The following is quoted from a fairly right-wing think tank that has been getting a lot of headlines in the past few days. The fact it is a relatively right-wing report makes it's conclusions even more damning to the current folly of missile defence.
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5.4 If Europe had a missile defense system, could that system protect Europe? The analysis given here shows that the missile defense system proposed for deployment in Europe has serious weaknesses and would not be able to provide a dependable defense against IRBMs and ICBMs launched from Iran, if such a threat were to emerge.
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Recommendations
5.10 This report has concluded that there is at present no IRBM/ICBM threat from Iran and that such a threat, even if it were to emerge, is not imminent. Moreover, if such a threat were forthcoming, the proposed European missile defenses would not provide a dependable defense against it. It does not make sense, therefore, to proceed with deployment of the European missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic.
"

 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/may/20/iran-test-fires-missile-israel

2000km range. That's IRBM,

Yes, I'd already read those reports, just like I read previous reports saying the Iranian missile ranges were as faked for national self-consumption as the previous reports of their missile sizes, just like the faked North Korean reports that they'd launched a satellite into orbit. Propa-fucking-ganda. These false reports are beneficial both to out state and the Iranian state, but even if they were true then how is that relevant? They have no payload. An Iranian missile slamming into Southern Europe could do no more damage than a homemade Gazan missile striking Israel. It would destroy one or two houses at most without a payload. And what response would that bring?

The report I quoted makes it clear it is talking about nuclear missiles. The scary sort of missile. It also makes it clear they don't have these, won't do for ages and even if they did, the Son of Star Wars shield would be ineffective at protecting Europe [which was the fucking point I was making]. It also makes it clear that any such weapon would be illogical and counterproductive for Iran. I assume you are just attacking my post because I posted it, WelshboyAndy, supposed friend of the Palestinian people. One monkey doesn't stop this show.


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5.5 Does Europe face a military threat from Iran, and if so what is the nature of that threat? This report has focused on the technical rather than the political aspects of a possible threat. It has not assumed that Iran is planning to attack (or to acquire the capability to attack) Europe with nuclear-armed ballistic missiles; it is indeed difficult to imagine the circumstances inwhich Iran would do so. Iran does not at present possess that capability, nor is there specifi c evidence that it is seeking to acquire it. The nuclear missile threat from Iran to Europe is thus not imminent. At some point in the future Iran could acquire the capability to attack Europe with nuclear-armed IRBMs. It is not clear, however that the deployment of IRBMs would enhance Iran’s security. Large, visible, ground-launched missiles would be both provocative and vulnerable; mobile or
silo-launched missiles would be more secure but would take much longer to develop, and their use would elicit a massive response.
"

Nice to know that you have authorative information about the range and payload of Iranian missiles. I'm sure the JIC will be most interested in hearing from you.

Could the 'missile shield' protect Europe? Unfortunately, we'll never know unless it actually happens. Think tanks may say 'no', but the Pentagon is going to have some convincing data on the system if it is to sell it to Congress and Obama. Yes, I know the inevitable response: 'The Pentagon can get away with what it likes, etc ...'

But as far as Europe is concerned, what have we to lose? Maybe the Iranians are no threat. Maybe the system doesn't work. But why should we care if we're not paying for it?

And the Russian response is frankly paranoid: twelve defensive missiles against a thousand or so warheads, which, if launched towards America, won't even come near the 'shield'?

"Could the 'missile shield' protect Europe?"

No. I don't think even the military are even pretending it could. Missile intercepts at ballistic speeds require a great deal of distance from the supposedly protected area to the intercept. This shield is solely designed to protect North America.

"But as far as Europe is concerned, what have we to lose?"

It makes every base in Europe associated with this a necessary 'first-strike' before any attempted strike on the US, in the same way that any tiny village with a Z or X Berth for Trident is a first-strike if the UK enters nuclear war.

"And the Russian response is frankly paranoid"

Hardly.

