Note that the only outstanding issues are those arising from accusations made by Israel and the United States, and there is no evidence thus far to back them up.
Israeli Extremists STILL Trying to Start Iran War
Date: 22 February 2008
For official use only
Item 5(c) of the provisional agenda
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement and relevant provisions of Security
Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747
(2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran
Report by the Director General
1. On 15 November 2007, the Director General reported to the Board of Governors on the
implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council
resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) (GOV/2007/58). This
report covers the relevant developments since that date.
2. On 11 and 12 January 2008, the Director General met in Tehran with
H.E. Ayatollah A. Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran; H.E. Mr. M. Ahmadinejad, President of
Iran; H.E. Mr. G. Aghazadeh, Vice President of Iran and President of the Atomic Energy Organization
of Iran (AEOI); H.E. Mr. M. Mottaki, Foreign Minister; and H.E. Mr. S. Jalili, Secretary, Supreme
National Security Council of Iran. The purpose of the visit was to discuss ways and means of
implementing all relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the United Nations Security
Council as well as accelerating implementation of the work plan agreed between Iran and the
Secretariat on 21 August 2007 aimed at the clarification of outstanding safeguards implementation
issues (GOV/2007/48, Attachment).
3. During the discussions, the Iranian leadership stated that the country’s nuclear programme had
always been exclusively for peaceful purposes and that there had never been a nuclear weapons
development programme. The Iranian authorities agreed to accelerate implementation of the work
Atoms for Peace
A. Implementation of the Work Plan on Outstanding Issues
A.1. Source of Contamination
4. On 15 September 2007, the Agency provided Iran with questions relating to the source of the
uranium particle contamination found on some equipment at a technical university, the nature of the
equipment, the envisioned use of the equipment and the names and roles of individuals and entities
involved, including the Physics Research Centre (PHRC) (GOV/2007/58, para. 24). This equipment
was procured by the former head of PHRC, who had also been a professor at the university. He had
also procured, or attempted to procure, other equipment, such as balancing machines, mass
spectrometers, magnets and fluorine handling equipment, which could be useful in uranium
enrichment activities (GOV/2006/27, para. 25).
5. On 10–12 December 2007 and on 15–16 December 2007, meetings took place in Tehran
between the Agency and Iranian officials during which Iran provided answers to the questions and the
Agency requested additional clarifications regarding the intended purpose of the equipment, the
persons and entities who had requested the items, the recipients, and the use and locations, both past
and present, of the equipment. In a follow-up letter dated 18 December 2007, the Agency provided
Iran with further details regarding the equipment.
6. In a letter dated 3 January 2008, the Agency reminded Iran that Iran needed to provide
additional clarifications to allow a full assessment of the issue of the source of contamination and
7. In a letter dated 8 January 2008, Iran provided answers to the questions raised by the Agency in
its letter of 3 January 2008.
A.1.1. Use of Equipment and Source of Contamination
8. According to Iran, vacuum equipment was procured in 1990 on behalf of the technical
university by the former Head of PHRC because of his expertise in procurement and PHRC's business
connections. The equipment was intended to be used at the Physics Department of the technical
university for the coating of items such as optical mirrors, optical lasers, laser mirrors, resistive layers
for solar cells and mirrors for use in medical operating theatres.
9. Iran stated that, upon receipt of the equipment in 1991, it was noticed that the delivery was
incomplete and that some incorrect parts had been supplied. The equipment was therefore put into
storage at the university. Iran further stated that a number of letters of complaint were written to the
supplier company at intervals until 1994, but to no avail.
10. According to Iran, some individual pieces of equipment were used both inside and outside the
university during the period 1994–2003 in research, operation and maintenance activities involving
vacuum conditions, but other parts of the consignment were never used. As its explanation of how the
contamination had come about, Iran said that, in 1998, an individual who was testing used centrifuge
components from Pakistan at the laboratory at Vanak Square for the AEOI (GOV/2004/34, para. 31)
had asked the vacuum service of the university to come and repair a pump. Iran stated that some items
of the vacuum equipment mentioned above were used for this repair activity and that, when these
items were eventually brought back to the university, they spread uranium particle contamination.
