens at home, sometimes faster than the chain of command is able to react. In addition, quite often it is the enemy that triggers the information, with the intention of weakening the alliance’s cohesion and national support for ongoing operations. To overcome this disquieting state of public relations affairs, NATO must urgently develop an information strategy that will get it and its nations back into the driving seat; otherwise it runs the risk of losing on the home front, even as its forces win at the tactical or operational level.
Therefore NATO must develop an information strategy that can serve three objectives simultaneously:
It must influence the world’s perception that NATO is a force for good.
Second, it must be on the screens before the opponent starts spreading the news, i.e. NATO has to win and maintain information dominance in public relations.
Third, it must help to win the hearts and minds both of its own nations (for NATO’s just course), and of the people in the theatre of operations.
These proposals in our agenda for immediate change are steps that need to be taken while NATO is engaged in operations such as those in Afghanistan. They are steps to repair an engine while it is running in high gear, but they are not in themselves sufficient to get NATO ready for the challenges ahead. We therefore propose two additional sets of steps in our agenda for the change of NATO: medium-term steps and long-term steps.
The Medium-Term Agenda for Change
Nobody can seriously dispute the need for NATO to review its 199 strategic concept. NATO itself acknowlegded the necessity of having a new strategic guideline when it accepted, at the 2006 Riga Summit, the Comprehensive Political Guideline (CPG), but this document is no substitute for the still-missing strategic concept.
NATO should take advantage of the new impetus towards mature transatlantic relations, which was noticeable in Germany in the autumn of 2005 and which one can now see in France. With a new British Prime Minister in office and a new US administration taking office on 20 January 2009, now is the right time to draft a new strategic concept. An ambitious option would be to agree it at the 2009 summit, which will mark NATO’s 60th anniversary. If this is too ambitious for the NATO bureaucracy to agree at the 2008 summit, then the process of developing a new strategic concept might be set in motion at the 2009 summit, aiming for agreement on the new strategy at the next summit.
We suggest that NATO should develop a grand strategy that encompasses much more than the military domain, and we propose the strategy that we spelt out in Chapter 3 as the initial building block for such a debate.
Simultaneously, NATO should address its biggest shortcoming at this time – its lack of means other than military. As a first step, it should look for an interim remedy, as we live in a world that does not permit us to wait endlessly.
It is our firm belief that the use of military force is by no means the only – or the inevitable – means by which to tackle crises. In very many cases, the use of force is counter-productive to the strategic objectives. We also firmly believe that one can no longer win in an armed conflict simply by killing or capturing as many of the enemy as possible or by just destroying his power base. Non-military means must be part of an integrated strategy: one in which non-military means are coordinated and deployed with maximum precision, concision and integration – the way a military mission should be conducted.
The possibilities here relate greatly to the use of escalation dominance. Recent history is replete with examples of possible escalation by non-military means being squandered because of imprecise objectives and disagreement at the highest level over aims.
Integrated approach
Since NATO does not possess this set of instruments, we propose either exploring the option of a ‘Berlin Plus in Reverse’ agreement with the EU or widening the Canadian initiative of a ‘comprehensive approach’, which is under discussion in NATO as a step to be taken by all NATO nations. The Berlin Plus arrangement between NATO and the EU allowed for NATO military assets and capabilities to be used for EU-led operations, and represents an example of what we consider to be an integrated and allied approach in action.
‘Berlin Plus in Reverse’ would be the mirror image, and would see the EU coming to the aid of a NATO-led operation with non-military assets and capabilities, on a case-by-case basis.
Most obviously, the EU could help with police and paramilitary forces, such as the Italian Carabinieri, on request from NATO for NATO-led stabilisation operations; but it could also support NATO with soft-power instruments that the EU has at its disposal.
In addition to such a solution, the non-EU/NATO nations should pledge that they will also make contributions of a similar nature and scope as those NATO nations that are EU members.
As an additional step, we propose a review of the existing set of tools for other than military steps, such as sanctions, the entire tool-kit of ‘defence diplomacy’, etc. This should be done first in NATO, then coordinated with the EU, and thereafter be brought to the attention of the OSCE or the UN.
Obviously, an arrangement such as ‘Berlin Plus in Reverse’ can be negotiated only if there is an end to the obstructions of NATO–EU cooperation that are currently damaging both organisations. We therefore call on all parties involved to free up the ongoing efforts to achieve a better and more profound EU–NATO cooperation, to negotiate in good faith and without imposing preconditions that render the entire project hostage to narrowly defined national egoisms.
