A network of individuals, independent and alternative media activists and organisations, offering grassroots, non-corporate, non-commercial coverage of important social and political issues.

How do you know that Indymedia does not keep logs?

Indymedia UK (IMC-UK) is a network of activists who provide an open publishing platform. We are part of the wider Indymedia Network that started in Seattle during the protests against the WTO in November 1999, and the UK site was one of the first to join the network in early 2000. In common with all Indymedia Centres (IMCs) around the world, as designated in the (draft) Principles of Unity, IMC-UK does not log IP addresses - as detailed on the security page. Moreover, following on from previous requests by governmental authorities for logs, IMC-UK and many other Indymedia sites (e.g. the global website, www.indymedia.org) do not retain any logs related to the website. These facts are documented on our open mailing lists and on the open IMC documentation site, docs.indymedia.org. (here for example).

In the rest of this article, we provide some advice on how to improve the measures you take when publishing on the website if you want to do so anonymously. We also outline some legal procedures that could potentially be used to attack Indymedia and the right to free expression, as well as describing some of the technical points in more detail.

What if you don't trust us?

Maybe the police have infiltrated us. Maybe there is some software security issue we're unaware of that means the police can track our users. Maybe the police/GCHQ/NSA/FBI/CIA are monitoring all the connections to our server. Maybe we're just a bunch of amoral snitches... Although we have previously had hassle from the FBI, the police, and even Russian oligarchs, that doesn't mean you have to trust us. And, ultimately, we don't actually mind if you don't trust us. We simply state what we do - believe us if you like, or don't. Your call.

Here are some things that you could do to improve your security when using the IMC-UK website:

Only post stuff to Indymedia that won't get you in trouble.
Use Tor - an application that allows you anonymise your IP address. Bear in mind that it is not 100% safe - see these Tor caveats.
Don't post it on Indymedia, post it on wikipedia or blogspot or... well those two aren't that good, but wikileaks is pretty secure and better security than Indymedia in a number of ways.
Set up your own open publishing platform: the more the merrier.
Don't post anywhere on the internet.

Legal points relating to Indymedia UK

Indymedia provides a platform for anyone to publish their news: text, photos, video, whatever. Thus, as citizen journalists, we are entitled to some protection from seizure of our materials under the UK law regarding "excluded materials." This is not an absolute protection - and would depend on the circumstances and seriousness of any alleged crime.

The UK Indymedia publish server is located in the USA. Thus, to be able to gain access to this machine, the UK would have to get a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) agreement with the USA (similar to the one that was received by the USA from the Italian authorities prior to the Ahimsa server seizure in 2004). This is not an easy undertaking and would require a strong justification for the request.

Additionally, Indymedia has many contacts and has been supported in the past by organisations like Liberty, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), the Association for Progressive Communications (APC), the National Union of Journalists (NUJ), Members of Parliament and many others.

Technical points about UK IMC

Hardware encryption

There are two physical servers that are owned by Indymedia UK. The first is the publish server (see below for more information about how the website software is designed), which is named Traven (after B. Traven, the author) and is located in Seattle, USA. The second was called Strummer (after Joe Strummer of The Clash) and is located in the UK. Both servers use Debian GNU/Linux and make use of disk encryption, which means that the data needs to be decrypted before it can be used. Disk encryption is carried out for the protection of all users: those viewing the website as well as the system administrators and Indymedia moderators. This is because, although we take measures (as outlined below) to ensure anonymity, we cannot be certain we have not overlooked something and so we wish to protect this information should it fall into the wrong hands.

The passphrases required for the disk encryption software are long (in the region of 30-40 characters, minimum) and not memorable - instead, they are only stored in an encrypted format by trusted administrators. If any of the servers are turned off for any reason (e.g. if there is a power cut), the passphrases need to be manually re-entered before the machine can become functional again. This is why there is sometimes a slight delay in reinstating services should a server become unreachable. Additionally, people who have physical access to the servers do not normally hold the passphrases - and, in some instances, the passphrases are kept in a different country to where the machine is located.

Software anonymisation

The UK Indymedia website uses a software called 'Mir'. This is designed around a central publish server from which static HTML content is then copied to mirrors. UK-IMC has employed up to 10 mirrors at any one time, although usually we use less than this number. The mirrors may be located anywhere around the world, and when you click on www.indymedia.org.uk you will be redirected to one of these mirrors at random. Mirrors, like the publish server, are set up to not log IP addresses - even though they only receive page views and do not contain any information about who posted an article.

Both the publish server and all the UK Indymedia mirror servers have Apache (the webserver software) set to not write any log files. But, since Apache requires an ErrorLog file before it will start, this is redirected to /dev/null/, thus:

ErrorLog /dev/null

This is important because otherwise errors (such as 404's - when a non-existent page is requested) are written to a file. Additionally, the way of controlling precisely what info is logged is via the LogLevel directive - and this cannot be set to not contain IP addresses.

There are no other lines related to recording information (logging) anywhere in the Apache configurations employed by Indymedia UK. The directory on the UK publish server that would normally contain log files relating to Apache shows only the following:

traven:~# ls -l /var/log/apache2/
total 28
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 24704 2009-02-10 01:39 jk-runtime-status
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root     1 2009-02-10 01:39 jk-runtime-status.lock
traven:~#

The two files shown here are related to the Mir software, which uses Java, and do not contain any information related to users. Indeed, this software was specifically designed for Indymedia, taking into account the provisions of the (draft) Principles Of Unity and the results of many discussions on the international imc-tech mailing list.

Conclusion

Indymedia takes your privacy seriously and works hard to ensure that the strictest security measures are in place. However, while we hope that everybody trusts our commitment to protect our users - and thus our technical and security procedures - we also understand that the measures we take may not be easily understandable by non-techs. In this article we have therefore tried to explain some of the measures we take and why we take them. We end with a reiteration of our commitment to the global Indymedia Principles of Unity - and particularly want to highlight Principle 4:

4. All IMC's, based upon the trust of their contributors and readers, shall utilize open web based publishing, allowing individuals, groups and organizations to express their views, anonymously if desired.

IMC-UK
Homepage: http://www.indymedia.org.uk

Additions

Some security resources for those concerned

19.02.2009 15:26

Tor - An anonymous internet communication system.

http://tor.eff.org

Torpark - A secure browser built on Firefox Deer Park, using the Tor network.

http://www.torrify.com

Ultrasurf - Secure Internet surﬁ ng.

http://www.ultrareach.com

Freegate - Encrypted Internet access.

http://www.download.com/3000-20-10415391.html

Peaceﬁ re - A censorship circumvention tool.

http://www.peaceﬁ re.org/

Hacktivismo - An international group of hackers, human rights workers, lawyers and artists that evolved out of The Cult of the Dead Cow (cDc).

http://www.hacktivismo.com

Tactical Technology Collective - A non-proﬁ t foundation promoting the use of free and open source software for non-governmental organizations, and producers of the Security NGO-in-A-Box.

http://security.ngoinabox.org/

http://www.tacticaltech.org/

Reporters Without Borders, Handbook for Cyber-Dissidents and Bloggers

http://www.rsf.org/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=542

Digital Security and Privacy for Human Rights Defenders by Dmitri Vitaliev
Published by Front Line - The International Foundation for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders

http://www.frontlinedefenders.org

http://www.frontlinedefenders.org/manuals/en/esecman.html

but, really, get real

Comments

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Hidden Comment

This posting has been hidden because it breaches the Indymedia UK (IMC UK) Editorial Guidelines.

IMC UK is an interactive site offering inclusive participation. All postings to the open publishing newswire are the responsibility of the individual authors and not of IMC UK. Although IMC UK volunteers attempt to ensure accuracy of the newswire, they take no responsibility legal or otherwise for the contents of the open publishing site. Mention of external web sites or services is for information purposes only and constitutes neither an endorsement nor a recommendation.

Like we would beleave:

19.02.2009 10:15

Former members of Trotsky groups a known Police Informer who do the admin and run the servers what point do you not get indymedia? come on kick out the dead wood, start again and then trust might just be given back.

However in light of recent events ill be more careful at what I post, though I use wifi, and other means when on line, my trust and the trust of others has been trashed this is sorry to say a little to late, as was the removing of misinformation, it might seem some people are making the job of some people a thankless task, far from it.