11. To assess the information provided by Iran, the Agency spoke with the individual from the
Vanak Square laboratory and the vacuum technician from the university who had carried out the
repairs. The Agency was also shown the pump that had been repaired using the equipment concerned.
The Agency made a detailed analysis of the signatures of the contamination of the equipment and
compared them with those of the swipe samples taken from the centrifuge components in Iran which
had originated in Pakistan. The Agency concluded that the explanation and supporting documentation
provided by Iran regarding the possible source of contamination by uranium particles at the university
were not inconsistent with the data currently available to the Agency. The Agency considers this
question no longer outstanding at this stage. However, the Agency continues, in accordance with its
procedures and practices, to seek corroboration of its findings and to verify this issue as part of its
verification of the completeness of Iran’s declarations.
A.1.2. Procurement activities by the former Head of PHRC
12. According to Iran, none of the equipment purchased or enquired about by the former Head of
PHRC (see para. 4 above) was intended for use in uranium enrichment or conversion related activities,
whether for research and development (R&D) or for educational activities in these fields.
Procurements and procurement attempts by the former Head of PHRC were said by Iran to have also
been made on behalf of other entities of Iran, as described below.
13. Iran stated that the vacuum equipment purchased by the Head of PHRC had been intended for
educational purposes in the Vacuum Technique Laboratory of the university, specifically for use in
experiments by students on thin layer production using evaporation and vacuum techniques, coating
using vacuum systems and leak detection in vacuum systems. To support its statements, Iran presented
instruction manuals related to the various experiments, internal communications on the procurement of
the equipment and shipping documents. Agency inspectors visited the Vacuum Technique Laboratory
and confirmed the presence of the equipment there.
14. Iran stated that some magnets had also been purchased by the Head of the PHRC on behalf of
the Physics Department of the university for educational purposes in “Lenz-Faraday experiments”. To
support this statement, Iran presented a number of documents: instruction manuals related to the
experiments; requests for funding which indicated that a decision had been made to approach the Head
of PHRC to order and purchase the parts; and an invoice for cash sales from the supplier. Iran stated
that the magnets were discarded after being used.
15. According to Iran, the Head of PHRC attempted twice — once successfully — to buy a
balancing machine for the Mechanical Engineering Department of the university for educational
purposes, such as in the measurement of vibrations and forces in rotating components due to
unbalancing. To support Iran’s statement, the Agency was shown laboratory experiment procedures,
requests about procurement and a letter confirming the completion of the purchase. Agency inspectors
visited the Mechanical Engineering Department and confirmed the presence of the balancing machine
16. According to Iran, the Head of PHRC also attempted to purchase 45 gas cylinders, each
containing 2.2 kg of fluorine, on behalf of the Office of Industrial Interrelations of the university. Iran
stated that the intended purpose of the fluorine had been to enhance the chemical stability of polymeric
vessels. To support its statements, Iran presented a request to buy fluorine and a communication
between the Head of PHRC and the President of the university about the proposed supplier’s refusal to
deliver the goods.
17. Iran stated that the AEOI had encountered difficulties with procurement because of international
sanctions imposed on the country, and that that was why the AEOI had requested the Dean of the
university to assist in the procurement of a UF6 mass spectrometer. According to Iran, in 1988, the
Dean of the university approached the Head of the Mechanics Workshop of the Shahid Hemmat
Industrial Group (SHIG), which belonged to the Ministry of Sepah, and asked him to handle the
procurement. According to Iran, the mass spectrometer was never delivered. The Head of the
Mechanics Workshop, who was later appointed Head of PHRC when it was established in 1989, is the
same person involved in the other procurement attempts mentioned above.
18. The Agency took note of the information and supporting documents provided by Iran as well as
the statements made by the former Head of PHRC to the Agency and concluded that the replies were
not inconsistent with the stated use of the equipment. The role and activities of PHRC will be further
addressed in connection with the alleged studies as discussed below.