Enlargement and the three circles
"The authors offer ideas on how to solve the problems of the rivalry with the EU"
As we noted above, and as NATO has declared repeatedly, its doors should always remain open for aspiring nations to apply for full membership. On the other hand, one should not close one’s eyes to the reality that NATO’s digestion has not yet fully recovered from the recent rapid process of enlargement. In the course of this, NATO compromised on some of its standards. In some member countries, question marks remain with regard to good governance, and there are also doubts whether the new members have lived up to the commitments they undertook upon accession to NATO. Needless to say, some of them can, as an excuse, point readily to many of the old members, who also failed to set a good example in honouring their commitments. But we feel that NATO should learn its lessons from the experience.
We therefore propose that NATO should state that it will not extend membership invitations to countries in which the standards of NATO members – such as democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law and good governance – are not fully adhered to. It should also be agreed that the alliance will not accept any country as a member which has unresolved territorial claims or which is involved in ongoing armed conflicts. The reason for this is the commitment of NATO to defend any country collectively, and to seek future members’ contribution to the collective defence of the NATO Treaty Area. In addition, we suggest that NATO should look at future enlargement and partnership arrangements through the lens of its strategic objectives.
As geostrategy is back on the stage, we could imagine NATO developing, as part of its future grand strategy, a concept for enlargement and cooperation that is based on the idea of mutual collective security, and on the following geostrategic concept.
NATO must seek clarity on its geographical dimension. NATO must act where its members’ security is at risk. To this end, NATO took a decision at the 2002 Prague Summit to act wherever necessary. NATO thus became a global alliance, but not a global policeman. In translating the proposed strategy into spheres of action, a concept of three concentric circles emerges. The three circles represent three spheres of alliance and partnership.
The inner circle will always remain the NATO Treaty Area (NTA) that is committed to collective defence, or the Collective Security Area (CSA). The second circle encompasses a wider sphere of partnerships in the Common Security Zone (CSZ). And the third circle of more distant partnerships and allies is the Outer Stability Area (OSA).
These areas are not limited, either geographically or politically. The inner circle of the NATO Treaty Area will change as enlargement progresses, based on NATO’s invitation to begin accession talks and on the prospective future member’s ability to meet a NATO member’s commitments. These three circles are not static, but form a framework, within which we can both categorise NATO’s responsibilities, partnerships and activities, and guide the process of enlargement.
When considering NATO enlargement to full membership, the geostrategic sphere must be taken fully into account, as must the capabilities of the current members to defend new members collectively; but so also must the capabilities of new members to defend everyone else collectively. Article 5 is an important two-way street, and we cannot extend membership in a manner that would dilute its meaning and value.
The middle ring, the CSA, concerns the various categories of NATO’s external relations. These include the Partnership for Peace (PfP), the Membership Action Plan (MAP) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), which elevated the Mediterranean Dialogue to a full-fledged security partnership in 2004, as well as the NATO–Russia and NATO–Ukraine partnerships. The middle ring or CSA is the area in which the partners seek to achieve collective security through conflict and crisis prevention, and by means of which NATO may keep armed conflicts at a distance from the NATO Treaty Area.
Nonetheless, membership of the CSA partnerships should not be seen as a way of getting cheap membership of NATO. Becoming a member of the middle ring also comes with obligations.
The outer circle, or OSA, is the area in which NATO seeks to promote stability through either permanent or ad hoc cooperation with nations that are neither members nor partners, but that share with the NATO nations certain basic values and convictions and that have similar security interests. This cooperation will seek the permanent exchange of intelligence and ever growing standardisation of formats and procedures, and it may lead, on a case-by-case basis, to coalitions of the willing in interventions, as well as in post-intervention stabilisation operations.
We propose that NATO should consider the option of such a concept, since it would not only enhance security, but would also contribute to strategic stability. It could help to improve the relationship with Russia – which still views NATO encroachment and encirclement as a threat – and could dispel the notion that an ever increasing NATO would become an instrument used to contain China.
Having mentioned Russia and China, one could add India as a country that should also be assured of NATO’s intention of seeking cooperation and partnership and of avoiding conflict and negative competition. NATO must make every effort to revitalise the NATO–Russia partnership, despite the more confrontational noises that have recently emanated from Moscow. It is worth NATO’s while to consider whether similar agreements could be sought with China and India.
As a last step in our medium-term agenda for change, we propose that a force structure review should be launched, to take stock of where NATO really stands in the process of military transformation and what can be achieved by the time a new strategic concept is applied. It should be a realistic force structure review, which, instead of giving the politicians the usual rose-tinted NATO picture, will deliver the sober analysis they will need as they decide how future scarce resources are to be spent. If this report is ready in time for the 2009 summit, it must not hesitate to pursue a ‘name and shame’ policy as far as the nations’ commitments are concerned.