I support the aims the objectives of indymedia, it is simple I do not trust former Trotsky group members now self proclaimed anarchist, and those who have been proven to have spoken to the police:

Until others involved stage an uprising and remove the dead wood, indymedia as a whole can and should never be trusted as long as these people are in place, try and talk to others inside indymedia it seems they have been brain washed, in all problity this is what has happened, there reluctant to talk, give comments in private there is a climate of fear inside indymedia and now more than ever we need people to speak out here is what the government has planed next few years:

Have we not told you before we are not going towards a police state,

http://politics.guardian.co.uk/homea…644201,00.html

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main…portaltop.html

erm we are already there?,

Here what is planned in the next few months

National Identity Card Act

http://www.no2id.net/

Requirements to report changes of address, handing over biometric details, system of fines for non-compliance and incorrect data. Holding an ID card or registering onto the National ID register could be made a requirement of obtaining any other document.

Even more anti-terror bollocks

http://projectsheffield.wordpress.com/2009/02/16/photographers-turn-out-in-solidarity-against-new-terror-law/

Potential Ban on Photography under new Terrorism Legislation (police will interpret whether people have good reason, so expect widespread abuse. Snatch film and camera now ask questions later). So much for a free press providing a watchful eye on the police.

Borders Citizenship and Immigration Bill

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/libertycentral/2009/feb/13/civil-liberties-immigration
New Customs and Exercises officials with powers of arrest and search etc., reporting directly to the Home Office and Secretary of state (politically controlled police force) Citizens

Coroners and Justice Bill

http://www.no2id.net/news/pressRelease/release.php?name=A_Bill_to_build

Data Sharing Orders created under clause 152 allowing government departments to circumnavigate data protection act and request any data about you from any other governmental department for any purpose. E.g. medical records sent to benefits offices to check up on people claiming incapacity.

Communications Bill

http://www.politics.co.uk/legislation/legal-and-constitutional/communications-data-bill-$1245133.htm

Plans to retain all our communications data as part of the Interception Modernization Program (IMP)Never even mind the Criminal Justice Act, Serious Organized Crime Act, and all the existing Anti-Terror legislation.

Now more than ever we need the likes of indymedia, what we need to ask are people prepapred to act and kick out the dead wood?

More

This posting has been hidden because it breaches the Indymedia UK (IMC UK) Editorial Guidelines.

to little to late

19.02.2009 14:11

Great that indymedia have finally collectively spoken after an long and embarrassing silence but what about the issue everyone has been talking about only to find their attempts at discussion are hidden? The issue of the admin accessible IP logs built into the indymedia software itself? We know it is there I really expected some explanation would be offered in this statement but again it is conspicuous by its absence.

Please indymedia, come clean, tell us what we need to know.

so what about the IP logging in MIR?

Hidden Comment

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19.02.2009 15:22

wots all this shit about police informers? you wonder why dannys first post was hidden, it will be because he is talking shit. for a start, he is making claims about somebody who he says is an admin on the scotland indymedia site which is separate from imc uk so hardly relevant to the issue at hand. secondly he offers nothing but his say so, part of a slagging match between him and the other person that has been going on for years on and offline. if danny had any evidence at all then i'm sure people would deal with it as who wants a police informer among them, nobody. on the other hand perhaps people just think that danny is a dick with a grudge who wild unsubstantiated accusations serve only our enemies.

who needs the cops

The double edged sword of anonymity

19.02.2009 15:51

The problem with anonymous posting is that only the poster knows if the poster can be trusted as telling the truth or what their motivations are for posting. Anonymity is great then if you don't want people to know you are responsible for a post, perhaps because it would reveal you to have been involved in some way with the things you speak of, or because you are a duplicitous tosser with malicious intend.

Indymedia seeks to provide security for the former, a way for people to publish first hand reports about the struggles they are involved in without getting their collars felt by the political police, powerful corporate interests or their employers. Sadly the later obtain equal cover and are free to hurl unsubstantiated accusations at whoever they please for whatever reason they might have.

Free reign for pretentious artists and danny boys to publish divisive claptrap on what was meant to be a platform for radically biased grassroots news coverage of important social and political issues - that is the price we all pay for anonymity.

An official IMC UK statement?

It's a bit of a red herring to worry about whether Indymedia is "infiltrated" or not.

You should never rely on a single third party for your anonymity anyway. Even if I knew every Indymedia admin personally and trusted them all totally, I still wouldn't rely on them. Accidents happen, people change, one of them could get a keylogger physically placed on their machine.

If you want anonymity, use something like Tor (

http://torproject.org) to post to or read Indymedia. Tor is decentralised, so is intrinsically more difficult to compromise. No single point of failure.

g33k

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20.02.2009 01:04

20.02.2009 00:16
Indymedia have recently demonstrated their ability and willingness to remove rogue admins.

im

From the outside though Ben defended 'you' when 'you' were falsley accused of keeping logs. If that is what you mean. I don't know the background to that so I don't want to judge. You probably shouldn't talk about it either. I will probably find out sooner than later because, well, I am not suididal. Would prefer prison to death you cunts.

Technically what'd I'd ask for as an improvement is that only a few of you volunteers can see my IP address, you stiffen up on your recruitment along with your internal security Thats a reccommendation not a condemnation.. If You need help recoding then I will do the dogs work but there are another dozen like me who don't post here yet. They are not scared of the tech but the admins, but they are approachable..

I would actuallly prefer a hostile witness to my claims. I can confirm for a fact that being told you are insane is damaging, but it is not fatal. Same goes for the CrimeStoppers terroriism charges. The stuff I can shrug off by it isn't aimed at me, it is aimed at my parents,

That does anger me.

Whatever you think of me they are nice people you'd like. They don't deseve the sort of abuse they've suffered because of my political actions.

Johnny aka

Anonymous and paranoid?

20.02.2009 08:24

If, by the use of ingenious technology, people are not arrested for exercising their freedom of expression how will the general public learn we live in a Police State? Those protesting on the streets do not fear arrest, despite the abuse of laws by the police as an excuse to arrest them on totally unrelated grounds. It is difficult here for the police to disguise confiscation of the server as anything else other than political repression, especially when accompanied by an arrest. Maybe sacrifices must be made for a cause?

My IP is 123.456.789.001 ;)

Wotsit

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Nothing to see here, move along

20.02.2009 10:55

"Maybe sacrifices must be made for a cause?"

Um, but I wasn't arrested and the police raids didn't target me but my family. I am offering to be arrested just to clean out one police informer from Indymedia, but that really won't help you next time because you obviously don't have the will or mechanism to deal with police informers with IM admin rights. Without that your 'principles' are just lies. The best technical set up IM can come up with will still fail somewhere between the keyboard and the chair.

In a lot of ways the police grasses here are less to blame than the ordinary IMCistas that allow them to operate. Of course you are going to be infiltrated, no shame in that, but it is shameful when you don't react to it.

Danny

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The revolution inches closer

20.02.2009 12:48

Yes it's true. The more comments per article, the more the revolution inches ever closer! Keep on posting these fascinating comments to a useful and great article.

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Have you ever thought

20.02.2009 12:55

Danny, please, if your accusations relate to a scotland indymedia site, as you've said before, then please stop implying it relates to admins on this unrelated site.

However, have you ever considered that if you have found yourself investigated by the police it might just be because you talk too much!

You've published on UK, scotland and ireland indymedia sites (among others) using your full name [Danny Prior] and given that name to the mainstream media too along with details like your age and home town. You've spouted off numerous claims relating to actions involving access to military bases, airports, criminal damage and conspiracy. You've admitted giving interviews to the police and going by your prolific publishing record we can reasonably assume you didn't give no comment interviews.

If there is a grass, perhaps it is you, simply unable to keep your mouth shut.

You've been kicked off of other sites for publishing information about other people - I think it is time indymedia banned you from this site as you are a danger to yourself and others.

@Dannyboy

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Boring

20.02.2009 13:40

Despite claiming to never do it Indy UK logs your IP details when you post a comment or file a story. Never, never, never use your own machine only use a web cafe machine and pay cash for the use.

Several ALF people have already been nicked as a result of the Indy logging of IP details, stay safe.