A.2. Uranium Metal Document
19. On 8 November 2007, the Agency received a copy from Iran of the 15-page document
describing the procedures for the reduction of UF6 to uranium metal and the machining of enriched
uranium metal into hemispheres, which are components of nuclear weapons. Iran reiterated that this
document had been received along with the P-1 centrifuge documentation in 1987 and that it had not
been requested by Iran. The Agency is still waiting for a response from Pakistan on the circumstances
of the delivery of this document in order to understand the full scope and content of the offer made by
the network in 1987 (GOV/2006/15, paras 20–22).
20. Polonium-210 is of interest to the Agency because it can be used not only for civilian
applications (such as radioisotope batteries), but also — in conjunction with beryllium — for military
purposes, such as neutron initiators in some designs of nuclear weapons. On 20–21 January 2008, a
meeting took place in Tehran between the Agency and Iranian officials during which Iran provided
answers to the questions raised by the Agency in its letter dated 15 September 2007 regarding
polonium-210 research (GOV/2007/58, para. 26). The Agency’s questions included a request to see
the original project documentation.
21. According to Iran, in the 1980s, scientists from the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre (TNRC)
were asked to propose new research activities. A project called “Production of 210Po by the
irradiation of 209Bi in the TNRC reactor” was proposed and eventually approved by the Scientific
Advisory Committee of TNRC in 1988. The project consisted of fundamental research aimed at
enhancing knowledge about this process. According to Iran, it was not aimed at a specific immediate
application. However, a potential use in radioisotope batteries, if the chemical extraction of polonium-
210 proved successful, was mentioned in the initial proposal.
22. Iran reiterated that the project was not part of any larger R&D project, but had been a personal
initiative of the project leader. According to Iran, the chemist working on the project left the country
before full chemical processing had been performed, the project was aborted and the decayed samples
were discarded as waste (GOV/2004/11, para. 30).
23. To support its statements, Iran presented additional copies of papers and literature searches that
had formed the basis for the request for approval of the project. Iran also provided copies of the
project proposal, the meeting minutes and the approval document from the Scientific Advisory
Committee of TNRC, as well as a complete copy of the reactor logbook for the entire period that the
samples were present in the reactor.
24. Based on an examination of all information provided by Iran, the Agency concluded that the
explanations concerning the content and magnitude of the polonium-210 experiments were consistent
with the Agency’s findings and with other information available to it. The Agency considers this
question no longer outstanding at this stage. However, the Agency continues, in accordance with its
procedures and practices, to seek corroboration of its findings and to verify this issue as part of its
verification of the completeness of Iran’s declarations.
A.4. Gchine Mine
25. On 22 and 23 January 2008, a meeting took place in Tehran between the Agency and Iranian
officials during which Iran provided answers to the questions raised by the Agency in its letter dated
15 September 2007 (GOV/2007/58, para. 27) with a view to achieving a better understanding of the
complex arrangements governing the past and current administration of the Gchine uranium mine and
mill (GOV/2005/67, paras 26–31).
26. According to Iran, the exploitation of uranium at the Gchine mine, as well as the ore processing
activities at the Gchine uranium ore concentration (UOC) plant, have always been and remain the
responsibility of the AEOI.
27. Iran stated that, by 1989, the extent of uranium reserves at Saghand in central Iran had been
established in cooperation with Chinese experts. Considering the promising output of this region, a
contract for equipping the Saghand mine and designing a uranium ore processing plant was concluded
with Russian companies in 1995. Insufficient funding was allocated in the Government’s 1994–1998
five-year plan for the AEOI to pursue activities at both Gchine and Saghand. Since there was more
uranium (estimated 1000 tonnes) at Saghand than at Gchine (estimated 40 tonnes), it was decided to
spend the available funds on Saghand.
28. According to Iran, in the period 1993–1998, tasks such as the preparation of technical reports
and studies, and some chemical testing of ores, were performed at the AEOI Ore Processing Center
(OPC) at TNRC. The focus of some of the documentation work had been to justify funding of Gchine
in the 1999–2003 five-year plan. These efforts were successful and funding for further exploration and
exploitation at Gchine was approved in the plan. A decision to construct a UOC plant at Gchine,
known as “Project 5/15”, was made on 25 August 1999.