The Long-Term Agenda for Change
Following agreement on a future NATO grand strategy, NATO will have to embark on a full review of its capabilities of implementing such a strategy.
The easy part will be the review of NATO’s military capabilities. Such a review must be focused on flexibility, deployability and sustainability; but its point of departure must be a solid medium- to long-term political commitment to implement appropriate force structures. To this end, nations should abandon such mechanisms as the French ‘loi de programmation’ or the Danish ‘defence contract’, and instead be supported by an appropriate defence industrial basis. The force structure review proposed in our medium-term agenda, which aims to take stock of the transformation process, would serve as the foundation and point of departure.
We propose to use it as a stepping stone to the development of a generic NATO force structure model. If possible, it should be developed in close cooperation with the EU, so that it might be used by the EU as well.
Depending on the results of such a wide-ranging force structure effort, NATO must then consider the extent to which it may wish to establish NATO-owned and operated multinationally manned and funded component forces, particularly in the enabling forces category – that is, the forces that set up logistics, command and control, communications, reconnaissance and intelligence, that precede the deployment of main body forces and support forces.
We see multinational NATO-owned and operated component forces as key to a quick and affordable modernisation of NATO’s forces, but we stress that this approach can only be taken if nations are willing to agree to a firm and binding commitment that these forces will be at NATO’s unrestricted disposal for any operations that the NATO Council might authorise.
And it must consider the establishment of disaster relief forces and deployable police or military-police components.
Three models of multinational forces
When it comes to structuring all these multinational forces, there are three basic models available: the AWACS Component Force Model, the Pool Model and the Two Pillar Model.
The Airborne Warning and Control System, or AWACS Component Force model functions well, and this is multinationally funded and owned.
The Pool Model involves pooling assets of a similar nature and similar purpose under a single arrangement; for example, in bringing together the British Hercules C130 and German A114 cargo aircrafts and amphibious shipping. The Pool Model establishes a common C4 component (command, control, communications, computers) and individual nations make national assets available.
The Two Pillar Model concerns an integrated, multinationally manned European component, combined with an American–Canadian command and control (C2) component. This arrangement allows the Americans to maintain their national prerogative, working together without having the Americans and Canadians integrated with European forces. It brings together, under a NATO C4 component, dedicated EU component forces and fully interoperable US and Canadian assets.
We strongly recommend looking into the establishment of a maximum of NATO-owned and operated multinationally manned component forces, in particular in the areas of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (C4ISR), military police, disaster relief engineers, airborne fire fighters and transportation, including air to air refuelling (AAR).
Depending on the details of a future grand strategy, there may be additional implementation steps, such as the coordination and concentration of foreign and development aid, the common financing of reconstruction efforts, etc.
It may be premature to consider at this time the extent to which this will have to be done within the NATO framework, or whether the strategy will lead to fresh ideas on how to make the common and comprehensive zone of common security from Finland to Alaska become a reality. But it should be clear that, even if all the steps we propose for NATO are taken, much would still depend on other organisations acting across the spectrum of action. Moreover, NATO’s ability to implement the proposed grand strategy will also depend on implementation of the steps proposed for the UN and the OSCE, and on the degree of NATO–EU cooperation.
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Helping to restore certanty
What we propose in our agenda for change is not intended to be prescriptive. Nor do we pretend to have covered all the issues that need to be considered. But we do believe that we are proposing an agenda that is feasible and affordable, and that could strengthen and deepen the cooperation between the two truly mutually indispensable partners, North America and Europe. It is an agenda rooted in the firm conviction that none of our nations is any longer capable of dealing with the complex and challenging world in which we live on its own, and that all of our nations have but one chance: We must stand shoulder to shoulder; we must share the risks and the burdens; and we must show the common resolve to see our commitments through and to prevail.
It is an agenda which, when implemented, will make it easier to provide security for the citizens of all nations between Finland and Alaska, while helping to prevent war and armed conflict elsewhere – or at least to contain and end it as quickly as possible. We could thus create the breathing space our nations will need to cope with the tremendous challenges the next decades will bring. We might, in the medium to long term, thus be capable of restoring certainty – something which we see as the most important prerequisite for functioning societies. Certainty is not all we need; but without it there will be nothing.
Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century.
The Project for a New American Century (The people who brought us Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Gaza, Iran, Syria, Lebanon ...)
www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf
A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm
(Israel's Version of a Grand War Strategy)
No NATO