Details are here of the logging being recorded.

http://lists.indymedia.org/pipermail/imc-uk-moderation/2009-February/0210-1k.html

truth out

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Dead link

20.02.2009 13:51

Truthout that's a dead link.

confused

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correct link

20.02.2009 14:14

That link dont work cause someone erased it from the database but its still in the google cache and can be read here

http://74.125.77.132/search?q=cache:SiBijgIz0WsJ:archives.lists.indymedia.org/imc-uk-features/2003-October/004250.html&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=uk

It confirms indymedia has ip logging but not saved to disk.

ip logged

Some strategies indymedia could impliment to improve security

20.02.2009 15:53

1. Ensure indymedia users are aware of inherent security vulnerabilities issues and are equipped with the knowledge and skills required to reduce the risks by:

a) Full disclosure of all pertinent information.
b) Provision of well written how-to instructions on using Tor on any platform.
c) Laying on training and indymedia 'open days' at hacklabs and social centers.

2. Protect users from rouge admins manually logging IP information, either by completely disabling the facility for admins to view IP logs held in memory, or:

a) Introduce a public log of which admins switch on the IP log, when, why and for how long.
b) Make it so that it will log only the next X number of submissions rather then switch off automatically.
c) Obscure logged IP addresses using a non reversible hashing algorithm.

That final option would allow spammers to be identified and filtered without indymedia having to retain any information which could be used to track and identify a specific individuals computer.

3. Protect users from traffic analysis using one or all of the following methods:

a) Insert random delay between the submitting of a form and the actual act of publishing.
b) Introduce random error into the time shown on published articles.
c) Publish after a specific number of other secure connections have been made to the publish server.
d) Add an option to the publish field that allows users to specify time an article will be published.

All or any of the above would make it impossible to establish beyond reasonable doubt that any specific individual was responsible for any specific post based on the time they were known to connect to indymedia and the time an article appeared.

g33k2.0

Geeky suggestions are go

20.02.2009 16:27

The idea of delaying publication could work well. There are loads more comments posted than newswire posts so you could hold back some comments and then publish them all at the same time the next time an article is submitted. Anyone logging encrypted traffic via the service provider would only see what time you connected to the publish server and then at some point in the future a bunch of comments and an article appear on the site but there would be no way to establish which one you posted, if any.

That hashed IP logging could also work well, helping indymedia admins to identify persistent disinfo trolls while preventing anyone who might gain access to the admin interface from noting down information that could be useful to the police. If I understand it correctly it is the same as the way passwords are generally stored using a repeatable but non reversible algorithm to generate a 'finger print' of the users password without actually having to keep the password. This prevents hackers or dodgy admins from obtaining those passwords which the users might use for other purposes.

It would be pretty simple to implement I think. There are probably better algorithms which weight some parts of the IP address higher than others or discard some information to make trivial reversal impossible but even just adding up all the numbers would work. Take the IP address 203.129.78.32 then add all the numbers together and you get 442 which you store instead of the IP address. The same IP address will always produce 442. There will be other IP addresses occasionally produce the same result, for example 197.124.42.79, but it is relatively improbably. Anyone wanting to calculate the original IP address from the stored value 442 would be completely wasting their time but admins would be able to see that one person was responsible for a series of posts and therefore be better placed to spot deliberate misrepresentation and misdirection.

null

Log off Log on. which is it

20.02.2009 16:49

uh! you read the article before you post or did I miss something? Indymedia say they don't log ip addresses so why are you proposing they change the way they do it?

clueless

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reply to clueless

20.02.2009 19:40

Indymedia DO keep saying that they DON'T log ip addresses but if you've been following closely you'd see that's NOT the whole truth. The admins who wrote the article above say, "we simply state what we do" but it was left to eagle eyed site users to fill in the gaps and find documented PROOF that some form of IP logging IS used by indymedia, although NOT in a form which would be useful to the police who snatched the server. For some reason the admins don't want that ordinary users to know this so continually hide or delete any reference to it but they can't delete google cache or the archive.orgs wayback machine.

View the HIDDEN comments on

https://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/2009/02/422330.html?c=all or add ?c=all to the url address of any of the other indymedia threads about the server seizure and IF you can be arsed to SIFT through the tangential you'll find all the CLUES you need.

slighty less clueless

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fuck hunting for clues just read this

20.02.2009 20:47

here is a quick copy and paste rehash from some hidden comments last week

....

That such a facility exists is no surprise, it's pretty much essential to maintaining the integrity of publishing platform, especially one which operates without user registration. What is surprising is that an organisation proporting to care about user security would go to such lengths to keep their users in the dark, especially surprising from an organsation which aspires to openness and horizontality.

....

We need to trust indymedia, not to be infallible but at least to tell the truth. We can cope with security risks when we are aware of them but to be placated with half truths and be cut down from discussing the issues, that's just not on.

....

Indymedia are acting like the chinese government censors, hiding all comments on this and even going so far as to purge the history books of references they dont like. The revisionistas have deleted from their own PUBLIC mailing list archives all the emails mentioned by an earlier poster who ironically was pointing out that you cant gain security by sweeping issues under the carpet.

....

The [ip logging] feature was publicly announced in some detail during October 2003 on the IMC-UK-FEATURES list....

[Imc-uk-features] IP address
andi andi at syndicate.org.uk
Thu Oct 23 13:11:05 PDT 2003

hi all,

it is possible to log ip addresses in the new codebase. this can be
switched on and off, and is by default switched off.

the data collected is held in memory, not on any hard disk space and
is gone once the log is switched off again - so if anyone ever wanted
to raid the server no information on posters can be obtained.

but we as imcistas have the option to track trolls. we have not used
ip blocking yet but were near doing it - i for one have hunted for
ram's ip, see

http://lists.indymedia.org/pipermail...ptember/004459.
html

anyhow we never made firm decisions on this.

a question would be as well for how long a block is supposed to be...

cheers andi

....

More of that discussion can be seen in a log of an IRC meeting which was posted to the IMC-TECH list....

yossarian i am for blocking Rockwell
...
bunny_ it can easily be bypassed especially if person knows they are being blocked
....
yossarian i am hoping that Rockwell is a shithead who is not technically
savvy
....
bunny_ I think blocking should be decided by a secret comminite in private that we sety up at sheff
bunny_ which report general critia
bunny_ in open but not specifics
....
bunny_ The problem with Blocking is it depends on switching IP log on
bunny_ which we shoudl no do if we can aviod
Tom secret committe - not really in the sprit of the Indymedia collective IMHO
zak i'm rather nervous about starting to take decisions in private -- it kind of goes against our princple of accountability and openness
yossarian bunny_ that is very bakunin of you
bunny_ but it is nature of the tool of blocking
bunny_ if one chooses to use it
bunny_ I say it should be used rarely
Tom what's the issue with IP logging?
...
yossarian i am not for secrecy in this case either
....
bunny_ then yossarian you must be against blocking
....
yossarian no i am not against blocking, i just think we should be open about why we are doing it and who we are doing it to

....

It seem that some indymedia admins are hoping to rely on what is know as security through obscurity
which basically means you know that you have vulnerabilities but hope that by not talking about it then nobody will discover them for themselves. This approach is generally considered highly flawed but there are arguments for it but in this case it's certainly a case of shutting the barn door after the horses have bolted since the codebase MIR is open source and the features actively publicised by the developers.

....

In the meantime, attempting to hide all this from indymedia users is totally counterproductive at this time, especially while people are seeking reassurance and carification over the potential for police to obtain IP data relating to specific posts. Honestly would be reassuring and as stated in that October 2003 email, "the data collected is held in memory, not on any hard disk space and is gone once the log is switched off again - so if anyone ever wanted to raid the server no information on posters can be obtained."

uncensored

re: Some strategies indymedia could impliment to improve security

21.02.2009 01:29

> 2. Protect users from rouge admins manually logging IP information, either by completely
> disabling the facility for admins to view IP logs held in memory, or:
>
> a) Introduce a public log of which admins switch on the IP log, when, why and for how long.
> b) Make it so that it will log only the next X number of submissions rather then switch off automatically.

Someone with admin rights on the server could always install some kind of hidden program that makes their own separate IP log that would be unknown to anyone else. Once someone has admin rights or physical access to the machine, you just can't totally protect against any damage they might do.