29. During the 22–23 January 2008 meetings, Iran also provided the Agency with supporting
documentation regarding the budget, the five-year plans, contracts with foreign entities and the
preparation of studies and reports. The Agency concluded that the documentation was sufficient to
confirm the AEOI’s continuing interest in and activity at Gchine in the 1993–1999 period.
30. Regarding the origin and role of the Kimia Maadan (KM) Company, Iran stated that the OPC, in
addition to its own staff, had hired consultants and experts for various projects, including for work
relating to Gchine. When budget approval was given in 1999 for exploration and exploitation at
Gchine, some experts and consultants had formed a company (KM) to take on a contract from the
AEOI for the Gchine plant. Supporting documentation was provided to the Agency showing that KM
was registered as a company on 4 May 2000. Iran stated that KM’s core staff of about half a dozen
people consisted of experts who had previously worked for the OPC. At the peak of activity, the
company employed over 100 people. In addition to its own staff, KM made use of experts from
universities and subcontractors to work on the project.
31. According to Iran, KM was given conceptual design information by the AEOI consisting of
drawings and technical reports. KM’s task was to do the detailed design, to procure and install
equipment and to put the Gchine UOC plant into operation. The contract imposed time constraints and
the time pressure led to some mistakes being made. After the detailed design was completed, changes
had to be made which led to financial problems for KM.
32. Iran stated that KM had had only one project — the one with the AEOI for construction of the
Gchine UOC plant on a turnkey basis. However, the company had also helped with procurement for
the AEOI because of the AEOI’s procurement constraints due to sanctions (GOV/2006/15, para. 39).
A document listing items procured for the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) was provided by Iran.
According to Iran, because of KM’s financial problems, the company ceased work on the Gchine
project in June 2003, when the three-year contract with the AEOI came to an end. Iran stated that KM
was officially deregistered on 8 June 2003 and provided a document supporting this statement. After
KM stopped work, the OPC again took over work on the Gchine UOC plant.
33. Iran stated that KM had been able to progress quickly from its creation in May 2000 and to
install foundations for the UOC plant by late December 2000 because the conceptual design for the
plant had been done by the OPC. This conceptual design and other “know-how” had been supplied to
KM, which used the information for the detailed design of processing equipment. KM was therefore
quickly able to prepare drawings and issue purchase orders. Documents supporting the conceptual
work done by the AEOI were presented to the Agency by Iran.
34. Much of the supporting information provided by Iran had not been presented to the Agency
during past discussions about Gchine. The Agency concluded that the information and explanations
provided by Iran were supported by the documentation, the content of which is consistent with the
information already available to the Agency. The Agency considers this question no longer
outstanding at this stage. However, the Agency continues, in accordance with its procedures and
practices, to seek corroboration of its findings and continues to verify this issue as part of verification
of the completeness of Iran’s declarations.
A.5. Alleged Studies
35. The Agency has continued to urge Iran, as demanded by the Security Council, to address the
alleged studies concerning the conversion of uranium dioxide (UO2) into uranium tetrafluoride (UF4)
(the green salt project), high explosives testing and the design of a missile re-entry vehicle, which
could have a military nuclear dimension and which appear to have administrative interconnections,
and in view of their possible link to nuclear material (GOV/2007/58, para. 28). As part of the work
plan, Iran agreed to address these alleged studies.
36. On 27 and 28 January 2008 and from 3 to 5 February 2008, the Agency and Iran discussed the
alleged studies at meetings in Tehran. During these discussions, the Agency provided detailed
information about the allegations and asked for clarification concerning other issues that had arisen
during the implementation of the work plan, including the roles of PHRC, KM, the Education
Research Institute (ERI) and the Institute of Applied Physics (IAP) (GOV/2004/83, paras 100–101).
