babs tucker | 15.07.2010 22:06
today the court of appeal refused amongst their ongoing state corruption - to disclose the draft judgement to litigants in person.
so YET more of our CAMPAIGNING time was wasted.
From: Barbara Tucker
Sent: 15 July 2010 22:40:12
Cc: civilappeals ( firstname.lastname@example.org)
Attachments: 1 attachment
court of ...doc (62.0 KB)
dear civil appeals office,
please forward the attached submission re 16th july 2010 in mayor of london - v- tucker 2010/1598, to the somewhat elusive mr lister, clerk to the master of the rolls - 0207 947 6371.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL IN MAYOR – v – TUCKER 2010/1598.
Written Submission made by MRS BARBARA TUCKER dated 15th July 2010.
On 14th July 2010, I noticed that the Court of Appeal had listed a hearing on 16th July 2010 at 9am in Court 71 at the Royal Courts of Justice, to hand down a judgment in Mayor of London v others.
Around 12pm on July 15th 2010, I visited the Civil Appeals office to collect my copy of the Draft Judgment in 2010/1598 Mayor of London v Tucker, so that I could notify the court of any errors or omissions and prepare any submission etc I might need to make.
The Civil Appeals office put me through to the Master of the Rolls clerk, a Mr Lister, on 0207 947 6371.
Mr Lister refused to give me a copy of the Draft Judgment and said that draft copies had only been given to counsel. I questioned this and was told to ring back at 2pm, when he said he would have spoken to the Master of the Rolls.
It subsequently transpired/ was claimed late in the afternoon, that lawyers who had copies of the Draft Judgment for several days, had instructions to not disclose this/copy to their clients, and that somehow litigants in person were not entitled to equality of arms and so on and so forth….??
Mr Lister refused to put in writing any explanation/legal basis for what was going on, and was discourteous in not giving me any contact details that would enable me to make a written complaint etc or the necessary submissions, directly to the Master of the Rolls.
Therefore, since I have no idea what is going on now, and with no time to make a considered decision, I am forced to put the following submission in writing, by email, c/o the civil appeals division.
1. This Defendant points out that unless the Defendant has no need to take matters further, the actions/lack of proper communication by YET another public authority, in this instance, the Court of Appeal, in very serious proceedings before the Court of Appeal has without explanation:
a) discriminated against the Defendant (because if anything I need more time than
any professional counsel to digest any ruling
b) disadvantaged the Defendant because i) I was unable to make any decision or
develop any argument regarding any necessary applications for appeal, ii) or in
relation to any application for costs or anything else that may flow from your
I note that this has happened in tandem with the Mayor and Press’s continuing dirty tricks campaign of ‘trial by media’ all of which goes well beyond state bullying, and disgracefully of a member/s of the public.
I therefore have reason to view these ‘proceedings’ as the continuance of an essentially ongoing apartheid government policy of bullying etc in Westminster which has always been about anyone having free rein to try to discredit, destroy and remove Brian Haws universal nine year campaign for justice for everyone.
Brian Haw was after all found to be lawful in Westminster City Council v Haw  EWHC 2073 (QB) (04 October 2002) before the Commissioner of the Metropolis under SOCPA 2005 ss 132-138, and then the Mayor of London, under the cover of bye-laws has sought to use land law to make what is lawful unlawful, all of which everyone has known, is contrary to a ruling that is binding on the Commissioner of the Metropolis , the Mayor of London and the Court of Appeal, in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Jones and Another  UKHL 5 (11th February, 1999) (refer below)
As per my earlier submissions in this appeal:
2. Justice Griffith Williams erred in fact and law, throughout his ‘judgment’ in:
The Mayor of London v Hall & Ors (Rev 1)  EWHC 1613 (QB) (29 June 2010)
(and btw I was only represented until 22nd June 2010) because:
he did not ‘distinguish’ between Brian Haws 9 year Parliament Square Peace Campaign and Maria Gallestegui’s and others recently arrived, ‘Democracy Village’.
3. In fact my unchallenged evidence (and that of Mr Haw), which established the true facts and was excluded from Justice Griffith Williams ‘judgment’, could not had it been included have led to the decision by Justice Griffith Williams.
• ie: 133 in The Mayor of London v Hall & Ors (Rev 1)  EWHC 1613 (QB) (29 June 2010) is about Democracy Village.