I think it is a red herring to focus on this too much. Hiding of IP addresses is better done by the end user, using Tor.

> c) Obscure logged IP addresses using a non reversible hashing algorithm.
>
> That final option would allow spammers to be identified and filtered without indymedia having
> to retain any information which could be used to track and identify a specific individuals computer.

Firstly, as above a rogue admin could just bypass this and record the IP addresses before the hashing happens.

Secondly, it would be trivial for someone to run the hashing algorithm on every possible IP address, build a database of hashes, and then use that to match any hash back to an IP address (or possibly multiple IP addresses, if there are collisions.

Or if the police get a list of the hashed IP addresses, they could just get a list (from the ISP) of all IP addresses connecting to Indymedia at that approximate time, and apply the hash to all of those to see which one matches.

g33k

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Talk too much

21.02.2009 14:59

>Danny, please, if your accusations relate to a scotland indymedia site, as you've said before, then please stop implying it relates to admins on this unrelated site.

I assumed I was talking to an IMC Scotland admin at the time as they do often post here. However the same principles apply to all collectives, and you do need to be prepared to investigate each other. If any activist was grassed up to the police by a mainstream newspaper journalist then it would presumably be mentioned here on an article about site security.

>However, have you ever considered that if you have found yourself investigated by the police it might just be because you talk too much!

Yes, that was certainly the case before 2006, partly deliberately when I was inactive to draw attention, partly to encourage more direct action, partly to test what the police knew and partly because I just can't keep my mouth shut like you say.

>You've published on UK, scotland and ireland indymedia sites (among others) using your full name [Danny Prior] and given that name to the mainstream media too along with details like your age and home town. You've spouted off numerous claims relating to actions involving access to military bases, airports, criminal damage and conspiracy.

Funny how often my name is used here by people who don't give their names, actually I kept my name off the internet for as long as possible. There other are interesting inaccuracies in your statement but I take it is now okay for me to name [removed]. Being a police informer isn't the worst thing about him but it is the easiest to prove. I doubt he would be behind grassing up ALF folk simply because he is a genuine vegan even if everything else about him is fakery.

>You've admitted giving interviews to the police and going by your prolific publishing record we can reasonably assume you didn't give no comment interviews.

You are welcome to join me as a witness and find out. In fact, until the last raid I didn't even mention [removed]name to the cops - being a police grass isn't a crime.

>If there is a grass, perhaps it is you, simply unable to keep your mouth shut.

Perhaps is a piss-poor word for any media site when proof is offered.

>You've been kicked off of other sites for publishing information about other people - I think it is time indymedia banned you from this site as you are a danger to yourself and others.

Site, singular. I was kicked off LibCom for calling someone by their Indymedia almost identical pseudonymn - someone who I was emailling and could just have asked me to edit it. [removed] don't identify him to anyone except those who already know him - it's not like I published his real name as you just did again, hypocrite. Other people on the forum were refering to each other by their realnames anyway and weren't banned. It wasn't malicious, it was a typically manipulative political maneuvre. I don't mind as I only posted there reluctantly after some of the posters were undeservedly abusing a genuine anarchist group.

I am naturally disruptive, and don't mind being hidden when I am, it is better than being dishonest. You have to measure that against the disruption of say, visiting your father in hospital after yet another police raid, or the disruption of any political activitity when grassing is ignored.

PS
Some of the safety measures G33k proposes are negated by the fact that I didn't write some of the posts attributed to me.

Danny Prior

We are told

21.02.2009 15:27

We are told that IMC UK "does not log IP addresses" and that this is "documented on our open mailing lists". Those would be the open mailing lists from which conflicting facts have now been deleted (but can still be found cached beyond reach of indymedia censors.

We are told "maybe the police have infiltrated us" but how would we know when comments containing accusations of this kind are hidden by admins (perhaps even the same admins the accusations refer to) and go unreported so no other admins may even be aware that the accusations have been made.

We are told of Indymedias' "commitment to the global Indymedia Principles of Unity" [

http://docs.indymedia.org/bin/view/Global/PrinciplesOfUnity], a draft set of principles written nine years ago and never even agreed by the Independent Media Center Network.

We are told that all IMC's consider "open exchange of and open access to information a prerequisite to the building of a more free and just society", while IMC UK continues to hide information that could be essential to its users remaining free, even going so far as to delete their own archived records.

We are told IMC UK is committed to "a direct, participatory democratic process that is transparent to its membership", but admins secretly hide comments they don't like with no way for the contributor to find out who did it or why.

We are told "we don't actually mind if you don't trust us". Well that doesn't really inspire much solidarity but may be the most honest statement in the whole article.

the membership?

more geek thoughts

21.02.2009 15:40

> Someone with admin rights on the server could always install some kind of hidden
> program that makes their own separate IP log that would be unknown to anyone else.

You confuse those who have been given access to the admin interface of the indymedia cms with those who have root access. There are perhaps dozens with admin access but there are unlikely to be more than two or three sysadmins with root access. None of those with ordinary admin access could install any kind of hidden logging program but currently any of them could be manually recording IP addresses from the admin interface. Although I agree that ideally the end user should take steps to address this, it is not a red herring to reduce the risk inherent within the cms.

> if the police get a list of the hashed IP addresses, they could just get a list (from the ISP)
> of all IP addresses connecting to Indymedia at that approximate time, and apply the hash
> to all of those to see which one matches.

I don't think so, especially if indymedia implemented the delayed publishing idea. The hashing idea proposed was for non reversible hashes, a really simple algorithm which reduced IP addresses from the billions possible down to just hundreds so reversal would produce way to many collisions to provide any kind of proof. A list of the hashes and articles and comments would have significantly less evidential value than an ip log while still enabling indymedia admins to identify certain types of abuse and act against it.

I followed the link to the wikileeks security page provided in the indymedia article above and thought of an additional step that indymedia could take (perhaps they already are). It is clear that their publish server and html mirrors are on different servers so basically when you read something on indymedia you visit a different server than when you publish. This is potentially dangerous as it exposes those who publish to traffic analysis as they are separate from the far more frequent accesses by those who are simply reading from the site. Wikileeks automatically generates false secure connections with servers around the world to help hide genuine users from traffic analysis. Indymedia could do something similar, perhaps by simply directing some of non publishing connections at the publishing server instead of one of the mirrors. Even if just one in ten of the traffic that normally went to a mirror was instead directed at the publishing server then that would go a long way to obscure connections from people that were publishing a comment or an article. There would be no way for somebody watching the encrypted traffic to establish if the connection related to reading or contributing an article.

2.0 ?

Aliases and security

21.02.2009 16:31

Why is it that in the publish form for both articles and comments, the 'author' is a required field? I think it is pointless if either pseudonyms or anonymity is acceptable so should be an optional field like the rest of the author information. Making it a required field encourages the use of repeated alias which is bad for security. It also assists those who attempt to pass themselves off as somebody else which is also bad for security.

Danny

re: more geek thoughts

21.02.2009 19:04

> > Someone with admin rights on the server could always install some kind of hidden
> > program that makes their own separate IP log that would be unknown to anyone else.
>
> You confuse those who have been given access to the admin interface of the indymedia
> cms with those who have root access. There are perhaps dozens with admin access but
> there are unlikely to be more than two or three sysadmins with root access. None of those
> with ordinary admin access could install any kind of hidden logging program but currently
> any of them could be manually recording IP addresses from the admin interface.

I do understand this, but maybe I should have explained it more clearly. The point still stands: you
shouldn't place your trust in those 3 sysadmins, since if any one of them are compromised,
so are you.

> Although I agree that ideally the end user should take steps to address this, it is not a red
> herring to reduce the risk inherent within the cms.

I sort of agree, it is an extra layer of security, but I still think people should be aware of the risks.
For all I know, Indymedia could have been set up by the state deliberately to monitor activists.
Now, I don't think that is true, but it is hypothetically possible, and someone new to the site
can't make an informed judgment either way about that.

Also, I wouldn't want the responsibility for my anonymity to rest on the shoulders of those
3 sysadmins. It is bad both for them and for me.