Russian Concerns about the European Missile Defense System

4.24 U.S. critics of the proposed missile defenses in Europe point to the weaknesses discussed above. Russian critics, on the other hand, point to the threat that those missile defenses pose to Russia’s national security interests. The main Russian concern is the EMR. The Czech Republic is a convenient place from which to gain a better view of Russian ICBMs and to defend the east coast of the United States. The Russians see enormous potential for upgrading the power of the EMR, giving the U.S. global missile defense system a broad capability to track ICBMs launched from the European part of Russia, providing information not only for the missile interceptors based in Poland but for those based in Alaska too. Deployment of the EMR will, in the Russian view, create over the territory of the United States a “missile defense umbrella” against a potential Russian ICBM attack. The resulting integrated defense, which would include missile defense radars in California and Alaska, would provide comprehensive missile defense coverage of the entire United States against all of Russia’s strategic missile forces. Russian military leaders and experts regard the proposed EMR in the Czech Republic as a key element in the creation of the information infrastructure for building up and strengthening the global U.S. missile defense system.
4.25 The United States has argued that since the launch site in Poland will have only ten interceptors it can pose no substantial threat to the large numbers of ICBMs
currently possessed by Russia. Russia has countered that the number of interceptors could be increased very quickly. It would not be diffi cult from either a technical
or an economic point of view to increase the number of interceptors: silo-based and mobile interceptors could be deployed for millions of dollars compared to one billion dollars for the EMR. Such interceptors could be deployed in Europe instead of the currently proposed interceptors. The ten interceptors planned for deployment in Poland will be able to intercept Russian ICBMs launched from the European part of Russia. Ten interceptors do not represent a big threat to the Russian strategic missile forces. But Russia is concerned that an increase in the number of interceptors in Poland or in other places in Europe, as well as the interceptors’ advancing capabilities, will seriously undermine the Russian retaliatory potential.
4.26 ICBMs launched from Iran on trajectories toward the United States, and IRBMs on trajectories towards Western Europe, would almost certainly deploy warheads
that are oriented towards the European midcourse radar, close enough to a nose-on orientation to have very small radar cross-sections. For ICBMs launched from Russia toward the United States, however, the radar viewing angles for the different ICBM stages will produce radar cross-sections hundreds of times larger than the radar cross-sections of warheads launched from Iran. These very large radar cross-sections would make it possible for the EMR — especially if it is upgraded — to track the upper rocket stages of Russian ICBMs with high precision. The radar could observe subtle changes in the motion of the upper rocket stages as the upper stage deploys warheads.
The radar might or might not be able to observe the warheads, depending on engineering details and on whether they can be viewed from the back end, but it might be possible to infer the trajectories of the warheads, providing enough information to launch interceptor missiles toward intercept points where they would then home in on the infrared signals from the warheads — and on the decoys that would almost certainly accompany the warheads.
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Conclusion
4.27 This analysis points to the following conclusions:
a. The proposed addition of European-based components to the U.S. national missile defense cannot provide a dependable defense for Europe or the United States.
b. Any country capable of building, deploying, and operating IRBMs or ICBMs will be able to develop the countermeasures needed to render the missile defense ineffective. The EMR will face great difficulties in discriminating warheads launched from Iran against Europe or the United States from the decoys that might accompany them.
c. If Iran were to produce a missile that could carry a nuclear warhead to a range of 2,000 km, the European-based components of the U.S. missile defense could not engage that missile. The appropriate missile defense would be shorter-range missile defenses such as Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). These missile defenses too would have to be able to cope with the potential countermeasures that could defeat the longer-range exoatmospheric defense system.
d. Russia has made it clear that it regards the proposed European missile defense system as a threat to its national security interests. It places particular emphasis
on the capacity of the system for expansion and modernization. Under these circumstances, Russia is unlikely to be willing to agree to deep reductions in strategic nuclear forces.
e. These conclusions suggest that, before taking a decision to deploy the proposed missile defenses in Europe, the Obama administration should conduct a serious technical review of the capabilities claimed for the proposed European missile defense system. In particular it should ask: does the EMR have the range against warheads to support its intended discrimination function? Can the system overcome simple countermeasures? Has the system “demonstrated through successful, operationally realistic flight-testing, a high probability of working in an operationally eff ective manner,” as required by the FY-2008 Defense Authorization Act.