The implications are simple and clear.

When a bank says "that phantom withdrawal was your fault" you can point to the Choudary research (which dates back to 2006) and ask, "can you prove that beyond all reasonable doubt". The truth is that the banks cannot. Just like bank charges were in the past, the future will be increasingly focused on banking security. How come Santander can send out other people's bank details on customers' statements?

The implications are that the simple device- which was to protect people from fraud - that Choudary developed has exposed a potentially major security flaw in the whole chip and pin system. If the research underpinning that device suddenly disappears then it gives credence to the argument (which many - myself included - will find to be conspiracy theory tin hat land) that the banks are covering up something much much bigger.

The banks were told chip and pin was not a magic bullet. They sold it as a magic bullet. The strategy was risk based. Better that it was an academic that realised the risk rather than some shadowy ultra secretive criminal mastermind who would simply start skimming the depositors without announcing that chip and pin is broken.

Realistically, I do not think there is any conspiracy. Just the banks attempting to hide their liabilities now their risk based behaviour has been exposed.

Banks attempt to suppress maths student's exposé of chip and pin

 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/education/education-news/banks-attempt-to-suppress-maths-students-expos233-of-chip-and-pin-2170396.html

You can print-out of the thesis as proof that transactions can be falsified, as Henry said. That's one implication that justifies keeping this online. Building the device would have other implications. You'd be able to test the security of smart card devices. A close software analogy would be a port-scanner, or a network stress tool like LOIC, which are pefectly legal because people have to test their networks to secure them, but tools like that are weapons when used maliciously by groups like Anonymous.

Henry is also correct that the banks knowingly introduced a flawed system, but it is less flawed than the system it replaced. I briefly worked for a smart card company in the early 90's, and my boss had a demo to evangalise the relative safety of smart cards. He'd copy credit card magnetic strips with a strip card reader, print out the copy onto video tape and hack accounts. A card strip reader cost £25 at the time, I sourced one five minutes after I first saw the demo. This is the equivalent for smart cards.

The encryption even the smart cards Sky TV use is licenced Israeli military encryption, no expense spared code. It's unbreakable, to me at least, unless N=NP and the mathematicians haven't proven that yet. Yet encryption is only one part of security, and this exposes gaping holes that are presumably down to multi-vendor (ie compromised) specifications and time constraints in the design process.

The banks say all fraud ultimately costs everyone but in reality there are different types of bank fraud. You can steal money from an individual account, or you can steal money from the bank, which to them is an acceptable loss that they will share out among their accounts. The bank steals money from you as stated policy, depending on your politics, but you also get shafted by other incompetence and theft from within the bank. I've had temp cashiers pocketing deposits, and the bank only admitting that after months of abuse once I found the receipt. One foreign bank sent me out a Chip n Pin card and security number without informing me (except through a TV campaign I never saw) which was intercepted and drained. So they have stolen money from me in various immoral ways, most costly the sharp practices recently. So I reciprocate, when they have stolen from me I deprive them of ten times that amount via roundabout ways. I don't steal from the banks to feed myself when I'm hungry, or to save other peoples lives, but when they fuck me over I fine them a greater amount. I burn some of their stolen money To me that is moral. That is my point in adding this post, to make anyone smart enough to build this tool consider when or if it is moral to use it as a weapon. Many protesters upset at the banks misbehaviour superglue or paint ATMs or block bank entrances, and that is barely effective at best, really it's just general maintenance costs far cheaper than fraud. Eric Cantona recently tried to get everyone to withdraw their cash from the banks at the same time, which shows he is a better poet than activist or economist. The Smart Card Defender is one of many, but not enough, tools that can dismantle capitalism, but it requires basic health and safety awareness. The elite are currently up a big shakey pedestal that we constructed for them. It's an inherently unsafe structure but if we dismantle it from the bottom then it is likely to collapse upon some of us. Plus on a hacker to hacker basis, if you overuse any tool then police will be breaking your door down.

My own metaphor for the safest liberation is when we crack the lid off a paint can. You don't try to prise it off from one point only, you swap positions repeatedly. Apologies if that reads like a Cantona poem, but anyone smart enough to build the SCD should get it.