37. The Agency showed Iran certain documentation which the Agency had been given by other
Member States, purportedly originating from Iran, including a flowsheet of bench scale conversion of
UO2 to UF4. The documents show a capacity of the process of about 1 tonne per year of UF4. The
flowsheet has KM markings on it and refers to “Project 5/13.” The documentation includes
communications between the project staff and another private company on the acquisition of process
instrumentation. These communications also make reference to the leadership of the project
concerning the missile re-entry vehicle. The Agency also presented a sketch of a process to produce
50 tonnes of UF4 per year.
38. Iran stated that the allegations were baseless and that the information which the Agency had
shown to Iran was fabricated. However, Iran agreed to clarify its statement in detail. On 8 February
and 12 February 2008, the Agency reiterated in writing its request for additional clarifications. On
14 February 2008, Iran responded, reiterating its earlier statements and declaring that this was its final
assessment on this point. Iran stated that the only organization that had been, and was, involved in fuel
cycle activities was the AEOI and that the AEOI had had a contract with KM to develop a UOC plant
in Gchine, which was the only project in which KM was ever involved. In Iran’s view, the flowsheet
was a fabrication and the accusation baseless.
39. During the meetings on 3–5 February 2008, the Agency made available documents for
examination by Iran and provided additional technical information related to: the testing of high
voltage detonator firing equipment; the development of an exploding bridgewire detonator (EBW); the
simultaneous firing of multiple EBW detonators; and the identification of an explosive testing
arrangement that involved the use of a 400 m shaft and a firing capability remote from the shaft by a
distance of 10 km, all of which the Agency believes would be relevant to nuclear weapon R&D. Iran
stated that the documents were fabricated and that the information contained in those documents could
easily be found in open sources. During the meetings mentioned above, the Agency also described
parameters and development work related to the Shahab 3 missile, in particular technical aspects of a
re-entry vehicle, and made available to Iran for examination a computer image provided by other
Member States showing a schematic layout of the contents of the inner cone of a re-entry vehicle. This
layout has been assessed by the Agency as quite likely to be able to accommodate a nuclear device.
Iran stated that its missile programme involved the use of conventional warheads only and was also
part of the country’s space programme, and that the schematic layout shown by the Agency was
baseless and fabricated.
40. During the meetings of 27–28 January and 3–5 February 2008, the Agency asked Iran to clarify
a number of procurement actions by the ERI, PHRC and IAP which could relate to the abovementioned
alleged studies. These included training courses on neutron calculations, the effect of shock
waves on metal, enrichment/isotope separation and ballistic missiles. Efforts to procure spark gaps,
shock wave software, neutron sources, special steel parts (GOV/2006/15, para. 37) and radiation
measurement equipment, including borehole gamma spectrometers, were also made. In its written
response on 5 February 2008, Iran stated that ‘PAM shock’ software was enquired about “in order to
study aircraft, collision of cars, airbags and for the design of safety belts.” Iran also stated that the
radiation monitors it had enquired about were meant to be used for radiation protection purposes.
Iran’s response regarding the efforts to procure training courses on neutron calculations, and
enrichment/isotope separation, spark gaps, shock wave software, neutron sources and radiation
measurement equipment for borehole gamma spectrometers is still awaited.
41. During the same meetings, the Agency requested clarification of the roles of certain officials
and institutes and their relation to nuclear activities. Iran was also asked to clarify projects such as the
so-called “Project 4” (possibly uranium enrichment) and laser related R&D activities. Iran denied the
existence of some of the organizations and project offices referred to in the documentation and denied
that other organizations named were involved in nuclear related activities. Iran also denied the
existence of some of the people named in the documentation and said allegations about the roles of
other people named were baseless. Iran’s response to the Agency’s request regarding “Project 4” and
laser related R&D activities is still awaited.
42. On 15 February 2008, the Agency proposed a further meeting to show additional documentation
on the alleged studies to Iran, after being authorized to do so by the countries which had provided it.
Iran has not yet responded to the Agency’s proposal.