And eventually they could just make it a crime for the sysadmins to not log and reveal IP addresses.
So you need a way so that the sysadmins can have "plausible deniability" with regards to the logs.
With Tor, they have this.

http://torproject.org

>> if the police get a list of the hashed IP addresses, they could just get a list (from the ISP)
>> of all IP addresses connecting to Indymedia at that approximate time, and apply the hash
>> to all of those to see which one matches.
>
> I don't think so, especially if indymedia implemented the delayed publishing idea.
> The hashing idea proposed was for non reversible hashes, a really simple algorithm
> which reduced IP addresses from the billions possible down to just hundreds so
> reversal would produce way to many collisions to provide any kind of proof. A list
> of the hashes and articles and comments would have significantly less evidential
> value than an ip log while still enabling indymedia admins to identify certain types
> of abuse and act against it.

You can't have it both ways: if you hash the IP addresses down to too small a set then
they become useless for identifying spammers or other bad IP addresses, and you will
block genuine posters.

If you make hash collisions too infrequent, a pre-built dictionary of hashes is a trivial
attack, and is commonly used in practice. Especially since the number of IP addresses
is relatively small compared to, for example, the number of possible passwords.

I don't think there will be a happy medium unfortunately. I'm sure the number of IP addresses
connecting to Indymedia in any hour is relatively small. If you are going to get a few hash
collisions just within that hour, it will be useless for the intended purpose. And if not, the
hash database will easily give an attacker a single IP address, or at the very least a small
list of possible IP addresses.

Giving people the option of delayed publishing is an excellent idea though.

> I followed the link to the wikileeks security page provided in the indymedia article
> above and thought of an additional step that indymedia could take (perhaps they
> already are). It is clear that their publish server and html mirrors are on different
> servers so basically when you read something on indymedia you visit a different server
> than when you publish. This is potentially dangerous as it exposes those who publish
> to traffic analysis as they are separate from the far more frequent accesses by those
> who are simply reading from the site.

That sounds like a very good idea.

g33k

Aliases and security - very funny in this instance

21.02.2009 20:00

You can tell your post isn't one of mine from the white background colour.
A repeated alias isn't necessarily bad for security and can aid comprehension and trust, many folk here do post regularly and openly under their real name simply because they are proud of what they do. Seemingly the software isn't up to permitting mainted 'logged on' identities that prevent that sort of id theft, I have asked that same question in the past. Some people have certainly used that as a smear tactic if you argue against them on one thread then your pseduonymn appears on an unrelated thread spouting disingenuous crap. The same people post multiple times on the one thread to create a false impression of consensus.

Oh, g33k, I can testify this isn't a site set up to monitor activists or I would have been arrested by the police long before I pissed off an admin. The only way to test the safety of a stepping stone though is to put some weight on it. There was a report in El Reg recntly about IP security flaws that should interest you.

Danny

Hidden Comment

This posting has been hidden because it breaches the Indymedia UK (IMC UK) Editorial Guidelines.

This just gets more and more ridiculous!

21.02.2009 20:14

Trawling through the hidden comments and articles I found an article summing up much of the background to the server seizure and subsequent arrest.

"On 22 January 2009 an Indymedia server was seized by the police in Manchester on the behest of Kent police who claimed to be investigating a post about the recent Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty trial. The police stated that they wanted the IP addresses relating to specific posters but Indymedia assured them and the sites readers that no such data was ever retained. The assurances did little to quell unease among some site users and it quickly became apparent that while such assurances were effectively correct there was pertinent information being kept secret. "

The article was published before indymedia official response in the form of the article which started this thread but quickly hidden. The imc-uk-moderation mailing lists says the article was hidden as inaccurate but doesn't explain how so I thought it would be good to analysis it together to see what can be found.

"The strap line on the top of this sites web pages asserts that Indymedia is a 'network of individuals, independent and alternative media activists and organisations, offering grassroots, non-corporate, non-commercial coverage of important social and political issues.' The line used on the UK site leaves out part of the messaging included on some other sites in the Indymedia network which assures readers that indymedia is a "democratic media outlet for the creation of radical, accurate, and passionate tellings of truth.' That passion for the truth appears to be missing from the IMC UK 'united kollectives' as anymore following the various threads covering this story can attest. Repeatedly over the last few days, comments containing vital information, warnings and advice regarding security for the sites users have been hidden by the sites admins in a totally unaccountable fashion."

Those are serious accusations but do they stand up to any examination. It is true that indy uk doesn't mention 'passionate tellings of truth' but so what, it's a pretty naff phrase anyway. The core accusation is that indy uk are not telling the truth and actually attempting to cover up the truth by hiding comments 'in an unaccountable fashion'. Checking the threads using the ?c=all option to reveal hidden comments certainly backs up the first part of that accusation. Follow that up with a quick scan through the archives of imc-uk-moderation for any mention of those hides and it can indeed be seen that those hides have not been reported.

http://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/2009/02/421703.html?c=all

http://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/2009/02/421827.html?c=all

http://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/2009/02/421839.html?c=all

http://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/2009/02/422330.html?c=all

http://lists.indymedia.org/pipermail/imc-uk-moderation/2009-February/date.html

"When an article is hidden from the UK newswire, the act is meant to be reported to a publicly archived mailing list called imc-uk-moderation. If you visit the archive you can in theory see what has been hidden and why but recently at least one admin admitted he'd not been bothering to do this and it was also revealed that automatic filters set up by admins were responsible for over 800 hidden articles last year alone with no notification to the list. According to documentation on site policy on the docs.indymedia.org site, moderation of comments is also meant to be reported to the list but there is a kind of 'unwritten consensus on some types of comment which probably don't need notification'. Such exclusions include 'mindless abuse, e.g. one-liners with 'Kill all the ***', or 'Indymedia sucks' and 'spam comments unrelated to the actual content of the article'. However when you check the comments that are being hidden without notification (the vast majority by a long shot) many certainly don't fall into those categories. The policy document goes on to give the following advice to admins, 'It's important you don't give in to the temptation of hiding comments that you violently disagree with, but don't really breach the editorial guidelines. Before hiding a comment, it's a good idea to ask yourself 'is this really against the guidelines, or am I just angry at the author for saying something so stupid?' We don't have the right to censor comments simply because we disagree with them.'"

A search within docs.indymedia.org confirms the quotes but raise more questions than answers. Just because the pages quoted indicate that admins should be reporting their hides it doesn't mean that there are not other more up-to-date decisions that supersede those documents and that would explain why no reports for hidden comments can be found. However, even if it is the case that the policy is now not to bother reporting hidden comments, that doesn't undermine the core accusation that the hiding of comments is happening in an accountable fashion.

"IMC UK claims the following among the principles in its mission statement: a focus on grassroots politics, actions and campaigns; to reject all systems of domination and discrimination; and to work on a non-hierarchical basis. However among the posts the current admins have been hiding were call outs to the users to get involved in re-domocrasising the project by attending what should be open meetings of the collectives. And how open are these meetings, if you can even find information on where and when they met? Another (hidden) post revealed that the London collective was closing ranks and making it's meeting even more private. "

The comments calling for more people to get involved in the collectives and attend meetings were indeed hidden which seems pretty strange. I couldn't find the email suggesting that the London group was making its meetings private but that might have been because it had been deleted from the archives. If anyone can find it then post it here.

"What is this dark secret that must be hidden at any costs? Apparently it is nothing more than the fact that the admin interface provides a feature that allows IP addresses of recent posts to captured for the purpose of creating filters against unwanted posters. Is it so important that this should be hidden even if it means sacrificing transparency and the trust of the site users? So important that it is worth the astonishingly extreme of purging information from indymedias public archives going back almost six years in a futile attempt at a coverup? "

Is this really what indymedia is trying to hide? If it is then merely hiding comments isn't going to achieve much and it's being done quiet inconsistently which some mentions of the logging facility left unhidden in some comments. This would suggest that the secret, if there is one, was something mentioned in the emails that have been deleted. Some of these could be found through links provided in hidden comments but I couldn't see anything that revealed anything more than the existence of a variety of anti spamming tools which included ip logging.

"That such a facility exists is no surprise, it's pretty much essential to maintaining the integrity of publishing platform, especially one which operates without user registration. What is surprising is that an organisation proporting to care about user security would go to such lengths to keep their users in the dark, especially surprising from an organsation which aspires to openness and horizontality. "

That all appears uncontroversial, I think most people would be surprised if indy uk were attempting a coverup and most would probably agree with most of what follows as well.