• No Mayor had genuinely tried to ‘negotiate’ with Brian Haw’s
Parliament Square Peace Campaign.
4. The third Defendant therefore remains able to rely on the fact that she was and is
acting reasonably and lawfully:
a) in the absence of any genuine written ‘negotiation’ providing a legal basis for any
decision, by any Mayor of London between 2006 - May 25th 2010
b) owing to the assurance given by Cecile De La Rue, on 16th August 2007,
c) owing to the fact that the GLA do not dispute that they acted unlawfully on 17th & 18th
August 2007 & 17th October 2007
c) and the subsequent failure to take any legal proceedings against this Claimant
between 2006 and May 25th 2010
d) and where there is no evidence of any written agreement by me to not use PSG.
& where it is unchallenged that:
a) the Defendant has been using PSG for four years
b) without preventing anyone else using the Square
c) there is not a single shred of evidence that has been provided in these proceedings of my being unreasonable in any way.
In terms of King Boris, irrationally demanding – recently – again without communication or negotiation - that I must – now – for example rest on the pavement, under at best, the because he can (demand it) Act 1984 which as any health and safety risk assessment would reveal would quite unnecessarily put me at risk of serious injury or death from a car mounting the pavement or a truck shedding a load,
I invite the Mayor stop trying to aggressively label me as a trespasser to get an injunction and instead, consider me a licensee/visitor.
refer: The Mayor of London v Hall & Ors (Rev 1)  EWHC 1613 (QB) (29 June 2010)
100…….“If that was to happen, any visitors would have the right to return immediately, as would the trespassers providing they did so only as visitors. I do not consider that this is a matter which prevents the making of orders for possession.”
It is clearly irrational for the Mayor to bring proceedings and for a judge to call me intransigent purely because quite sensibly I cannot see why and how it is necessary to:
a) suddenly demand that I ‘accept’ being at risk of serious injury or death from a car mounting the pavement or a truck shedding its load.
b) go to prison.
The following is the tortuous and circuitous route the Mayor has obsessively taken to try and achieve this bizarre ‘end’.
Clearly Parliament intended that the Queen should have title:
a) so that it remained public land that could be used in perpetuity by the public (because
land cannot be taken from the Queen, so legally no-one could ‘occupy’ it)
b) to prevent public land being used as a political football, by political parties, to eject
those they do not like, such as in the case of Mr Haws Parliament Square Peace
Had parliament intended or been able to legislate otherwise, it had every opportunity to give the land to the GLA/Mayor, and it did not.
The Mayor of London v Hall & Ors (Rev 1)  EWHC 1613 (QB) (29 June 2010)
90…….He (Mr Luba) submitted that the byelaws do not control access by the public to the land but their behaviour once on it and that this contrasts with the rights of a person who asserts ownership who can keep anyone out. He submitted that the claimant has no power and is given no power by statute to keep anyone out of the land and that this is inconsistent with the proposition that there is occupation by a person who is asserting the equivalent rights of an owner. He submitted it would be without the vires of the GLAA for the claimant to physically occupy PSG and to exclude all others.
91 ….section 385 (1) does not permit the making of byelaws to exclude persons from PSG
92. ….cannot support the claim to exclusive possession.
96. A claim for possession against trespassers (CPR Part 55 (1) (b)) "means a claim for the recovery of land which the claimant alleges is occupied only by a person or persons who entered on or remained on the land without the consent of a person entitled to possession of that land". This wording is important:
6. In Westminster City Council v Haw  EWHC 2073 (QB) (04 October 2002) where Mr Haws’ campaign was found to be reasonable is not just virtually identical. It is the same campaign.