B. Current Enrichment Related Activities
43. On 12 December 2007, the first physical inventory taking was carried out at the Fuel
Enrichment Plant (FEP) in Natanz and verified by the Agency. Since the beginning of operations in
February 2007, a total of 1670 kg of UF6 had been fed into the cascades. The operator presented, inter
alia, about 75 kg of UF6 as the product, with a stated enrichment of 3.8% U-235. The throughput of the
facility has been well below its declared design capacity. There has been no installation of centrifuges
outside the original 18-cascade area. Installation work, including equipment and sub-header pipes, is
continuing for other cascade areas. Since March 2007, a total of nine unannounced inspections have
been carried out at FEP. All nuclear material at FEP remains under Agency containment and
44. On 8 November 2007, Iran stated that it “agreed that exchanging of the new centrifuge
generation information” would be discussed with the Agency in December 2007 (GOV/2007/58,
para. 33). On 13 January 2008, the Director General and Deputy Director General for Safeguards
visited an AEOI R&D laboratory at Kalaye Electric, where they were given information on R&D
activities being carried out there. These included work on four different centrifuge designs: two
subcritical rotor designs, a rotor with bellows and a more advanced centrifuge. Iran informed the
Agency that the R&D laboratory was developing centrifuge components, measuring equipment and
vacuum pumps with the aim of having entirely indigenous production capabilities in Iran.
45. On 15 January 2008, Iran informed the Agency about the planned installation of the first new
generation subcritical centrifuge (IR-2) at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) and provided
relevant design information. On 29 January 2008, the Agency confirmed that a single IR-2 test
machine and a 10-machine IR-2 test cascade had been installed at PFEP. Iran reported that about
0.8 kg of UF6 had been fed to the single machine between 22 and 27 January 2008. Iran has continued
to test P-1 centrifuges in one single machine, one 10-, one 20- and one 164-machine cascade at PFEP.
Between 23 October 2007 and 21 January 2008, Iran fed a total of about 8 kg of UF6 into the single
P-1 and the 10-machine P-1 cascade; no nuclear material was fed into the 20- and 164-machine
cascades. At the end of January 2008, the single P-1 machine and the 10- and 20-machine P-1
cascades were dismantled and the space was used for the new IR-2 machines. All activities took place
under Agency containment and surveillance.
46. On 5 February 2008, the Deputy Director General for Safeguards and the Director of Safeguards
Operations B visited laboratories at Lashkar Abad, where laser enrichment activities had taken place
in 2003 and earlier. The laboratories are now run by a private company, which is producing and
developing laser equipment for industrial purposes. All the former laser equipment has been
dismantled and some of it is stored at the site. The management of the company provided detailed
information on current and planned activities, including plans for extensive new construction work,
and stated that they are not carrying out, and are not planning, any uranium enrichment activities.
C. Reprocessing Activities
47. The Agency has continued monitoring the use and construction of hot cells at the Tehran
Research Reactor (TRR), the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (the
MIX Facility) and the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40) through inspections and design
information verification. There have been no indications of ongoing reprocessing related activities at
those facilities. In addition, Iran has stated that there have been no reprocessing related R&D activities
in Iran, which the Agency can confirm only with respect to these facilities.
D. Heavy Water Reactor Related Projects
48. On 5 February 2008, the Agency carried out design information verification at the IR-40 and
noted that construction of the facility was ongoing. The Agency has continued to monitor the
construction of the Heavy Water Production Plant using satellite imagery. The imagery appears to
indicate that the plant is operating.
E. Other Implementation Issues
E.1. Uranium Conversion
49. During the current conversion campaign at UCF, which began on 31 March 2007,
approximately 120 tonnes of uranium in the form of UF6 had been produced as of 2 February 2008.
This brings the total amount of UF6 produced at UCF since March 2004 to 309 tonnes, all of which
remains under Agency containment and surveillance. Iran has stated that it is carrying out no uranium
conversion related R&D activities other than those at Esfahan.
E.2. Design Information
50. On 30 March 2007, the Agency requested Iran to reconsider its decision to suspend the
implementation of the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1.
(GOV/2007/22, paras 12–14), but there has been no progress on this issue. However, Iran has
provided updated design information for PFEP.