"We need to trust indymedia, not to be infallible but at least to tell the truth. We can cope with security risks when we are aware of them but to be placated with half truths and be cut down from discussing the issues, that's just not on. Quoting a hidden comment, 'Lets defend indymedia, defend ourselves - against not just the intimidation and threats of the state against our infrastructure but also against those among us who are bring shame down on all of us. We urgently need to hold these people to account as our enemies are having a field day and the long it festers the longer it will take to heal the rifts.'"

The accusation here seems to be that some actions of the admin group are bringing shame onto indy uk and that we the users need to do something about it. I can't see any justification for hiding the article as inaccurate but it's hard to know if the admins have information we don't have which has led them to hide some it or some of the other comments etc. On the whole I am inclined to agree that it looks pretty bad and think there are certainly questions to be asked and probably changes to be made.

"Born on the streets of Seattle in 1999, the indymedia project is approaching it's tenth anniversary. It would seem that this year would be a good time to assess its strengths and weaknesses, before either reinvigorating the project or building something stronger and better in its ashes as we move into what premisses [sic] to be the most significant period of social struggle this planet has ever seen. "

A tenth anniversary for a web project is without doubt a major milestone and as good a time as any to reassess principles, policy and working practices, assuming there is the energy and will to do so. Of course it will be difficult for us to do so if those entrusted with the day to day running of the site are intent on dismissing constructive criticism and keeping its users at arms length.

scanner darkly
Homepage: http://https://publish.indymedia.org.uk/en/2009/02/422330.html?c=all

hashed IP logging for enhanced security

21.02.2009 23:58

@g33k and g33k 2.0

Actually logging of hashed IPs for security reasons is not a new idea and already implimented in at least one indymedia CMS, dadaIMC.

"The Blocked IPs module allows you to prevent posting by visitors using either IP addresses or (a bit more secure) MD5-encrypted IP addresses. To block an IP address, you must either know it in advance, temporarily capture IP addresses in the Apache log, or use the "Capture IPs" module preference (Admin->Site Prefs->Misc->Accounts) to log IPs to the dadaphp.log" -

http://www.dadaimc.org/mod/documentation/display/1/page/9/index.php

The ability to admins to temporarily switch on logging is not unique to dadaIMC but may be implemented in different ways. On MIR, the codebase used by indymedia UK, the IP log is held in memory and not saved to disk.

Most CMS have some facility to identify and block abusive users and that includes most of the purpose built indymedia codebases currently in use.

The documentation for SF Active (which is one of the most popular indymedia CMS) contains the following:

"You can set sf-active that it logs the ip-numbers of people who publish. You must be aware that logging ip numbers of people who publish is potentially dangerous for activists. In other words, you shouldn't do it. We advice you only do it for a short time to find people who manage to get through the rules defined above... IP log lets you take a look at the file /www/htdocs/sf-active/sitename/local/cache/ip_log.txt to check the ips of the people who posted articles and comments." -

http://sfactive.indymedia.org/docs/en/03_use_instructions/02_admin/07_spam/index.html

Since the facility to temporarily log IP addresses already exists (and is arguably essential to blocking spam) then implementing hashed storage of those IP address, such as the system used by dadaIMC, would seem to be a reasonable and sensible compromise.

coder
Homepage: http://sfactive.indymedia.org/docs/en/03_use_instructions/02_admin/07_spam/index.html

Remove IP logging from MIR

22.02.2009 01:51

The suggestion by g33k2.0 that IMC UK (and others) should remove the IP logging feature of MIR is a good one. IP based filters are pretty useless against a determined spammer and other mechanisms can often be as effective without compromising user security.

While it is true that sysadmins with root access could still harvest IP addresses, it is a lot harder for an infiltrator to obtain the level of trust required to be given root permissions than it is for them to become a volunteer moderator with the ability to spy on IP addresses within the CMS.

Remove the feature - remove the opportunity. It may make some of the amateur spammers a little harder to filter but it is a small price to pay.

interested bystander

how does hashing IP addresses make it any more secure?

22.02.2009 01:52

> The Blocked IPs module allows you to prevent posting by visitors using either
> IP addresses or (a bit more secure) MD5-encrypted IP addresses

Sorry, but I still don't understand how MD5 hashing of IP addresses makes it any more
secure. It seems to me like what they call "security theatre" where the facade of
security is there but it has no real substance.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_theatre

I assume that dadaIMC use a "salt" when MD5 hashing the IP address?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salt_(cryptography)

This would make dictionary attacks against *all* entries in the IP address log more difficult. But generally an attacker would only be interested in *one* of the hashed IP addresses - the one that posted a specific news item or comment.

And what would you use as the salt? It would have to be the same each time you get the same IP address, otherwise the hashes wouldn't match.

And if you store the salt somewhere so you can compare the hashed IP address to a raw IP address, an attacker can just use that salt to hash every single IP address to find which one it is. If they have a list from the ISP of all IP addresses connecting to the Indymedia server within that day, it makes the job even quicker.

I'm not an encryption expert, so maybe I am overlooking something. If so, please enlighten me!

I think going down this route is a red herring. It may give some protection against an opportunist but it won't protect against a determined attacked (e.g. the state). It is essentially security by obscurity:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_by_obscurity

Tor will be a good solution from the point of view of the user. But what if spammers post a load of stories via Tor? Then the IP address filter will be useless.

You would need the ability to set up user accounts in Indymedia. Then if you only access them over Tor, Indymedia never knows your true identity, but you can build up a reputation with your "pseudonymous" identity.
Alternatively, Indymedia could allow user to upload their public PGP-keys and allow users to PGP-sign their posts (sent over Tor). Then they will know if a message is from a user that has posted good information in the past, or if it is from a spammer.

g33k

re: hashed logs on toast

22.02.2009 14:07

I don't think the hashed logs is a particularly secure idea either but sounds like a hugh step forward from the current situation. There are lots of other ways of moderating disruptive users, such as getting a lot more moderators on the case on some kind of rota basis and doing it the traditional way. There are also other tools available other than those based around IP identification.

The Oscailt CMS used by Indymedia Ireland amongst others has probably the most impressive suite of tools for handling publishing abuse. Yet even with its array of powerful tools the manual for Oscailt describes IP logging and filtering as the biggest gun available to administrator.

"Normally IMC codebases don't collect or rely upon IP addresses at all for privacy and security reasons - and neither does oscailt! Oscailt manages to do this by providing a real-time IP monitor facility which only collects the IP addresses of the last few publishers to the site. Most of the time, this feature should be disabled and when it is disabled, it purges all IP addresses from the system. When you encounter an abusive user, you can discreetly enable this feature and use the monitor to view the IP addresses of only the people who publish to the site. When the abuser next publishes, you can simply click on his IP address and select the length of ban that you want to give him. " [

http://docs.indymedia.org/bin/view/Devel/OscailtAntiSpam]

It sounds very much like the IP monitoring currently available to IMC UK admins in the MIR codebase.

A UK admin who uses the nick gdm made a proposal yesterday on the imc-uk-moderation list [

http://lists.indymedia.org/pipermail/imc-uk-moderation/2009-February/0221-rr.html] to set up an automatic filter to block posts from the SHAC campaign. Whether this would require indymedia to first establish the IP addresses used by the campaign isn't clear, perhaps they already have those IPs or another strategy to identify the posts they wish to block.

XFCE

SHAC posts to be filtered?

22.02.2009 18:44

22.02.2009 21:40

"
It's now looking like the gdm proposal to ban SHAC from indymedia might be a disinfo attack on indymedia. Although it began on the mailing lists the public face of the attack is a newswire thread and if it turns out that it really is all some sick hoax then it demonstrates why it is vital that indymedia admins have some way to detect abuse.

I'm not defending the secret IP logging but you get my point
"

To be honest, I'm not that bothered about secret IP logging, but I don't think it is a very good way to detect abuse. Many people have dynamic IP addresses anyway. It won't help for people who use Tor, since different people could share the same IP address. People who want to post things against Indymedia guidelines could just use a public computer to bypass any filtering by IP address.

Better would be to have "accounts", so people can be trusted based on their posting history.