7. The High Court, Court of Appeal and The Mayor of London are – ALL - bound by the ruling made by Lord Irvine in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Jones and Another  UKHL 5 (11th February, 1999) where Lord Irvine stated:
(reasonable – no limit on size, duration…)
Since the law confers this public right, I deprecate any attempt artificially to restrict its scope. It must be for the magistrates in every case to decide whether the user of the highway under consideration is both reasonable in the sense defined and not inconsistent with the primary right of the public to pass and repass. In particular, there can be no principled basis for limiting the scope of the right by reference to the subjective intentions of the persons assembling. Once the right to assemble within the limitations I have defined is accepted, it is self-evident that it cannot be excluded by an intention to exercise it. Provided an assembly is reasonable and non- obstructive, taking into account its size, duration and the nature of the highway on which it takes place, it is irrelevant whether it is premeditated or spontaneous: what matters is its objective nature. To draw a distinction on the basis of anterior intention is in substance to reintroduce an incidentality requirement. For the reasons I have given, that requirement, properly applied, would make unlawful commonplace activities which are well accepted. Equally, to stipulate in the abstract any maximum size or duration for a lawful assembly would be an unwarranted restriction on the right defined. These judgments are ever ones of fact and degree for the court of trial.
(ie: you can’t keep trying, like in this case, to make something that is lawful, unlawful)
Finally, I regard the conclusion at which I have arrived as desirable, because it promotes the harmonious development of two separate but related chapters in the common law. It is neither desirable in theory nor acceptable in practice for commonplace activities on the public highway not to count as breaches of the criminal law of wilful obstruction of the highway, yet to count as trespasses (even if intrinsically unlikely to be acted against in the civil law), and therefore form the basis for a finding of trespassory assembly for the purposes of the Public Order Act. A system of law sanctioning these discordant outcomes would not command respect.
(ie: Article 11 – the starting point is not that assembly is always unlawful)
But in my judgment our law will not comply with the Convention unless its starting-point is that assembly on the highway will not necessarily be unlawful. I reject an approach which entails that such an assembly will always be tortious and therefore unlawful.
Justice Griffith Williams clearly erred in law when he said in 101.. “Such management responsibilities are not inconsistent with a right to exclusive possession – "giving permission for rallies and events, advertising and filming" may be regarded as concomitant with exclusive possession.”
It would then follow that under SOCPA 2005 ss 132-138 the Commissioner of the Metropolis has the right to exclusive possession within 1km of Parliament, which clearly he does not.
Authorisation is NOT compatible with ECHR:
Contrary to point 129 in the High Court Judgment, there is an “issue”. Blum et al did not argue whether authorization procedure is ECHR compliant and as this Defendant’s first witness statement and written final submission stated, I did not ever concede that an authorization procedure was compliant, nor did Mr Harris, who was counsel for Mr Haw.
Further points to Note:
• In The Mayor of London v Hall & Ors (Rev 1)  EWHC 1613 (QB) (29 June 2010) point 71 is deliberately disingenuous.
Any failure was on the part of the GLA who failed to provide in writing a legal basis
as to why only Mr Haw could have a tent.
• The unchallenged evidence of my witness statements, contradicts for example 52 – 55 & 109 in
• Parts of Brian Haws Parliament Square Peace Campaign have always been on the grass
First Witness statement of Barbara Tucker: …..
4. There has always been some of the Parliament Square Peace Campaign on Parliament Square Green for as long as I have been a 24/7 member;
5. This has never prevented other people from also using Parliament Square;
6. It has never been my intention to occupy Parliament Square. I am in Parliament Square campaigning because we need a universal system of justice to protect all people’s lives;
7. "As WCC v Haw shows authorisation was not necessary and the much larger campaign was not an unreasonable obstruction.
8. We have never prevented anyone else from using public space".
9. Wherever we are one public authority or another is attacking us.
53. 16th August 2007: Cecile De la Rue from the GLA management team came to Parliament Square and told Brian Haw and myself that they were moving some people at the back of the square but that they would not be doing anything to us.
54. The following facts are well publicised:
55. 17th August 2007: GLA and MPS illegally move Brian Haw’s campaign into a cage that is on PSG, causing criminal damage etc in the process.
There is no legal basis given etc.
62. 17th October 2007: The GLA conducted their second illegal attack on Brian Haw’s PSPC on PSG, involving assaults, and criminal damage by the MPS, GLA and private contractors.
63. The GLA have without warning attacked and assaulted people as further criminal damage is caused to people and property. No paperwork is produced to give a legal basis for these actions. Senior members of the GLA management team are present and witness the assaults and criminal damage being caused which they find amusing.
My second witness statement was of course a brief one liner disputing all the statements that were subsequently made by Mr Grinter, Mr Syed Shah and various wardens, in a bundle served by the GLA.
Signed: Date: 15th July 2010.