E.3. Other Matters
51. On 26 November 2007, the Agency verified and sealed in the Russian Federation the fresh fuel
foreseen for the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP), before its shipment to Iran. As of February
2008, all fuel assemblies had been received, verified and re-sealed at BNPP.
52. The Agency has been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material
in Iran. Iran has provided the Agency with access to declared nuclear material and has provided the
required nuclear material accountancy reports in connection with declared nuclear material and
activities. Iran has also responded to questions and provided clarifications and amplifications on the
issues raised in the context of the work plan, with the exception of the alleged studies. Iran has
provided access to individuals in response to the Agency’s requests. Although direct access has not
been provided to individuals said to be associated with the alleged studies, responses have been
provided in writing to some of the Agency’s questions.
53. The Agency has been able to conclude that answers provided by Iran, in accordance with the
work plan, are consistent with its findings — in the case of the polonium-210 experiments and the
Gchine mine — or are not inconsistent with its findings — in the case of the contamination at the
technical university and the procurement activities of the former Head of PHRC. Therefore, the
Agency considers those questions no longer outstanding at this stage. However, the Agency continues,
in accordance with its procedures and practices, to seek corroboration of its findings and to verify
these issues as part of its verification of the completeness of Iran’s declarations.
54. The one major remaining issue relevant to the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme is the alleged
studies on the green salt project, high explosives testing and the missile re-entry vehicle. This is a
matter of serious concern and critical to an assessment of a possible military dimension to Iran’s
nuclear programme. The Agency was able to show some relevant documentation to Iran on 3–5
February 2008 and is still examining the allegations made and the statements provided by Iran in
response. Iran has maintained that these allegations are baseless and that the data have been fabricated.
The Agency’s overall assessment requires, inter alia, an understanding of the role of the uranium metal
document, and clarifications concerning the procurement activities of some military related institutions
still not provided by Iran. The Agency only received authorization to show some further material to
Iran on 15 February 2008. Iran has not yet responded to the Agency’s request of that same date for
Iran to view this additional documentation on the alleged studies. In light of the above, the Agency is
not yet in a position to determine the full nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. However, it should be
noted that the Agency has not detected the use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged
studies, nor does it have credible information in this regard. The Director General has urged Iran to
engage actively with the Agency in a more detailed examination of the documents available about the
alleged studies which the Agency has been authorized to show to Iran.
55. The Agency has recently received from Iran additional information similar to that which Iran
had previously provided pursuant to the Additional Protocol, as well as updated design information.
As a result, the Agency’s knowledge about Iran’s current declared nuclear programme has become
clearer. However, this information has been provided on an ad hoc basis and not in a consistent and
complete manner. The Director General has continued to urge Iran to implement the Additional
Protocol at the earliest possible date and as an important confidence building measure requested by the
Board of Governors and affirmed by the Security Council. The Director General has also urged Iran to
implement the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1 on the early
provision of design information. Iran has expressed its readiness to implement the provisions of the
Additional Protocol and the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1, “if
the nuclear file is returned from the Security Council to the IAEA”.
56. Contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related
activities, having continued the operation of PFEP and FEP. In addition, Iran started the development
of new generation centrifuges. Iran has also continued construction of the IR-40 reactor and operation
of the Heavy Water Production Plant.
57. With regard to its current programme, Iran needs to continue to build confidence about its scope
and nature. Confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme requires that
the Agency be able to provide assurances not only regarding declared nuclear material, but, equally
importantly, regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. With the
exception of the issue of the alleged studies, which remains outstanding, the Agency has no concrete
information about possible current undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. Although Iran
has provided some additional detailed information about its current activities on an ad hoc basis, the
Agency will not be in a position to make progress towards providing credible assurances about the
absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran before reaching some clarity about the
nature of the alleged studies, and without implementation of the Additional Protocol. This is especially
important in the light of the many years of undeclared activities in Iran and the confidence deficit
created as a result. The Director General therefore urges Iran to implement all necessary measures
called for by the Board of Governors and the Security Council to build confidence in the peaceful
nature of its nuclear programme.
58. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.
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