People could still post anonymously without an account, but those posts would be less reliable, and there could be an option for people to ignore those posts.

Even people with accounts could be anonymous, if they always use Tor to log in to their account.

See how

http://slashdot.org works for an example.

anon

@anon

23.02.2009 13:13

Unbelievable, the proposal to block posts from/about SHAC appears to be genuine, although the whole conversation about it in the newswire has now been hidden (twice - first as a complaint about moderation

https://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/2009/02/422645.html and the second time as disinfo

https://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/2009/02/422679.html). It would have be comforting to think it was simply a divisive hoax designed to push us apart and far more horrifying for it really to be from an admin who can hide posts on a whim.

The issues of security inherent with us entrusting our anonymity to a small pool of unknown admins mirror the issues of democracy when we entrust our freedom of expression to a small pool of unknown moderators.

There have been some great ideas here for how some of the security issues can be addressed. In the light of the ongoing censorship regarding IP monitoring, does anyone have similar constructive suggests on how the moderation process could also be improved? Perhaps something more like slashdot where the whole community gets help moderate?

Chris

Hidden Comment

This posting has been hidden because it breaches the Indymedia UK (IMC UK) Editorial Guidelines.

IP monitoring in MIR and complaints re moderation

23.02.2009 13:25

It's untrue to say that all posts mentioning IP monitoring (NOT LOGGING) in MIR are being hidden. Some posts talk about the feature from a technical or security point of view and you can still read them. Others moan about a supposed indymedia 'cover up' and those posts are being hidden as discussion about admin 'censorship' is a breach of editorial guidelines.

Please read the guidelines before posting

https://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/static/editorial.html

Address complaints about moderation to

imc-uk-moderation@lists.indymedia.org

IMCista

IMCistas should be ashamed

23.02.2009 17:54

Arrange any psychiatric exam you want, I'd be happy to take it. It was Hoosie at faslane who named me 'Vodka Danny' to differentiate me from 'Danny Panic' in 2002 as I regularly took the campers vodka. Hooosie wasn't being nasty or trying to smear as witnessed by the fact that my dink is Islay malt whisky - just too expensive to supply more than once.

[removed] admitting beating up a girl half his age and size on Indymedia, which [removed]didn't mind because she was working class and he was mixing his bipolar medication with acid. [removed]has been accused of inappropriate sexual behaviour by his ex's never mind me. I can prove both of them are police informers to anyone who cares to witness me change my plea to the allegations they've made.

I stopped having anything to do with [removed]after they started making threatening phone calls to my parents in the middel of the night, and threatened me with a smear campaign if I didn't shut up. Prolonged abuse of that nature is indeed damaging but it is also perfectly provable.

The fact [removed] reflects badly on every collective in my opinion, when smears like this are published, confessions like [removed]girl-beating hidden, and no one takes the time to investigate.

23.02.2009 22:44

(I posted this before but it was hidden. Maybe because of the title, which was a reply? I have cut out that bit now and left what I hope is the non-contentious and useful part.)

To be honest, I'm not that bothered about secret IP logging, but I don't think it is a very good way to detect abuse. Many people have dynamic IP addresses anyway. It won't help for people who use Tor, since different people could share the same IP address. People who want to post things against Indymedia guidelines could just use a public computer to bypass any filtering by IP address.

Better would be to have "accounts", so people can be trusted based on their posting history.

People could still post anonymously without an account, but those posts would be less reliable, and there could be an option for people to ignore those posts.

Even people with accounts could be anonymous, if they always use Tor to log in to their account.

See how

http://slashdot.org works for an example.

anon

@anon - agree

23.02.2009 23:28

I've been saying that for over two years without anyone demurring, I think IM-UK need a programmer to donate their time though to implement stuff like that. Not like The Register though which allows multiple people to use the same names for different email accounts

Danny

Indymedia, direction and web 2.0

24.02.2009 10:42

Having compulsory registration would mean that indymedia could not claim to the authorities that there is no useful data available for identifying the author of a specific post. There would be a history of posts (whether the authors name was revealed publicly when articles where displayed or not). Even something as simple as a pattern of dates and times a user has logged in would could provide the police with fair chance of identifying the contributor. If during just one post in hundreds, the user has revealed some small piece of personal information like the name of a nieghbour or the model of their car or attendance at a specific meeting etc etc. any anonymity gained through the use of secure connections or Tor etc would be lost.

Compelling users to register is just not an option and such a proposal would never reach consensus.

Even proposals to introduce optional registration have so far fallen flat (although such schemes are used by other indymedia sites including the new London site). Having optional registration and leaving the facility for unregistered 'anonymous' posting makes the idea of filtering by registration pretty pointless as filtered users would just post without logging in. However, optional registration does go a very long way in reducing the opportunities for people to pretend to be another person and so reduce a lot of the malicious disinformation which indymedia uk is currently prone to.

Perhaps the biggest and simplest step which indymedia could make immediately without needing any significant coding changes would be to pre moderate all comments. This would effectively end the use of comments as a discussion forum and only posts which updated, amended or corrected a news article would be shown. The would instantly eliminate the divisive slagging matches and negativity which put loads of people off from bothering to post or read reports on imc uk. It would also help to reduce to some degree the danger of stupid people posting stupid ill conceived stuff like judges home addresses.

Some people would argue that pre-moderation of comments represents a fundamental change to indymedias policy of open publish but I don't think that is the case. In fact many indymedia sites pre-moderate ALL posts including articles.

Open publishing is a fairly vague concept but I think it can be summed up as a media platform which doesn't have a narrow and closed pool of writers and editors but rather is open to all contributions. Open publishing p isn't the same thing as providing a free speech anything goes platform. It doesn't mean that there are no parameters on the content and indymedia sets those parameters in it's mission statement and editorial guidelines. Those parameters define the niche the site caters to and protects it from spamming or illegal content which would otherwise threaten the site and those who administer it.

Open publishing is about giving everyone the same opportunity to tell their story but it doesn't preclude posts being checked for suitability before they appear on the site!

Indymedia is meant to be about giving people the chance to write about their activities, their experiences, their concerns, to share the background and raise the issues which would otherwise be ignored, misrepresented or glossed over in the mainstream media. It sets out to be a non corporate news site for our grassroots struggles with the aim of strengthening our campaigns and movements. Sadly, the comments section of the site is increasingly being used and abused as a place to spread disinformation, dismiss peoples efforts, discredit, divide and discourage involvement. Meanwhile there are less and less people bothering to write first hand reports or upload video or photos and more and more people reposting something that caught their eye in the mainstream media or on the blog of some political analyst etc.

Since the launch of indymedia the internet and the political climate has changed a lot. Broadband in every home, internet on mobile phones, blogs, CiF, Youtube, flickr, myspace, facebook etc etc. all have completely changed the ecology of the net but indymedia has been painfully slow to adapt. A victim of its own success perhaps as the open publishing concept at the core of indymedia has become increasingly irrelevant as now anyone can set up a blog or post on youtube. Clunky old indymedia can't compete many campaigns don't bother with the site at all, preferring instead to use myspace and their own wordpress site. It's a vicious cycle that leaves less and less original content in the news wire.

I'm losing hope that IMC UK can be turned around but I go through phases and the current one is definitely a negative swing. I know I'm not alone in feeling this way and its good to see fresh things emerging with London indymedias move away from the constraints of the national infrastructure and processes. I don't totally dismiss the idea that IMC UK could also step up the challenges it faces but this site is like a runaway train with the driver dead but still grasping the controls in his cold rigid hands. There's an momentum resisting any change no mater the best intentions off all involved and it is really hard to see how that could happen without a significant influx of new ideas, skills and energy to wrestle away the dead hands at the wheel.

brief comment become rant

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For what it's worth

25.02.2009 21:16

Proof isn't a promise to take a lie detector test, it's something tangible you can provide documented evidence of here and now. You've not been able to do it and you'll not be able to do it because you are lying. You stories meanders from one place to another. The fact of the matter has become painfully clear for anyone watching - you are full of shit.

Damned if you do, damned if you don't.

25.02.2009 22:39

This is an interesting debate and covers a lots of issues:

the need for indymedia not to store ip addresses in order to protect their sources
the need for contributors to not rely soley on indymedia in order protect their identity
the inherent danger that open publishing will be used to spread divisive disinformation
the questionable value of open comments on an open publishing news site
the need for indymedia to be able to deal with spammers/disruptive users
the difficult balancing act between moderation, utility and maintaining the open publish ethos
the risk that power corrupts admins, leading to unaccountable censorship
the value of ip monitoring and filtering as a tool against spammers/disruptive users
the risk of infiltrators becoming admins and logging ip information etc by stealth
the legal risks to those who provide infrastructure or are seen as 'responsible' for the site
the influence that fear of prosecution can have on indymedia admins, leading to political filtering
the conflict between security and policies relating to open/transparency/accountability etc
the unavoidable technocratic hierarchies and other power structures that divide user from admin
the potential for knee jerk defensiveness towards criticism or complaint about those with power
the difficulties in agreeing and implementing any positive changes

Security of servers, users and admins is the responsibilty of everyone

26.02.2009 11:48

I don't subscribe to all of the views expressed on here (advocation of violence for example), but a free and independent press is important.

It pisses me off no end that people only see it as Indymedia's responsibility to protect the sacred freedom. Whilst I wouldn't accuse anyone posting to this thread of this, there are too many occasions when people "piss in the public pool". If people keep doing this it makes it harder to justify keeping it running, and everyone will be the poorer in that event. If you want to post controversial or illegal stuff, first consider whether it is so important that you must do so. Consider that doing so, may affect the those people who operate servers on behalf of Indymedia and the availability of the servers themselves. Is your post really that important that you can put all of that at risk? Note that of course others may post stuff that provides an opportunity for the police to investigate, but at least take responsibility for your own actions.

The inherent nature of the Internet means that the server needs to know the clients IP address, so irrespective of the fact that logging is disabled, IPs will always be available to someone with time and skills, which is why the advice to use Tor is a good one and arguments over logging are disingenuous.

someone

Some good points there...

26.02.2009 19:16

"the need for indymedia not to store ip addresses in order to protect their sources"

Well, that they don't log is good; though there are various issues regarding the addresses being held in memory. I think there needs to be some transparency as to how it works and a public log of who used it when and for what. That will give some assurances about its use & potential misuse.

There are also however as the hidden comments indicate other issues that conflict with the desire for total hiding of IP details.

If there were more volunteers on 'shit shovelling detail', I guess managing disruptive trolls & spammers would require less technical interventions?

"the need for contributors to not rely solely on indymedia in order protect their identity"

Again, I think this could be eased by IMUK being a bit more open about their anti-anti-social abuse measures, and making sure users KNOW that they cannot rely on IM for anonymity. It may be obvious to us, but some people are still green on such matters.

"the inherent danger that open publishing will be used to spread divisive disinformation"

I think some kind of more pro-active policy of editing/hiding posts that make personal attacks based on no evidence whatsoever is needed- the way things run as it is flies in teh face of journalistic ethics. IS this a question of lack of human resources or just a fundamental ignorance of how damaging such disinfo campaigns are, to IM itself?

"the questionable value of open comments on an open publishing news site"

I kind of reluctantly agree wit this. Ideally there should be enough people to be able to implement site policy in the comments, but it seems that the trolls, loons and spammers perhaps overrun the available resources?

"the need for indymedia to be able to deal with spammers/disruptive users"

See above.

"the difficult balancing act between moderation, utility and maintaining the open publish ethos"

No comment

"the risk that power corrupts admins, leading to unaccountable censorship"

Well, the answer to that one is simple: become the admins. It's very easy to carp from the sidelines.

"the value of ip monitoring and filtering as a tool against spammers/disruptive users"

See above

"the risk of infiltrators becoming admins and logging ip information etc by stealth"

See above. But don't jump to conclusions. let's hear about how it works and when it has been used first?

"the legal risks to those who provide infrastructure or are seen as 'responsible' for the site"

I think perhaps circumventing UK jurisdiction may be a way forward?

"the influence that fear of prosecution can have on Indymedia admins, leading to political filtering"

Which is ironic considering how much in the way of defamation is allowed to be posted on here on regular basis... This place could have been sued into the dirt by various individuals with legitimate gripes ten times over in the last 2 years.

"the conflict between security and policies relating to open/transparency/accountability etc"

See above

"the unavoidable technocratic hierarchies and other power structures that divide user from admin"

If they are unavoidable, then there cannot be changed... ;-D

"the potential for knee jerk defensiveness towards criticism or complaint about those with power
the difficulties in agreeing and implementing any positive changes "

It's called human nature, no?

Tragedy

a Boy named Sue

27.02.2009 15:35

"This place could have been sued into the dirt by various individuals with legitimate gripes ten times over in the last 2 years."

No, it couldn't. I personally could have, and am happy to be. I find it suspicious that while legal letters have been issued against others more vunerable than me, and veiled threats like this are stated, the only legal action against me has been anonymous Crimestoppers reports deliberately aimed at my family.

Danny

Defamation 101

27.02.2009 16:25

Under the laws of England & Scotland Indymeda UK would be considered liable for all material publshed on this site- irrespetive of who wants to carry what can.

If the litigant wished to prosecute the author, which in this case wold be harder to achieve, it would be a matter for the litigant's disgression and not a mechanial statutory matter that could be invoked by the accused.

If the litigants wished, they could even sue Indymedia's ISP.

The case precedents are easy enough to find via Google.

Perry Mason

No such law

27.02.2009 17:03

You mean liable and slander. In such case as the author is identifiable and the media has broken no law, the author is primarily responsible according to my brother in law who is an expert. If you want to sue me, sue me, I won't hide under anonymity.

Danny

Black Blog

27.02.2009 17:19

Black Bloc rules of engagement clearly state you should not through rocks from the back of a crowd because that places the people in front of you at risk of retaliation.

The trouble is that laws are warped by the judiciary to suit. That is why US activists have been imprisoned harshly for publishing black bloc rules, and why republican US professors remain unprosecuted for doing exactly the same thing.

If any of my posts ever get Indymedia into trouble then I am happy to step forward and identify myself. I'd just prefer if I was warned about that in advance if possible rather than having to endure 'trial by anonymous witnesses'. I think one of the strengths of IM is that there are a great number of willing 'arrestables' here, and while I may not be someone you would wish to associate with or whatever, I still have no issue with having my name on any contract to save the real IMCistas from malicious prosecution.

Danny

Well

27.02.2009 17:20

27.02.2009 18:28

"I already blew your position into the air with the previous Google link I posted that has a number of landmark cases since Defamation '96 that have established a number of liability options in civil prosecutions."

No, you didn't, you 'blew your position into the air'. You claimed IM was responsible for what I post here even if they remove them. They clearly aren't from the law that you posted. You did trump me by posting a law I've never seen before ( I lived abroad at that time) so kudos for that, thanks for educating me, let me return that favour.

Obviously from that law and others Indymedia might be responsible if they didn't correct any of my mistakes published here when corrected, but they aren't the author to be prosecuted, I am. They may perhaps be prosecutable if they knowingly do so given this site unusually allows anonymous posts but read the text again and realise I have never hidden my idendity from lawyers or the law, just from malicious fuckwits who I've never met.

I don't run from that. If I have posted anything defamatory here then I will step forward and take the heat when the heat is applied. I hope others do so too to avoid similar situations. I hope we can all agree that whoever had posted the contentious comments should have admitted it. Hopefully other people will in future as black bloc tactics are moral and widely applicable.

Danny

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Please mods - ban danny

28.02.2009 21:17

He is nothing but pollution

yawn

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server in US... huh?

21.03.2009 09:56

You locate your server in, ummm, the USA? Land of the free? Seriously folks... what planet are you on?

Why not somewhere relatively safe from interference like, say, Sweden?

danny

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Peaton

23.03.2009 00:02

> server in US... huh?
>You locate your server in, ummm, the USA? Land of the free? Seriously folks... what planet are you on?
Why not somewhere relatively safe from interference like, say, Sweden?
>danny

Interesting, typical, post under my name. Flak. I have certainly praised certain Swedish media outlets resiliency, but then there are advantages to publishing in the US if you are a US citizen. Personally I would go for a 'third world' country or 'interbational waters'.

Faker, your charges are false, your crimes are admitted and your tactics are consistently reprehensible.

Danny

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